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Among Advaita Vedntins there is a tension between those who believe texts are
the ultimate authority and primary soteriological method for gaining liberation and those
who advocate an independent process of meditation and self-inquiry leading to religious
experience.  This dissertation examines the role of Advaita’s contemplation
(nididhysana) as a method in which text and practice intersect.  I focus on akara, the
seventh-century Advaitin, whose interpretations of Advaita have been authoritative
within the tradition.  This investigation examines how akara strove to exclude
contemplation from a discourse of practice while maintaining it as a part of textual study,
and explores the intersections of text, contemplative practice, and liberating experience in
Advaita’s soteriological program.  I argue that sacred texts possess a receding horizon for
akara.  At first there appears to be a clean distinction between texts and contemplative
practice.  However, if one enters the methodology prescribed by akara, the notion of
text expands and continues to grow the deeper one studies. Sacred texts stretch beyond
conventional boundaries of words, not only to encompass contemplation, but knowledge
of non-duality and liberation as well.  One never catches the boundary of the boundless
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text. This dissertation will be of benefit to religious studies scholars seeking to
understand the relationships of textual study, contemplation, and religious experience in
the Indian context.
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1Introduction
The Central Problem
A number of religious traditions accept a dichotomy of texts and practice, which
limits the study of texts to one domain and religious practice to another.   Though these
two domains may interact in a number of ways, they are understood as fundamentally
different.  This division is sometimes expressed as an ideological struggle between the
religious specialist in the study of sacred texts and the religious specialist in spiritual
practice.  The former believes texts, when properly studied under a capable teacher, are
the ultimate authority and primary soteriological method.  The latter critiques texts as
hollow theoretical intellectualizing and instead advocates an independent process of
meditation or practice leading to religious experience.   The tension between the external
dependence on texts, tradition, and culture versus an internal dependence on self-inquiry,
insight, and religious experience is found in some form within many traditions, such as
Christian official doctrine and Christian mysticism or the Koran traditionalist and the Sufi
mystic or between the Buddhist focused on interpreting the Buddha’s word and the Zen
Buddhist meditator. The difference between the specialist in textual study and specialist
in practice alludes to a number of other dichotomies, such as the tension between
knowledge and action, theory and practice, conceptual knowledge and direct experience,
intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, and externalism and internalism.
The varied and complex relationships of texts and practice have led religious
studies scholars to approach texts and practice in a number of ways.  Sometimes the
2historical record of religious practice is only found in texts; thus, texts are studied to
discover practice.  Others focus on the ways texts are used within practice, particularly
the ways in which they are employed within ritual, mediate the sacred, or become objects
of worship themselves.  Other religious studies scholars make a sharp distinction between
texts and practice since texts, though considered normative, are often divorced from
practice. While acknowledging that texts may be used, quoted, or lend authority to
practice, such scholars often assign greater weight to the forms of religious life, such as
rituals, customs, art, and pilgrimage.  Further, they may privilege what people actually do
as constituting “religion” rather than the beliefs defined by texts. This distinction is
especially relevant to the study of South Asian traditions in which the primary scholarly
focus used to be on Sanskrit religious literature.  In recent decades scholars have
increasingly recognized that an emphasis on Sanskrit literature privileges elite
brahmanical authors, and fails to include the varied expressions of local Hinduisms in the
sub-continent and Hindu diaspora.  However, despite this important corrective measure,
we must remember that texts are not static.  They continue to develop in their
commentaries and interpretations, and interact with the real world of religion.  The often
critically viewed elite textual Sanskrit tradition is in fact, perfectly alive in religious
practice.  In addition, sometimes the approaches we find within traditions do not fit any
neat distinction of text and practice.  This is certainly true in the case of Advaita Vednta,
whose approach makes it problematic to speak of texts and practice as a simple
opposition.  In Advaita the domains of the text and practice categories share a complex
relationship that may exclude or include the other, depending on one’s perspective.
3During the past fourteen centuries Advaita Vednta has proven to be one of the
most influential philosophical traditions in India. It traces its roots back to the Upaniads,
Bhagavadgt, and  Brahmastra.  Advaita is based on the concept of non-duality or
oneness.  This basically means that despite the diversity and multiplicity people perceive
and take for granted, the reality of it all is undifferentiated, infinite non-duality.  So even
though I may take myself as an individual different from others and separate from the
world around me, in reality there is no separation at all.  Another way of stating this is
that the individual, the universe, and vara (God) are ultimately one.
Advaita was likely systematized prior to the seventh century C.E.  During this
early period there were a number of competing lineages, which disagreed on important
points such as the relationships between text and practice, text and mystical experience,
text and liberation, and more broadly, between knowledge and action.  These
relationships hold a particular significance in the context of Advaita.  Of primary concern
is the question of the goal and finding the proper and adequate means to reach that goal.
All Advaitins agree that the ultimate aim of life is liberation (moka), freedom from the
unending cycle of death and rebirth (sasra) that is impelled by karma, the residual
force of one’s present and previous actions.  Liberation occurs through the direct
recognition of one’s identity with brahman, the Advaita word for non-duality or the
absolute.  This is the highest good, devoid of suffering, of unequaled security, happiness,
and fullness, where all dualities resolve in oneness.  Despite the agreement concerning
this core of belief, early Advaitins contested how text and practice interact with each
other within the means to liberation.  These competing ideologies arose because the
4tradition itself possessed an internal tension between text and practice. This was a special
problem for akara, the great proponent of Advaita and commentator who lived circa
the seventh or eighth century of the Common Era.  The tension has similarly concerned
Advaita Vedntins up to the present.
The following study looks back at early Advaita literature in order to understand
this tension, how it arises, and how it is addressed within the tradition. I use the lens of
Advaita’s contemplative practice (nididhysana), a unique method in which text and
practice intersect, to address these concerns.
This dissertation is not just an exercise in Indian philosophy and textual
hermeneutics.  The connections between text, practice, and contemplation matter to
Advaita practitioners today and are still debated.   Finding solutions to the tension
between text and practice continues to shape the lives of Advaita practitioners.
Furthermore, Advaitin religious adepts are in turn religious leaders for the larger
community, so there is no small weight in their interpretations.  Traditional Advaitins
such as the present akarcryas and other popular teachers maintain a powerful
influence on contemporary Hindu ideology.  Their attitudes filter down in direct and
indirect ways to the wider community of monks and lay people.  In addition, during the
past century a number of new Advaita Vednta traditions have arisen that understand
texts and practice in ways contrary to akara.  Perhaps foremost is the neo-Vednta of
Swami Vivekananda, which emphasizes independent meditation leading to religious
experience as an essential and superior method to textual study.  Recently, other non-
traditional neo-Advaitins, who dismiss both the study of sacred texts and practice, have
5spread into the diaspora of new religious movements in North America and Europe.  The
diversity found in contemporary Advaita, in terms of both ideology and geography, is
unparalleled in Advaita’s history.
Central Questions
Some Advaitins critique textual study as a means to liberation because sacred
texts lend themselves to theory and intellectualizing.  Texts attempt to grasp non-duality
through concepts; however, concepts are intrinsically limited to duality and unable to
capture non-dual brahman.  The non-dual brahman is the source of awareness, but
formless and unavailable for objectification.  If expertise in texts is inadequate, then the
natural assumption is that texts should yield to practice of some sort.  But how do
classical Indian practices such as yogic meditation, prayer, or ritual lead to liberation?
Are they not subject to the same problems as texts? And how can such practices grasp
non-duality even if they are fundamentally different and independent of texts?  Should
one posit some unique experiential event produced from meditation or other practices that
removes conventional limitations and obstacles obscuring non-duality, and eradicates
karma and psychological afflictions?   Early Advaita Vedntins such as akara were
acutely aware of such questions, and carefully crafted their method and teachings to
balance textual, philosophical, and practical concerns.  Nididhysana is a form of
contemplation comprising one essential aspect of this path.
This dissertation is an investigation of akara’s understanding of the
nididhysana contemplation and the ways in which he situates it within the larger system
and concerns of early Advaita Vednta.  I explain the method and function of
6nididhysana  and locate it within key aspects of Advaita’s epistemology and
metaphysics.  I also unfold certain dilemmas and ambiguities in akara’s concept of
nididhysana that point to its boundaries and possible paradoxes. These dilemmas reveal
the tension between external textual study and internal meditative practice and the
relationship of contemplation and liberation.  They reflect conflicts over the nature of
nididhysana during akara’s time period, and anticipate the later intra-Advaita
discussions about contemplation that continue to this day.
The central questions of this study are:
1) How does akara understand and define nididhysana in terms of its structure,
method, and function?
2) Why and how does akara exclude nididhysana from a discourse of action and
practice and distinguish it from practices such as meditation?
3) Does akara interpret nididhysana as dependent on the teaching of the
Upaniads and as a mode of textual study? And if so, why?
4) Does nididhysana function as the bridge between language and immediate
knowledge or as a cause for experiences of non-duality?
Through answering these questions I find that akara’s nididhysana functions
as a central method and underlying piece of the Advaita puzzle.  It contains and dissolves
the opposing sides of various dichotomies such as internal meditative practice and
external textual study, knowledge and action, theory and practice, and direct and indirect
knowledge.   Though akara excludes certain types of practices such as ritual and other
7actions as preliminary prerequisites, he expands the domain of textual study so that it
ultimately absorbs contemplation.  This move allows him to include all methods directly
leading to liberation as modes of textual study.  In doing so he breaks the false dilemma
of studying texts verses self-inquiry, so that they come together.  For him, texts expand
with self-inquiry.  The notion of text is much larger than what many scholars and
practitioners assume when approaching the study of Advaita and has been largely
misunderstood.
What is nididhysana (Contemplation)?
Nididhysana is a specific term interwoven with Advaita’s metaphysics and
textual exegesis and has no neat and tidy English translation.  It is commonly
mistranslated as “meditation”, even though akara makes a distinction between
nididhysana and forms of meditation more common in yogic practice.  The term
“contemplation” is more accurate, but this term loses much in translation, often leading to
false assumptions. Nididhysana is not contemplation in the sense of ruminating over
something or problem-solving through a process or mental action incorporating different
thoughts, variables, emotions, or deductions.  It is closer to the general sense of gazing
thoughtfully at something for a long time. Nididhysana is an advanced part of the study
process.  It occurs after a student understands the Upaniadic formulation of identifying
oneself with non-duality, and has resolved philosophical doubts regarding this unity. It
appears to be a process of intentionally remaining in an awareness of non-duality, and
maintaining or repeating that knowledge to the exclusion of other thoughts and types of
consciousness. This is more technically stated as continuously maintaining a flow of
8remembered cognitions that hold the content of the great Upaniad sentences
(mahvkyni) – namely those sentences that identify one’s self with brahman.
Nididhysana, as a word, derives from the desiderative form of the verbal root
dhyai (to meditate, to think about), reduplicated with the prefix ni.1 It is a specific type of
contemplative practice that forms the third part of a three-fold learning methodology,
along with listening (ravaa) and logical reflection (manana). Advaita Vedntins extract
the triple process from a root passage in the Bhadrayaka Upaniad 2.4.5, which
occurs in the context of the Yjñavalkya and Maitrey dialogue.2  In response to
Maitrey’s query about the means to immortality, Yjñavalkya says,
Oh Maitrey, the self should be seen, should be heard, should be reflected on, and
should be contemplated upon. By seeing, listening, reflecting, and contemplating,
all this is known.3
ravaa is listening to the Upaniads as taught by a qualified teacher.  It consists of
exegetically investigating those texts according to specific hermeneutical methods in
order to understand the primary teaching of non-duality.  Manana consists of reflecting
on those texts through forms of logical inquiry, such as inferential reasoning, that are in
keeping with the teaching of the Upaniads.  It serves to negate doubts about the
possibility of non-duality, particularly when there is conflict between what is determined
                                                 
1 In Pinian grammatical terms this is described as ni + dhyai + san + lyut.
2 This passage is repeated almost verbatim in BU 4.5.6.
3 tm v are draavya rotravyo mantavyo nididhysitavyo maitreyi
tmano v are daranena ravaena maty vijñneneda sarva viditam (Translation by author here and
everywhere except as otherwise noted).
The last line of BU 4.5.6 is slightly different and reads tmani khalv are de rute mate vijñta
ida sarva viditam.
9by the Upaniads and by other means of knowledge.  Analysis through manana removes
doubts and strengthens the teaching of the Upaniads.
Despite the numerous studies on Advaita Vednta there is still a surprising
amount of ambiguity, and at times confusion, regarding the method and function of
Advaita’s nididhysana.  This ambiguity is not limited to contemporary scholars, but was
also the source of a number of intra-Advaita debates during akara’s time period and
among post-akara Advaitins. One reason for this ambiguity is the difficulty Advaita
faces in articulating a form of contemplation directly contributing to the rise of self-
knowledge (tmavidy or brahmavidy) and liberation, while at the same time striving to
exclude this contemplation from a discourse of practice.
According to Advaita, self-knowledge is not a product of any action or practice.
Advaita holds that liberation is already attained.  The seeking individual is already that
which he or she wishes to become, namely brahman, the immortal, infinite, ever present,
non-dual reality.  However, this leads to a paradox of action and liberation.  If one’s self
is of the nature of brahman and intrinsically liberated, then there is no need to engage
disciplines composed of action, for they are superfluous.  Furthermore, all actions,
including ritual actions and meditation, cause products that are finite in breadth and
transitory.  A finite action cannot possibly produce an infinite result. Liberation by
definition is infinite, has no end or limitation, and thus cannot be a product of action.
Yet despite these claims, the Advaitin seeker still feels incomplete and desires a
dramatic change, some radical transformation or enlightenment that reflects the fact that
liberation is accomplished, and thus he or she embarks on a path to gain it. Why is one
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already liberated yet suffering from a lack of individual security and wholeness?  And
how does one engage a path for solving a problem that does not truly exist? Advaitins
such as akara untangle this dilemma by locating the fundamental problem in a
discourse of ignorance and knowledge rather than actions and results.  Due to a primal
epistemic failure, the individual mutually superimposes the properties of the true self
(tman/brahman) with the finite individual self, resulting in a case of mistaken self-
identity.  Superimposition and its effects create a range of obstacles that veil one’s nature
as already liberated.  The solution is to remove all such obstacles by recognizing
superimposition, discriminating the true self from the finite self, and understanding
oneself as non-dual brahman.    
akara’s view of opposition between knowledge and ritual action is theoretically
distinct from our exposition but potentially problematic nevertheless in terms of
Advaita’s own methodology.  While distinguishing physical actions and knowledge is
relatively easy, we find much more difficulty in distinguishing Advaita’s knowledge-like
contemplations (nididhysana) from mental actions such as meditation (dhyna/upsan)
and devotion (bhakti). This difficulty is perhaps most problematic in the case of certain
forms of meditation that deal with superimposing some form or idea of non-duality or an
all-pervading deity onto one’s self, or taking it as one’s self-concept.  akara is not
always clear in making the distinction between contemplation and meditation.  But I
believe it is quite apparent upon looking carefully at his writing.  And, indeed, for
akara and other Advaitins, there is much at stake in this distinction, for the very
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possibility of liberation is compromised without the proper understanding of study and
contemplation.
For akara, self-knowledge alone is identified as liberating.  Any other action
may be indirectly helpful in preparing a student, but does not directly remove ignorance.
Falsely attributing the status of a knowledge source to practices such as meditation or
insisting they must be used in conjunction with knowledge is unacceptable to him.   But
akara does accept nididhysana as a soteriological method.  How does he separate
nididhysana from the very criticisms he aims at meditation?  Why does he embrace a
form of contemplative practice, which, although directly contributing to knowledge,
stands outside of the limitations of action and within the domain of the soteriological
efficacy of the Upaniads?  Does not nididhysana involve the basic paradox of doing
something to accomplish what is already accomplished?  Addressing these questions
helps us contextualize Advaita’s contemplative and meditative practices, illumines key
distinctions separating nididhysana from other practices, and reveals the underlying
nature of nididhysana.
Difficulties in Understanding nididhysana
Unfortunately, it is difficult to provide great detail on the contemplative process
itself without reconstructive speculation. This is mostly due to the lack of details
concerning instruction about the discipline or process in akara’s writing.  Even though
nididhysana ostensibly plays a pivotal role in Advaita praxis, detailed discussions of
how to do it are mostly absent in early Advaita literature, and rare even in the most prolix
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of later texts. In fact, akara rarely provides any practical instruction. This includes
yogic praxis, even though he occasionally refers to it or endorses it as helpful in the study
process. It was probably the case that among Advaita practitioners, yoga teachings, such
as those in the Bhagavadgt were well known, assumed by everyone, and to a great
extent practiced.  The lack of instructional details is common in some early Indian
commentarial traditions and the stra genre, sacred literature dealing with specialized
traditions of learning.  stra, along with its commentaries, often does not give detailed
instructions for practice and assumes that the teacher provides instruction.
To complicate matters, I suspect that akara had difficulty placing ideas about
nididhysana and other practices seamlessly into his epistemology and broader
philosophical views.  A closer study of nididhysana reveals a number of conundrums
regarding the way it functions, its stages in the study process, whether it leads gradually
to clarity or to a sudden liberating cognition, and whether it is still necessary after such a
cognition.  akara himself does not address such potential inconsistencies.  In fact his
writing does not provide us with a totally systematic philosophical system in which he
lays everything out clearly.  This may be because most of his writing, with the exception
of the Upadeashasr, is commentarial and constrained to the ideas in the texts.  Even in
his commentary on the Brahmastra, which contains the bulk of his more technical
writing, his intention is not to establish a philosophical system but to establish the thesis
of non-duality as the primary intention of the statements of the Upaniads and to defend
that thesis against contending theses of contemporaneous traditions.  In addition, akara
intentionally leaves a number of important philosophical questions unanswered, perhaps
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because he was more concerned about teaching students then getting bogged down in
establishing Advaita’s philosophical coherence.  He may have believed such questions
would only lead to pedantic quibbling and lack any fruitful result.
In addition, certain paradoxes and ambiguities seem intrinsic to Advaita’s concept
of liberation. For example, we encounter the following paradox similar to Meno’s
paradox:  the unknown cannot be contemplated and the known need not be contemplated.
How can one do nididhysana on the Upaniadic sentence meanings if the sentences and
the tman are not understood?  And if tman is already known from the Upaniads then
why bother with nididhysana?  If the sentence meanings are understood, then there
should be direct non-propositional brahmavidy without doubts because akara holds
the positions of intrinsic veridicality (svaprmya) and self-luminosity (svaprakatva).
Can the tman be partially known, or known and unknown at the same time?
Non-duality is a unique subject matter that resists any clear categorization such as
“subject” and “object”, or “knower” and “known”.  Even though Advaitins sometimes
characterize liberation as a liberating cognition of non-duality, it is difficult to say what
this cognition is and how it functions. There is metaphysical uncertainty about it, for on
the one hand a cognition may be able to remove ignorance, but on the other it is
problematic to reduce liberation to a cognition which exists as a product and is an event
happening in time.   Furthermore, Advaitins identify self-knowledge with non-duality, as
indeterminable, and not subject to verbalization and objectification.  It is not a new
experience because it is of the nature of one’s already present, intrinsically reflexive self.
Therefore it does not lend itself to objectification, apperception, or post-knowledge
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retrospective description. If nididhysana is the penultimate precursor to this knowledge,
or even identified as this knowledge, then the concept of it may share some of the same
obscurities as the concepts of self-knowledge and brahman.  Thus articulating a
contemplative process that maintains or cultivates self-knowledge or removes
obstructions to such self-knowledge is difficult at best. Yet ironically, in a sense language
also provides the most important key for understanding nididhysana; for akara holds
the counter-intuitive position that the words in the Upaniads, when engaged according to
particular methods, are the means for recognizing brahman.
Studying the Upaniadic texts and understanding their meaning comprises the
core of akara’s soteriological strategy and is the basis for nididhysana.   This requires
a strong element of trust in those sacred texts.  Yet an Advaitin may question whether
such sacred texts truly possess the independent power to reveal brahman.  Knowledge
derived from textual study often appears indirect and theoretical, irreparably distant from
direct self-knowledge.  And indeed, many Advaitins questioned whether they could be
freed from sasra merely through understanding textual passages.  Listening and
reading just do not seem like they are enough for the lofty goal of liberation. This doubt
led some Advaitins to emphasize the importance of contemplative practice or to embrace
certain forms of meditation as methods necessary for gaining wisdom beyond textual
study and scholarly intellectualizing.  Some early Advaitins viewed nididhysana as a
direct, internal method for liberation independent of or even antithetical to textual study,
a position not shared by akara.  In their opinion, such forms of contemplation are a
necessity, as much as or more so than textual study, for the Advaita seeker engaged in a
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deep spiritual practice and working towards a life-transforming realization in the form of
a mystical experience of non-duality.
It is within this philosophical milieu, where Vedntins vociferously contested the
relationships of textual study, spiritual practice, and liberation, that akara crafted his
methodology based on his understanding of the Upaniads.  akara recognized that
listening is not always enough and accepted additional contemplative practice by
expanding his notion of textual study to include contemplation. Though he focused on
textual study through listening, reading, and logical reflection, he incorporated
nididhysana as a method to internalize the external structure and content of sacred texts.
This inclusive move preemptively avoids the conflict of pitting contemplation against
textual study.
In addition, the boundaries between textual study and meditative practice or
between rationality and spirituality become blurred in the case of akara’s
understanding of nididhysana.  This is a balancing act where even though nididhysana
possesses a deep structural grammar dependent on language, textual study, and logical
inquiry, it simultaneously holds a space which is non-verbal and not rational or beyond
rational. Nididhysana becomes a bridge through which one finds that the distinction of
indirect textual knowledge and immediate liberating experience of non-duality is simply
an appearance and not reality.  It is a nexus for diverse elements of Advaita’s method and
metaphysics, and a transition area between the clear methods of textual study and the
indeterminable nature of liberating knowledge.   Ultimately the practice of nididhysana
allows one to become comfortable and rooted in self-evident and self-certifying
16
knowledge of non-duality, at which point one’s knowledge does not depend on anything
else, including the source of that knowledge, the Upaniads.  With this knowledge, the
Advaitin becomes liberated while living (jvanmukta).
Methodology
The bulk of my research centers on di akarcrya.  His commentaries on the
Upaniads, Bhagavadgt, and Brahmastra comprise a fundamental stock of ideas from
which the later Advaita tradition would draw and attempt to clarify. In addition, he
established monastic centers (mahas), which continue to play an important role among
Advaitins and the wider community of Hindus in modern-day India.  This dissertation is
primarily philological in orientation in that it deals with texts and their interpretation.  It
attempts to understand akara in his own traditional context through careful studies of
his writing.  I trace and outline a synchronic view of his theories and reveal the
intersections of his philosophical, exegetical, and pedagogical programs by investigating
the textual developments in his commentaries. These commentaries include those on the
ten principal Upaniads, the Brahmastra, and the Bhagavadgt as well as the non-
commentarial text, the Upadeashasr.4  I have avoided using some other texts, such as
the Vivekacman or Aparoknubhti, which, although attributed to akara, are most
likely of later origin.  I also do not draw upon the Yogastrabhyavivaraa because
there is not enough evidence to judge it as an authentic work of akara. My analysis is
restricted primarily to the commentarial tradition in an effort to retrieve the voice and
arguments of akara accurately without projecting decontextualized interpretations or
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superimposing the ideas of later Advaitins anachronistically onto akara, a tendency
vitiating many studies.  However, in situations where akara is difficult to comprehend,
I have depended on traditional responses and interpretations in certain sub-commentaries.
In addition to study of the texts, I have conducted extensive fieldwork in India
with contemporary Advaitin practitioners, particularly senior Advaitin monks of the
Arsha Vidya Gurukulam.  They provided a wealth of information through classes and
discussion, and led me through some of the intricacies of Advaita theory. Though for the
most part I am not analyzing practices of contemporary Advaitins, interpretations
cultivated through a lifetime of dedicated study on the part of my teachers inform my
work and help me to appreciate nuances that I could not have achieved on my own.
Implicit to this endeavor, which attempts to find order in the often digressive
prose of akara, is the assumption that his views are coherent.  His ideas and language
are at least for the most part consistent throughout his writing. The assumption of
coherence also implies that I do not assume an evolution of ideas based on a chronology
of akara’s writing, partly because there is not enough credible evidence to determine
textual chronology and also because the degree to which akara was an innovator or
founder is questionable.  He may be personally responsible for systematizing Advaita to
some extent, but it is quite likely that his interpretations and methods came down to him
through a teaching lineage.  Furthermore, much of his doctrine is quite similar to that of
his contemporary, Maana Mira, who appears to be from a separate lineage.  This
supports the theory of a broadly accepted system among Advaitins in place by akara’s
                                                                                                                                                  
4 See Hacker 1995, pp.41-56 for a discussion of akara’s authorship.
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time despite their differences.  Of course there are a number of apparent inconsistencies,
ambiguities, and unanswered questions in akara’s writing, which makes him at times
enigmatic.  akara was most likely aware of at least many of these tensions and issues in
the context of nididhysana.  He consciously and carefully chose where to target his
explanations and when to gloss over issues or to remain silent.  What lies unanswered yet
available between the lines of the text is part of what inspires studies such as this one to
take a fresh look at akara.
With these resources, I try to tease out akara’s primary views about
nididhysana and to situate nididhysana in the broader context of Advaita philosophy. I
explain the epistemological underpinnings of nididhysana and demonstrate how akara
strove to exclude it from a discourse of practice.  This dissertation illumines the ways in
which akara attempts to weave the threads of contemplative practice coherently into a
soteriological project.  It explains the delicate balancing act of defining nididhysana in
relation to texts and practice, and the ways in which nididhysana attempts to embrace or
resolve the contradictory propositions of Advaita’s soteriological paradoxes.  Unraveling
these threads facilitates understanding nididhysana with its rich complexity, provides a
window into the nature of non-duality according to Advaita, and more broadly
contextualizes the relationship of sacred texts, religious practice, and religious experience
in Advaita Vednta and akara in particular.
This dissertation is written especially for scholars interested in Advaita Vednta
and classical Indian philosophy more broadly.  However, even though aspects of my
work are rather technical, I believe it will be of benefit to religious studies scholars
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seeking to understand the relationships of textual study, contemplation, and religious
experience in the Indian context.  In addition, nididhysana is a crucial topic of study not
clearly understood by many in contemporary Advaita traditions. This study is potentially
useful for people who try to live according to the teachings of akara and to their
understanding of their contemplative processes and practices.
What this Dissertation is not about
Please note that my intention is not to judge absolute truth and falsity, for I shall
not argue for the validity of Advaita’s claims, or its presuppositions, such as the
possibility of the truth or reality of non-duality, the intrinsic reflexivity of awareness, or
the infallibility of the Upaniads.  However, I do try to find the positions closest to what
akara intends, and I favor certain positions with regard to contemplation based on their
coherence with wider Advaita philosophy as shown by later commentators as well as
modern scholars.  My work, while critical, is sympathetic to much in Advaita traditions
in that my analyses are contextualized by Advaita’s own philosophical and textual
parameters and I assume that the Advaita worldview is coherent overall, though like all
worldviews it has its obscurities (perhaps fewer, I shall show, than is sometimes thought).
Some of these obscurities, such as the nature of brahmavidy, the fact that liberation is
the end of a process yet already accomplished, and how exactly the Advaitin can
transition from understanding awareness to identifying that awareness with the world, are
central conflicts in the context of contemplative practice.  Such issues may be
unresolvable conceptual knots in akara’s writing and this dissertation does not solve
and unify all of them.
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Though my work deals with the philosophical history of early Advaita, it does not
analyze the socio-historical context and political forces that influenced the discussions in
the commentarial texts. Advaita is on one hand an orthodox brahmanical tradition, which
upholds elements of brahmanical religious practice, defends the authority of Vedic texts,
and criticizes those who do not accept brahmanism.  On the other hand, Advaita is a
radical tradition, whose textual interpretations challenged and altered mainstream
brahmanical ideology.  Advaitins critique some fundamental brahmanical axioms such as
the importance of ritual, being a householder, and seeking a heavenly afterlife.  They are
instead clearly in favor of renunciation, asceticism, forms of yogic praxis, and an
uncompromising inquiry into the nature of self.  These positions indicate a political and
social background importantly contextualizing akara’s writing.  Philosophical thought
does not exist in a vacuum and texts are written for a number of reasons.  We cannot
discount the political or social advantages in terms of power and hierarchy that an author
gains by writing a text.  I recognize that such issues may be quite significant for better
understanding akara.  However, reconstructing sociological and political forces of
akara’s culture cannot but be mainly speculative.  Scholarship concerning the history
of classical Indian culture and subcultures such as Advaita is not advanced.  There is also
much debate over dating akara and it is unknown where he spent the majority of his
adult life.  Therefore I have left such concerns aside in order to focus on doctrinal issues.
There is much more research to be conducted on Advaita’s nididhysana not
included in this study.  A vast amount of post-akara Advaita literature, which
possesses valuable theories on nididhysana built upon akara’s system, remains
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untapped. Many of the debates about nididhysana and its relationship to textual study
and immediate self-knowledge are found in the writing of akara’s direct disciples,
Padmapda and Surevara.  Padmapda in his Pañcapdik and Surevara in his
Naikarmyasiddhi , Taittiryopaniadbhyav r t t i k m , and the voluminous
Bhadrayakopaniadbhyavrtikam, wrote extensively on nididhysana.  During the
9th to 11th centuries, intra-Advaita differences and controversies arose over contemplation
between the Bhmat school of Vacaspatimira and the Vivaraa school of Praktman.
From the 11th century onwards a highly technical body of literature arose largely due to
the influence of other philosophies. In order to defend themselves, Advaitins borrowed
the very dialectical methods used by traditions harshly critical of Advaita, such as Navya
Nyya, Viitdvaita, and Dvaita Vednta. These Advaitins sought to clarify
philosophical concepts and to systematize akara’s thinking into a tightly coherent
system impervious to philosophical attacks. Complex theories plumbing the depths of
epistemology arose, tit for tat, out of scholastic polemics in sub-commentaries and texts
such as Sarvajñ tman’s Sakeparraka, Citsukha’s Tattvapradpik, Srhara’s
Khaanakhaakhdya , Madhusdhana’s Advaitasiddhi , Appayya Dkita’s
Siddhntaleasagraha, and Dharmarja’s Vedntaparibh, to name only the most
well-known. In the middle of this time period we also find more practical, pedagogical
texts such as Vidyraya’s Jvanmuktiviveka, which reveal a philosophical and social
movement incorporating theories of Yoga into contemplative Advaita practice. All of
these Advaita texts claim allegiance to akara and are indeed dependent on him.
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During the past two centuries Advaita has undergone perhaps its most radical
changes through the advent of Vivekananda’s neo-Vednta with its emphasis on multiple
paths to liberation, universal inclusivism, and mystical experience.  More recently, semi-
traditional yet innovative Advaita traditions such as Swami Chinmaya’s Chinmaya
Mission, non-traditional lineages such as that of Ramana Maharshi, and theistic Vednta
traditions that espouse some thesis of non-duality have grown in numbers.  In addition,
there is a proliferation of popular new religious movements espousing forms of non-
duality that incorporate Advaita teachings though in a decontexualized manner apart from
traditional lineages.  Amidst all these voices the Advaita tradition is thriving, and I hope
to present here at least a little of the philosophical and methodological developments
regarding contemplation and textual study in contemporary Advaita, which, I claim
scholars should not neglect.
All historical layers of Advaita deserve further research and need to be understood
in order to have a complete view of nididhysana in its various contexts.  In addition,
there is comparative work to be done with other Indian philosophies that endorse forms
of contemplative practice, and also room to bring in fresh philosophical lenses, both
Indian and non-Indian, to Advaita’s understanding of contemplation in order to maximize
objectivity. However, it is necessary to understand akara in his immediate
philosophical and religious context before moving to the more technical later texts, to the
living Advaita tradition, or to comparative studies.  Indeed, akara anticipated many of
the arguments that arrive in the later tradition.  One goal of my work is to explain the
basis for these later arguments in the context of akara by examining how he understood
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and anticipated them, and either answered them or purposely left them ambiguous. This
dissertation seeks a foundation – a coherent worldview – grounded in the source texts as
a starting point for future research.
Chapter Outline
This dissertation is divided into five chapters.  The first chapter offers an
overview of Advaita metaphysics.  It introduces the reader to Advaita’s basic doctrines
such as the problem of ignorance and superimposition and the need for liberation.  It goes
on to explain the nature of brahman as undifferentiated existence, pure irreducible
awareness, and infinite fullness. An important emphasis of this overview is the nature of
brahman as self-luminous awareness underlying each and every individual experience
and witnessing all cognition.  This doctrine is key to understanding Advaita on
contemplation and the means for identifying oneself as non-dual brahman.  In addition,
the chapter includes brief explanations of the distinction of absolute and conventional
reality and the ontological status of the world as dependent on brahman according to
mainstream Advaita expositions.
The second chapter explains the opposition of knowledge and action, which gives
rise to a false dilemma generating  much of the confusion surrounding nididhysana.
The chapter first unfolds the historical context of this false dichotomy in early ritual
philosophy.  It moves on to address akara’s interest in contrasting Advaita with the
ritual tradition by refuting the notion of action as a source of self-knowledge.  Despite
this refutation of the action thesis, akara endorses various actions and practices, such
as meditation, as foundational to the Advaita pursuit. I explain these practices and their
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importance for preparing the student for recognizing non-duality by cultivating mental
purity, a key qualification for contemplation and self-knowledge.  The remainder of the
chapter compares and contrasts nididhysana with other meditative and contemplative
practices.  It provides an extensive comparison of contemplation with meditation known
as upsan, a practice that appears strikingly close to nididhysana.  It then takes up the
question of the nature of prasakhyna, a form of contemplation that has led to
vociferous debates among Advaita lineages.  This section overviews the prasakhyna
contemplation disputes and examines whether it is compatible with nididhysana or not.
It deals extensively with akara’s older contemporary, Maanamira, who promoted a
variation of the prasakhyna contemplation in his text, the Brahmasiddhi.  It then
closely probes akara’s rejection of the prasakhyna  contemplation in his
Upadeashasr and compares and contrasts akara’s views with Maanamira’s.
The third chapter moves on to the importance of verbal testimony and textual
study for akara.  It begins with a discussion of the difficulty of identifying different
types of knowledge in akara’s thought and proceeds to disuss theory and practice, and
the orientation and way in which akara believes one should properly approach textual
study in order to avoid action.  The chapter then moves to a discussion of the different
sources of knowledge accepted by Advaita and why Advaitins claim that the Upaniads
are the only source of knowledge for knowing brahman.  The fourth section explains the
fundamental exegetical and pedagogical methods akara employs for interpreting sacred
texts through case studies of Upaniadic passages.  These methods, which are also
primary means in the process of contemplation, include concepts of negative language
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(neti neti), secondary implication (laka), and continuity (anvaya) and discontinuity
(vyatireka).
The fourth chapter examines the method of nididhysana.  It first analyzes the
root text for nididhysana (BU 2.4.5). It then studies contemplative methods found in the
Bhadrayaka Upaniad , the Upadea shasr , the K a ha Upaniad , and the
Bhagavadgt and akara’s corresponding interpretations of these passages.
The fifth chapter attempts to reconstruct the method of nididhysana by
interweaving my own speculation based on the case studies in chapter four and my
fieldwork with contemporary Advaitins.  This chapter also demonstrates how the
contemplative process is intimately connected to akara’s exegetical strategies
explained in chapter three, so much so that nididhysana can be understood as a mode of
textual study clearly dependent on texts.  At the same time, even though nididhysana is
dependent on texts for its, as I say, contemplative grammar, I discuss how texts are
supposed to become transparent when one becomes fluent in nididhysana.  This allows
akara’s nididhysana to be dependent on texts yet simultaneously appear to transcend
texts and be independent of textual study. The chapter concludes with an explanation of
the concepts of repetition and the continuous flow of knowledge inherent to the practice
of nididhysana.
Chapter five continues with an analysis of the function of nididhysana according
to akara and his followers.  The chapter focuses on the relationship of nididhysana
and liberation, questioning whether nididhysana is to be the bridge between indirect
textual knowledge and direct experience of brahman.  The discussion questions and
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dismisses a false distinction of indirect and direct knowledge as incompatible with
akara’s theory of knowledge.  It goes on to show devastating problems in projecting
ideas of mystical experience onto akara’s Advaita teaching.  The function of
nididhysana is significantly streamlined through an interpretation that dismisses the
importance of mystical experience as well as the notions of indirect and direct
knowledge.
The concluding sections of the chapter discuss the primary aim of nididhysana
as removing habitual reflexive and reactive thought patterns (sa skra  or
vipartabhvan) formed by previous conditioned beliefs of oneself as finite, limited, and
intrinsically separated from the surrounding world. These thought patterns are a unique
class of obstacles that reinforce notions of duality or limited self-identities and disturb
one’s understanding of non-duality. The Advaitin becomes liberated while living when
his or her recognition of brahman becomes clear and stable through the adequate removal
of these obstacles.
In the conclusion I first provide a summary of the major findings and the positions
taken in the preceding chapters with a particular focus on the complex relationship
between texts and nididhysana.  Based on these conclusions, I theorize that for akara,
sacred texts possess a receding horizon.  At first there appears to be a clean distinction
between texts and contemplative practice.  However, if one enters into the methodology
prescribed by akara, the notion of text expands and continues to grow the deeper one
studies. Sacred texts stretch beyond conventional boundaries of words, not only to
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encompass contemplation, but knowledge of non-duality and liberation as well.  One
never catches the boundary of the boundless text.
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Chapter 1: An Overview of Advaita Vednta
1.1: The Fundamental Problem:
Advaita Vednta is traditionally viewed as a body of knowledge and
teaching methodology leading to liberation.  The teacher (guru), well versed in Advaita
literature, employs the proper methods to reveal the wisdom of the Upaniads to the
student (iya).  The subject matter of Advaita deals with the relationship between the
individual, the universe, god (vara), and brahman.  Brahman is the self and substrate
non-dual reality comprising the other three terms. The fundamental thrust of Advaita is
that the self is alone the totality of our existence.  It is one without a second (advaita),
non-dual, infinite existence, pure awareness, and fullness (saccidnanda).  Advaita
considers the perceived universe to be an apparent and dependent (mithy) reality known
as my.  It is projected by the self, sustained by the self, and resolved into the self.  The
Advaita concept of vara is the self plus my, or alternatively, brahman viewed as the
universe with all its attributes. The key teaching of Advaita is that the reality of vara,
which is brahman, and the reality of the limitless universe, are one and the same as the
underlying self of the individual (jva).  Therefore the self of the individual also, is
limitless and has no beginning or end. The Advaita teaching method and the students
process of self-inquiry are designed to reveal knowledge of one’s self as brahman, the
infinite non-dual substratum and being of the universe.
One simple analogy that is particularly useful for summarizing the relationship of
the individual to brahman and vara and a presupposed identity of cause and effect is the
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wave and ocean.5   The virtually infinite waves, ripples, foam, bubbles, etc., make up the
vast ocean.  These forms maintain their individuality with reference to each other, but
ultimately the reality, or essence, of both the wave and the ocean is simply water. In this
analogy the individual wave represents the individual person.  The ocean, which contains
the totality of names and forms, represents vara.  And the water making up the forms
represents brahman. Just as the virtually infinite water is the content, or self, of the waves
and the entire ocean, so too is the infinite and formless brahman the self of vara and the
individual, and the essential being of all the objects within the universe. A division of
wave and ocean exists from individual standpoints, but resolves from the standpoint of
water.  Similarly, the experiencer and objects of experience remain in conventional
discourse, but such dualities dissolve from the standpoint of the one, all pervasive
brahman.
One may well question that even though non-duality is an interesting and perhaps
appealing concept, why is knowledge of non-duality important? For Advaitins there is a
practical and essential goal in mind beyond speculative philosophizing.  Like many other
Indian philosophers, they observed a pervasive sense of dissatisfaction among
individuals.  That is not to say that people are basically unhappy or that life is simply
suffering.  People have ups and downs and some are fortunate to have a great deal of
happiness in their lives.  But the Advaitin argues that even if a person has everything he
or she can imagine, such as health, prosperity, family, accomplishment, fame, and
                                                 
5 akara uses variations of this analogy in numerous places.  See BSbh 2.1.13, BUbh 1.4.7, 3.5.1, US
prose 1.19, and CUbh 8.14.1.
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respect, he or she still has a sense of being unfulfilled.  This may manifest as insecurity,
fear, inadequacy, a sense of smallness, or in a variety of other ways.  That sense of
unfulfillment will, at the least, reside in the back of one’s mind as a gnawing silent
presence or perhaps it will be experienced consciously and painfully.
People are able to recognize this dissatisfaction in one form or another upon
inquiry because they spend all their effort for accomplishments such as security, wealth,
and pleasure in order to quell their unhappiness. It is always gaining the next
accomplishment that people believe will solve their fundamental problem.  Yet even after
gaining what is coveted there will still be a next thing that they desire to fill their
emptiness, and one more after that, a series extending indefinitely. Unfortunately, gaining
objects that offer security and pleasure provide a temporary release at most, while failing
to provide any lasting solution.  All of these pursuits are the result of a desire to change
and to reach wholeness, yet such means are not capable of reaching that goal and the
inability to find satisfaction causes suffering according to Advaita.  And indeed,
recognizing the inadequacy of these means and ends does drive people to approach
traditions such as Advaita to find a means to discover wholeness and happiness.
Advaita does not claim that suffering is the cause of the problem, but rather that
suffering is a symptom caused by a fundamental epistemic failure, namely self-ignorance.
Self-ignorance (avidy), which is beginningless and uncaused, produces a mistaken
superimposition of the true self, brahman, onto the mind and body.  Due to this erroneous
cognition, the mind (antakaraa) unwittingly assumes that the undifferentiated being
and pure awareness of the infinite self belong to it.  This superimposition (adhysa) is
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mutual and symetric, occurring in both directions.  Not only are the intrinsic properties of
the tman superimposed onto the mind, but the finite and limited properties of the mind
are also superimposed onto the tman.  In akara’s introduction to the Brahmastra,
aptly named the adhysa bh (commentary on superimposition), he writes,
[O]ne first superimposes the internal organ [mind], possessed of the idea of ego,
on the self, the witness of all the manifestations of that organ; then by an opposite
process, one superimposes on the internal organ etc. that self which is opposed to
the non self and which is the witness of everything.  Thus occurs this
superimposition that has neither beginning nor end but flows on eternally, that
appears as the manifested universe and its apprehension, that conjures up
agentship and enjoyership, and that is perceived by all persons.6
People mistakenly believe that the mind is the ground from which consciousness
springs.  The consciousness that is tman is seemingly reflected in the mind, identified
with, and assumed to be the individual (jva). The mistake of identifying the mind and all
its modes as the self extends to the physical body, which is intimately connected to the
mind, so that one’s self-identity includes the mind-body apparatus.  akara details this
superimposition in his commentary on the Bhadrayaka Upaniad 2.1.20:
Similarly this individual self, which is of the same category as the Supreme self,
being separated from It like a spark of fire and so on, has penetrated this
wilderness of the body, organs, etc., and, although really transcendent, takes on
the attributes of the latter, which are relative, and thinks that it is this aggregate of
the body and organs, that is lean or stout, happy or miserable-for it does not know
that it is the Supreme self.7
The stock Advaita analogy for superimposition is the perceptual error of
mistaking a rope for a snake.  The properties of the snake are projected on to the rope
                                                 
6 Gambhirananda 1996, p. 6.
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while simultaneously veiling the true properties of the rope.  Another analogy employed
to explain the misidentification of the mind with brahman is a red hot iron ball.  When
immersed in a fire the iron ball appears to be a fireball. What appears to be one entity is
really two, the fire and the iron ball. The attributes of fire and iron will be mutually
superimposed if one does not know the difference between them. Another analogy is the
translucent crystal, which is mistaken to be red when a rose is placed behind it, just as the
self is mistaken to be the body.
Just as before the perception of distinction, the transparent whiteness, constituting
the real nature of the crystal, remains indistinguishable, as it were, from red, blue,
and other conditioning factors; but after the perception of distinction through the
valid means of knowledge, the crystal in its latter state is said to attain its true
nature of whiteness and transparence…8
Mistaken attributes such as the color red in the analogy of the crystal are akin to
the individual mind and body assumed to be the self.  The body, mind, and their various
modes are limiting conditions or adjuncts (updhi) that circumscribe individuation.  The
finite body and ever fluctuating mind with which we identify with as the self has intrinsic
limitations, and these limitations, based on a assumption of duality cultivate fear.9 Due to
these limitations the individual constantly strives to reach wholeness, a desire based in
ignorance because the true nature of each person is infinite, and nothing else is required
for that which is infinite.  Unaware of this mistake, the individual desires and pursues
various goals and physical objects. The solution to this fundamental problem, says the
                                                                                                                                                  
7 Madhavananda 1993, p. 211.
8 BSbh 1.3.19. Gambhirananda 1996, p. 193.
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Advaitin, is to understand one’s self through recognizing brahman, the Upaniadic
formulation of ultimate truth and Advaita’s principle of non-duality.  When there is no
more duality then there is no possibility of fear.10 A popular definition of brahman
among post- a  kara Advaitins defines it as existence/truth (s a t),
awareness/consciousness (cit) and wholeness/absolute happiness (nanda).
1.2: Brahman as Existence:
Advaita states that brahman is undifferentiated singular existence, the sole reality,
and the substrate ground or essence of everything.  It is non-dual, unchanging, infinite,
and eternal.  These definitions of brahman are dependent on Advaita’s specific
understanding of what is real (satyam), non-existent (tccham), and apparent (mithy).
The Advaita criterion for something to be absolutely real is that it must exist in all three
periods of time, past, present, and future. If something that originates was formerly non-
existent and goes into non-existence then it cannot be truly existent in the middle, just
like a dream or a mirage.  For example, Gaudapda states,
That which does not exist in the beginning and the end is equally so in the present
(i.e. in the middle).  Though they are on the same footing with the unreal, yet they
are seen as though real.11
                                                                                                                                                  
9 TU 2.7.1, “When a man creates a hollow or a fissure within it, then he experiences fear” (Olivelle 1996,
p. 188).
10 “That first being became afraid; therefore, one becomes afraid when one is alone.  Then he thought to
himself” ‘Of what should I be afraid, when there is no one but me?’  So his fear left him, for what was he
going to be afraid of?  One is, after all, afraid of another” (BU 1.4.2. Olivelle 1996, p. 13).
11 GK 2.6. Gambhirananda 1992, p. 231.
In TUbh 2.1.1, akara writes that a thing is real when “it does not change the nature that is ascertained to
be its own; and a thing is said to be unreal when it changes the nature that is ascertained to be its own”
(Gambhirananda 1992, pp. 308-9).
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  What is real cannot be negated, and cannot come from non-existence or go into
non-existence. 12 The analogy of a clay pot explains this definition.  A potter can take a
lump of clay and mold it into a pot, shape it into a cup, and then flatten it into a plate.
Throughout this process different names (nma) and forms (rpa), such as the pot, cup,
and plate, are created, but their substance continues to be the same clay. The pot form is
subject to change, but the substance of the pot does not change; therefore, within the
limited parameters of this analogy, the clay is more real (satyam) than the pot or plate,
which are its names and forms. This concept is put forth in the Chndogya Upaniad
6.1.4:
Oh good looking one, as by knowing a lump of earth, all things made of earth
become known: All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is name only.
Earth as such is the reality.13
In explaining this concept in CUbh 6.2.2, akara writes:
Even though a pot is different from a lump, and a lump is different from a pot,
still, the lump and the pot are not different from the earth.  However, a cow is
different from a horse, or a horse from a cow. Therefore pot etc. are merely
different configurations of earth, etc.  Similarly all these are but different shapes
of existence.14
akara applies the idea underlying the clay/pot analogy to all phenomenal objects in
order to arrive at pure existence (satt).  Every object exists independent of the mind in
the Advaita theory of realism.  One says, “The table is,” “The chair is,” “The tree is.”  In
such expressions “is-ness” appears to be an attribute of the object, meaning the tree or
                                                 
12 Also see BG 2.16.
13 Gambhirananda 1992, p. 409.
14 Gambhirananda 1992, p. 421.
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table possesses existence.  The Advaitin inverts this relationship and says existence is the
common denominator and ultimate universal, which possesses or manifests as a particular
form, such as the chair.  Forms such as the chair and its various properties such as color
and density are adventitious and dependent on existence.  The forms and properties
continue to change but existence remains unchanging and unaffected by changing
phenomenal forms and properties.  All forms can be discarded and reduced to universal
existence.
Another way of approaching brahman as pure existence is to attempt to find the
fundamental material or basic building block in which existence is located.  For example,
in locating the existence of the chair we may look to its content, the material wood.
However, when we look at wood as the existence constituting the chair we find it is itself
an aggregate of forms.  Wood further breaks down into elements, such as carbon.  In
looking for the existence of carbon, it also breaks down into atoms and particles, leading
to an indefinite series.  The Advaitin believes that anything that possesses form is an
aggregate, further divisible into other forms. Discriminating the content into finer forms
fails to answer what something is.  Therefore the process of searching for essential
existence as the most basic underlying cause succumbs to the fallacy of an infinite
regress.  At this point the Advaitin moves from a physical order of explanation to a
metaphysical one. The Advaitin infers that therefore existence cannot be located or
confined in any substance or form.  The result of this line of reasoning is that the root of
all forms is undifferentiated existence, but even though one naturally accepts the fact of
existence, existence cannot be located in form or space and is in fact outside of spatial
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limitations and therefore infinite.15 Advaitins go a step further and claim that existence is
not limited by time and exists independently of time.  It resides as one’s deepest self, is a
witness to time and stands outside of time.
The Advaitin cannot deny his or her existence, yet cannot locate it in space or
time, and thus concludes that individual existence is not individual at all.  One’s deeply
personal sense of existence is not limited to the body or mind.  It remains constant and
unchanging, regardless of the changing forms of one’s mind and body.  It is not even
subject to death. Advaita’s understanding of existence points to the infinite and
unchanging nature of brahman as one’s self.  The infinity of brahman is immanent in
time and space yet stands outside of any temporal or spatial boundaries.
The clay/pot analogy also serves to explain the relationship of dependency. Clay
exists independently of the forms it takes, but the pot or plate cannot exist without the
substance of clay, and thus are dependent on the clay for their existence.  When the
material cause is known then all the forms made of that material are known for they are
only modifications, says the Chndogya Upaniad. They are mithy, meaning their
ontological existence is dependent on the clay. Like the Skhya philosophy, Advaita
holds the position of satkryavda, in which the effect inheres in the material cause.16
However, an important point to understand in Advaita’s theory of causation, unlike the
Skhya theory, is that the cause is not truly changing and immutable despite the
                                                 
15 For example, see CU 6.12 where Uddlaka directs his son, vetaketu, to take a banyan fruit, cut it into
pieces, and then break the tiny seeds further into pieces, at which point vetaketu cannot see anything left.
Uddlaka then explains that the banyan tree stands due to this finest unseen essence that makes up the seed,
fruit and tree, and this essence is the self of the world.
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changing effect.  The effect, a change in form, is virtual.  It is an appearance (vivarta) of
change and not an actual transformation (parima) where the nature of the cause
intrinsically changes with the effect.17  So too, the world is only a modification of
brahman.  Even when one says brahman is the cause of the universe, this does not mean
that brahman is a material cause that transforms and changes into the universe.  Though
there is an appearance of change, brahman remains changeless and independent of its
effect.  This is not to say the world is non-existent, but that its reality is a modification of
its source and depends on brahman for its existence.
The concepts of absolute reality (satyam) and dependent reality (mithy) are
integral to Advaita and inform its theories of multiple levels of reality and the doctrine of
my.  Advaita holds a doctrine of two truths, or two levels of reality, conventional
reality (vyavahrikasatt) and absolute reality (pramrthikasatt).18 Conventional
reality is the empirical and transactional world that people commonly accept.  But
Advaita posits absolute reality as a higher reality.  From the level of absolute reality there
are no empirical divisions of subject and object, or perceiver and perceived.  From this
standpoint there is only brahman, the ultimate cause in which all causes and effects are
reduced to oneness.19
                                                                                                                                                  
16 See BSbh 2.1.5-20.  The point of satkryavda for Advaita is nothing about the effect, but that the cause
is existent.
17 The example of milk changing to curd illustrates a parima effect.  The milk is the cause of curd but
inherently changes and does not continue to exist as milk when the curd is formed.
18 Some Advaitins sometimes include subjective reality (pratibhsikasatt) as a third level of reality.
Subjective reality, in the form of dreams, hallucinations, and projections does not necessarily match
conventional reality.  It is usually only available to the individual and not shared by a group.
19 See BSbh 2.1.14 and akara’s commentary on GK 4.57 and 4.60.
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The absolute nature of brahman as non-dual appears to contradict the perception
of multiplicity within the world. How can absolute reality and conventional reality exist
simultaneously and be identical yet fundamentally different? The paradoxical conflict
between brahman and world is resolved through the famous and often misunderstood
doctrine of my.  According to Advaita, my is the apparent creative capacity of
brahman and identified with the universe. The definition of brahman as what is real is an
important point to consider when examining my.  As the universe, my is an apparent
reality that depends on brahman for its existence and is thus mithy.  From the standpoint
of dependency, my is brahman but brahman is not my, just as all forms of clay are
necessarily clay but clay is not necessarily one one of those forms.  The identity of world
and brahman is asymmetrical, unlike worldly identities, because from the absolute
perspective there is no my.  One cannot identify brahman with the world.
My, though not absolutely real, is not simply an illusory or completely non-
existent (tccham).  For akara, non-existence refers to something that can by definition
never come into being.20  Classic examples of non-existence include the horn of a hare,
the son of a barren woman, or castles in the sky.  Another clear example is a square
circle, an impossible shape that contradicts the rules of geometry.  Non-existence is
incompatible with what is mithy.  One would not say that the pot or the wave is an
illusion or non-existent.  So too, the Advaitin is not denying that the world empirically
exists.  Due to the relationship of dependency and the doctrine of two levels of reality, the
Advaitin concludes that the universe holds a unique ontological category of being
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indeterminable  or inexpressible (anirvacanya) in relation to brahman because it is
different than what is ontologically real or unreal (sadasadvilakaa ) or is not
determinable as being true or something other (tattvnyatvbhym anirvacanya).
akara writes,
Brahman  becomes subject to all kinds of (phenomenal) actions like
transformation, on account of the differences of aspects, constituted by name and
form, which remain either differentiated or non-differentiated, which cannot be
determined either as real or unreal [tattvnyatvbhym anirvacanyena] , and
which are imagined through ignorance.   Brahman remains unchanged and
beyond all phenomenal actions.21
  The world is not non-existent or unreal like the square circle, yet it does not
possess its own existence because existence depends on brahman.   The thrust of
Advaita’s concept of my and theory of dependency is not to focus on the illusory
nature of the world, but rather to encourage the student to switch standpoints.  My is a
conceptual tool to indicate brahman, the underlying nature and substratum constituting
the world and one’s self.22
The doctrine of my is often denigrated as something negative and world
denying, and characterized as the deluding power of the world and the problems the
world entails.  On the other hand, it is also identified as the material body and creative
                                                                                                                                                  
20 CUbh 6.2.1, BGbh 2.16.
21 BSbh 2.1.27.  Gambhirananda 1996, p. 356.
For further discussion of anirvacanyatvam see Hacker 1995, pp. 71-3 and for a different opinion see
Comans 2000, pp. 241-6.
22 Opponents to Advaita or those who wish to distinguish Advaita from other Vednta traditions,
sometimes refer to Advaitins as myvdins, those who hold the doctrine of my.  While this is not
incorrect, it attributes undue importance to my and may represent the criticism that Advaitins mistakenly
believe in the non-existence of the world and vara.  It is more accurate (and perhaps neutral) to call
Advaitins advityabrahmavdins (or some such phrase), “those who hold the doctrine of non-dual
brahman.”
40
power of vara.23  From this latter standpoint, vara is identified as the lower brahman,
identical with vyavahrika reality and responsible for the manifestation, preservation, and
dissolution of the universe.24  It is both the efficient and material cause of the world and a
locus for prayer and worship. vara is omniscient as all knowledge, omnipotent as the
controller of all things, immanent within the world and all objects, and possessing
attributes (sagua).  Yet vara’s reality is ultimately brahman, and from the standpoint
is transcendent to the world.25 Similarly, an individual paradoxically holds the status of
being the mind-body complex while in reality having no such limitations because one’s
self is in reality not other than brahman.
1.3: Brahman as Awareness
Theories of awareness or consciousness that are limited to an individual ego are
strikingly different from Advaita’s theory of consciousness.  akara identifies
consciousness or awareness (cit or caitanyam) with the basic sense of self-existence
everyone possesses, but does not consider awareness to be a product of mind or body.
Awareness is limitless by nature and pure, in the sense that is free from any relations,
attributes, or predication.   Advaita claims that awareness is not a substance available for
qualification.  It cannot be a quality or possess qualities, for all qualities are dependent on
a substance.  Nor does Advaita consider awareness episodic or subject to birth and death.
                                                 
23 BUbh 4.4.22, BSbh 1.4.3.
24 BSbh 1.1.11, 2.1.14, 4.3.14.
25 My depiction of vara is simplified here.  The question of vara’s identity in akara’s thought and in
relationship to para (higher) and apara (lower) brahman (or to brahman with or without attributes) or with
my is complicated and disputed by scholars.  akara himself assigns different meanings to vara in his
various commentaries, sometimes identifying vara with brahman and sometimes not.  It is unnecessary to
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It has no beginning or end.  Awareness is unchanging and never separate from one’s self.
There is no past or future absence of awareness, including states of deep sleep or death;
thus awareness is the constant principle underlying all change, is ubiquitous, and exists
independently of time or space.  Time and space only pertain to objects of awareness.
Awareness is also non-intentional (aviayat) because awareness is non-dual and thus
there is no object outside of itself of which it could be directed towards.  Nor is there an
agent standing wielding awareness.  It is identified with the primary essence and very
existence of all names and forms, though not limited to those forms in any way.  This
conception of brahman as awareness, the absolute ground and reality of all phenomena
and individuals, equates awareness with brahman understood as undifferentiated
existence.  Brahman is the totality and basis of existence, and knowing is the essential
nature of brahman like heat is to fire.26
According to the Advaitin, awareness is self-illuminating (svata praka) or
intrinsically reflexive and does not require a second or higher-order cognition to reveal it.
This concept is crucial for understanding Advaita’s theory of consciousness and its
theories of knowledge.  akara elaborates on the theory of svata praka based on
passages such the Bhadrayaka Upaniad 4.3.6.  There the sage Yjñvalkya speaks to
King Janaka of the self as its own light:
                                                                                                                                                  
explore such details in this study.  See Comans 2000, pp. 184-202, 215-31, Hacker 1995, pp. 85-96, and
Warrier 1997.
26 Bhadrayaka Upaniad. 4.3.30, “for the knower’s function of knowing can never be lost, because it is
imperishable.” (Madhavanda 1993, p. 472).
na hi vijñtur vijñter viparilopa vidyate ‘vinitvt
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‘When the sun and the moon have both set, the fire has gone out, and speech has
stopped, Yjñavalkya, what exactly serves as the light for tman?” ‘The self
serves as his light.  It is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out, works
and returns.’  ‘It is just so, Yjñavalkya.’27
The Kaha Upaniad 2.2.15 compares brahman to the sun, which does not need another
source of light to illuminate it:
There the sun does not shine, neither do the moon and the stars; nor do these
flashes of lightning shine.  How can this fire? He shining, all these shine; through
his luster all these are variously illumined.28
akara writes in his introduction to the Brahmastra that the tman as awareness
is not an object (viaya) of knowledge but is not absolutely not an object either.  It cannot
be known as an object but is not beyond apprehension because it is the content of ‘I’ and
always directly and self-evidently known.29 Citsukha, an Advaitin of the 13 th century,
expands upon akara’s understanding of self-illumination and defines svata praka as
“the capability of being called immediate in empirical usage while remaining at the same
time the non-object of knowledge.”30 It is important to note that, according to the
mainstream Advaita conception, awareness does not objectify itself and is self-
illuminating in the negative sense that it is not manifested by any other cognition.31  In
his commentary on Gauapda’s Krik 3.33, akara writes “the self being ever a
                                                 
27 BU 4.3.6.  Madhavananda 1993. p. 420.
28 KU 2.2.15.  Gambhirananda 1995, p.211.
29 na tvad ayam ekntenviaya, asmatpratyayaviayatvt aparokatvac ca pratyagtmaprasiddhe.
30 avedyatve sati aparokavyavahrayogyatvam (Trivedi 1987, p. 118).
31 Saksena 1944, p. 78.
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homogeneous mass of consciousness, like the sun that is by nature a constant light, does
not depend on any other knowledge (for its revelation).32
The Advaitin’s metaphysical view of awareness as non-dual potentially excludes
many questions of epistemology, and he faces a difficult ontological hurdle in making the
transition from pure non-dual awareness to explaining the existence of the dualistic
universe.  This also holds true for explaining cognition of objects.  From the absolute
standpoint (pramrthikavyavasth) there is only awareness and no individual or
cognition comprised of subject, object, and instrument of knowledge.  From the empirical
or conventional standpoint (vyvahrikavyavasth) there obviously is.  For akara it is a
fruitless and mistaken search to look for a true causal connection between pure
consciousness and cognition or between consciousness and the world.  Objects in the
world are found to be indeterminable as real or unreal, and that which is indeterminable
cannot have a casual connection with the ultimately real brahman.  To look for a causal
connection is to misunderstand the nature of the dependent world of names and forms and
its relationship (or lack of one) of dependency and identity with brahman.
Despite the lack of causal connections, akara felt compelled to provide some
metaphorical examples to explain the occurrence of mental awareness while
simultaneously claiming it is not different from absolute non-dual awareness, as well as
to account for the distinction of individual and vara, and the relationship of brahman
                                                 
32 Gambhirananda 1992, p. 306.  Also see BSbh 2.3.7, US prose 2.91.
nityaprakasvarpa iva savit nityavijñnaikarasaghanatvn na jñnntaram apekata ityartha
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and objects.  He provides two primary theories, reflection and limitation, sometimes in
conjunction with the other.33  For example, he writes in BSbh 3.2.18,
Since this self is by nature consciousness itself, distinctionless, beyond speech
and mind, and can be taught by way of negating other things, hence in the
scriptures dealing with liberation an illustration is cited by saying that it is “like
the sun reflected in water”.  Here the aspect kept in view is the one with attributes,
which is not real and which is created by limiting adjuncts, as it is done in such
texts, “As this luminous sun, through one in itself, becomes multifarious owing to
its entry into water divided by different pots, similarly this deity, the birthless
self-effulgent self, though one, seems to be diversified owing to its entry into the
different bodies, constituting its limiting adjuncts.”34
 The metaphor of the sun’s reflection in water explains cognition and the individuated
person as a reflection of consciousness (cidbhsa or pratibimbavda).35  The mind, or
inner instrument (antakaraa), is a subtle substance that appears to reflect awareness
like a mirror or water reflects sunlight.  The reflection of awareness and the mistaken
superimposition of awareness onto the mind lead to an individual sense of awareness.  Of
course there is no literal reflection of awareness, but there is an “as though” reflection
when the tman manifests in the mind as awareness.  akara also employs another
theory, the limitation theory (avacchedavda), to counter the obvious problem of
dualities inherent to the reflection theory, such as reflection and the source of reflection
or material and light.  The avaccheda theory explains that just as non-dual space is
perceived as limited by a pot, which makes a pot space, so too is non-dual brahman
mistakenly understood as limited by the mind, giving rise to mental awareness.  Absolute
                                                 
33 BSbh 2.3.46, 3.2.18.
34 Gambhirananda 1996, p. 615.
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space cannot be divided or limited and is therefore never separate from the pot space in
past, present, or future.  There is nothing to separate the space in a room from the space
in the pot; however, the form of the pot leads to this error, serving as a limiting property
(updhi) that is superimposed onto space.36  Yet the larger space is unaffected by the pot
space, even when the pot is broken.
Post-akara Advaitins debated the merits of the pratibimba and avaccheda
theories.  Padmapda, Praktman, and the Vivaraa school of Advaita emphasized the
pratibimbavda.37  Vcaspati Mira and the Bhmat school favored the avacchedavda
theory.  The focus of the pratibimba theory on reflection and prototype emphasizes the
positive identity and non-difference of individual and tman.38 The avacchedavda does
not emphasize identity in order to refrain from the mistaken objectification of awareness
or the problematic of explaining how consciousness can be reflected.
Both pratibimbavda and avacchedavda are closely related to akara’s theory
of mistaken superimposition of mind on awareness and vice versa,39 yet superimposition
does not completely explain the relationship awareness has with the individual.  To
further explain this relationship, the akara introduces the concept of the witness
                                                                                                                                                  
35 See BSbh 2.3.46, 2.3.50, 3.2.18-20, and TUbh 2.6.  For later Advaitins see Pañcada 4.29-31 and
chapter 10, Also see, pp. 179-183 of Madhavananda’s (1993) translation of Vednta Paribha.
36 Roodurmun 2002, p. 139.
See BSbh 1.2.6, GK 3.3-7.
37 urevara held a theory similar to pratibimba called bhsavda (appearance or semblance of brahman).
The difference being that a semblance only resembles the prototype, but is essentially different from it
(Balasubramanian 2000, p. 221).
38 Potter 1981, p. 73.
39 One may question how this is possible if awareness is not an object.  The Advaitin replies that awareness
is still known as the content of ‘I’ and is thus subject to superimposition.
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(skin).  The theories of pratibimbavda and avacchedavda, self-illumination,
superimposition, and witnessing awareness comprise a unified set of coherent concepts to
explain awareness and the mind.  akara adopts the concept of skin from texts such as
the Kena Upaniad 1.2:
That which is the ear behind the ear, the mind behind the mind, the speech behind
speech, and indeed the breath behind the breath – wise persons, having become
freed from these become immortal when they leave this world.40
This verse describes brahman as the witness (skin), which is the underlying subject that
objectifies the mind and sense organs and directly and independently illumines all that is
falsely superimposed on it.  The skin is not subject to the fluctuations of the mind and
body, and is unaffected by what it illumines.  It is pure awareness and is the very
presupposition of all experience and knowledge.  For the Advaitin, this witnessing
awareness is the most basic epistemological factor and presupposed in all knowing.  The
skin is self-existent and self-luminous.  For akara, awareness does not require an
object.  For example, in deep dreamless sleep, he claims that awareness continues
regardless of an object.41  In the akara’s theory of apprehension, awareness remains as
an unchanging presence, which simply illumines whatever mental thought mode arises in
the mind including modes of both ignorance (ajñnavtti) and modes of conventional
apprehension (jñnavtti).42   Due to the skin, wherever there is apprehension of an
                                                 
40 rotrasya rotra manaso mano yad vco ha vca sa u prasya pra |
cakua cakur atimucya dhr pretysml lokd amt bhavanti || KeU 1.2 (my translation).
Also see BU 3.4.2.
41 USG 2.93.
42 USG 2.75.
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object, the fact of that object is immediately known.  Conventional  apprehension (as
opposed to absolute apprehension of Brahman) is itself not self-illuminating but it does
not need another apprehension for its revelation.  If so, then the second would require a
third, leading to an infinite regress.  Apprehension is revealed as soon as it rises because
it is directly illumined by the skin without any mediation.  The skin is already present
as the very ground or basis, the primitive presence of one’s own being and sense of self
and the locus (adhihna) of reflexive awareness   It is an eternal, self-illuminating,
neutral awareness that manifests everything else.  To quote Bina Gupta, “Skin, in other
words, is a form of apprehension that is direct, non-relational, nonpropositional, and
nonevaluative in both cognitive and practical affairs.  It is the basis of all knowledge.”43
For akara, awareness is intrinsically non-intentional and formless.
Intentionality, form, and content are superimposed onto it.  When a mental thought mode
(antakaraavtti) takes place, it takes the form of the object, and is immediately and
directly known by witnessing awareness.  It is only the antakaraa (the “inner
instrument” composed of the intellect, mind, memory, and I-notion in the Advaita
conception) that changes and is intentional and relational, but these qualities appear to
qualify consciousness.44  The skin illumines the cognition without becoming one itself
and does not need to have its own existence revealed.  It is important to note that the
                                                 
43 Gupta 1998, p. 5.
44 Mohanty 2000, p. 15.  See BUbh 3.4.2, Vedntaparibh, Ch. 1 p. 32 in Madhavananda 1963.
Further discussion on the mind is in my section, “Gaining Purity of Mind” in chapter two.   Unless
otherwise noted, I use “mind” as a general translation of antakaraa which includes all four components
of the antakaraa.
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antakaraavtti, along with the mind, is inert and is not self-illuminating by itself.
Apprehension, in the form of illumination (praka), is the nature of the skin alone.
According to akara, brahman is the absolute basis of awareness as well as the
existence of all objects in the universe.  This raises some interesting conflicts with the
concept of the skin, because the skin is differentiated from external objects.  What is
the relationship of the witness to external objects?  If the witnessing awareness is
distinguished from all objects, then how can akara transition to the metaphysical claim
that the same awareness is none other than the existence underlying all names and forms?
These questions bring us back to the relationship of brahman with the world and the
solution in the theories of my and mithytvam.  My is the bridge to understanding
how the self can be both the skin and the world. akara speaks of awareness on two
levels, the absolute level where it is pure awareness and the empirical level where it is
witnessing awareness reflected in the mind and manifesting as mental activity. The
duality of witness and object only exists from the standpoint of conventional reality.  It
serves as a teaching method and preliminary step for self-inquiry, but is dismissed as the
student progresses towards an understanding of nonduality.  Understanding these basic
concepts is fundamental to the process of contemplation and will be further explained in
the following chapters.
A theory closely related to self-illuminating awareness is Advaita’s theory of the
origin, apprehension, and certification of truth, namely intrinsic veridicality (svata
prmya). Though akara only holds this theory in a nascent form, other Advaitins
subsequently developed it in detail, and the topic, though somewhat technical, requires
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some elaboration to better understand nididhysana. A discussion of intrinsic validity is
subsequent to praka because Advaita’s theories of truth and certification are directly
dependent on and extended by presupposed theories of consciousness and illumination.
Without the knowledge itself there is no question of truth or falsity of apprehension.
According to Advaita, truth is known immediately with the apprehension of cognition.
Certification of truth is natural and intrinsic to cognition and does not depend on extrinsic
factors or a secondary process such as inference.  In a sense there is no separation
between awareness and truth. The Advaitin may argue that in daily life and in science we
do not and cannot find absolute verification of any fact despite our effort. There is always
the possibility, no matter how remote, that a future cognition will correct an earlier one.
Furthermore, the nature of objects is indeterminable and name and form are negated by
the direct recognition of brahman.  To claim the necessity of absolute certification would
lead to hopeless skepticism and an inability to conduct any normal activity, and is
ultimately not possible because brahmavidy negates the reality of the objects in
question.
The most common Advaitin definition of truth is a cognition that is not
contradicted.  Non-contradiction (abdhitva) is a purposely negative definition of truth.
Advaitins employ this negative definition because they have no need for positive criteria
for truth when it is the cognitive default.  In the case of self-illuminating awareness
concerned with the truth of itself, there is no possibility of extrinsic certification, for
cognition is known immediately and cannot be known by a second cognition.  Only
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awareness itself has access to itself as awareness.45 In contrast, Advaitins only search for
criteria of falsity, where knowledge is accepted as true until proven otherwise.46
Cognitions of external objects are not absolutely true though, for objects do not have
absolute reality and are sublated by liberating self-knowledge. 47  Ultimately self-
knowledge is the only cognition that is absolutely not negatable.  It stands outside of any
dichotomies such as true and false and is not subject to external justification like
empirical knowledge.
Advaitins face an obvious difficulty in accounting for error through the svata
prmya theory.  The svata  prmya theory says truth (pram) is intrinsic to
cognition, but it is a common experience for someone to consider a cognition as true and
later realize it is false.  If all cognitions are intrinsically true, then how can error arise in
the first place?  How can one distinguish error from truth?  Intrinsic validity either
completely excludes error or has the contradictory job of separating truth from error.
Advaitins were well aware of this critique and did not ignore the possibility of errors like
projections, hallucinations, and other misjudgments.  One may react to the svata
prmya theory due to its strictness and apparent exclusion of error; but it is not as strict
and more palatable when Advaita’s criteria for error are factored in.  Advaitins explain
                                                 
45 Phillips 1997, p. 79.
46See Mohanty 1989, Bilmoria 1985, and Chatterjee 1991.
Later Advaitins gave different definitions of truth to deflect new criticisms.  Madhusdana
Saraswati for example does not accept non-contradiction as a successful definition of truth, and in his
Advaitaratnarakaam defines truth as “the property of being a certain apprehension of an object which
was previously unknown.”(ajñtrthanicaytmakatvam eva prmyam).  Quoted in Mohanty 1989, p. 16
47 See Vednta Paribh, p. 150 (7.1).  Madhusdana Saraswati believes that truth is anirvacanya
(pramtvam anirvacanya lokasiddham), though he has to make an exception to this to account for
empirical dealings. Quoted from Advaitaratnarakaam in Chaterjee 1991, p. 247 fn. 11.
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error as an aberration due to the improper use of a means of knowledge (prama).
When the prama is not properly aligned, knowledge cannot take place and error may
arise. Error is known through another cognition that corrects the first (false) cognition, or
through a cognition that contradicts the first one or shows some defect or lack in the
prama.  The latter situation causes doubt that eventually leads to correction.  Advaitins
seek correction only when there is reason to doubt the cognition.  The key difference is
that they do not consider error as jñna, but as something falsely appearing as knowledge
(jñnbhsa).  External tests are not for certification of truth, but for apprehension of
error and the defects that caused the doubt.48  It must be remembered that the absence of
defects is also not the cause of apprehending truth.  Truth is apprehended with the
conditions responsible for the cognition of the object.49
If certification of truth is unnecessary, and indeed not possible according to
intrinsic validity, then where does one differentiate between knowledge and belief?  To
say that knowledge and belief are not different sounds hopelessly naïve, for one cannot
deny that beliefs are sometimes false.  In answer to this question a svata prmyavdin
may claim a psychological account of intrinsic validity, which refers to the sense of
certainty we assume in most cognitive instances; however, psychologism is a weak
response because it does not distinguish between knowledge and belief and removes the
idea that true knowledge must match the object.  According to Advaita truth is not
identical with a psychological sense of certainty.  Instead, Advaitins identify knowledge
                                                 
48 Chatterjee 1991, p. 243.
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(jñna) with true apprehension (pramtva), and exclude error completely from
knowledge.
1.4: Brahman as Limitlessness:
The third part of Advaita’s basic definition of brahman is nanda.  This word is often
translated as “bliss”.  “Bliss” is not exactly wrong, but because it implies a perfect state
of joy, ecstasy, or rapture it leads to the confusion that nanda is an experience of mental
or physical bliss.  People may then believe that liberation is gained through a mystical
blissful experience.  However, such experiences of bliss are time-bound, have numerous
degrees and intensities, and are brought about by states of mind.50  According to the
Upaniads, brahman is infinite and free from change; therefore, nanda cannot be a
changing mental state or physical sensation that is objectifiable.  akara writes:
Hence the text, ‘knowledge, bliss,’ etc., must be interpreted as setting forth the
nature of brahman, and not signifying that the bliss of the self is cognized. 51
Brahman as nanda refers to the infinite nature of one’s self, which is never subject to
fluctuation, decay, inadequacy, or finiteness. nanda is the limitless nature of brahman,
absolutely full and complete (pra).  Therefore it is perhaps more accurate to translate
nanda as limitlessness (anantatvam) or wholeness (pratvam) rather than bliss to
describe more aptly the complete nature of nanda  that is not born out of contact
between a sense organ and an object.  Pleasant experiences that arise from the sense
                                                 
50 It is interesting to note that akara rarely, and cautiously uses the term nanda to define brahman.  In
the entire US he only characterizes brahman as nanda twice and rarely does so in his BSbh, except when
forced to by the root text (Mayeda 1965, p. 186).
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organs are of a relative nature, and are only a finite and changing reflection of nanda
manifest as a mental state.  Absolute nanda, or fullness, is quite different than relative
pleasure.  It is not episodic, has no beginning or end, and is the very nature of brahman.
This is stated in the Taittirya Upaniad 3.6.1,
He (Bhgu) understood nanda as brahman; for, indeed, from nanda all these
beings are born; having been born, they are sustained by nanda; they approach
and enter into nanda (upon death).52
Fullness is one’s self-nature, not something to gain, experience, or accomplish.
However, Advaita appears to contradict itself because people do not always experience
happiness.  If in reality the self is fullness, and by nature devoid of suffering, why then do
people not experience that continuously?  Daily life is filled with both happy and sad
moments.  If both types of emotion are part of normal experience, then how can fullness
be intrinsic to the self?  According to Advaita, moments of happiness and sorrow are
manifestations of the mind only, not the self.  Sorrow is caused when the mind is agitated
and unable to reflect the fullness of the self.  The fleeting moments of pleasures and
happiness encountered in life are just the fragmentary reflections of the fullness of the
self, experienced when the mind is quiet or in an altered state.
The cause of sorrow differs from individual to individual, but sorrow is only
experienced through the thought modifications (vtti) in the mind.  Even if the cause is
present, the sorrow will not manifest without the corresponding thought modifications.
                                                                                                                                                  
51BUbh 3.9.28.7.  Madhvananda 1993, p. 396. This is the concluding statement of a long discussion
distinguishing nanda as perceived or experienced pleasure from the nature of brahman as nanda.
52 nando brahmeti vyajnt | nandd dhy eva khalv imni bhtni jyante | nandena jtni jvanti |
nanda prayanty abhisaviantti |  TU 3.6.1 (my translation).
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For example, pain in the body is not experienced when the mind is engrossed in an
activity or in deep sleep.  In deep dreamless sleep the self is present without the sorrow
that the mind creates.  Sorrow has no power unless the corresponding thought
modification is manifest.  The mind naturally returns to a state of fullness when there are
no agitating thoughts. When the mind reaches a quiet state, a natural experience of
fullness and happiness results.  This distinction between nanda as brahman and nanda
as a blissful state is crucial because otherwise Advaita practitioners may falsely assume
that a blissful experience is synonymous with self-knowledge.  People then try to “reach”
brahman through an ecstatic state of bliss or a thoughtless state devoid of sorrow induced
through meditation.  These states may be powerful and transformative, but fall infinitely
short of liberation.  Unfortunately, even though those experiences are wonderful, they
result only in a happy memory and a burning desire for similar experiences.  They do not
result in self-knowledge and may instead lead to further craving for mystical experiences
and potentially aggrandize a spiritual ego.
1.5: The Goal
The fundamental goal of Advaita is to understand the identity between individual
and infinite brahman, a truth which is unfortunately veiled by ignorance in the form of
superimposition. Knowledge of brahman (brahmavidy) allows the student to make a
staggering metaphysical transition where his or her most precious sense of “I” moves
from a limited entity to a universal and singular brahman.  There is no separation and no
potential for feeling separated from brahman or vara when one directly recognizes non-
duality through a unique apprehension of brahman.  For Advaitins, this is an integral
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truth not simply meant for pedantic philosophical discussion of intellectualization, but
one that must be directly recognized. The idea of non-duality may sound nonsensical and
certainly contrary to experience, but according to Advaitins, it is something that needs to
be studied systematically with a teacher in its variegated nuances to be recognized. The
Advaita teaching methodology is designed to lead the student to the direct recognition
that his or her self is brahman by differentiating the self from the mind and body and
revealing its infinite nature.
The key to Advaita’s knowledge of non-duality is to recognize brahman as the
primitive unchanging presence, basis, and content of the subjective experience that lies at
the core of a person’s sense of self. This is a process of knowledge that removes false
superimpositions of body, senses, and mind previously attributed to brahman.  The
Advaita teaching method leads one to see through the false projections of limitation and
suffering superimposed on the self.  One must first differentiate the self from limiting
adjuncts such as the mind and body, with which it has erroneously been identified, and
secondly recognize the non-dual nature of that self. Only when all conceptions of “I” as
“this” or “that” are negated can pure awareness be understood as identical with one’s self.
All that is required is the direct recognition of this fact. There is nothing new to gain
because one already is the self.  There is nowhere to go because the self is already
present.  And there is nothing to change because the self is already available, immutable,
and whole.
Unfortunately, destroying one’s ignorance is not so easy even though there is
nothing to accomplish.  If it was, then one could be liberated simply by glancing at an
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Upaniad, or listening to a teacher who says “you are brahman.”  But this is clearly not
the case and highly unlikely even if theoretically possible. The Advaitin still faces an
arduous journey to discover self-knowledge.  So how does one read or listen to words to
make that liberating knowledge manifest in one’s live as living wisdom? Where do
practices such as meditation fall into this process?  And how does one assimilate
something as large and abstract as non-duality through contemplative methods?  The
following chapters discuss the ways akara attempts to solve these questions.
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Chapter 2: Action (karman) and Knowledge (jñna)
Controversy over the nature of action and knowledge, and the relationship these
two have with liberation, engaged Indian philosophers during akara’s time period.
This debate is derived from and contextualized in ritual theory, which is crucial for
understanding Advaita praxis and nididhysana in particular.  As an orthodox and
orthoprax upholder of the Vedic tradition, akara was embedded in a culture that valued
ritual action.  The degree to which Vedic ritual was practiced during akara’s time
period is a matter of historical speculation; but there is no doubt that the Prvamms
philosophy, which deals with Vedic ritual and textual hermeneutics, was an influential
force pervading all brhmaical intellectual traditions at that time, from ritual to
philosophy to law.  Thus, akara’s interest in philosophical dialogue with Mms
comes as no surprise.  His exegetical strategies are largely derived from Mms, and
numerous aspects of his metaphysical and epistemological analysis find their precursors
in Mms philosophy. Despite this dependence on Mims, we find an ubiquitous
concern with disputing Mms throughout akara’s writing in the form of a critique
of action (karman) and his emphasis on renunciation.  akara, as well as his immediate
disciples, made every effort to distinguish knowledge and action, negate action as a
means for liberation, and to champion knowledge as the only means of liberation.53
                                                 
53 akara’s commentary on BS 1.1.4 (samanvaya adhikaraa) is his most exhaustive discussion putatively
refuting action and establishing knowledge as the only means for liberation.
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In this chapter I outline the Prva Mmsaka’s understanding of action first,
particularly the relationship of action and language.   Then I explain akara’s refutation
of action as an independent means for liberation and why he claims cognition is the sole
means for liberation according to Advaita. The second half of the chapter explores
Advaita’s use of actions, such as meditation, to gain the proper qualifications for gaining
knowledge, contrasts meditation and contemplation, and lastly shows how the knowledge
and action debate highlights difficulties in understanding contemplation. As I will argue,
the contentious discussions, ambiguities, and paradoxes surrounding nididhysana are
rooted in intra-Advaita debates regarding the relationship of action and knowledge.   In
particular, Advaita philosophers faced the critique that nididhysana is an action and thus
strove to distinguish it from any action.
2.1.1: Prvamms and karman
The Mmsaka’s world revolves around the sacrifice (yajña).  His central
concern is the proper performance of yajña in terms of words uttered, materials used,
correct actions in the right sequence, etc. by a qualified sacrificial performer.  Proper
sacrifice contributes to upholding social and universal order, and is instrumental to the
individual’s pursuit of duty (dharma) and liberation.  Ritual practices create an unseen
residual power (aprva akti), which causes the manifestation of the fruits of action.  In
support of this concern with ritual, the Mms tradition developed a vast literature
dealing with exegetical strategies, ritual theory, and a supporting system of epistemology
and metaphysics.
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Like most Indian philosophical traditions, the Mmsaka’s conception of
liberation is the cessation of karman.  Karman comprises the bondage that keeps people
individuated through endless lifetimes in bodies that are subject to suffering.  When this
karman ends there is no more bondage and thus liberation.54   In order to achieve the
highest human goal, the individual must refrain from prohibited actions and perform
other actions, particularly the daily (nitya) and periodical (naimittika) rites.  One must
avoid prohibited actions because they result in further bondage, and perform ritual
actions because they expiate bondage.  If one does not perform those actions he will
generate karmic bondage.55  This process eliminates one’s karman, which was produced
through proper action (dharma) and improper action (adharma).  Eventually there is no
more cause for taking birth.56
The central concern of avoiding wrong actions and performing sacrificial action is
interdependent with Mms’s analysis of Vedic texts.   The Vedas are the only means
of knowledge for ritual action.  They are infallible, eternal, authorless, and give the
means and results of ritual action. Vedic sentences have meaning according to their
connection with sacrifice, and sacrifice is understood only through the instructions and
injunctions in the texts. To give up ritual action would make the Vedas meaningless.  The
second stra of Jaimini’s Prvammsstras (PMS) states, “Dharma is an aim that is
characterized by injunction (codan).”57  Codan is defined as a sentence that enjoins an
                                                 
54 Ramprasad 2000, p. 26.
55 Ramprasad 2000, p. 30.
56 K.T. Pandurangi 2006, p. 568.
57 codanlakao ‘rtho dharma (PMS 1.1.2)
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individual towards a particular action.  Dharma is only known through injunctive
sentences found in the Vedas,58 and one should fulfill injunctions for Vedic sacrifice.
According to the Mmsaka, the meaning of a Vedic injunctive sentence is tied
to the action it enjoins.  The entire Veda’s true intention is to convey action, and this
action is known through injunctions. Injunctions are primarily denoted through
imperative or optative suffixes in verbs that order action.  For example, in the sentence
svargakmo yajeta (the one desirous of heaven should perform sacrifice), the verb yajeta
is in the optative mode (viddhi li) and enjoins sacrifice.
However, apart from injunctive (vidhi) and prohibitory (niedha) sentences, the
Vedas contain sentences that do not carry any injunctive force in their verbs.  Mmsa
classifies these as mantra (hymn), nma (naming), and arthavda (eulogistic or
explanatory) sentences. In the PMS 1.2.1, Jaimini raises an objection, questioning
whether such sentences, particularly arthavdas, have any overall significance.
The purpose of the Veda lying in the laying down of action, those (parts of it)
which do not serve that purpose are useless; and in these therefore is the Veda
said to be non-eternal (i.e. of no permanent value).59
Here the opponent (prvapaka ) in stras 1.2.1-6 claims that all sentences that do not
immediately bear on action or prohibition do not deal with dharma, and are therefore
meaningless.  Many such sentences are simply statements of Vedic facts or assertive
propositions such as “Vyu is the swiftest deity.”  In response, Jaimini writes:
                                                 
58 See PMS 1.1.5.
59PMS 1.2.1 (Jha 1916, p. 22).
61
Inasmuch as they are syntactically connected with the injunctive passages, they
(arthvda passages would be) (authoritative), by reason of their serving the
purpose of praising what has been enjoined (PMS 1.2.7)60
The Mmsaka cannot accept that any portion of the Veda is meaningless; for such an
admission may lead to the doubt whether the Vedas are truly infallible.  This stra points
out that arthavda sentences indeed have a purpose because they are connected to
injunctions and prohibitions, and are thus helpful for dharma.  Arthavdas help by
praising enjoined actions, which prompts people to perform the enjoined action.
From the Advaitin’s standpoint, the Mms definition of assertive propositions
as arthavda, along with their inclusive way of accepting them as helpful for injunctions,
is deeply problematic. This definition may seem inclusive, yet is intended to exclude the
importance of sentences that provide factual statements or convey knowledge of an
existing entity. According to the Mmsaka, the Upaniads, which focus on self-
knowledge, metaphysical and ontological realities, and various meditations, is
supplementary to the mantra and brhmaa sections of the Veda. If the Advaitin accepts
this view, then virtually the whole of the Upaniads becomes merely arthavda and
subsidiary to these other portions of the Vedas and the rituals they enjoin.
In the Mmsaka view, Upaniadic discussions of one’s identity with brahman
is only a means of praising the ritual and the results of ritual that accrue to the sacrificer,
not a means for liberation.  Ignorance is neither a major factor nor a cause for bondage,
and self-knowledge (tmajñna) is only for the sake of the ritual (kratvartha).61  Self-
                                                 
60 PMS 1.2.7 (Jha 1916, p. 26).
61 See K.T. Pandurangi 2006, p. 569, and Kumrila’s arthavddhikaraam in his Tantravrttika.
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knowledge functions solely to show the sacrificer that his self is other than the body, and
that this non-physical self can enjoy the results of yga in a heavenly world.  Thus self-
knowledge serves as an indirect subsidiary for liberation by enabling the performance of
rituals.  akara makes every effort to criticize this position to defend self-knowledge as
the means for liberation, as well as to establish that the Upaniads alone can trigger this
liberating knowledge.  Upaniadic instruction about brahman has its own independent
purpose of removing ignorance and achieving liberation.62
It is clear in the Mmsaka’s view that self-knowledge is not understood as a
means for liberation, but rather as a subsidiary process necessary for the proper
completion of ritual. Knowledge is significant only in support of action.  And though it
may lead to correct action, it cannot effect action or the results of action. The
Mmsaka’s subordination of self-knowledge in particular can be viewed in a strong
thesis and a weak thesis.  In the strong thesis, self-knowledge has no reference to
liberation, and only informs and prompts the agent and the requisite actions.  In the weak
thesis, self-knowledge is still subordinate to action, but has some direct reference to
liberation, in that the actions leading to liberation must be informed by it.63  Both versions
are unacceptable to akara.
                                                 
62 akara provides discussion in his commentary on BS 1.1.4.
63C. Ramprasad 2000, p. 10.  See Ramprasad 2000, p. 8-14 for a concise explanation of the relationship of
action and knowledge in Mms.
There are some differences regarding the relationship of action and knowledge within the vast
corpus of Mms literature.  For example, see Kumarila on the vykaraa adhikaraa where he makes
an exception and gives more importance to self-knowledge (Pandurangi 2006, p. 570), than does his rival
Prabhkara.
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2.1.2: akara’s Rejection of Action
akara is not opposed to the pursuit of heaven or material ends through ritual
action.  In fact, as an orthoprax upholder of Vedicism he supports such action, as long as
one recognizes that they are limited to their respective ends.  akara also supports the
practice of nitya (daily) and naimittika (periodic) karmans such as agnihotra (the daily
fire ritual) and rddha (ancestral death rites) for householders who are, he says,
obligated to perform those rituals.  Yet akara’s views on action and knowledge are
almost the exact opposite of Mms. Renowned as an advocate of a form of
renunciation in which all ritual actions are prohibited, he makes room however for ritual
action within his Advaita teaching.  He accepts karman at a subsidiary level, used by
householders as a supplemental practice for enabling self-knowledge.  In a strong thesis,
karman generates results that remove obstacles to the path of self-knowledge.  In a weak
thesis, ritual action only contributes to a desire for self-knowledge.  Ritual is a subsidiary
for mental actions such as meditation, which cultivate mental purity and are themselves
subsidiary to self-knowledge.  From this perspective action serves as remote tertiary
auxiliary cause with respect to liberation.64   In BSbh 3.4.27, akara writes:
Hence sacrifices, etc. and self-control, etc., which are the duties of the respective
stages of life, are all but means for the emergence of knowledge.  And yet among
these, such means as self-control, etc., which are connected with knowledge by
the clause, ‘He who knows as such’ (BU 4.4.23), are proximate to knowledge,
while the other means, viz sacrifices etc., are external (i.e. remote), they being
                                                 
64 In a slightly weaker thesis, ritual action can directly give mental purity and removes obstacles in the
pursuit of liberation when performed with the attitude of the yoga of action (karma yoga) described
generally in the BG and specifically BUbh 3.3.1 and BSbh 4.1.18. See next section on purity of mind for a
brief description of karma yoga.
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connected with the ‘seeking to know’ (BU 4.4.22).  This is how these are to be
distinguished.65
akara’s views on action and knowledge are reflected in his categorization of
Vedic literature.  He formulates a break in the Vedic literature; the first section, including
the mantra and brhmaa sections, is concerned with ritual action (karmaknda) and the
second section is comprised of the Upaniads, which reveal ultimate knowledge
(jñnaknda).66  With this hermeneutical move he separates the intentions of different
part of the texts so that they do not conflict with each other and can accommodate the
views of both Mmsakas and Advaitins.  This move also neutralizes the Mmsaka
attempt to include the Upaniads within ritual literature as mere arthavda.
akara agrees with the Mmsakas that the Vedas are the authority for ritual as
well as understanding reality, and that action and knowledge operate in mutually distinct
domains.  Action and knowledge are mutually autonomous and do not have an effect on
each other’s content.67  Cognition is not identical to action, does not produce action, and
cannot destroy the results of action.  Action cannot produce knowledge or destroy
ignorance (avidy).  Unlike the Mmsaka however, akara finds the root cause of
bondage not in karman, but in ignorance.  The Mmsaka focuses on ritual for
removing karman, but akara is concerned with knowledge for removing ignorance, the
cause for karman.  It is only through ignorance that the individual mutually superimposes
the tman with the mind/body complex (updhi), and the updhi with the tman.
                                                 
65 BSbh 3.4.27 (Gambhirananda 1996, p. 785).  Also see BSbh 3.4.26.
66 This split is also the underlying justification for the Brahmastras as a separate text from the PMS.  The
Mmsakas do not make this separation.
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Superimposition creates the false belief that one’s self is a finite mind-body
complex subject to suffering, old age, death, and rebirth.  This sense of limitation
engenders fear and produces a desire for security and wholeness, which then prompts the
individual to pursues various means and ends to quell fear and find absolute security.
Unfortunately all means and ends found in the world, such as gaining health, wealth,
power, prestige, and family are all similarly limited.  They are products of desire-
motivated action, finite in breadth and transitory.  It is not possible for a finite action to
produce an infinite result.  And liberation by definition has no end or limitation, and thus
cannot be a product of action.
All pursuits requiring action create seen (da) and unseen (ada) results
(phala).  The seen results are clearly evident in terms of cause and effect.  The unseen
results of actions, such as the performance of ritual or virtuous moral action, accrue to the
individual and manifest in the future based on their unseen power (aprva akti) to
generate results.  Mms holds that all events are to some small or large extent
influenced by unseen (ada) force.  Advaita categorizes the ada karmic results into
three categories.  The unseen results of action (ada phala) that cause one’s birth and
continues manifesting in this life is “already begun karman” (prrabdha karman).
Ada phala that is continuously created and accruing during one’s life is gmi karman.
And the sum total of one’s ada karma-phala from infinite previous lives is sacitta
karman.  Sacitta karman is analogous to one’s total bank account of unmanifest results
of karman.  In each lifetime some portion of this account is doled out to the individual
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and gains the status of prrabdha.  There is virtually no beginning or end of sacitta
karmna because we have accrued karman over infinite past lifetimes and continue to do
karman and produce new ada karma-phala on a daily basis.  akara believes that,
while there are ways to neutralize certain negative karmas through expiatory action
(prayascitta karman) and one can avoid action to a small degree, it is not possible to live
such an actionless life that all of one’s karman would be burned up.68
The ignorant person naively continues to pursue limited actions with the false
assumption that acquiring a few more things will culminate in security.  Pursuing objects
of desire requires action, which then creates new ada phala for our sacitta karman
repository.  The accumulation of ada phala propels us into future births to enjoy or
suffer the results of our actions.  However, even though karman is the obvious culprit of
rebirth, individuation, and suffering, it is not the root cause.  The root cause is ignorance
(avidy).   Karman is dependent on this ignorance, and is thus not opposed to it or
capable of removing it.  In keeping with this distinction of ignorance and karman as a
kind of cause and effect, akara emphasizes the necessity of knowledge to remove
ignorance.  He writes:
Ignorance, which is non-manifestation, is the opposite of knowledge, which is
manifestation; but action is not the opposite of ignorance, and is therefore entirely
different from knowledge.  Ignorance, whether it means the want of knowledge,
or doubt, or a false notion, is always removable by knowledge, but not by action
in any of its forms, for there is no contradiction between ignorance and action.69
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As I will elaborate in the next section, akara asserts that knowledge is the only means
to remove ignorance .  Knowledge is not an action, and thus it does not produce new
results or generate any kind of karman.
akara, following Mms, divides action into four nonoverlapping categories.
An action can attain something or reach a destination (pti or gati), modify something
(vikra), purify something (saskra), or produce something (utpatti).70  akara asserts
that none of these categories of action can result in liberation because action cannot
destroy ignorance and stands opposed to the nature of liberation.  For example, in BUbh
3.3.1, akara refutes an opponent who questions if liberation can result from one of the
four action types:
(Liberation) cannot be produced because it is eternal.  Therefore it also is not
modified.  And thus also because its nature is not a thing (used as) a means, it is
not purified.  For an object whose nature is a means is purified, such as a vessel or
clarified butter, etc. by sprinkling.  Nor is (liberation) purified or like the
sacrificial post to be brought about by purification.  Nor indeed is it gained
because (liberation) is the nature of one’s self and because it is one (identical with
one’s self).71
A key concept alluded to in the passage, and underlying akara’s type of
rejection of action and his understanding of liberation, is his identification of liberation
with brahman. If liberation possesses the same intrinsic nature as brahman, then it also
                                                 
70 I’m not sure where this division first appears in Mms literature.  A. B. Keith gives a reference to
Prabhkara’s Prakaraapañcik (Keith 1978, p. 88fn –reprint of 1921 edition), which deals with the third
chapter of PMS and the topic of deciding what is primary and subsidiary in a ritual.
71 na tvat utpdya nityatvt; ata eva avikrya; asaskrya ca ata eva asdhanadravytmakatvc ca
sdhantmaka hi dravya saskriyate yath ptrjydi prokadin; na ca saskriyama,
saskranirvartyo v ypdivat….na pyo ‘pi tmasvabhvatvt ekatvc ca (my translation).
See akara on BSbh 1.1.4 (Gambhirananda 1996, pp. 28, 32) for more explanation that liberation
is not produced, nor can the self be the locus of any action or subject to any action because then brahman
would become impermanent.
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lacks all qualities, dualities, and limitations, and exists in the past, present, and future
because it is not limited by time.  The eternality of liberation removes it from the domain
of action, which can only take place in time and result in time-limited effects.  Secondly,
the eternality of liberation, and its equivalence to brahman, means it is immediately
present and so accessible to the seeking individual to be – in a seeming paradox – already
accomplished.
Such assertion of one’s self as already liberated, due to one’s self-luminous nature
as brahman, is one of the cornerstones of the entire Advaita philosophy.  It dismantles the
whole pursuit of action, whatever be the practical teaching for the seeker.  There is no
need to gain, produce, purify, or modify your self or anything else because you already
are what you seek to be.  The Advaitic pursuit is the paradoxical task of accomplishing
what is already accomplished.  This is not an “accomplishment” through actions and
results because in reality there is nothing to accomplish in that sense.  “Pursuing”,
“gaining”, and “accomplishing” liberation are only used metaphorically.72  In reality it is
simply the recognition of one’s own true nature.  The whole preoccupation with trying to
transform one’s self is missing the point.  It is like a sugar crystal assuming it is bitter and
believing it needs to transform itself through action to become sweet. The paradox of
seeking liberation is that it is already present.
The thesis of liberation as already present as one’s self, and its distinction from
action, sets up akara’s basic refutation of the Prvammsaka’s conception of
heavenly liberation.  akara characterizes their notion of liberation as a winning of
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heavenly worlds by performing certain actions and avoiding others.73  But according to
akara, this liberation must be limited by time.  akara notes the following passage
from CU 8.6.1.
And as here in this world the possession of a territory won by action comes to an
end, so in the hereafter a world won by merit comes to an end.  So, those here in
this world who depart without having discovered the self and these real desires do
not obtain complete freedom of movement in any of the worlds, whereas those
here in this world who depart after discovering the self and these real desires
obtain complete freedom of movement in all the worlds.74
This passage clearly states the limitations of karman for securing liberation.  Karmic
merit (puya) comes to an end.  In reality going to heaven is like a long vacation.  Just as
time and money runs out during a vacation, so too does puya run out for individuals in
heaven.  Eventually they will return to a worldly existence.75   akara further critiques
the Mmsaka’s “liberation” as subject to a gradation of happiness and sorrow.  He
analyses of various levels of happiness resulting from action  (nandamms) as
described in TU 2.8 and BU 4.3.33.
Had liberation been spoken of (in the scriptures) as supplementary to action and
had it been asserted as a thing to be achieved, it would become impermanent.  In
that case liberation would become some sort of an excellent product amidst a
horde of above-mentioned products of work standing in a graded order, but all
who believe in liberation admit it to be eternal.  Thus (since liberation is the same
                                                                                                                                                  
72 See akara on TUbh 2.1.1, BUbh 3.3.1, and BSbh 4.3.14.
73 akara may not be giving an accurate description of Mms’s view of liberation.  See Ram-Prasad
(2000) for a discussion of Kumrila’s understanding of liberation.  According to Ram-Prasad, Kumrila is
well aware of the type of critique akara gives in terms of the limitations of action.  Kumrila sidesteps
this critique by saying liberation is the absence of karmic bondage.  And he does not claim a positive result
produced by action.  In some ways this parallels the same type of argument Advaita makes in saying
knowledge is the destruction of ignorance and not a positive production.
74 CU 8.6.1 (Olivelle 1996, p.167).
75 See also BU 3.8.10 and MU 1.9.
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as brahman), it is not proper to talk of brahman as through it formed a factor in
some action (BSbh 1.1.4).76
Here akara comments that individuals experience a gradation of sorrow and
happiness based on the results of their virtuous or prohibited actions.  Different results for
actions are clearly articulated in the Upaniads such as the southern and northern routes
to be taken after death or the descriptions of different heavenly realms one can reach.
These realms attained after death have different grades of happiness.  Denizens of higher
realms possess bodies capable of experiencing more happiness (nanda) than those in
lower realms.  akara insists the heavenly results resulting from virtuous deeds are
entirely distinct from liberation because there cannot be any gradation of happiness and
sorrow with reference to brahman.  Brahman is not subject to a body that experiences
happiness and sorrow, and when an individual recognizes the self as brahman then he or
she is also not subject to this variation.  In fact, self-knowledge removes any sense of
agency.  A sense of agency opposes the nature of brahman and is the presupposition of
all action.77
2.1.3: The Relationship of Knowledge and Action in Advaita
The conflict between Advaita and Mms is based on different conceptions of
liberation and of different means thereto. Advaita and Mms agree that action and
knowledge are somehow mutually exclusive, but disagree on which to stress as the means
for the summum bonum. On one extreme we find Mmsakas such as Kumrila Bhaa
who champion karman .  On the other, we find akara rejecting karman  and
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emphasizing the autonomy of self-knowledge.  A number of other traditions, particularly
other Vednta traditions, formed views with other mixes of akara and Kumrila’s
positions, and emphasized some combination of action and knowledge
(karmajñnasamuccaya) as soteriological means.  Those who espouse a combination of
action and knowledge (karmajñnasamuccayavdins) form a whole spectrum of views
varying with the relative importance placed on action or knowledge.  The basic questions
regarding the combination of action and knowledge are: Does action or knowledge
receive the greater emphasis in terms of its causal efficacy for liberation?  And what
relationship do these two variables have to each other?  Let me explain:
These questions parallel a basic Mms analysis of Vedic ritual.  Rituals, such
as the full moon sacrifice (pramsa), require a main ritual as well as smaller secondary
rituals. The primary ritual is the focus, but the primary ritual cannot be effective unless
the certain subsidiary rituals are also performed.78 M msakas developed methods to
decide which rituals are primary or subsidiary and how they are related to each other in
terms of chronology, method, and results.  Vedntins applied similar methods to
questions about the relationship of action and self-knowledge to determine which is the
main (pradhna, agin, or ein) and which is the subsidiary (gua, aga, or ea) given
liberation as the goal.   We can split this spectrum into five basic positions: 1) the
Prvamms position placing all emphasis on action; 2) an emphasis on action which
also requires self-knowledge as a subsidiary; 3) an equal emphasis on action and self-
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78 See chapter 3 of the PMS for a lengthy discussion of how to decide what is primary and subsidiary.
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knowledge together; 4) an emphasis on self-knowledge with action as a subsidiary; and
5) a total emphasis on autonomous self-knowledge.
Positions two, three, and four encompass karmajñnasamuccaya traditions.
Though antecedent writing is mostly lost, we know from references in commentarial texts
that a number of pre-akara philosophers such as Bhskara, Bhartprapañca (self-
knowledge and rites),79 Brahmnandin (self-knowledge and upsan),80 and Brahmadatta
(self-knowledge and prasakhyna)81 held varying forms of karmajñnasamuccaya.82
These philosophers attempted to include both self-knowledge and action in order to
accommodate the diverse views found in the Upaniads.  A central concern is
maintaining Vedic ritual in line with Mms along with an emphasis on mental action
in the form of meditation and upsan.  For some karmajnanasamuccayavdins,
meditation and upsan  alone are viewed as essential for immediate liberating
brahmavidy.  Others combine physical ritual along with meditation and some form of
propositional self-knowledge, or focus only on ritual action in combination with
propositional self-knowledge.    In addition, some karmajñnasamuccayavdins insist
that even after direct brahmavidy takes place there is still a requirement to continue
performing actions whether ritual, meditative, or contemplative.  akara disagrees with
all of these positions.83
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A critical question is whether the subsidiary variable functions directly or
indirectly (or as an independent or dependent means) towards liberation.  Is the
subsidiary functioning in tandem or simultaneously with the primary as a cause for
liberation, or does the subsidiary only function indirectly by helping the function of the
primary variable?  For the Mmsaka, propositional self-knowledge is only indirectly
helpful by showing how to do a ritual and why it will be efficacious.   Some of the
karmajñnasamuccayavdins claim that mental actions such as meditation, rather than
ritual actions, are directly instrumental to liberation.  This position was particularly
disconcerting to akara because it elevates mental action to a means of self-knowledge
and begins to blur the line between action and and the proper source of self-knowledge.
akara discusses the separation of action and knowledge in general and in the
specific case of brahmavidy in order to discount action and place full importance on
self-knowledge gained through the Upaniads.  However, his intention is not to exclude
action completely from the Advaitin’s spiritual path. For the Advaitin, action is not
absolutely negated.  It is an indirect subsidiary, which helps align the prama and
facilitate the cognitive process.84  Action is not a direct cause for brahmavidy, but is a
requirement for properly employing a prama.  For example, if I want to look at a
particular object I require a set of conditions.  The object has to be within sight, my eyes
have to be open, and I may need to turn a light on.  A whole set of actions may be
necessary to create the proper conditions and align the prama in order for perceptual
knowledge to take place.  In the case of self-knowledge, mental actions, not physical
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ones, are of primary importance for aligning the prama.  akara places these actions
in a specific category of cultivating mental purity (antakaraa-uddhi or citta-uddhi),
which gives the student the proper qualification (adhikritva) for liberation.  These
actions are essential practices, but they are fundamentally different the knowledge
process leading to brahmavidy, which is dependent on the Upaniads.  The following
section outlines the process of gaining mental purity.
2.2.1: The Qualified Student (adhikrin)
In order for self-knowledge to take place, certain mental qualifications are
required. Many minds are simply not prepared for certain types of knowledge.  For
example, a young child cannot study calculus.  That child must first begin with
arithmetic, algebra, etc., and only after years of preparation can the child move on to
advanced mathematics.  Similarly, the Advaita student must be prepared to gain self-
knowledge.   Even if a means of knowledge is operating, such as the Upaniads, the mind
will not gain self-knowledge if it is lacking in ability or incapacitated by obstructions like
distraction or agitating emotions.  Therefore it is important to understand the necessary
mental qualifications that make a qualified student (adhikrin) who is able to gain self-
knowledge. akara classifies the predispositions or qualities required for self-knowledge
into four major categories (sdhanacatuaya).  These include: (1) discrimination
                                                                                                                                                  
84BUbh 4.4.22 and BS 3.4.26-7, 4.1.16; 4.1.18.
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(viveka); (2) dispassion (v a i r  g y a ); (3) the six-fold qualification
(amdisdhanasampatti); and (4) the desire for liberation (mumukutva).85
The first quality described by akara is viveka or discrimination.  Viveka is the
“discernment between what is eternal (nitya) and non-eternal (anitya).”86  Every object
one may acquire is bound by time and impermanent.  One cannot gain permanent
satisfaction from an impermanent object.  In their ignorance of this limitation, people
pursue new objects after the first fails to provide any lasting satisfaction, creating a cycle
of false hopes and disappointment.87  For the adhikrin, viveka is the discernment that all
objects are time-bound, and unable to give lasting happiness.  By gaining viveka, an
individual shifts his or her pursuit towards the ever-present self.  Only then can inquiry
into reality commence.  Viveka provides the impetus for realizing the self because the
student recognizes that all prior actions were performed in ignorance.  Viveka is the
ability to separate all entities and attributes from the self.  This is a process of
distinguishing the tman from the antman, and includes the differentiation of the body
and mind from the self.
The second quality of adhikritva is vairgya or dispassion.  Vairgya is a mental
disposition characterized by the absence of longing for all seen or unseen time-bound
objects of enjoyment.88  This is a result of viveka.  The desire for objects is vitiated when
one knows they are incapable of yielding lasting fullness, which is indeed the nature of
                                                 
85 BSbh 1.1.1.  See BU 4.4.23 and BS 3.4.27, which shows that the phrase amadamdi was already
prevalent by Bdaryana’s time.
86 nitynityavastuviveka (BSbh 1.1.1).
87 KUbh 2.1.2.
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one’s self.89  This leads to an objective and dispassionate mind, unattached to the objects
of enjoyment. For example, In the Kaa Upaniad, young Nciketas displays great
vairgya when rejecting Lord Yama’s offers of wealth, land, and divine women with
chariots and musical instruments, in favor of self-knowledge.   Naciketas responds in KU
1.1.26, “O Death, ephemeral are these, and they waste away the vigour of all the organs
that a man has.  All life, without exception, is short indeed.  Let the vehicles be yours
alone; let the dances and songs be yours.” 90
The fourth quality of the adhikrin is amdisdhanasampatti.91  This is a
collection of six qualities, including ama (mental control), dama (control of the organs
of action and perception), uparati (withdrawal), titik (fortitude), samdhna (focus),
and raddh (trust).92  akara defines ama as control of internal organ (the mind).  It is
a natural result of both discrimination and dispassion.93  As one’s mind gains objectivity
there is a parallel increase in ama, a disposition of calm and restraint.  Mental agitation,
which results from likes and dislikes, is alleviated when a false value is not projected
                                                                                                                                                  
88 ihmutrrthbhogavirga (BSbh 1.1.1).
89 BGbh 6.35
90 Gambhirananda 1995, p. 127.
91 See USG 2, BU 4.4.23 (in which the nominal forms ama and dama and samdhna are given as the
past participles nta, dnta and samhita.
92 akara must have derived this group from BU 4.4.23 (tasmd evavic chnto dnta uparatas titiku
samhito bhtvtmany evtmana tarati).  In this version, the Kva recension, there is no mention of
raddh.  However, the phrase raddhvitto is in the Mdhyandina recension.  He must have seen this and
added raddh to the group.
akara does not always mention the six-fold qualities all together as a group, but it became a
stock phrase in later Advaita.  For example, see Vedntasra 1.15-26.
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onto objects.  This is viewed not as a mental restraint based on forceful willpower, but
rather as a natural disposition that is based on the unfolding of self-knowledge .94
Dama is the ability to control and restrain the sense organs (taste, hearing, smell,
sight, and touch) and organs of actions (speaking, grasping, moving about, procreating,
and evacuating).95  The control of the organs through an act of will is necessary when a
disposition of calm and restraint is lacking.  Often times the mind is difficult to control,
and powerful emotions such as fear, hatred, and anger can easily possess or hold the
individual’s mind in their sway.  Dama is needed to control the action that these emotions
can manifest.  For example, it is not suitable to lash out every time anger is experienced,
though it may also be unhealthy to suppress anger.  Releasing anger in a healthy
unharmful way is accomplished when the mind has control of the organs.  This ability
can only be accomplished with a high degree of awareness to emotional reactions.
Without strengthening the mind and developing will power, the senses and organs of
action are uncontrollable like wild horses and cannot be directed to the pursuit of self-
knowledge.96
Uparati is a type of withdrawal, where external objects do not affect the mind.  It
is a continuation of ama and dama to a further degree and implies that the individual
does not hold the notion of personal possession.  Titik is fortitude, and the patient
endurance of suffering.  People who have titik are able to withstand the opposites such
                                                 
94 Rambachan 1991.
95 bhyendriyopaama (BGbh 10.4).  See BGbh 16.1, 18.43.
96 The Kaha Upaniad illustrates the control of the sense organs with the well-known chariot analogy
which compares the sense organs to the horses. See KU 1.3.3-9.
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as hot and cold, light and dark, and pain and pleasure.97  When such difficulties are
experienced one should not lament, dwell on them, or be disturbed by them.98 Titik is
not simply the emotional ability to bear pain.  It includes a state of calm and objectivity
directed towards any type of suffering.99  Samdhna is the ability to keep the mind
focused and single pointed (ekgrat) upon an object.100
The last quality of the six-fold qualification is raddh, often translated as trust or
faith.  raddh  is vital element of adhikritva.  The one with raddh gains self-
knowledge.101  At the outset, the knowledge of non-duality is completely incongruous
and diametrically opposed with common experience.  People do not experience
themselves to be infinite of fully content, and they require raddh to comprehend subtle
topics such as brahman.102  The confusion must be resolved by an experienced teacher
who can facilitate raddh by using rational arguments and the student’s experiences as a
foundation for proper inquiry. raddh is trusting the Vednta teaching as a valid means
of knowledge.  This is the proper approach to ruti, without which the teaching will lack
transformative power and become incapable of conveying self-knowledge.103  The
Advaitin should trust the teacher and the Upaniads just as one has total trust in his eyes
to convey visual perception. raddh facilitates an open and willing mind without
                                                 
97 BGbh 2.14-15.
98 BGbh 2.15.
99 I do not believe that akara’s intention is that that people ought to ignore or disregard emotional and
physical pain in al situations.  If possible, negative situations should be changed for that is the role of
action, but titik is necessary when a given situation or the result of an action cannot be changed or is out
of one’s control.
100 US 17.23.
101 BG 4.39.
102 CUbh 6.12.2.
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sacrificing firm judgment, enabling the ruti to reveal the self.  This would not be blind
faith, but trust, pending verification through one’s self-knowledge.  The goal of self-
knowledge is still placed under the scrutiny of rational thought.
The fourth quality of the adhikrin is mumukutva.  This is the burning desire for
liberation that drives an individual single pointedly to pursue self-knowledge to the
exception of all other pursuits and distractions.  A common illustration for the mumuku
is a person who discovers his hair on fire while sitting on a riverbank.  At that moment all
activities cease in the mind, except for the dire need to run into the water to douse the
fire.  The enlightened teacher should teach such a person endowed with the qualities of
adhikra.104
2.2.2: Gaining Purity of Mind (antakaraa uddhi)
The primary way of achieving the qualities of the adhikrin is through methods
for purity of mind (antakaraa-uddhi).  Prior to describing the methods for gaining
mental purity, it is necessary to briefly overview the Advaitic conception of mind.  The
antakaraa is translated as the inner instrument because it is more subtle than the sense
organs and the organs of action.  For example, people are aware of their capacity for
eyesight because the mind can objectify the eyes.  The mind is flexible and almost
transparent, constantly in movement and taking the form of various thought modifications
(vttis).  The subtlety of the mind is apparent by the speed and ease in which it can
modify objects of opposite natures.  Advaita divides the mind into four major aspects,
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including the ahakra (I notion or ego), manas (sense mind), buddhi (intellect), and
citta (function of recollection).105
The ahakra is the sense of one’s finite self, produced from the erroneous
identification with mind and body due to superimposition. The manas enables the mind to
come into contact with the sense organs and assimilate the objects of perception.
Although manas  synthesizes sense impressions, because it does not have the
discriminating capacity to make proper use of them it is often associated with doubt.106
The buddhi is the decision-making faculty and the discriminating capacity to discern and
decisively make use of the objects of perception.  Understanding and knowledge take
place through the buddhi’s reasoning power.107  The fourth division of the mind is the
citta, the faculty of recollection.  Citta is the antakaraa in its state of referring to or
remembering a past event.108
The mind is the instrument that removes ignorance when employing the
Upaniads as a means of knowledge.  Unfortunately, almost every individual has
numerous obstacles in the mind that blocks self-knowledge arising from a prama.
Knowledge of one’s true self is an extremely difficult pursuit because of mental obstacles
such as habitual thinking, emotional pain, and distraction.  In order to correctly approach
the ruti as a means of knowledge, the mind must resolve its obstructions and acquire the
qualities of the adhikrin.
                                                 
105 Datta 1960.
106 Indich 1980.
107 Indich 1980.
108 Datta 1960.
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The state of being a qualified student (adhikritva) can be accomplished only
when the mind has gained antakaraa uddhi.  The pure mind has composure, is
capable of understanding ruti, and has a strong faculty for viveka.  There are various
methods to gain antakaraa uddhi depending on the needs of the individual.  The Kena
Upaniad 4.8 describes some of these means: “Concentration, cessation from sense-
objects, rites, etc., are its legs, the Vedas are all its limbs; truth is its abode.”  This verse
also reiterates the subsidiary process of adhikritva to the goal of self-knowledge.109  The
following section outlines some important means advocated by akara for gaining
antakaraa uddhi.  These processes are important to understand because the results of
purity of mind and self-knowledge are often confused.  Understanding the distinction
between these two goals is essential in for a proper understanding of nididhysana, and
differentiating nididhysana from such mental activities.
2.2.3: Karma yoga
According to akara, a primary factor that plagues the minds of people, limiting
their potential for adhikritva, is their susceptibility to likes (rga) and dislikes (dvea).
The Bhagavadgt states, “Rga and dvea are present with reference to sense objects.
One should not come under their power, for they are his enemies.”110  A basic way an
individual relates to the world is through rga and dvea, where every object is one that
he or she likes, dislikes, or is neutral towards.  These judgments are not intrinsic
attributes of the objects, but are simply within the mind of the individual.  For example,
                                                 
109 See BGbh 2.21 and 18.55.
110 indriyasyendriyasyrthe rgadveau vyavasthitau |
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three people may have different relationships to the taste of apples.  The first likes the
taste, the second dislikes it, and the third has no preference.  The apple cannot be the
locus of opposing qualities of good and bad taste because they are mutually exclusive.
Thus the preference in taste is subjective and solely within an individual’s mind.
In akara’s view, people spend their time mainly chasing objects to gain
happiness or avoiding objects that make them unhappy.  This is constant, except during
deep sleep, and creates tremendous mental anxiety.  If the number of objects pursued and
avoided could be finite then the problem could be solved.  Eventually all desires could be
fulfilled and one could be immersed in ultimate satisfaction. Unfortunately this is not the
case because new desires continuously arise.  The subjective nature of the individual is in
constant flux, causing his or her tastes, preferences, and needs to change daily.  Likes and
dislikes do not end by simply attempting to fulfill them, and in reality there is a
continuous overwhelming deluge of rga and dvea that is impossible to satisfy.
In the Bhagavadgt, Ka repeatedly urges Arjuna to attain a mind devoid of
this disruptive attachment.  People deny their intrinsic nature of nanda in the process of
continually seeking objects other than their self.  Attachment to rga and dvea cause
angst in the mind because the mind cannot remain at ease while continuously running
towards or away from objects.  The subjection to rga and dvea allows even trivial daily
occurrences to cause emotional upset, further obstructing the mind’s ability to gain self-
knowledge. 111
                                                                                                                                                  
tayor na vaam gacchet tau hy asya paripanthinau || BG 3.34 (my translation).
111 BGbh 2.60, 2.62-3, 3.34, 18.27.
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The happiness of a person, who is not liberated, depends on the fulfillment of
rga and dvea, but for the liberated person, even though likes and dislikes may still be
present, happiness is not dependent on their fulfillment.  Self-knowledge cannot be
gained when one’s happiness is dependent on rga and dvea, but only the liberated
person has resolved this problematic attachment.112  This poses a paradoxical problem for
the student because self-knowledge and the resolution of attachment to likes and dislikes
are both dependent on each other.  The solution is not to eliminate rga and dvea, but to
gain an attitudinal change.  If an attitudinal change takes place in the mind, then rga and
dvea can be neutralized and self-knowledge can take place.  This is accomplished
through karmayoga.113
Karmayoga can be described through the terms varrpana buddhi (intention of
offering to vara) and prasda buddhi (intention of acceptance).  vara-arpana-buddhi
is an attitude where every action is performed as an offering to vara (god).114  Prasda-
buddhi is an attitude of acceptance of the results of action which leads to a serene
equipoised mind.115  The intrinsic nature of life includes activity, but people have little
power over the results of action because many variables affecting the results are outside
of an individual’s control.  According to akara, the fruits of action must be accepted
because they are distributed by vara in accord with the order of the universe.116  This is
similar to the way devotees accept prasda ((literally “grace”), the food offered to the
                                                 
112 BGbh 2.57.
113 See Rambachan 1991, p. 92-5 for a good overview of karma yoga.
114 BGbh 3.9, 3.30, 5.10-12, 12.6.
115 BGbh 2.65.
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deity in brahmanical rituals.  This food is redistributed to people after being blessed by
the deity, and one should accept it graciously and without objection because it is
sacramental.  This type of acceptance must be extended to all results of action in life.
The action is the offering and the result is the prasda.
Karma yoga does not imply action taken without intention or expectation for
results.  However, instead of engaging action with an attachment for the result, the result
should be accepted whether or not the intention is fulfilled.117  Likewise, people
performing religious rights should not be attached to the results of ritual, but rather see it
as a way to purify the mind and lead to knowledge.118   Regular or obligatory rites do not
only refer to those necessitated in the duty of the brhmaa priest.  People must perform
a variety of daily actions according to the obligations of family, work, and society.
With a prasda buddhi, gained through karma yoga, there is a freedom
from the judgment of success and failure, for even failure is vara’s prasda.  Rga and
dvea do not agitate the mind when the student is free from judgment.  When rga and
dvea are neutralized the mind gains a state of equipoise and equanimity, allowing the
individual to appreciate the world and life with healthy objectivity.119  This equanimity is
a type of “skilfullness,” a mental disposition that is ideal for meditation and
contemplation and necessary for gaining self-knowledge.120
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2.2.4: The Role of Meditation (dhyna)
Rga and dvea, along with the negative emotions they cultivate, and other
obstacles such as self-criticism, distraction, and laziness, are some of the foremost
stumbling blocks in the pursuit of self-knowledge according to akara.  A person may
wish for a tranquil mind but is unable to control it and feels helplessly prone to its
constant restless wandering.  Arjuna famously compares controlling the mind to the
difficulty of controlling the wind.121 This is a problematic situation that is not conducive
for self-knowledge.  To counter this problem, the mind must be trained to become
efficient and controllable.122  A distracted mind moving in different directions, and
buffeted by desires and disappointment cannot gain self-knowledge.123
Advaitins employs various types of meditation for harnessing the mind and
gaining adhikritvam.  akara  does not elaborate on the varieties and methods of
meditation.  He accepts Yogic praxis124 despite refuting aspects of Yoga and S khya
metaphysics,125 and assumes that one can look to the Yoga texts for more details. 126  He
                                                 
121 BG 6.34.
122 BGbh 6.35.
123 BGbh 2.62-3.
124 BSbh 2.1.4, 1.4.1, 3.2.24, MU 3.1.
125 The two basic points he refutes is the plurality of jvas (BSbh 2.1.1) and the duality of purua and
prakti (BSbh 1.1.5 and 2.2.1).  He also disagrees that vara is solely the efficient cause (BSbh 2.2.37).
akara also disagrees with the use of meditation in Yoga’s methodology. He does not agree that it leads to
liberation and he does not agree that samdhi is synonymous with liberation (BSbh 2.1.3, BUbh 1.4.7,
MUbh 3.39).  Though he does accept yogic siddhis (BSbh 4.2.14; 4.4.15) and occasionally quotes Patañjali
for support (BSbh 2.4.12; 4.1.10).
126 For more details on akara and Yoga see Sundaresan’s chapter entitled “Yoga: The Indian Tradition,”
in Whicher and Carpenter 2003; Halbfass 1991, pp. 224-228; Nakamura 2004, pp. 734-767; Rukmani 2001,
pp. 216-22 (Appendix II); Paul Hacker’s “akara the Yogin and akara the Advaitin” in Hacker 1995;
and Comans 1993, pp. 19-38.
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does, however, spend considerable effort discussing a type of meditation termed upsan,
which is prevalent throughout the Upaniads.
2.3: Upsan
Upsan is a special category of meditation used for mental purity (antakaraa-
uddhi), and is a practice that comes closest in appearance to nididhysana. There are
numerous categories of upsan and various specific ones, which require different
actions and produce different results.  Many are quite technical and require deep
knowledge of Vedic ritual as well as Upaniadic ontology.  However, understanding
nuances is unnecessary for the present discussion.127 The following section is a brief
outline of upsan  practice, and a lengthier discussion of its relationship with
nididhysana and self-knowledge.  The ease with which upsan and nididhysana are
conflated necessitates some discussion of their similarities and differences.  This
discussion also illumines some difficulties in trying to separate contemplative practice
from other forms of mental action.
2.3.1: Upsan in Upaniadic Context
A common theme regarding Vedic ritual found in the Upaniads is symbolically
locating the physical macrocosm within the sacrificial microcosm. This is usually
facilitated through a theory of correspondence where physical categories have a correlate
or prototype in the sacrificial framework.   The Upaniads, in a spirit of philosophical
                                                 
127akara describes upsan in numerous places, particularly throughout BS 3.3, which contains a vast
discussion primarily concerned with looking at the diversity of upsan and finding some unity among
them.  The first five chapters of CU, TU chapter one, and various places in BU deal with upsan. For
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reflection and inquiry, used this theme to develop other interpretations of ritual,
particularly an interiorization of ritual, in which elements of the external ritual are
symbolically homologized to elements internal to the sacrificer’s body. Just as one
imitates the physical macrocosm in the microcosm of the ritual, one can also conduct the
physical ritual through bodily processes or mental activities, amounting to a form of ‘self-
sacrifice’ (tmayajña).  In some contexts the Upaniads consider these interpretations to
be extensions of the rituals, which imbue the ritual with greater soteriological efficacy.
In other cases these reinterpretations are pushed so far that ritual is itself transcended and
canceled out.128
Ritual interiorization is found throughout the Upaniads. For example, the
Chndogya Upaniad compares hunger and thirst to sacrificial consecration, eating and
drinking to preparatory rites, and laughing, feasting, and sexual activity to chanting and
recitation.  Austerity, generosity, integrity, non-injury, and truthfulness are the gifts to the
priests.129  The Bhadrayaka Upani ad compares a man’s mouth to firewood, his
breath to smoke, speech to flame, embers as sight, and sparks as hearing.  The gods offer
food into that and this sacrifice produces semen.130  Another important example is
                                                                                                                                                  
more on upsan, see Bader 1990, pp. 32-40; Nakamura 1990, pp. 519-524; and Nakamura 2004, appendix
B.
128 See Heesterman 1993, p. 215 and Kaelber 1989, p. 84.
The Upaniads contain some severe criticism of ritual in order to stress the importance of new
soteriological goals and methods.  See Muaka Upaniad (MU) 1.2.7-9, 3.1.8, 3.2.6. See also Kaha
Upaniad (KU) 1.1.14-19 for an interesting example where the Nciketas fire ritual (a ritual that Yama, the
lord of death, teaches to Nciketas, the main protagonist of the Upaniad) is glorified, yet inferior to
knowledge of brahman because it only acquires a place in heaven.  For other examples of criticizing rituals
see BU 1.5.16; 6.2.14-15, CU 5.10.1-7, and PU 1.9-10.
129 CU 3.17.1-4
130 BU 6.2.12.
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internalizing the fire ritual (agnihotra).131   Fire is not only a fundamental element of
virtually all Vedic ritual, but also lends itself to interiorization due to its manifestations as
heat, energy/activity, anger, sexual desire, digestion, procreation, and asceticism in the
Vedic world view.132  Consumption of food itself became oblation to the digestive fires
(jtavedas).  Internalized fire ritual also takes form as identifying the breath(s) (pras)
as the sacred fires (prgnihotra).133  Thus, one can use the breaths to convey oblations
to deities.  Just as food is offered as an oblation to the inner fire in the stomach, so too is
food offered to the fires homologized as the pras.134 Or one may allow the breaths to
become the object of the rite itself, in which case breathing alone becomes a continuous
process of internal ritual activity.135
In many cases the Upaniadic homologies connect physiological processes and
cosmic processes through the mediation of the ritual.  By understanding the hidden
connection of these homologies, the individual becomes identified with phenomena in the
cosmic sphere.136  In many cases the connection is not simply physical resemblance or
equivalence but one born from etymological connections based on phonetic equivalence.
                                                 
131 The internalization of fire in the Upaniads has its predecessor in earlier Vedic literature dealing with
the agnihotra.  Sometimes when traveling, a ritualist could not carry his fires and had to ritually deposit the
fires within his self.  See the Taittirya Sahit 3.4.10.5. One could also ritually deposit the fire in the fire
sticks or into a piece of firewood. This practice probably became more common during the time of the
Upaniads and later became part of the rite of passage into Brahmaical renunciation, except in that case
one would never again rekindle the sacrificial fires.  Instead, the body remained as the ritual domain for the
rest of the renunciate’s life. See Olivelle 1992, p. 86-89.
132 Bentor 2000, p. 595
133 See the section on agnihotra and prgnihotra in Bodewitz (1973) for a detailed discussion.
134 See CU 5.18-24. The Upaniad also stresses the importance of knowing this special meaning of the fire
sacrifice to gain the true power of the rite.
135 See Kautaki Upaniad 2.5 and PU 4.3.
136 Olivelle 1996, p. liii, Brereton 1990.
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The name of a thing expresses its essence, so phonetic similarity provides a means to
understand their hidden connection.137  For example, the udgtha (high) chant serves to
connect the individual with the rising (udyan) sun.138  In other cases physiology and
cosmic processes are directly equated. For example, pra (vital breath, exhalation,
wind) already represents both the microcosm and macrocosm as breath and wind.  As
breath, it was considered a principle of life and longevity and associated with the cosmic
element/deity of wind.139  Such homologies based on finding equivalences and
connections form types of ritual upsan performance that move away from simply
supplicating heavenly deities and cosmic processes to superimposing identities on them.
Establishing and maintaining the identity is itself the ritual performance.  All this follows
the natural philosophical trajectory of the Upaniads, towards an inquiry into deeper
realities of both self and world, and leads to importance being attached to understanding
and identifying the self (tman), which is within and represents the supreme deity,140 and
brahman, which is the ultimate underlying foundation of all things, the absolute principle
of reality, and the highest formulation of truth.141
                                                 
137 Olivelle 1996, p. liv
138 See CU 1.3.1, 1.11.7
The term udgtha possesses a somewhat stretched etymological connection with udyan (rising) based on the
common prefix ut.
139 Zysk 1993, p. 202.
140 Bodewitz 1973, p. 328.
141Though I use terms such as ‘evolve’ and ‘lead’, I am not sure whether there is actually a historical
change moving in this order, nor am I suggesting that we can date layers of the Upaniads based on
concepts which I isolate as changes, though such history is not ruled out.  akara, as a traditional exegete,
takes a synchronic view of the texts and does not analyze the texts or assume a textual hierarchy based on
chronological change.
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This transition may or may not have been a gradual ideological movement, but it
is clearly a dramatic conceptual break from the preceding ritual literature. The placing of
fire within the self was one bridge for the evolution of the internalization. The fire hidden
inside the body became identified with one’s immortal self, the substratum or deepest
part of the person.  A similar transition takes place with a trope of light.  In early Vedic
literature the light of immortality was identified within, beyond, or behind the heavenly
sun.  In the Upaniads, meditations are prescribed to visualize oneself as identical with
this light symbolized as the sun.142  However, the Upani ad progresses further and
identifies the light of immortality as self-light (tmajyotis), subjective witnessing
awareness of the individual, in the mainstream Advaita reading.143 These examples
demonstrate the Upaniadic method of using resemblance, equivalence, or intrinsic
connection to relocate the source of immortality – such as heaven (the sun) or the
sacrifice (fire) – to its true location within or as the individual self.  Then the ultimate
equation the Upaniads make is identity between this tman so conceived and
brahman.144  The fire/self located in the individual is also identified with impersonal
truth.145 The light of immortality identified as one’s self is understood as the conscious
core of the individual as witnessing awareness and simultaneously identified as the
immortal existential essence of all things.146
                                                 
142 See CU 3.13.7, TU 2.8.5.
143 BU 4.3.
144 Olivelle 1996, p. lvi.
145 Heesterman 1993, p. 217.
146 See BU 4.4.7, 4.4.16-18, BSbh 1.3.40, CU 8.3.4
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Scholars, both contemporary and classical Indian, contest what this equation
means, what purpose it plays within Upaniadic literature, and in what sense and whether
or not it is the ultimate goal or message of the Upaniads.  Such debates of course led to
the proliferation of numerous Vednta traditions.  However, for Advaitins like akara,
the identity of tman and brahman is, at least in some sense, the paramount aim of the
Upaniads.  Knowledge of this identity is said to be the only means for liberation.  But
akara faced a difficult task.  The Upaniads label the various forms of homology and
identities based on equivalence outlined above as upsan, (used synonymously with
terms like vidy).  akara, however, separates those that lead to lower knowledge
through meditations on resemblance from those that lead to the highest goal of liberation
(moka) through contemplations of true identity.147  He makes this crucial distinction
among upsans following his separation of action and knowledge.148
2.3.2: akara’s Method of Upsan
Upsan is a repeated mental meditative action that incorporates various forms of
visualized concentration on two or more superimposed objects.  The Sanskrit word has
the meanings of “adoration,” “worship,” “service,” “veneration,” and “meditation.”  It
literally means “sitting near” – from the prefix upa (near) and the verbal root s (to sit).
                                                 
147 The Upaniads themselves do not make any formal reflexive categorization of upsan.  Many other
classical Indian philosophies as well as the Brahmastras do not make a categorization either.  This
becomes a point of contention, for some traditions such as Vasiha Advaita believe that upsan in the
form of actions of worship or self-surrender can lead to liberation.
148 It also follows the related distinction of empirical and absolute reality, and the division of Vedic
literature into the karmaknda (dealing with ritual) and the jñnaknda (dealing with self-knowledge).
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This derivation refers to the mind sitting near, or dwelling upon, a particular object such
as a deity. The following are two brief definitions of upsan provided by akara:
Upsan is approaching with the mind, the natural form of a deity, etc., explained
by the Upaniads in the arthavda (explanatory) section dealing with the objects
of upsan, and uninterruptedly concentrating on it without the intervention of
conventional thoughts until there is a manifestation of a conception of one’s self
identified with the form of that deity like one’s conventional self-identity.149
Upsan is a flow of uniform thoughts according to the Upaniads, not inhibited
by dissimilar thoughts, and relates to an object said by the Upaniads.  The
meaning of the word upsan is well known among people (in sentences such as)
‘He serves (or adores) the teacher,’ ‘He serves the king.’  He who always serves
the teacher, etc, he is said to be one who does upsan”150
In these passages upsan is thought to share similar fundamental characteristics with
other forms of meditation (dhyna) in that it is a stream of uniform thought-modifications
repeated to the exclusion of all dissimilar thoughts.151  This is compared to the uniform
and constant flow of poured oil, which does not deviate or waver.   As in dhyna, the one
performing upsan (the upsak) must possess a mind free of distraction.  In fact
upsan is to be practiced seated because the mind is distracted when walking, running,
                                                 
149upsana nma upsyrthavde yath devatdisvarpa ruty jñpyate tath manasopagamya,
sana cintanam, laukikapratyayvyavadhnena, yvat taddevatdisvarptmbhimnbhivyaktir iti
laukiktmbhimnavat| BUbh 1.3.9 (my translation).
150 upsana ca yath stra tulyapratyayasantatir asakr ctatpratyayai stoktlambanaviay ca
| prasiddha copsanaabdrtho loke gurum upste rjnam upsta iti | yo hi gurvdn santatam upacarati
sa upsta ity ucyate | sa ca phalam pnoty upsanasya | TUbh 1.3.4 (my translation).
akara gives an almost identical definition in his introduction to CU:  “Whereas upsana is
taking some object (lambanam) following as said in the text (stra), and maintaining a continuous
current of the same though on that (object), not disturbed by any different thought.”
upsana tu yathstrasamarthita kiñcid lambanam updya tasmin samnacittavttisatnakaraa
tadvilakaapratyaynantaritam | CU introduction (my translation).
Also see BSbh 4.1.1.
151 The “continuous stream” idea also comes up in TUbh 1.3.2-3, BGbh 12.3, BUbh 1.4.7, and BSbh 4.1.8-9
among other places.  The analogy for this type of concentration is the concentrated mind of a heron hunting
for fish, or a woman who has her mind fixed on her exiled lover (BSbh 4.1.8 and BSbh 4.1.1). This is also
similar to what we find in the Yoga Stras.  See Vysa’s commentary on Yoga Stra 3.2.
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or standing, and may fall asleep if lying down.152   However, upsan is fundamentally
different from many common forms of meditation, which may or may not consist of a
secular thought. 153  For example, one can meditate on any object such as an image, a
meaningless sound, or one’s breath.  In contrast, upsan only relates to objects enjoined
in the Upaniads such as a deity or a Vedic chant and incorporates a sense of repeated
devotion and worship.  A similar attitude between a student and teacher, or minister and
king, or a woman separated from her husband, is brought to upsan.154
The defining characteristic of upsan and its fundamental difference from other
forms of meditation is its use of intentional superimposition.  Upsan generally consists
of identifying one object with another.155  In many cases this takes the form of seeing
one’s self as X.  Two of the primary types of upsan akara refers to are sampad
upsan and adhysa upsan .   Sampad upsan is using a lower-order object or
symbol and superimposing its qualities on a higher object or symbol through some type
of resemblance.  Through this superimposition of similarities, one raises the lower object
or symbol to the higher one.156  An example of sampad upsan comes in BU 3.1.9, “The
mind is indeed infinite, and infinite are the vivadevas.  Through this meditation one wins
an infinite world.”157  This upsan makes use of the similarity between the mind and the
vivadevas  (a class of deities).  The mind is infinite in terms of its forms and
                                                 
152 BSbh 4.1.7.
153 It is important to note that akara does not employ these words in such a narrow sense.  He often uses
dhyna and upsan interchangeably.
154 akara repeats this in BS 4.1.1.
155 See CU 3.14.1 for shaping the conviction of identity and gaining the goal one is identified with.
156 Gambhirananda 1992.
157 Madhavananda 1993, p. 296.
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modifications.  This aspect of the mind is used as a connecting parallel to the infinite
vivadevas.  By superimposing the vivadevas onto the mind through this similarity, one
develops a new mind identity, raising the mind to the level of the vivadevas.  In this
upsan the focus is on the higher object so that the superimposed identity assumes the
form of the vivadevas.  Adhysa upsan has an inverse focus compared to sampad
upsan.  Primacy is placed on the locus of upsan rather than the superimposed object.
For example, in CU 3.18.1 we find the injunction to meditate on the mind as brahman.158
Here the focus is on the mind not on brahman.159
The upsan presented in the Upaniads create a variety of results depending on
the specific upsan.  Some are performed at the same time as a physical ritual, such as
the agnihotra.  akara explains that such upsans are powerful auxiliaries for making
rituals truly effective.160 For example he writes:
Now the meditations based on resemblance are being spoken of.  By this is meant
a meditation, by virtue of some point of resemblance, on rites with inferior results
like the agnihotra, as rites with superior results, in order too obtain these results;
or it is a meditation on some part of the lesser rite as those very results.  Even
when people try with all their ardour to undertake measures for bringing about
                                                 
158 Also see CU 7.32.
159 See Rambachan 1991, p. 82.  Rambachan describes two other types of upsan; kriyyoga upsan
where two different actions are superimposed into identity based on their similarities of action, and
saskra upsan where upsan is used to purify the ritual agent to make him qualified for a particular
ritual. There are many other categories of upsan, such as pratka (sound symbols) and pratim (physical
objects or form symbols) meditations, those that use a sound or form as the locus of superimposition, such
as superimposing Viu on a ligrma stone, or sagua (with attributes) brahman on to om meditations.
There are others that focus on qualities of brahman, etc. Another distinction that is not clearly evident in
these categories is that of ahagraha upsan, where superimposition is onto one’s I-notion or ego, verses
external upsanas where both the object and locus of upsan is external to the individual.  akara
himself doesn’t appear to make a formal categorization.  See Gambhirananda’s introduction to the CU and
Nakamura 2004, appendix B, for attempts at categorizing upsan. For symbols (pratka) and attributes
(gua-viea) see Nakamura 2004, p. 739. Also see Olivelle’s introduction to his translation of the
Upaniads (Olivelle 1996, p. xlix-lvi).
160 For example, the udgtha upsan removes hindrances from the ritual and makes it more affective.  See
BSbh 3.3.42 and BSbh 4.1.19.
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certain ends, they may fail of their object through some defect. So a man who
regularly tends the sacrificial fire takes up any rite, such as the agnihotra, that
suits him, and if he happens to know the results of particular rites, achieves the
results he seeks through meditation.161
Other upsans help by destroying previously earned demerit (ppman) or they may lead
one to the highest realms of heaven.  Certain upsans can also lead to krama-mukti
(gradual liberation or liberation by stages) where a person achieves a divine status,
reaches the highest heavenly world (brahma-loka), and gains self-knowledge there.162
Advaitins do not perform upsan to gain such results because such results are unrelated
to gaining self-knowledge during one’s lifetime.  Their primary incentive for upsan is
gaining steadiness of mind (antakaraa-naicalyam),163 which helps develop
adhikritvam by removing obstacles to knowledge.164
It is not clear what role upsan  played among Advaitins over the centuries.  A
number of contemporary Advaitins have reported to me that Upaniadic upsans are
largely absent among today’s orthodox practitioners.  It is probably a broken tradition of
teaching, though some may try to construct and practice upsan from the Upaniads.
There are surely a number of historical reasons for all this.  One may be the fact that
these upsans depend on intimate knowledge of Vedic ritual but those rituals are rarely
practiced today.  It is not clear whether these upsans were seriously practiced during
                                                 
161 BUbh 3.1.6 (Madhavananda 1993, p. 293).  Also see BSbh 3.3.42, and CU 1.1.10.
162 BSbh 3.2.21 and BUbh 1.5.16.  For a more detailed discussion of the results of upsan see Nakamura
2004, pp. 744-8.
163 BS 4.1.9.
164 BSbh 4.1.19.
An attitude of karma yoga, where one holds an orientation of performing action as an offering to
the highest deity, vara (varrpanabuddhi), and graciously accepting the results of action as sacramental
(prasdabuddhi) can also be applied to mental actions like upsan.
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akara’s time either.  However, many contemporary Advaitins continue to practice
upsans that are not strictly found in the Upaniads, and it is possible that similar
upsans were practiced even at akara’s time.  Some forms of upsan practiced today
are also intertwined with other forms of worship, including bhakti traditions,
aivasiddhnta worship, Tantric imagery etc.
2.3.3: Comparing upsan and nididhysana
The similarities of upsan and nididhysana may be traced to a number of
reasons.  As already noted, they are both forms of mental action that rely on manipulating
thoughts, and they share the qualities of concentration and repetition. In his introduction
to the CU, akara notes that both are presented in the Upaniads “because they are
similar as secret and because they are similar as modifications of the mind.  For there is
the similarity that just as knowledge of non-duality is only a modification of the mind, so
too do other upsans have the form of modifications of the mind.”165
Some upsans have contents that appear strikingly similar to nididhysana on
the surface.  And even though they have important fundamental differences, as I will
explain, they also have a core resemblance.  Upsan can function as a precursor to
nididhysana, and is a bridge between the physical actions of Vedic ritual and the
assimilation of self-knowledge found in the Upaniads. According to akara, it
functions as an important interiorization of Vedic ritual, where entire rituals are
completed purely mentally, without any reliance on physical and vocal actions. This
                                                 
165 rahasyasmnyn manovttismnyc ca; yathdvaitajñna manovttimtra tathnyny apy
upsanni manovttirpty asti hi smnyam | (my translation).
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practice allows one to move away from physical ritual, develop skills for internal
introspection, and transition towards the types of mental effort used in Advaita’s
contemplative pursuit of non-duality.166 It is for this reason, according to akara, that
upsan forms the early chapters of some Upaniads.  This is particularly evident in the
oldest Upaniads, the Bhadrayaka and Chndogya.  akara explains this function of
upsan in his introduction to the Chndogya Upaniad:
These upsans are helpful for the knowledge of non-duality because they (help)
illumine the reality of the vastu (brahman) by providing mental purity, and they
are easy to practice because their object is a thing/locus.  Therefore they are stated
at the beginning.  Here, because the practice of ritual action is so deeply rooted, it
is difficult to place the mind in meditation by giving up action.  Thus upsan,
which is a part of the ritual, is stated in the beginning (of the Upaniad).167
The similarities between upsan and nididhysana potentially lead to confusing
them. Such confusion would be partly due to the terminological ambiguity of the
Upaniads as well as the similarity of their practice.  The Upaniads and akara’s
corresponding commentaries do not specifically differentiate the terms used for upsan,
nididhysana, and self-knowledge.  In the Upaniads, upsan is often labeled as jñna,
vijñna or vidy, terms which also mean knowledge.168 The synonymous use of these
terms is confusing because they often refer to self-knowledge in the context of Advaita,
not meditative actions like upsan.  In other attestations, upsan does not refer to
                                                 
166 I suspect that the self-superimposed broader cosmic identities in upsan also function to soften any
rigid sense of self limited to the physical body. In this way upsan is a transitioning step to help students
grasp their own non-dual identity.
167 tny etny upsanni satvaudhikaratvena vastutattvvabhsakatvd advaitajñnopakrakny
lambanaviayatvt susdhyni ceti prvam upanyasyanti | tatra karmbhysasya dhktatvt
karmaparitygenopsan eva dukha ceta samarpaa kartum iti karmgaviayam eva tvad dv
upsanam upanyasyate | CUbh introduction (my translation).
168 For example, see BS 3.1.1, 3.3.5 and CU 5.3.7.
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meditative action, but rather to the knowing process and nididhysana.169  akara
addresses the common use of these terms in his commentary on BS 4.1.1 where he
explains the similar usage of the verb roots vid (to know) and upa+s (to worship, to
meditate on).170
It is seen in the Upaniads that the use of the verb roots vid and upa+s are not
different.  Sometimes the text starts with the root vid and ends with the root
upa+s.  For example “I say the same about he who knows that which (Raikva)
knows”(CU 4.1.4).  Later it says, “Oh Sir, teach me that devat upon whom you
meditate” (CU 4.2.2).  Sometimes the text begins with the root upa+s and ends
with the root vid.  For example, “One should meditate on the mind as brahman”
(CU 3.18.1), and later, “he who knows this shines and blazes with fame, glory,
and the splendor resulting from sacred knowledge” (CU 3.18.3).171
In the above passage and the following commentary, akara points out that the
Upaniadic usage of the verbs upa+s and vid, and the associated practices, upsan and
nididhysana, imply acts of repetition.  Therefore, even though these words and the
processes they refer to are different in important ways, they are used interchangeably by
the Upaniads due to the similarity of required repetition.172 akara himself does not
favor one term or the other, using them interchangeably, yet occasionally he makes a
                                                 
169 Dhyna is also often used for upsan and occasionally as a synonym for nididhysana.  See BG 13.24.
Also “dhyyamna” means nididhysana in MU 3.1.8.  akara glosses nididhysanam as dhynam in
BU 2.4.5.
170 BS 4.1.1 states vttir asakd upadet: “Repetition is necessary, since the Upaniads instruct
repeatedly” (Gambhirananda 1996, p. 813).
171 vidyupsyo ca vedntev avyatirekea prayogo dyate kvacid vidinopakramyopsinopasaharati
yath - ‘yas tad veda yat sa veda sa mayaitad ukta’ ity atra ‘anu m et bhagavo devat dhi y
devatm upssa iti | kvacic copsinopakramya vidinopasaharati yath ‘mano brahmety upsta  ity atra
bhti ca tapati ca krty yaas brahmavarcasena ya eva veda iti | (my translation).
172 In addition, these terms may be employed interchangeably because they specifically refer to mental
actions. Nididhysana is not discussed usually as a mental action because it is has knowledge as its content,
however it overlaps with mental actions as meditation in terms of repetition and concentration. While
upsan does not provide self-knowledge, it still depends on the ruti for its content, and in this sense deals
with knowledge.
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clear distinction. For example, in BSbh 4.1.12 akara divides upsan into lower and
higher ones that specifically lead to the proper vision of self-knowledge.173
In his commentaries on a number of important passages in the Upaniads and the
Bhagavadgt we find akara interpreting forms of the verb ups as nididhysana.  For
example, the Bhadrayaka Upaniad states, “One should meditate on the self alone”
(tmety evopsta).174  According to akara, this sentence uses the verb “ upsta” in the
context of gaining self-knowledge and repeated contemplation. The Bhagavadgt
contains passages such as, “However, those who contemplate (paryupsate) on that
which is imperishable, indescribable, and unmanifest….” 175 Here, the verb paryupsate
is used in the context of gaining knowledge and therefore akara believes it refers to
nididhysana. This is clear because the object of paryupsate is brahman spoken of in
absolute negative terms as without any attributes (nirgua).  It is contrasted with the verb
upsate, in the previous verse (18.2), which lacks the pari prefix and refers to the karma-
yogin performing action and upsana meditations.  Pari is prefixed to signify a totally
committed contemplation on self-knowledge.176
In other places it is not clear whether the reference is to upsan or nididhysana.
In these cases, it appears that depending on the student’s level of understanding, the term
upsan may be understood either as a meditation or as nididhysana. For example, if
one meditates on om as a sound symbol (pratka) then it is an upsan on the lower
                                                 
173 samyagdaranrthany upsanni
In other contexts akara specifically separates the two by using both terms in proximity to each
other.  Also see BSbh 4.1.1.
174 BU 1.4.7.
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brahman with qualities (aparam sagua-brahman, i.e. vara).177 Om upsan may be
used at the lower level for helping rituals, for gaining the highest heavens,178 or for
purifying the mind, but if one understands the meaning of om as indicating knowledge of
the higher unqualified brahman (param nirgua-brahman) then it functions like a
mahvkya, which directly reveals self-knowledge. When om is correctly understood as
designating unqualified brahman, then it can be a source for repeated contemplation on
self-knowledge.  Repeating om while recognizing this understanding is nididhysana.179
Even though there is a leap between upsan and nididhysana in terms of content, we
can see a possible continuum, moving from meditation practice to contemplative
assimilation of knowledge while using the same symbol or sentence.180
2.3.4: Upsan as Depending on the Person and nididhysana as Depending on the
Object
Listening to texts (ravaa) and logical reflection (manana) possess some obvious
differences from upsan.  However, distinguishing the valid cognition present in
                                                                                                                                                  
175 ye tv akaram anirdeyam avyakta paryupsate (BG 12.3 a-b).
176 Also see BG 9.22, 12.6, 12.20 and 13.25.
177 This is a common form of om meditation. For example see akara on BU 5.1.1 and BG 8.13. For
meditation on om for helping ritual, see CU 1.1.9.
178 See BS 4.3.15 for om meditation leading to the highest heaven (brahmaloka).
179 An example of this two-fold approach to om is found in PU 5.1-7. See also KU 1.2.15-17 and MU 2.2.6.
In the Mkya Upaniad we find om used in the context of knowledge.  There it indirectly points to
brahman through anvaya and vyatireka as the constant awareness underlying all states of experience, and
functions like a mahvkya.
180 We can see this potential transition in the common Advaita and yogic practice of repeating a mantra
(japa).  For example, one can repeat “Om, salutations to iva” (om nama ivya) as a simple japa
meditation.  This can then transition to upsan if while repeating the mantra one visually superimposes
the deity iva onto an object (like a iva liga) or one’s self, and gives salutations to that object or self.
This upsan can subsequently transition to nididhysana if one recognizes the identity of iva (in terms of
his non-dual existence and pure awareness), as one’s self while repeating the mantra.  This works only after
exposure to the Advaita teaching, after which one can load the content of the mahvkya on to a japa
mantra or upsan, which is not strictly Upaniadic.
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nididhysana and the visualized mental action inherent to upsan is confusing yet
critical to akara’s entire methodology.  The distinction is of essential importance for
understanding nididhysana, as well as akara’s emphasis on the Upaniads as a means
of knowledge and refutation of the thesis that self-knowledge is a new experience
produced by meditation. The most important difference akara draws between upsan
and nididhysana follows the distinction of person dependent action (puruatantra
karma) and object dependent knowledge (vastutantra jñna). akara’s distinction of
action as person-dependent and knowledge as object-dependent is part of his critique of
action, and by extension upsan, as a means to self-knowledge.181
akara’s primary complaints against action, whether physical, vocal, or mental,
as a direct cause for liberation are the time-bound nature of the products of action and the
mutual autonomy of action and self-knowledge.  Yet one may question how such
criticism does or does not also target everyday knowledge.  Cognition is similar to action,
in that it takes place in time, and is an effect produced by various causal mechanisms and
a means of knowledge such as perception or inference.  As a product, it is also transitory
and rapidly decays.  This is clearly evident in our experience.  Cognition, whether
veridical or not or imaginative, reflective, etc., arises and then quickly disappears when a
subsequent cognition arises.  While there are numerous similarities between cognition
and mental action, akara makes a critical distinction between the two based on content-
dependence.  While action is dependent on an individual’s will, veridical cognition is at
                                                 
181 In addition, this distinction underlies the debates surrounding nididhysana that continue throughout
the history of Advaita literature.
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least ultimately dependent on the nature of the object.  This distinction separates
upsan, which is person-dependent (puruatantra), from nididhysana, which is object-
dependent (vastutantra).  akara’s concise explanation of this distinction of knowledge
and action is worth quoting in full:
Worldly and Vedic action can be performed, not performed, or performed
otherwise, just as one goes by horse or by foot or does not go.  But a thing cannot
be imagined to be of such a kind, or a different kind, or to be non-existent.
Options are dependent on the mind of the individual.  Knowledge of the real
nature of an object is not dependent on the mind of the individual.  What then
(does it depend on)? It is dependent on the object itself.  Indeed, in the case of a
stump, knowledge is not “This is a stump or this is a person or this is something
else.”  “That is a person or something else” is incorrect cognition.  “That is a
stump alone” is knowledge in that it depends on the object.  In this manner, the
validity of cognition regarding existing objects is dependent on the object.  This
being so, knowledge of brahman is also only dependent on the object (brahman)
because it is an existing thing.182
akara raises this distinction specifically to differentiate gaining self-knowledge
through ravaa, manana , and nididhysana from any enjoined action, including
meditations such as upsan.183 Injunctions for action are only possible when there are
                                                 
182 kartum akartum anyath v kartu akya laukika vaidika ca karma, yathvena gacchati
padbhym anyath v, na v gacchatti |
na tu vastv eva naivam asti nstti v vikalpyate | vikalpans tu puruabuddhyapek | na
vastuythtmyajñna puruabuddhyapekam | ki tarhi vastutantram eva tat | na hi sthv ekasmin
sthnur v puruo ‘nyo veti tattvajñnna bhavati | tatra puruo ‘nyo veti mithjñnam, sthnur eveti
tattvajñna, vastutantratvt | eva bhtavastuviay prmya vastutantram | tatraiva sati
brahmajñnam api vastutantram eva bhtavastuviayatvt | BS 1.1.2 (my translation).
Also see BSbh 1.1.4 and US 1.1.13.
183 Many Vedntins contemporaneous with akara, particularly those that combined action and
knowledge as necessary for liberation (karmajñnasamuccayavdins), focused on meditation and/or
upsan as the primary method for gaining liberation.  As rival Vednta traditions with similar doctrines,
these philosophies were a greater threat to akara than Mms ritualists.  akara attempts to distance
himself from these traditions probably because they were so similar to him that he feared his Advaita could
be conflated for them.  In fact this distinction becomes of central importance within the akara lineages in
their effort to either establish or critique the prasakhyna contemplation.  According to akara, placing
too much importance on meditation and upsan results in elevating mental action, or a combination of
knowledge and mental action, to an independent means of knowledge.  For akara and his disciples, this
has the disastrous consequence of leading one down a fruitless path.
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options to do something, or not to do it, or to do it otherwise.  When options are available
in the context of Vedic ritual, then an injunction is required to direct us to the proper
action.184  In the case of injunctions there is the choice of following them or not because
action occurs independently of the nature of the thing concerned.  Knowledge is
fundamentally different because it has no options or alternatives.  Knowledge is a mental
event, yet it is not done, but determined by things.185 This makes injunctions for
knowledge superfluous.186
As an existing entity brahman falls outside the scope of action.  Vedic texts give
knowledge about injunctions which deal with potential activity for future (bhavya) results
alone.187  The knowledge of the injunction by itself does not result in acquiring the
desired object.  The results described in such sentences are only fulfilled through
performing an action or refraining from action.  In contrast, sentences giving knowledge
of an existing object such as brahman fulfill their purpose by that knowledge alone.
Once knowledge takes place there is nothing left to be done.  The means and the end are
contained within the sentence meaning arising as cognition.  In this way also there is no
choice.  After understanding an injunction, one chooses an action according to will.  But
after correctly understanding an existing object there is no choice remaining to
                                                 
184 This is particularly relevant because ritual knowledge does not fall in the domain of empirical
knowledge and is dependent on the authorless Veda.
185 There is of course to some degree a voluntary element to any knowledge.  One must create the proper
conditions to align the means of knowledge if they are absent.  For example, in visual perception the object
has to be within sight, my eyes have to be open, and I may need to turn a light on. Even after the basic
conditions are met I still need to intentionally direct my attention to the object.  These conditions fall under
the category of basic qualifications for knowledge to take place (adhikra).
186 Rambachan 1991, p. 80.
187 For more on the refutation of injunctions see BUbh 5.1.1 and BSbh 1.1.4
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understand it differently or as non-existent.  No further action is required because
knowledge is the goal. Furthermore, after one gains knowledge of brahman and liberation
is understood as accomplished, then all notions of duality and agency are consumed in
that knowledge.  Action is not possible when there is nothing left to be achieved and
there is no agency (karttvam) to attach to action and the result of action.  After self-
knowledge there is no need for the jñnin to actively eschew or perform action because
action is simply irrelevant at that point.
One way of explaining the distinction of puruatantra action and vastutantra
knowledge is the idea that knowledge is dependent on a means of knowledge
(pramatantra).  This distinction places the emphasis on the valid means of knowledge
required for properly cognizing an object.  For example, one has to use the organ of
smell, the nose, for olfactory knowledge.  Similarly, one must employ the Upaniads to
know brahman.  This emphasis negates the importance of a person’s will or imagination
for gaining knowledge, emphasizes the primacy of the prama, and implies a sense of
surrendering to the prama.  In operating a means of knowledge one should not wish it
one way or another, or let notions and biases get in the way, or decide what the object
will be.  In fact, in akara’s conception, one’s will should be suspended so it does not
interfere with the epistemic process.  akara’s emphasis is properly employing the
Upaniads, the only appropriate prama , to reveal knowledge of brahman.
Nididhysana is simply an extension or mode of the prama, which employs the
Upaniads and allows them to reveal self-knowledge.  There is no will on the part of the
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contemplator, except to properly engage the prama through anvaya and vyatireka and
to keep the mind free from distraction.
It is clear that the distinction between upsan and nidihysana is very important
in akara’s mind, for he repeats the same argument at least three times in BS 1.1.4 and
in numerous other places.188 For example he writes:
And this knowledge of identity of brahman and tman is not in the form (of the
upsana called) sampad .  For example, “The mind is indeed infinite, the
Vivedevas are also infinite, by this (upsana) he wins an infinite world” (BU
3.1.9). Nor is  self-knowledge in the form of adhysa (upsan).  For example,
“The mind should be meditated on as brahman” (CU 3.18.1).  “The sun is
brahman.  This is the teaching” (CU 3.19.1).  And here there is superimposition
of the idea of brahman on to the mind, the sun, etc.  Nor also is it based on some
special action (of meditation) like “The air is indeed the place of merger.  The
pra indeed is the place of merger (CU 4.3.1 and 4.3.3).189
akara goes on to argue that upsans centered on superimposition cannot be self-
knowledge because they contradict mahvkyas like “You are that” (CU 6.8.7), “I am
brahman” (BU 1.4.10), and “This self is brahman” (BU 2.5.19), which state the already
present identity between one’s self and brahman.  Intrinsic to upsans is a stream of
person-dependent thoughts linking two objects in order to superimpose them on each
                                                 
188 Also see BS 3.1.1, BS 4.1.3, BS 4.1.4, BUbh 1.4.7, 1.4.10, 2.1.4, 5.1.1, 2.3.39, GK 3.1 and GKbh 3.15.
In BUbh 1.4.10 akara specifically says that the sampad upsan can only be performed when two things
are different, not when they are the same, and therefore, the self and brahman are not available for
upsan. In BUbh 1.4.7 akara argues that upsan cannot generate a special knowledge of the self.  In
BUbh 2.1.4 he writes that knowledge of the conditioned brahman is not knowledge and that upsan
requires an original injunction. In GK 3.1 Gaudapda says a person trying to understand non-dual brahman
through upsan is pitiable or narrow in outlook.  In GKbh 3.15 akara says upsan is for dull people,
not for people seeking liberation. KU 1.5.6 states that what people worship (through ritual or upsan)
cannot objectify the self. BSbh 4.1.3 distinguishes the superimposed meditation of upsan with
knowledge of non-difference. BSbh 4.1.4 states that one should not fix the idea of one’s self on symbols.
There cannot be upsan on the self involving self identification
189 naceda brahmtmaikatvavijñna sapadrpam |  yath ananta vai mano ‘nant vivedev
anantam eva sa tena loka jayati iti | na ca adhysarpam | yath mano brahmety upsta  dityo
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other.  In the case of upsan identifying the lower brahman with one’s self, the
identification of one’s self with brahman is a superimposition of a concept by the mind.
This superimposed brahman is simply a concept of brahman with attributes, which
serves as a locus/object for imaginary superimposition.190  Yet this conceptually
objectified brahman cannot be non-dual brahman, which is not subject to objectification
by definition.  Such meditative superimpositions on brahman rely on the upsak
conceiving of his or her self as infinite, expanding endlessly in time and space,
embodying the universe, etc.  In reality, brahman is not subject to time or encapsulated
by any special boundaries and is thus not a thing or locus (lambana) available for such
meditations. The fact that brahman is not subject to upsan is yet another refutation of
upsan as a means for self-knowledge.191
One point akara emphasizes is that in the case of both upsan  and
nididhysana, there is no true transformation or change of the individual.  However in the
case of nididhysana, there is a radical change of one’s self-idenity. Upsan provides an
imagined identity that does not transform one into the other because the two objects
connected in upsan are intrinsically different and cannot result in factual identity
(though one may feel as though that identity is real after cultivating experiences of unity
                                                                                                                                                  
brahmety dea iti ca mana ditydiu brahmadyadhysa | npi viiakriyyoganimitta vyur vva
savarga pro vva savarga itivat | BS 1.1.4 (my translation).
190 In BSbh 4.1.5, akara mentions superimposing (adhyropana) the idea of brahman on to symbols
(pratka) or forms (pratim) as upsan and compares it to superimposing silver onto a shell.
191 See BSbh 1.1.4 and KU 1.5.
In BSbh 1.1.4 akara writes, “Brahman is denied to be an object of the act of knowing.  So also
there is the denial of its being the object of the act of meditation.  For in the text, ‘That which is not uttered
by speech, that by which speech is revealed’, it is first declared that brahman is not an object, and then it is
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in upsan).  Their superimposed identity is based on resemblance, a resemblance
conceived through connections and homologies provided by the Upaniads.  Establishing
the superimposed identity is dependent on the individual’s imaginative power, not on the
reality of the objects or a true unity of them. Furthermore, such meditations do not result
in the object of meditation itself or a transformation of the lower symbol/object to the
higher one.  Meditating on the mind as brahman does not turn the mind into brahman.
Or meditating on one’s self as a certain deity, such as Indra, will not make one Indra.192
On the other hand, when one understands “I am brahman” after contemplating sentences
that state the unity of self and brahman, then that person has recognized brahman. There
is no difference between the subject of contemplation (one’s self) and the object of
contemplation (brahman) after understanding such sentences through nididhysana
because this unity is already present and factual.  Self-knowledge becomes manifest in
everyday awareness.  Thus the Muaka Upaniad 3.2.9 states, “One who knows
brahman becomes brahman.”193
akara’s distinction of puruatantra and vastutantra is vital for the Advaitin,
who may have difficulty distinguishing nididhysana from doing an adhysa upsana
                                                                                                                                                  
said, ‘Know that alone to be brahman and not what people worship as an object’ (KU 1.5)” BSbh 1.1.4
(Gambhirananda 1996, p.31).
192 One will not become Indra in this lifetime.  See CU 3.14.1 for becoming the deity after death through
upsan. Upsan is a means to gradual liberation (krama-mukti) by becoming a deity in the brahma-loka
heaven after death. Sometimes akara states that, “How one meditates on him (the object of upsan),
him (that) indeed he becomes” (ta yath yathopsate tad eva bhavati).  See BSbh 1.1.11, 3.4.52, 4.3.15,
CUbh 1.1.7, BUbh 1.3.16 (Bader 1990, p. 35 fn. 26). This may not mean true identity. It can refer to
properties, qualities, or other things that characterize the object of meditation.  Or this may mean literal
identity when referring to the afterlife or subsequent birth.
193 sa yo ha vai tatparama brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati. akara also quotes BU 4.2.4 and BU 4.4.25
in support of this. Of course there is no true becoming, achieving, gaining, or reaching brahman for it is
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where one imagines one’s mind or limited sense of self as brahman. However, even if,
for the sake of argument, we hypothetically accept as true the basic tenets of Advaita,
such as the validity and infallibility of the Vedas, the self-luminous nature of awareness,
the identity of tman and brahman and furthermore, the distinction of upsan and
nididhysana there is still the obvious problem of just how the Advaita practitioner is to
make this distinction. How does an Advaitin know whether he or she is truly doing
nididhysana or accidentally practicing upsan? It seems quite likely that an Advaitin
may conflate an upsan that superimposes a notion of non-duality, infinity, or all-
pervasiveness, with nididhysana.
Advaitin renunciates and teachers have told me in discussions that they recognize
this potential dilemma but do not find it overly problematic.  In their opinion, upsan is
a useful gateway to nididhysana.  If the student has not clearly understood the
mahvkya, then he or she will naturally do upsan  and is unable to do nidihysana.
This will provide mental purity (antakaraa-uddhi), and with continued study and
clarity, the upsan will gradually transition into nididhysana. From this perspective it
is not essential (and perhaps not possible) that students are capable of judging whether
they are doing upsan or nididhysana.  On the other hand, it seems possible that
without proper understanding of this issue, students may plateau in their process, doing
upsan with the mistaken assumption it is nididhysana.
                                                                                                                                                  
already one’s self.  Such terms are used metaphorically.  The only thing that happens is the removal of
ignorance and the mind’s recognition of it’s own reality.
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Let me summarize the important differences between ups a n  and
nidhidhysana. The fundamental distinction is that upsan, unlike nididhysana, has no
self-knowledge content.  It is an action, and therefore subject to all the objections
concerning action in the context of liberation.  It creates time-bound results in the future
(bhavya phala), does not deal with present objects such as one’s self (or perceptual
objects), is dependent on human will, requires injunctions, and cannot remove self-
ignorance and superimposition. Upsan, even when using one’s mind or limited self-
conception as an object for superimposition, only deals with a qualified (sagua),
conceptual, and objectifiable  tman/brahman, and remains at the empirical level of
reality (vyvahrika avasth).194  For the Advaitin, upsan is primarily to be aimed at
purification of mind and mental steadiness.
Nididhysana is for recognizing an existing reality (bhta vastu), brahman.  It
makes use of a valid means of knowledge (prama) and depends on an immediate
object, and therefore does not have any direct positive results that are subject to time, and
is not subject to the drawbacks of action.  It is centered on brahman without attributes
(nirgua), which is absolute undifferentiated awareness at the highest level of reality
(pramrthika avasth) and identified as one’s self-luminous, non-conceptual,
                                                 
194 BS 3.1.1
In GK 3.1 Gaudapda says a person trying to understand non-dual brahman through upsan is pitiable or
narrow in outlook.
In BUbh 1.4.7 akara argues that upsan cannot generate a special knowledge of the self.
BUbh 2.1.4 says that knowledge of the conditioned brahman is not knowledge and that upsan requires
an original injunction.
KU 1.5.6 states that what people worship (through ritual or upsan) cannot objectify the self.
BS 4.1.4 states that one should not fix the idea of one’s self on symbols.  There cannot be upsan on the
self involving self-identification.
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unobjectifiable  tman.  Nididhysana is a process necessary for clarifying the meaning of
the Upaniads and removing obstacles to knowledge.
Furthermore, even though the verbal roots upa+s, vid , and jñ  are used
interchangeably in the Upaniads and by akara and others, Advaitins use radically
different language techniques depending on the contextual objective.  On the surface,
sentences dealing with upsan and nididhysana look similar because both state some
type of equation and both are intimately connected to the language found in the
Upaniads.  The difference lies in how akara interprets or resolves such equations. The
power of the Upaniadic word/sentence taken as the basis for upsan or nididhysana
appears to be quite different in each case.  Some upsans depend on a mystical power
intrinsic to the word itself, particularly those based on etymological equivalences.  So
too, is the power of the sentence, in terms of its meaning, the basis for nididhysana.
akara’s approach to nididhysana may at some levels retain this mystical power of the
word (at least in terms of claiming the authorless infallible nature of the Vedas and their
status as a prama) but this recedes to the background in nididhysana.  The power of
the mahvkya sentence is located in the method of understanding the sentence, not a
mystical power of the words.
 Passages dealing with upsan (as meditative action) use positive language of
names and forms to create a first-person identification. 195  On the other hand, passages
dealing with nididhysana employ continuity and discontinuity to isolate the self by
negating all erroneously superimposed self-identities, and state an equation to indicate the
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self’s identity as unobjectifiable brahman.  Corresponding to these forms of language, we
find that upsan builds one’s identity up, or negates one’s identity in order to establish a
greater one. Upsan uses imagined superimposition to create an experience and
conviction of identity, a temporary identification with something else.  There is still a
knower and known, even though one’s identity as the knower may change according to
the superimposed variables enjoined in the upsan. The ahakra (ego or I-sense) is not
negated in upsana in the way it is through knowledge, though the ahakra may be
affected.  One could say that the aggrandizement of the ahakra in upsan (by
visualizing it as the sun, or as infinite, or as brahman, etc.) is in fact a way of negating
one’s limited notion of self in favor of a different identity; however, one’s sense of self is
still only expanding to a larger sense of self which is still limited conceptually and within
the boundaries of finite space and time.  This is fundamentally different than the self’s
negation and identity as brahman through self-knowledge. Though upsan is a helpful
step towards self-knowledge because by changing self-identities one may become more
comfortable negating self-identities through self-knowledge.
Nididhysana negates one’s everyday identity so that only brahman is left.
Nididhysana cuts through dualities and directly allows non-duality and the identity of
tman with brahman as a self-evident fact.  All differences of knower, known, and
knowledge are resolved through this self-knowledge.  When the mind recognizes that it is
illumined by brahman and not separate from brahman, then there is no finite self to
                                                                                                                                                  
195 BU 4.3.14 and BU 4.3.9.
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superimpose upon something else and no locus for attachment.  Then the I-notion loses
its sense of finite identity and naturally dissolves.
2.4: akara and the prasakhyna Contemplation
One of the most important discussions in early Advaita literature regarding the
difference between action and contemplation is the question of prasakhyna, a practice
of repeated contemplation that is closely related yet fundamentally different from
Sankara’s nididhysana.  During akara’s time different Advaitins had slightly different
interpretations of prasakhyna, and their distinctions are not always clear.  The writing
of most of these cryas is lost, with only fragments or references of them surviving in
other texts.  However, from the brief references available, it appears that
prasakhynavdins, those who hold the prasakhyna position, believe that words are
insufficient for giving a direct experience of brahman.  Instead, one must transcend
verbal knowledge in order to gain a direct experience.  This doctrine led to disputes
among Vedntins. The fundamental question underlying this dispute is how a student
moves from studying the Upaniad texts to liberation.  Are the texts alone sufficient, and
if so how?  For we find many people who study texts but they appear to lack direct
knowledge and wisdom.  Or is some type of other mental action, such as meditation or
repetition, necessary for producing direct knowledge?  In this case we face another
problem: how is an action capable of producing knowledge?
 akara and his immediate disciple, Surevara, offer severe criticisms of
prasakhyna, evidence that they regarded it as a dangerous doctrine. akara and
Surevara believe that prasakhyna is a form of action, is independent of the Upaniads,
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and compromises the authority of the Upaniads. Intrinsic to their descriptions of
prasakhyna is that listening to the teacher unfold the Upaniads and studying the texts
can only result in mediate knowledge, not liberation; that indirect verbal knowledge must
be transformed into immediate knowledge through repeated contemplative action; and
that prasakhyna is an action apart from the Upaniads or some combination of action
and textual knowledge, which requires Mms style injunctions. For akara, the
prasakhynavdin, intentionally or unwittingly makes the erroneous move of elevating
the status of contemplation to that of an independent source of knowledge (prama).
This compromises the authority of the Upaniads by making them dependent on and
secondary to contemplation.
The prasakhyna position, which I will explain in the following sections, is
further complicated because early Advaitins struggled to distinguish nididhysana from
prasa kh yn a . Some criticized it and accused other Advaitins of being
prasakhynavdins, yet did not clearly differentiate their own position. Others agreed
with prasakhyna to some degree (even though they may not identity themselves as
prasakhynavdins) but certainly did not think their position contradicted Advaita
theory. Foremost among the latter are Maana Mira and Vcaspati Mira, who were
both well-known Advaitins. Maana Mira was an older contemporary of akara and
the author of the Brahmasiddhi, a text that was highly influential for many centuries.  The
later Advaita tradition tended to identify Maana with Surevara.  However, many
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scholars have contested this identification and most agree that they are not identical.196
Maana is the author of other authoritative works, particularly on Mms, such as the
Mmsnukramaika, the Bhvanviveka and the Vidhiviveka.  He also wrote the
Sphoasiddhi, a work analyzing the grammarians’ philosophy of language, as well as the
Vibhramaviveka, which looks at theories of error.197 Like Maana, Vcaspati Mira was
a polymath, who lived during the 10th century C.E.  His works ranged throughout Indian
philosophy and included Advaita Vednta, Nyya, Mms, Skhya, and Patañjali
Yoga.198  Within Advaita he is best known for his Bhmat, the first full length
commentary on akara’s Brahmastrabhyam.  Maana’s and Vcaspat i ’s
interpretations regarding the nature of contemplative practice contributed to the
polarization of later Advaita writing, and are one of the many issues that led to the
opposition between the later Bhmat and Vivaraa schools of Advaita.
From a bird’s eye view we have two broadly differing positions within the
literature:  (1) akara, his disciples, and the Vivaraa deemphasize nididhysana.  They
completely exclude any action from the domain of knowledge and emphasize the
importance and authority of the Upaniads for generating direct knowledge.  This is for
many possible reasons, mostly to uphold testimony in the form of the Upaniads, as the
ultimate and only source of knowing one’s self-identity with brahman.  A second
important issue is to avoid contradicting the doctrine of the self-luminosity of brahman.
                                                 
196 See Kuppuswami Sastri’s (1937) introduction to the Brahmasiddhi.  Others, such as R.
Balasubramanian 1983, 2000, argue that there is not enough evidence to make the clame that Maana and
Surevara are not the same person.
197 Balasubramanian 2000, p. 175.
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To some degree akara marginalizes nididhysana by reducing it to a mode of listening
to the Upaniads, so much so, that his references to nididhysana are fleeting and far
between.  Surevara follows suit and occasionally takes an extreme position, completely
negating nididhysana and emphasizing solely listening (ravaa) and logical reflection
(manana).  A similar rejection of nididhysana may also be implicitly read in some of
akara’s writing though he does not directly say so.
(2) The second position, found in Maana, Vcaspati, and the Bhmat school,
views nididhysana much more positively. Maana is a bit apologetic for action and
meditation.  He struggles to reconcile the necessity for direct experience of brahman with
the experientially indirect, theoretical, and verbal nature of Upaniad texts.  He thus
emphasizes the necessity of repeatedly contemplating the Upaniad sentences.  This is a
special form of contemplative practice, commonly labeled as prasakhyna, which
transforms indirect (paroka) knowledge from the Upaniads into direct immediate
(aparoka) knowledge. The position’s emphasis on nididhysana /prasakhyna may
create some questionable epistemological situations, as we shall see, yet its attempt to
find more value in nididhysana speaks to the realities of Advaita students who fail to
gain knowledge simply by listening, or who are stuck in a purely academic type of
knowledge and fail to see themselves as immediately non-dual.
I believe these two opposed positions reveal the difficulty Advaitins, in particular
akara, had in reconciling the tension between epistemology and practice. akara, in
his Upadeashasr, critiques a proto-prasakhyna position similar to that of Maana’s
                                                                                                                                                  
198 Sankaranarayanan 2000, p. 286.
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in his Brahmasiddhi.  Surevara directly and severely critiques Maana repeatedly
throughout his major works.  And in later centuries Praktman, who wrote on
Padmapda’s work in his Pañcapdikavivaraa (which became the moniker for the
Vivaraa school) criticized Vcaspati Mira’s Bhmat (which became the moniker for
the Bhmat school) for being a prasakhynavdin (though it is questionable if these
critiques are accurate or if they are creating straw men).
In the following sections I explore Maanamira’s understanding of
prasakhyna in his work, the Brahmasiddhi, and akara’s refutation of prasakhyna
in his Upadeashasr.  Do akara and Maana use the term prasakhyna in the same
way?  Does akara’s critique accurately dismantle Maana’s theory?  Can Maana
legitimately defend his arguments for prasakhyna against akara’s critique?  Crucial
doctrines are at stake in this discussion. The answers to these questions not only illumine
critical theoretical and methodological differences among early Advaitins, but also
penetrate Advaita’s essential, yet sometimes ambiguous understanding of verbal
knowledge, immediate knowledge, and contemplative practice.  At the same time the
ambiguities and dilemmas that surface in this discussion reflect their struggle to resolve
the tension between epistemology and practice in the tradition.
2.4.1: Maana’s Understanding of prasakhyna
The term prasakhyna has the meanings or enumeration or repeated meditation.
Perhaps the earliest philosophical use of prasakhyna occurs in Patañjali’s Yoga Stras,
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where it is attested only once in YS 4.29.199  It also occurs in Vysa’s commentary on this
stra and on four other stras.200   The Yogic  prasakhyna is a specific practice that
destroys afflictive psychological dispositions (kleas)201 and develops detachment
(vairgya) through discriminative insight (viveka khyti).  It is an important factor
leading to dharmameghasamdhi, the penultimate stage of the Yogi’s highest state of
samdhi.202
In the entire Brahmasiddhi, Maana uses the word ‘prasakhyna’ only twice
and in the same passage.203 Maana brings up prasakhyna in the context of refuting
different theories of the relationship between knowledge (jñna) and action (karman).
The second theory Maana raises is that action is a means to destroy desire, and only by
destroying desire though action will one gain the highest state of Prajpati.204  Maana
explains that this position is incorrect “because the destruction of desires is not through
the fulfillment of desires, but through prasakhyna, which has the ground of the
repetition of defects.”205  The Vedas contain various means to desirable objects.  A
                                                 
199 prasakhyne ‘py akusdasya sarvath vivekakhyter dharmamegha samdhi (YS 4.29).
200 See YSBh 1.2; 1.15; 2.2; 2.11
201 See Bader 1990, pp.76, 82 and Rukmani 2007, pp. 131-139 for more details about prasakhyna and
Yoga.
202  The use of prasakhyna may differ between the different stras and there are varying interpretations
of its definition.  It can also be identified with dharmameghasamdhi.  In 4.29 there is a reference to letting
go of attachment to the accomplisment (siddhi) of sarvabhva (omniscience or pervasive presence).
Vivekakhyti may not simply be detachment from desires, or accomplishments, but the discrimination of
the intellect (buddhi) from pure awareness (purua).  See Sundaresan 1998, pp. 65-71, and Rukmani 2007,
pp. 131-9 for more details.  Also see Dasgupta 1997, vol II pp. 250-51, who says prasakhyna is rooting
out saskras and that true knowledge takes place through dharmameghasamdhi.
203 BrSi, p. 30.
204 BrSi, pp. 27, 13-16.
205 BrSi, p. 30.  yato na kmaprpty kmapravilaya, api tu doaparibhvanbhuv prasakhynena (my
translation).
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person will never be fulfilled by these pleasurable objects and will continue pursuing
them and naturally become averse to pursing self-knowledge.  The only means to destroy
desire is by prasakhyna, the repeated meditation or analysis of the negative aspects and
faults of desire.206
It is interesting to note that Maana does not necessarily use the term
prasakhyna  for repetition of self-knowledge or as a synonym for Advaita’s
contemplation (nididhysana), but as a specific practice for neutralizing desires by
focusing on their negative repercussions.207  His use of prasakhyna is closer to its use
in Patañjali’s Yoga Stras, particularly YS 1.15. where Vysa, the commentator,
mentions the technique of seeing the defects of desirable objects when in their presence.
In fact, Maana even quotes Vysa’s commentary on YS 2.15 to lend more authority to
his advocacy of the effectiveness of prasakhyna.208  Ma ana is not employing
prasakhyna  as a means to convert indirect self-knowledge into direct self-
knowledge.209  It is a form of meditation used to let go of desires by understanding how
                                                                                                                                                  
The translation of “ground” (bhuv) is problematic here.  It could be translated as “prasakhyna
which has the ground of repetition of defects” if ‘bhuv’ is taken as a noun.  If ‘bhuv’ is understood as a
verb, making an upapadatatpurua compound, the sentence will be translated as ‘prasakhyna, which
arises by the repetition of doas”.
206 tasmt prasakhynam evaika kmanibarhaopya  (BrSi, p. 30)
207 In a separate instance he uses the phrase prasankytni karmi (BrSi p. 33 line 11), but this is in an
unrelated context, which takes the literal meaning of enumerated actions.
208 bhogbhysamanu vivardhanti rg kaualni  cendriym iti (YSBh 2.15).  Repetition of
enjoyment increases desires and sharpens the sense organs.
209 Maana does not make this entirely clear.  There are some parallels between his prasakhyna and
contemplative practice that make this distinction a bit ambiguous.  It is also important to note that the
context of the root sentence for nididhysana in Bhadrayaka Upaniad 2.4.5 (tm v are draavya
rotavya mantavya nididhysitavya) is dealing with letting go of attachments to wife, husbands, sons,
wealth, etc. (see chapter 4).  While the result of vairgya occurs both in the Advaitin’s and Patañjali
Yogin’s process, the methods are fundamentally different.  The Advaitin does not actively examine doas,
but understands the tman through knowledge.
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they are problematic in their consequences even when fulfilled and how they obstruct
one’s path to liberation.  This is a common practice for cultivating detachment (vairgya)
in Advaita and the larger context of Indian philosophies.  It is not unique to Maana.210
During or prior to akara’s time period, other Vednta traditions apparently
redefined prasakhyna as different variations of contemplative practice which involve
both knowledge and action.  Identifying Maana as a prasakhynavdin probably
occurred following akara refutation of the prasakhyna position in the US.  His
disciple Surevara also uses the term and specifically targets Maana and other
philosophers, such as Brahmadatta,211 as holding this view of prasakhyna.212
However, I believe it may be a historical misnomer to term Maana’s contemplation
prasakhyna because he employs prasakhyna to neutralize desires, and uses other
                                                 
210 For example, see Vatsyayana’s Nyyabha 4.2.46.  For a similar practice see GK 3.43 and akara’s
commentary on it.
211 See Jacob’s introduction to his edition of the Naikarmyasiddhi, p. xxiii.  He cites the Vidysurabhi
commentary on Naikarmyasiddhi 1.67 and nandajñna’s commentary on Surevara’s Sambandhavrtika,
verse 797, where Brahmadatta is named.  See also M. Hiriyanna, “Brahmadatta: An Old Vedntin,”
Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference 4 (1925), pp. 78-98 and Potter 1970, p. 354 (from
Thrasher 1979, p. 133 fn. 43).
212 Surevara built on akara’s arguments in his Naikarmyasiddhi, Taittirya Vrtikas, and
Bhadrayaka Vrtikas.
The prasakhynavda would also become identified with Vcaspati Mira’s conception of contemplative
practice.  Vcaspati Mira integrated many of Maana’s ideas into kara Advaita through his work, the
Bhmat, an important full-length k on karabhyam.  In addition, Vcaspati wrote an important
commentary on Vysa’s YSBh, the Tattvavairadi k, and was clearly aware of Yoga’s use of
prasakhyna.  In fact in his k on YSBh 1.15 he explains prasakhyna almost identically to Maana’s
use of it. I have not been able to find any reference to prasakhyna in the Bhmat and it is unlikely that
Vacaspati used that term to denote his contemplative practice.  Vcaspati also wrote a commentary on the
Brahmasiddhi named the Tattvasamk.  The Tattvasamk was thought lost, but recently scholars
discovered a fragmentary manuscript.  This manuscript is reconstructed and published by Diwakar Acharya
2006. Unfortunately we do not know how Vcaspati glosses Maana’s use of prasakhyna in this
commentary because the relevant folios are missing.  However, Vcaspati does support the indirect and
temporary nature of verbal knowledge and the necessity of repeated contemplation for direct knowledge in
the Tattvasamk (Acharya 2006, pp. 260-1).  It is possible that the opponents of the Bhmat tradition
labeled Vcaspati as a prasakhynavdin due to his integration of Maana, and as a polemical device for
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terms to denote contemplation.  This terminological confusion may also be influenced by
Patañjali’s and Maana’s mutual use of the word saskra.  The Yoga use of saskra
revolves around kleas and problematic desires.  As I will show below, Maana’s
contemplative practice does not focus on simple desires or kleas, but on specific
saskras that obstruct or disrupt knowledge of non-duality.213  Despite this problem of
terminology, in this study I will continue to use the term prasakhyna to mean
contemplation with Maana because this reading is commonly accepted by scholars.
This is in accord with Sakara and later Advaita caryas, who interpret prasakhyna in
the manner of Maana as repeated contemplation on Upaniad sentences, rather than the
Yogic process of examining doas.
Maana uses a number of different words and phrases for contemplation.  These
include tattvadaranbhysa (the repetition of the vision of reality),214 prama
anusandhna (examination of the means of knowledge),215 anucintanam (recollecting or
calling to mind),216 upsan.217 and dhynbhysa (repeated contemplation). 218  To take
just one example, Maana describes dhynbhysa as the following:
                                                                                                                                                  
identifying him with akara’s opponents; however, I do not know if this first originates in the Vivaraa
texts.
213 This distinction is a little difficult because Yoga has a range of types of saskra, mental dispositions
with information.  Some are are the last obstacles to gaining final asamprajñta samdhi, a type of
saskra that may be closer to Maana’s conception. It is possible that Maana was heavily influenced
by Yoga’s theory of saskra, particularly the idea of negating old saskras and instilling new ones.
214 BrSi, pp. 12-13.
215 BrSi, p. 35.
216 BrSi, p. 154.
217 BrSi, p. 134.  In the same passage he also uses ‘bhvan’ and ‘dhynam’ as synonyms for upsan.
Also see BrSi pp. 12-13.
218 BrSi, p. 12.
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How is ignorance removed?  By the different means spoken by the stra,
listening, reflection, and repeated contemplation219 and by celibacy etc.  How?
This repeated contemplation, preceded by listening and reflection (in the form of)
“This (self) is not that, not that,” is on the self, which is contradictory to the entire
world of duality.  That (contemplation) is clearly contradictory to the vision of
duality and removes it.  And (this contemplation) removing the vision of duality
in general also becomes dissolved by itself.220
We find two major aspects of Maana contemplation from the above quote and
the various terms he employs.  It is completely dependent on verbal knowledge produced
from the Upaniads and it consists of repetition.  One must repeatedly revisit the
mahvkyas. Repetition is focused on the meaning of words, and is not simple meditation
or mechanical repetition as in mantra japa.  In his view, contemplation appears to be
something deeper than basic semantic and syntactic analysis and it is supposed to
strengthen one’s sense of being brahman.  At the same time, even though he uses the
term upsan, it is not a form of visualization or mental worship.221
A number of interrelated factors lead Maana to emphasize the necessity of
repeated contemplation.  (1) In Maana’s view, language can only generate mediate,
indirect (paroka) propositional self-knowledge.  If language is intrinsically limited to
conferring indirect knowledge of brahman, then something additional is required to
transform that indirect knowledge into direct and immediately experienced knowledge.
                                                 
219 I translate dhyna as contemplation here because it is clearly a reference to nididhysana and follows
from listening.  It is not the same as more general forms of yogic concentration.
220 Kena punar upyenvidy nivartate? ravaamananadhynbhysair brahmacarydibhi ca
sdhanabhedai stroktai | katham? yo ‘yam ravaamananaprvako dhynbhysa
pratiidhkhilabhedaprapañce “sa ea neti neti” tmani, sa vyaktam eva bhedadaranapratiyog tan
nivartayati; sa ca smnyena bhedadarana pravilpayann tmanpi pravilyate | (my translation).
221  It is interesting to note that Maana rarely, if at all, uses nididhasana, the common term for
contemplation in Advaita, even when directly citing the root sentence for nididhysana which is in
Bhadrayaka Upaniad 2.4.5. For example, see BrSi, p. 12, 35.
122
(2) Even though the Upaniads convey knowledge of brahman, this knowledge does not
completely root out ignorance.  Ignorance continues even after verbal knowledge.  The
Advaitin requires prasakhyna as an additional means to destroy this remaining
ignorance. (3) The mental impressions (saskras) from perception and worldly activity
continue to obstruct knowledge.  A stronger samskra of direct knowledge of brahman
(aparoka brahmajñna), strengthened and reinforced through prasakhyna,  is
necessary to suppress and cancel out worldly samskras.  (4) The direct perception of the
world is more powerful than the indirect knowledge from the Upaniads.  The Advaitin
requires a direct experience of brahman which is able to negate direct perceptual
experience.
Maana is adamant that the Upaniads are the proper means of knowledge
(prama) for self-knowledge.222  They give real knowledge of brahman which is certain
and free of doubt.  He supplies copious arguments to demonstrate their validity and to
affirm that they are free from defects and not of human authorship.  He also tries to prove
that the knowledge conveyed by the Upaniads trumps that of perception.223  Despite his
defense of the Upaniads, he claims that all verbal knowledge is indirect or mediate
(paroka )224 and of a complex nature ( samsa).225  All verbal knowledge involves
relation of some manner.  In a sentence there are different words referring to different
objects. It is syntactically proper arrangement of words that makes a sentence.  Thus, the
                                                 
222 BrSi, pp. 156-7.
223 BrSi, pp. 39-44.  For further explanation see Thrasher 1978, pp. 156-7 and Balasubramanian 1983, pp.
140-50.
224 parokarpa bdajñnam (BrSi, p. 134).
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sentence can only generate a complex cognition that involves divisions, and cannot
generate a cognition of non-duality capable of eliminating ignorance.  Though the
Upaniads convey knowledge of brahman that is free from doubt, they cannot give
immediate knowledge, and ignorance continues in the absence of immediate
knowledge.226
Maana provides us with a significant discussion of the potential of abda
prama in his analysis of the concepts of karman and jñna.  He refutes a number of
different views, including the view that karman and knowledge are unconnected and
fundamentally opposed.  This view is strikingly similar to akara’s position and
possibly represents his lineage.227  In the ensuing discussion, an opponent to this view
argues that verbal knowledge cannot, by itself, provide non-dual knowledge of brahman.
It is unclear here whether this opponent is Maana’s own voice, though this appears
unlikely. 228 However, Ma ana clearly does not agree with the opposing prvapaka
                                                                                                                                                  
225 BrSi, p. 19.  See Thrasher 1978, pp. 150-1 and 1993, p. 93.
226 BrSi, p. 134.
227 This of course raises the question whether Maana knew akara. This is possible, however akara’s
views may have represented a broader group of Advaitins at that time and not his own idiosyncratic ideas.
In any case, I don’t believe Maana’s views are derivative of akara.
228 BrSi, p. 33.  This may be a siddhantaikadein who does not fully represent Maana’s views.  Thrasher
notes that the commentator nandapra takes the opponent to the prvapaka as the siddhntin, while the
commentator Citsukha takes him as a siddhntaikadein. Thrasher points out that after this discussion, in
Maana’s statement of his own position, he does not explicitly claim that verbal knowledge necessarily
involves division and does not use the same terminology as the objector to akara’s position (Thrasher
1978, p. 153).
According to Thrasher 1978, p. 153, we cannot claim that Maana does not accept verbal
knowledge without divisions (nirvikalpa). Thrasher appears to argue, based on Maana’s theory of
language and his abda brahman theory, that the final cognition can still be verbal and direct.  Even though
Maana comes to this from a different angle, it may take him closer to akara and contradict some of
akara and Surevara’s rejections of prasakhyna.  It also keeps Maana more tied to the Upaniads
throughout the process than I normally think of him, even if he is not explicitly using verbal methods such
as implication (laka).
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view resembling akara, that language is alone capable of generating direct liberating
knowledge.  It is the inefficacy of language that necessitates prasakhyna.
Maana claims that mental impressions (saskras) block a student from
gaining immediate knowledge.  Maana’s theory of saskra is intimately connected
with the mediate nature of verbal knowledge and underlies the necessity for
prasakhyna.  He says,
Even when the reality is determined firmly from a means of knowledge, false
appearances do not stop.  They continue to exist because of particular causes.  For
example, the error of seeing two moons or the error of direction continues for a
person who has gained the truth of the (single) moon or the (proper) direction
from a trustworthy person.  In a similar way, even for a person who has
understood the true nature of tman from the Vedas without any doubts, there is
still a continuation of false appearances because of the strength of strong mental
impressions (samskra) accumulated by the repetition of beginningless false
vision.  Something else is required for its removal, and that is well known in the
world as the repetition of the understanding of reality.229
In this passage Maana points out that firm knowledge from a proper source is not
capable of overpowering deep-rooted saskras.  Saskras are so powerful that they
continue causing confusion and even create completely illusory emotions and sense
perceptions.  Repetition of one’s verbal understanding of reality (tattvadaranbhysa) is
the necessary additional practice that removes saskras. Maana clarifies how this
repetition functions:
                                                 
229 nicite ‘pi pramnt tattve na sarvatra mithyvabhs nivartante, hetuvied anuvartante ‘pi;  yath
dvicandradigviparysdaya ptavacanavinicitadikcandratatvnm;  tath nirvicikitsd mnyd
avagattmatattvasya andimithydaranbhysopacitabalavatsaskrasmarthyn
mithyvabhsnuvtti; tan nivtaye ‘asty anyad apekyam; tac ca tattvadaranbhyso lokasiddhi |
BrSi, p. 35 (my translation).
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Strengthening (its own) saskra, and having blocked the earlier saskra,
repetition accomplishes its own purpose (effect)….Even when the vision of
reality (verbal knowledge) takes place, when an effective saskra is not
instilled, and when a saskra born of the vision of falsity is stronger, even
certitude becomes a false object. For example, a person confused about a
direction, who does not instill the knowledge imparted to him from a qualified
person (becomes confused again) because he is seen to continue as before (in the
wrong direction).  So too, even when the nature (of the snake) as rope is
understood, fear is seen (in him) when the means of knowledge is not examined.
Therefore, even when the vision of reality has arisen from a means of knowledge,
they consider that the repetition of the vision of reality eradicates and suppresses
the earlier stronger saskra, which is the result of the repetition of beginningless
false vision.  So too, it is said, “it is to be reflected on, it is to be contemplated.230
Maana affirms the proposition that the Upaniads not only give knowledge of
brahman but do so with absolute intellectual certainty.  In a later passage in the same
discussion he again states that knowledge is produced from words and that the Upaniads
result in certainty because they are free from all doubt.231  These passages show a
particular aspect of Maana’s understanding of language and contemplation.  Even
though the Upaniads may only give indirect knowledge, they can still remove all doubts
and lead to nicaya (firmness or certainty); however, this nicaya is not the final
liberating knowledge.  Maana’s nicaya is perhaps a form of intellectual certainty
where one is convinced of a particular position, in this case non-duality. If a person
accepts the validity of the Upaniads, the authority of the teacher, and has doubts
removed through logical arguments he or she will be convinced.  This intellectual
                                                 
230 abhyso hi saskra drahayan prvasaskra pratibadhya svakrya satanoti…. jte ‘pi
tattvadarane, anhite ca paau saskre, drahyasi ca mithydaranaje saskre nicay api mithyrth
bhavanti;  yath dimhasynanusahitptavacasa, prag iva pravttidarant;  tath
pramitarajjubhvy api rajjv pramnnanusandhne sarpabhrnty bhayadaranam|
tasmj jte ‘pi pramnt tattvadarane andimithydaranbhysaparinipannasya drahyasa
saskrasybhibhavyocchedya v tatvadaranbhysa manyante |  tath ca mantavyo
nididhysitavya ity ucyate |  BrSi, p. 35 (my translation).
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conviction may appear firm, but in reality is weak and shallow in the face of
contradictory life experiences.
The goal of prasakhyna is not nicaya, for that would make it redundant to
verbal knowledge which has already accomplished nicaya.  Maana explains that
repeated contemplation of the verbal knowledge of brahman has a two-fold effect.  It
strengthens the saskra born from verbal knowledge and suppresses and eradicates
contradictory saskras of duality.  According to this theory, a prama, in this case the
Upaniads, produces a weak saskra.  This saskra lacks strength because it is new
and contradicted by other saskras.  In the context of self-knowledge, there are
innumerable samskras from previous lifetimes negating the possibility of non-duality
and reinforcing the reality of the world and duality.  Verbal brahmajñna has no chance
against such an overwhelming force, and error will continue to remain despite any
nicaya.    The solution is to repeatedly contemplate one’s view of non-dual reality.
In response to the explanation of samskras, an objector retorts that if the
prama produces certitude, then there should not be any activity for that person.232  At
this point it should also make no difference if false appearances continue to exist.
Maana gives two additional illustrations to solve this doubt.  When a spectator is
watching a play, he knows certainly that the play is not real.  But despite this knowledge,
the actors on stage are the causes of his sadness and fear, emotions that are false
appearances.  Or a person may clearly know the sweetness of sugar, but due to a certain
                                                                                                                                                  
231 BrSi, p. 35.
232 BrSi, p. 35.
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illness such as jaundice, the sugar has the false taste of bitterness.  Even though one
logically knows that the experience of bitterness is only a false appearance, it is
disturbing and forces the individual to spit out the sugar.233
In a later section of the Brahmasiddhi, Maana continues to develop his
argument for prasakhyna.  He writes,
Verbal knowledge has an indirect form and the appearance of the world has a
direct form.  Because of this, there is no mutual contradiction between the two.
The appearance of the world is not a non-toucher of the self, is not a non producer
of any effect, is not non bondage.234
Here Maana claims that indirect verbal knowledge remains distant from the individual.
The phenomenal world on the other hand is immediately and directly experienced and is
a constant barrage of stimuli to all our sense organs.  Verbal knowledge and perception
are in effect different species and do not oppose each other.235  The directly experienced
world has a stronger effect than verbal knowledge.  Maana illustrates this with another
version of the sugar illustration, similar to the one in his discussion of saskras.  In the
process of converting sugar cane into sugar (jaggery) there are a number of intermediate
stages of the sugar substance that are occasionally consumed.  In one of these
intermediary stages the sugar tastes bitter, even though one knows this is a false
appearance.  Other pramas, such as being told it is sugar, prior experience, and
inference, demonstrate that the sugar is not intrinsically bitter.  The taste of bitterness has
                                                 
233 BrSi, p. 35.
234 ucyate parokarpa bdajñnam, pratyakarpa prapañcvabhsa;  tena tayor avirodhena
prapañcvabhso ntmsaspar, nkicitkara, na na bandha | BrSi, p. 134 (my translation).
235 akhpni’s commentary provides details (BrSi, pp. 265-6).
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a similar form to perception but does not actually relate to the substance.  Despite
knowing this fact, the appearance of perception is more powerful, and due to dislike one
will spit it out.236
Verbal knowledge of non-duality contradicts the reality of the world, but this
contradiction has little effect for the practitioner because in Maana’s opinion, verbal
knowledge cannot counter direct experience.  The solution is strengthening verbal
knowledge into direct experience (sktkra) through prasakhyna.237  At this point
knowledge becomes aparoka and exists for the individual at the same level as direct
perception.  When aparoka knowledge and the phenomenal world are thus mutually
contradictory, self-knowledge can negate the appearance of the world.  Then the
individual becomes liberated, is not affected by the world, and there is no occasion for
error to arise again.
2.4.2: akara’s Critique of prasakhyna in the Upadeashasr
akara provides an extended critique of the prasakhynavda in metrical
chapter eighteen of his Upadeashasr.238  He summarizes the prasakhyna position in
verses 18.9-18.239  The following are the major aspects he points out: (1) Prasakhyna,
which consists of repetition (anucintanam) and reasoning (yukti) is necessary because
                                                 
236 See BrSi, p. 134 and akhapi’s commentary on this in BrSi, pp. 265-6.  akapi identifies this
intermediate substance as khaa.  I’m unclear on exactly what khaa is.  See Sanskrit khaaarkar or
Marthi Kkvi.
237 It is not clear if Maana endorses a transformation to immediacy or if aparoksatvam is coming simply
from the removal of samskaras.  From the latter perspective he would sound much closer to akara.
238 It is important to note that akara describes a type of contemplative practice he calls “parisakhyna”
in the third part of the prose section of the Upadeashasr.  Furthermore I have doubts whether this section
can be safely attributed to akara.  For more information, see Sundaresan 1998; Kunjunni Raja 1990; and
Mayeda’s introduction to his critical edition of the Upadeasahsr.
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liberation does not arise when one is told ‘You are that’ (tat tvam asi).  Hearing the
sentence once and understanding its literal meaning does not free a person from samsra.
Further repetition is required.240  (2) Prasakhyna is subject to an injunction ( vidhi) like
a ritual.  It is enjoined as something to be performed after verbal knowledge.241  (3)
Saskras from perception negate the knowledge that ‘I am brahman’.242  (4) Perceptual
knowledge negates knowledge gained from the Upaniads.243  5) No one is seen to be
liberated from samsra simply by understanding a sentence.  If someone is, he must have
done repetition in a previous birth.244  And (6) the rules of conduct of a sannysin would
not be approved by the stra.245
akara’s prasakhynavdin has a striking resemblance to Maana.  He points
out the problem of indirect knowledge, and more specifically the problem of saskras
and the conflict between perceptual knowledge and verbal knowledge.  The major point
of difference is the claim that prasakhyna  involves an injunction.  Maana
vociferously refutes the application of injunctions for self-knowledge throughout the
Brahmasiddhi whereas akara’s prasakhynavdin insists on them.  Though Maana
                                                                                                                                                  
239 akara also uses prasacak synonymously with prasakhyna (US 18.9).
240 US 18.9-10.
241 US 18.11-12.
242 US 18.13.
243 US 18.14.
244 US 18.15.  This probably refers to someone like Vmadeva who was liberated while in his mother’s
womb from listening.  See BU 1.4.10 and Aitareya Upaniad 2.1.5.
245 US 18.16.  akara’s prasakhynavdin is implying that one must accept the injunction of
prasakhyna.  If the injunction is not accepted then the rules of conduct for the paramahasa sanysin
would not be approved by the stra, and in that case he may or may not follow the rules.  If someone gives
up these rules, he is someone who has risen to (reached the stage of) a paramahasa and then fallen
(rudha patitatvam).  But it is not desirable to conceive of a paramahasa who can fall from that stage for
it threatens the whole concept and institution of sannysa.  See nandagiri’s commentary for an
explanation.
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does employ the term ‘anucintanam’, he does not specifically use the term ‘yukti’ in
connection with his contemplative practice.  Unlike akara, Maana does not use the
term ‘prasakhyna’ in the context of contemplation, but rather for doaparibhvana,
similar to its use in Patañjali’s Yoga.
It is likely that akara was refuting a popular concept held by other Advaitins
and not directly targeting Maana in the Upadeashasr.246  Ma ana appears to fall
somewhere in between akara and the doctrines akara is attacking, and thus he may
represent some other Advaita lineage existing at that time. However, akara’s critiques
are still applicable to Maana.  akara refutes prasakhyna in two ways.  He asserts a
proper method for understanding Upaniads sentences and points out the illogical
contradictions inherent to prasakhyna.
Let us look briefly at akara’s method in the US for recognizing the self before
we expand on his method in the next chapter.  akara explains that the Upaniads impart
knowledge when they are understood through the specific methods of negation (neti neti)
and continuity and discontinuity (anvaya-vyatireka).247 He writes,
Knowledge that the tman is always free is from the sentence and not otherwise
(from prasakhyna).  The understanding of the meaning of the sentence is
preceded by the memory of (the implied) meanings of words  (US 18.190).
                                                 
246 nandagiri does not specifically state Maana as the prvapaka, but does clarify the opponent as
being an advaitin, literally saying an idea belonging to one’s own herd (svaythyam matam).
 Surevara specifically attacks Maana by building on akara’s arguments.
247 US 18.96; 18.177-183; 18.190-1.
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The meanings of words are firmly remembered (understood) by (the process of)
continuity and discontinuity.  In this way one understands the self is free from
sorrow and action  (US 18.191).248
 The sentences work by negating the false superimpositions of one’s self onto the
mind and body.  When superimpositions are dissolved, then the reality of one’s self is
recognized.  This takes place specifically through a “great sentence” (mahvkya) such as
“You are that” (tat tvam asi) or “I am brahman” (aham brahmsmi).  When two words
such as ‘you’ and ‘that’ are equated through grammatical apposition, the sentence
appears contradictory.  The lack of syntactical contiguity (yogyat) appears to thwart the
complete sense of the sentence and forces one to look for the implied meanings of the
words.  In this case one must discover the continuous presence of pure existence which
underlies one’s self and worldly phenomena, and one must drop anything which is
discontinuous, such as the mind, body, and external objects.  Through this method of
reasoning based on the sentence, the self is determined as non-dual.  Complete
understanding of non-duality might not occur the first time one hears the sentence.  It
may take an extended time to understand a sentence correctly, requiring a process of
reflection and contemplation.249  The purpose of listening, reflection, and contemplation
is only to understand the sentence.  Moka occurs at the same time the sentence is finally
and clearly understood.250
                                                 
248 nityamuktatvavijñna vkyd bhavati nnyata |
vkyrthasypi vijñna padrthasmtiprvakam || US 18.190 (my translation).
anvayavyatirekhbhy padrtha smaryate dhruvam |
eva nirdukham tmnam akriya pratipadyate ||  US 18.191 (my translation).
249 For example, see akara’s commentary on Brahma Stra 4.1.2 (ligt ca).
250 US 18.103-4.
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Despite the brief summary of akara’s method, a fundamental question still
remains: How does the sentence generate immediate knowledge?  In one passage,
akara’s prasakhynavdin raises the following objection:
(Immediate knowledge) is not gained from the sentence like the satisfaction
gained from eating.  (Immediate knowledge of brahman from) understanding the
sentence is like preparing pyasam from cow dung  (US 18.201).251
This objection draws on common experience.  I cannot satisfy my hunger by reading a
menu, or enjoy the taste of sweetness from hearing the word ‘sugar’.  Similarly, the claim
that words are an independent means to direct knowledge is as foolish as trying to make a
sweet dish from cow dung. The analogy implies that there is no logical causal process
possible because there is an unbridgeable gap between experience and words, which are
incompatible species.  This objection sounds perfectly legitimate, yet it is too strong a
claim and overlooks akara’s understanding of brahman and experience.  akara gives
the following response:
This is indeed true, indirect knowledge is from sentences dealing with objects
other than the self. But this is not the case with reference to the inner self, which
is like the gain of the number252   (US 18.202).
In order to follow akara’s position we must return to Advaita’s conception of
self-luminosity (svaprakatvam), a critical presupposition of akara’s method of
reasoning.  According to akara, brahman is pure undifferentiated consciousness that is
                                                 
251 yathnubhyate tptir bhujer vkyn na gamyate |
vkyasya vidhtis tadvad goaktpyaskriy || US 18.201 (my translation).
Pyasam is milk boiled with rice and sugar.
252 satyam evam antmrthavkyt prokyabodhanam |
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other than the mind, yet illumines the mind.  Brahman is the ground and presupposition
of the subjective experience that lies at the core of an individual.  Advaita makes this
claim based on an important position that consciousness is self-illuminated (svapraka),
self-evident (svasiddha), and immediate (aparoka).  As self-luminous consciousness,
brahman is immediately evident as the real subject and illumines all objects, but cannot
itself become an object of perception. It does not require anything outside of itself, such
as a means of knowledge, another source of consciousness, or a separate cognition, to
reveal itself.  Whenever a thought arises in the form of a mental modification (vtti), it is
immediately known due to the self-luminous nature of brahman. As consciousness,
brahman is always the subject and immediately present in all experience and cognition.
It cannot be objectified.
Self-illumination  is a foundational theory guiding akara’s method of reasoning
to find the self.  If brahman is already existing and self-luminous, then no new
experience or objectification of brahman is necessary or even possible.  The process of
anvyaya-vyatireka used through mahvkyas such as ‘You are that’ does not objectify
brahman, but removes the veil of ignorance that causes the erroneous superimposition of
limiting adjuncts onto brahman. When one’s self is already immediately present, then
words can lead to direct knowledge through this negative process of removing obstacles
that obstruct knowledge of an immediate entity. Identity statements such as “You are
that” strip away false identities associated with the self.  Moka accomplishes what is
already accomplished.  There is no action that needs to be done.  The only goal is to
                                                                                                                                                  
pratyagtmani na tv eva sakhyprptivad adhruvam || (my translation).
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recognize the self as it truly is because an individual is already non-dual brahman.  This
is not a new experience because your self is awareness itself, the substratum underlying
each and every experience and cognition.
akara points out a number of problems in the prasakhynavdin’s position.
He explains that an insistence on prasakhyna will falsely elevate action to an
independent prama, require injunctions, make liberation limited by time, negate the
prmyam of the Upaniads, and contradict brahman’s self-luminous nature.
Prasakhyna is an additional mental action of methodical repetition, which is
necessary because the mahvkya is unable to fulfill its goal of imparting self-
knowledge.253  But if prasakhyna is an action, or a combination of action and
knowledge, it will fall into a number of problems explained previously.  An action
produces a new result and all products are finite and time bound.  If moka is a result it
will last for a finite period of time and will be other than one’s self.254 This contradicts
the Upaniads and the timeless and infinite nature of brahman. Moka, which is not
separate from brahman, is already accomplished and thus outside the sphere of action.255
akara critiques prasakhyna for falling under human volition, similar to his
critique of upsan.  He also points out the illogical dependency of knowledge and action
in the prasakhyna theory:
                                                                                                                                                  
The ‘number’ is a reference to the ‘tenth man’ story explained below.
253 US 18.19, US 18.206, also nandagiri on US 18.200, 206.
254 US 18.207; nandagiri on US 18.19.
255 US 18.209-10.
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Should there not be (knowledge) from listening alone, then there certainly must
be an injunction (of repetition).    Even before listening to the teaching, it is
accepted that the self exists by itself. (18.102)256
akara argues that, if immediate knowledge does not take place from the Upaniads,
then there must be an injunction (vidhi) for repetition like all other actions known from
the Vedas.257  In this case, action becomes primary, and by extension, the
prasakhynavdin must admit that that self-knowledge is dependent on action and the
volition of the individual rather than dependent on the nature of the object. This is
problematic, because individually dependent mental action does not need to match the
object of inquiry.  It may or may not be valid knowledge and can be reduced to belief or
imagination.  The problem with prasakhyna is its insistence on action after the
prama has completed its function.  This does not make sense in akara’s theory of
knowledge.  It is superfluous, like repeatedly turning the head and opening the eyes again
to see an object already seen.  akara clearly states that liberating knowledge occurs at
the time of listening when there are no obstructions.
Valid knowledge arises at that time (of listening) and results in freedom from
hunger, etc.  There is no doubt about the meaning of sentences such as ‘You are
that’ in the past, present, and future. (18.103) 258
There is no doubt that valid knowledge of one’s self indeed arises (at the time of
listening), because the self, whose nature is awareness, has no obstacles.
(18.104)259
                                                 
256 rutamtrea cen na syt krya tatra bhaved dhruvam |
vyavahrt purpa sadbhva svayamtmana || 18.102 (my translation).
No one doubts the existence of his or her self because it is self-evident.
257 Also see US 18.21.
258  aanydinirmuktyai tatkl jyate pram |
tatvamasydivkyrthe triu kle ‘py asaaya || US 18.103 (my translation).
259 pratibandhavihnatvtsvayam cnubhavtmana |
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The prasakhynavdin agrees that the Upaniads are the proper prama for
self-knowledge, but asserts the abda prama is indirect and thus incomplete.  akara
argues that if prasakhyna is required then it must be considered an independent
prama .  This is due to the fact of making self-knowledge dependent upon
prasakhyna.  akara is not averse to repetitive contemplation (nididhysana) for all
students.  Some students may require an extended period of time to remove the obstacles
to their understanding; but for akara, nididhysana is dependent on ravaa.  In fact,
nididhysana can be understood as an advanced mode of ravaa.  akara sees the
prasakhyna position as reducing ravaa to a subsidiary position, dependent on mental
activity.  If this is taken to its logical conclusion, the prasakhynavdin should claim
that prasakhyna, and not the Upaniads, is the prama for self-knowledge.  But
prasakhyna, or any other form of action, is not a means of knowledge like perception
or inference, and it is unreasonable to consider it an independent prama.   In addition,
this leads to the repugnant consequence of destroying the validity of the Upaniads and
undermining the entire Advaita pursuit.260
 akara believes that the prasakhynav d a  not only destroys the
epistemological method of Advaita, but also contradicts  self-luminosity.  Prasakhyna
presupposes a distinction and distance between the individual and moka.  Advaita
identifies moka and brahman; therefore, if the individual is distinct from moka he is
                                                                                                                                                  
jyetaiva pam tatra svtmany eva na saaya || US 18.104 (my translation).
This means there are no obstacles in understanding the self through a sentence like ‘you are that’ because
of the process of anvyava vyatireka.
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also distinct from brahman with the result that his nature is not already free.  akara
writes,
There should be this (prasakhyna) if a difference between the listener and the
object of listening is desired.  In this case, there will be a violation of the desired
goal.  (Therefore) this speech (idea of prasakhyna) is illogical in all ways (US
208).261
In addition, this distance between seeker and brahman implicit to the prasakhyna
position reinforces the desire to produce a new immediate experience of brahman, and
cultivates the idea that one must reach or merge with brahman in some manner.
Reaching, gaining, or requiring a new experience of brahman is mutually contradictory to
its self-luminous nature.262  An insistence on producing new immediate knowledge is
only possible if brahman is not self-luminous.  Brahman cannot come into or go out of
experience and it can never be objectified or reached.
2.4.3: In Maana’s Defense
akara provides a sustained and penetrating critique of prasakhyna.
Accepting these arguments on the merit of akara’s authority may be tempting, but let
us step back and question how well they target Maana.  A careful analysis of Maana
reveals that he attempts to counter many of the arguments that akara makes.
Maana and akara have some clear differences in their incorporation of action
in the pursuit of liberation.  Maana was not a sannysin and places more emphasis on
                                                                                                                                                  
260 US 18.199-200.
261 rotrotavyayor bhedo yada syd bhaved idam |
irthakopa eva syn na yukta sarvath vaca || US 18.208 (my translation).
262 See akara on Brahma Stra 1.1.4.
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the householder stage (ghastha rama).  Though he accepts the possibility of liberation
through the sanysa rama, he claims that engaging in vaidika karman throughout
one’s life is a more efficient path toward liberation than renouncing karman through
sanysa. He endorses karman as a helpful accessory to knowledge according to the
principle of sayogapthaktva (sevarality of conjunction).263 Based on this principle,
karman can have a subsidiary function of aiding self-knowledge along with its intended
respective results, such as attaining heaven.  Maana also accepts that karman can act
for purification.264  His endorsement of this variation of karma-jñna-samuccaya would
be disconcerting for akara and may have instigated critiques of him by later
Advaitins.265  However, we should not conflate Maana’s incorporation of ritual karman
with his contemplative practice.  Maana does not equate them and discusses them in
separate contexts.  In his opinion, ritual action is optional, and acts as an indirect catalyst
that is more efficient than sanysa.  Prasakhyna on the other hand, is a specific
indispensable practice required for making verbal knowledge aparoka.
Maana does not clarify the distinction between knowledge and action with the
precision of akara, but I believe he does not view prasakhyna as an action, certainly
not in the way he understands ritual action.  Maana’s use of terms like upsan and
bhvan for contemplation may lead to the doubt that his contemplation is a type of
                                                 
263 BrSi, pp. 36-37.
264 BrSi, p. 36.
265 Though akara is considered to be hostile to karma, he does incorporate it in certain ways.  See
Brahma Stra 3.4.42 and discussions of Bhadrayaka Upaniad 4.4.22.  But akara only gives an
endorsement of karma in the context of gaining purity of mind and for karma yoga, or when required for
sensible exegesis.  He negates the utility of karma in most instances unlike Maana’s open insistence on
it.
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mental action similar to other upsans, consisting of some type of worship, guided
conceptualization, or imaginary superimposition.266  However, Ma ana views his
contemplation as a continued analysis of verbal knowledge (anusandhna  or
anucintanam), and not as a guided conceptualization.  In addition, this repetition does not
have an unseen (ada) future (bhavya) effect like Vedic ritual or upsan.  It culminates
in immediate knowledge like the result of eating.267
Maana makes several other points that block any accusation of action.  He
claims in multiple places that moka is not an effect.268  Moka is not a future result and is
not something that is accomplished or produced like the results of karman, for if moka
begins it must also have an end.  Maana further argues that brahman is not something
that can be attained for it is already one’s self.269  In an argument reminiscent of akara,
he explains that moka is the manifestation of one’s already existing form by the removal
of conditioning adjuncts.  Removal of these adjuncts, or coverings, does not produce
brahman, but reveals brahman, which was and is always there.270 This explanation of
brahman and self-knowledge appears to negate any action in prasakhyna and implies
that prasakhyna, similar to akara’s method, works through negation and removal.  In
addition, it does not contradict self-luminosity because brahman is not reached, gained,
or produced.  Maana’s reiteration that brahman is an existing object, and that
                                                 
266 If this is taken to its extreme conclusion, one could reduce Maana’s entire process to bhakti or
visualization.
267 See BrSi, pp. 152, 154-5 and akhpni’s commentary on pp. 291-4 and 265-6.
268 BrSi, pp. 36, 77.
269 BrSi, p. 120.
270 BrSi, p. 37.
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knowledge can only illumine what already exists, hints at an implicit distinction between
object-dependent knowledge and individual-dependent action.
If prasakhyna is not a volition based action then it does not falsely raise action
to an independent prama and subsequently negate the prmyam of the Upaniads.
Maana also devotes the entire third chapter of the Brahmasiddhi, the niyoga ka, to
refuting any possibility of injunctions with reference to self-knowledge from words, the
repetition of that knowledge, or the immediate manifestation of knowledge.  Implicit to
his argument against injunctions is his belief that knowledge only deals with existing
objects and is not subject to volition or action.
2.4.4: Unresolved Issues with Maana
We can reconstruct a number of counter arguments to akara from Maana’s
Brahmasiddhi; however, several issues remain unresolved.  Maana’s understanding of
paroka and aparoka self-knowledge is potentially problematic. Does his distinction of
paroka and aparoka knowledge contradict self-luminosity?  Mediate knowledge of
one’s immediately known self is a contradiction.  It cannot be termed “knowledge,” yet at
the same time it is not fully an error.  Perhaps a type of faith or belief is a more
appropriate term.  In order to maintain the paroka/aparoka distinction, one has to
explain the epistemological movement from mediacy to immediacy; but this is difficult
with reference to self-knowledge.  How does this transformation take place?  Is a positive
action of transformation congruent with the negative process or removing ignorance?  Or
is it possible to define transformation as a purely negative process?
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Can Maana maintain the Upaniads’ status as a prama if they only give
paroka knowledge?  If paroka “self-knowledge” is not immediate knowledge, but
simply belief or conviction grounded in an assertion of the authority of the Vedas, and
dependent on a mental process for immediacy, then the Upaniads are not an independent
prama.
Another problematic issue is Maanas discussion of saskras and experience.
Let us turn back to his sugar analogy.  Maana employs this analogy differently than the
neo-Vedantic example in the introduction, which dismisses language totally.  He wants to
maintain the importance of language while pointing out the problem of perceptual
experiences that contradict one’s knowledge. Maana claims that self-knowledge must
be immediate and firm so that it directly conflicts with the experienced world.271 But is
Maana implying the necessity for a new experience of brahman or an experience
where all contradictory mental impressions and perceptual data that contradict non-
duality are absent?  This is analogous to the sweet sugar, which is perceived as bitter.
This analogy appears to imply that the sweetness of sugar is useless if it tastes bitter and
one must work towards negating bitterness through an experience of sweetness.  The
knowledge that sugar is sweet is constant, but one’s experience must conform to that
knowledge.
A similar example to the bitter sugar is the perception of grief or anger during a
play, even though one knows it is theatrical and unreal.  Only at the conclusion of the
actor’s performance do these emotions cease.  Yet why are these examples and their
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corresponding experiences necessarily problematic?  Are these experiences negating or
contradicting one’s knowledge?  Perhaps one can comfortably hold knowledge even
while facing contradictory perceptions.  In fact, the analogy of the play is also used to
illustrate a person possessing self-knowledge, who is an observer enjoying the play and
the experience of emotions, yet simultaneously maintaining total clarity about the
theatrical nature the play.272  Maana’s use of these examples lead to some confusion of
whether he claims that one’s experience of the world must change, or that one must
maintain a mental state devoid of any perceptual experience in order to deal with the
phenomenal world.
Maana explains that repeated contemplation strengthens the saskra of non-
duality and negates empirical saskras.  How does this negation (virodha) work?  Why
would saskras of brahman negate empirical saskras?  Are they necessarily
mutually contradictory?  And if they are a contradictory then does this necessitate the
generation of new experience?  Even if it does work, to what degree do empirical
saskras need to be attenuated; completely or just to a certain degree that they do not
obstruct self-knowledge?  It is also not clear whether contemplation simply strengthens
the knowledge saskra or creates an entirely new saskra, which is immediate in
nature.
Maana argues for self-luminosity and does not explicitly commit to attaining a
new experience of brahman; yet it is unclear whether he thinks self-knowledge is simply
                                                                                                                                                  
271 BrSi p. 134.
272 For example, see Pañcada chapter ten, entitled “The lamp of the theater.”
143
a strengthening of the saskra generated from the Upaniads, the generation of a
completely new and independent saskra, or primarily the negation of contradictory
saskras.273  A new saskra sounds like a new experience and may support akara’s
critique that prasakhyna becomes an independent prama.  If self-knowledge is just a
strengthening of the Upaniad s a skra , then the pramatvam of Upaniads is
maintained as in akara’s nididhysana; however, how can a strengthened saskra
tally with the paroka/aparoka distinction?  akara’s avoidance of paroka and
aparoka knowledge bypasses this dilemma.274  Can strengthening a saskra transform
knowledge from paroka to aparoka or is there simply a gradual process of deeper
clarity?  It this transformation a new experience and does it take place gradually or
suddenly?  Unfortunately Maana was not focused on these questions and does not
clearly resolve them in the Brahmasiddhi.  And perhaps he would not consider these
questions as a productive line of inquiry.  In a particular pithy, yet telling passage,
Maana beautifully states the difficulty in grasping the nature of Advaita’s liberation
and the apparent efficacy of effort to accomplish what already exists.  He writes,
Therefore, just as an uncovered object, as though covered, requires human effort
so that it is as though manifested.  So too, the reality of the tman, though
                                                 
273 In the US akara does not discuss saskras as a part of his own view of the knowledge process, but
he does in some other contexts in terms of knowledge obstacles as well as justifying the validity of living
while liberated (jvanmukti). See Br.U.1.4.7, Br.U 1.4.10; BS 3.4.51; BS 4.1.15; BG 5.13; BG 8.10; and
GK 3.44.
274 akara makes no paroka/aparoka distinction, but he does so implicitly in other texts through terms
such as jñna and vijñna or jnti and abhijnti when they are used in the same sentence.  Unlike
Maana however, akara does claim that parokatvam is due to the limitations of language, but rather
due to a lack of eligibility and preparadness (adhikritva).  The terminological distinction refers to the
individual’s phenomenological experience and the process of removing ignorance and gaining greater
clarity.
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uncovered, is as though covered, and it is manifested as though by someone’s
effort.  That is enough.275
2.4.5: Concluding Notes on prasakhyna
akara’s conception of contemplation (nididhysana) has some important
differences when compared to that of Maana. The primary difference between them
concerns language.  Maana claims language is necessarily mediate while akara
asserts the capacity of language to generate immediate knowledge when the object of
knowledge is itself immediate.  akara’s position allows him to maintain the
pramatvam (validity) of the Upaniads.  He purposely holds nididhysana, as well as
manana, as a subsidiary position to ravaa by including it as an extended mode of
ravaa.  If nididhysana can be reduced to a mode of ravaa, then the validity of the
abda prama is maintained because there is no question of raising repetition to an
independent prama and no reason to focus on an extra process in addition to ravaa.
Maana’s focus on prasakhyna ostensibly separates ravaa and nididhysana and
potentially demotes ravaa to a subsidiary position.  Advaitins such as akara perceive
a threat to the tradition and the Upaniads in this position.
Compared to Maana, Sankara expresses less concern with the perception of the
world or the problem of saskras contradicting knowledge of non-duality.  There are
occasional places where he implicitly accepts this type of theory, but he does not
explicitly concern his writing with it. akara does not describe the learning process in
terms of obstructing dualistic saskras and strengthening the saskra of non-dual
                                                 
275 tasmd yathtirohitam api tirohitam ivbhivyajyata iva prayatnpeksam, tathtmatatvam apy
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knowledge.  A corollary of the difference over saskras is the possible difference they
have between requiring and not requiring a non-dual experience.  The absence of the
paroka/aparoka distinction in akara saves him from some epistemological dilemmas,
yet at the same time makes it difficult for him to articulate the individual process of the
knowledge event taking place in time even though moka is never truly gained.276
We can clearly delineate a number of differences between the two cryas;
however, if we take more of an overview we can also resolve some of them.  akara
tends not to discuss repeated contemplation, but occasionally accepts it. akara does not
delve into a theory of saskras, but appears to directly or implicitly accept it.  Even
though Sakara dismisses the distinction between paroka and aparoka self-knowledge,
he may implicitly accept some notion of them when he distinguishes terms like jñna and
vijñna. 277  Perhaps most importantly, it is difficult to decisively state any clear
differences in the actual contemplative practices that akara’s and Maana’s students
engaged in.  The lack of texts used as manuals for contemplative practice leaves the
scholar to speculate on practice based only on the tenuous ground of epistemological
debates.
                                                                                                                                                  
atirohita tirohitam iva prayatnd abhivyajyata iveti pukalam | BrSi, p. 37 (my translation).
276 Though I think he tried to articulate this through terms like jñna and vijñna.  akara’s Advaita is not
totally systematic.  He intelligently left a number of provocative issues unresolved, opening his philosophy
to fluid adaptation and interpretation.  There are a number of related technical issues that led to intra-
Advaita debates in later centuries, such as the ontological nature of moka and the liberating cognition, the
existence of ignorance, and the process of perception.
277 Discussed in chapter 6.  I believe these discrepancies show breaks between akara’s wielding of
epistemology as a polemical tool and the necessity of recognizing the practical realities of students and
their process of gaining clarity.  To a certain degree akara is not rigid in his terminology and layers terms
with different meanings according to their context.
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One difficulty in resolving the questions I raise in this chapter is whether we
should analyze Maana from a strict epistemological standpoint or as a compassionate
teacher. There may be a disjunction between wielding epistemology as a polemical
defense with the practical realities that students face.  His theory of saskras and the
paroka/aparoka distinction may be an attempt to more realistically capture the learning
process and difficulties that Advaita practitioners face, rather than an attempt to
philosophically justify his method.  akara generally writes from the perspective of the
highest qualified student (uttama adhikrin).  He includes nididhysana only for the
students of dull or mediocre intellect, though most people will fall into this category.
Maana comes dangerously close to walking the tightrope of the Naiyayika’s
paroka bdajñnam and Prva Mmsaka’s karman and vidhis.  Perhaps Maana
wants to have his cake and eat it too.  He wants to maintain a separation between
repetition and injunctions, the co-presence of the pramatvam of Upaniads and the
necessity of repetition, and a combination of the parokatvam of language with Advaita’s
metaphysical understanding of self-luminous aparoka brahman; but these pairs may not
be ultimately compatible.
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Chapter 3:  Testimony as a Source of Knowledge
Advaita’s method of engaging the Upaniads, otherwise known as the ruti
(literally “that which is heard”), as a means of self-knowledge (prama) is often
misunderstood or overlooked, a surprising fact, considering its fundamental importance
in the pursuit of moka and its importance in Indian philosophy as a whole.  For akara,
ruti independently provides knowledge about self and brahman  as well as the
methodology to communicate that knowledge.  A fundamental distinction of action and
knowledge is evident in akara’s writing.  Physical, mental, and vocal actions are only
indirectly helpful to the main process of studying ruti.   From a historical perspective,
this approach to ruti as a means to brahmavidy is one of the basic differences
separating akara from other Vedntins of the time, particularly those who emphasized
some combination of action and knowledge (karmajñnasamuccayavdins).  From the
standpoint of akara, improper use of ruti jeopardizes the viability of the moka
pursuit.  It leads to illogical methods and the loss of any possibility of self-knowledge.
The questions that arise then are how does the Advaitin approach the texts? What
methods are employed in studying these texts? And what relationship do these texts and
textual methods have with nididhysana?
This chapter discusses akara’s understanding of the Upaniads as a direct
means of immediate self-knowledge.  It begins with a brief discussion of the difficulty of
pinpointing different types of self-knowledge in akara’s writing such as propositional
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and non-propositional self-knowledge.  It then develops our previous knowledge and
action discussion, explaining how some textual study, premised on a distinction of theory
and practice, contradicts akara’a orientation to the Upaniads.  I then move to discuss
different means of knowledge accepted by Advaita and why Advaitins claim testimony
(abda prama), in the form of the Upaniads, is the only means of self-knowledge.
Showing abda prama as the means to brahmavidy according to akara, I present
akara’s specific methods of interpreting and communicating Upaniadic sentences, and
exemplify these methods with textual case studies of “You are that” (tat tvam asi
[Chndogya Upaniad 7.8.7]); “Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite” (satyam jñnam
anantam brahma [TU 2.1.1]), and “About this tman (one can describe it as) not that, not
that” (sa ea neti nety tm [BU 3.9.26]).
3.1: The Ambiguity of Knowledge Types
Before discussing Advaita’s accepted sources of knowledge, we need to address a
difficulty concerning nididhysana.  akara does not make any clear distinction between
different types of self-knowledge.  He uses a variety of terms for liberating self-
knowledge such as jñna, vijñna, vidy, prajñ, pratipatti, and daraa.  Sometimes
these are in compounds such as tmajñna (self-knowledge), brahmavidy (knowledge
of brahman), or samyagdaraa (correct vision).  Despite these different terms and
phrases we do not know whether he accepts all as meaning direct liberating self-
knowledge or if he has in mind some distinctions of knowledge types connected to the
progress of study.  Generally it appears that he means direct liberating knowledge for all
the terms except in the rare occasions that he uses two terms (such as jñna and vijñna)
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in the same sentence.  The difficulty this presents concerns contemplative practice. Surely
there is some change or deepening of knowledge as one continues to study and
contemplate, but how can we, and should we, attempt to describe this change?  How do
we distinguish the knowledge we have before and after contemplation? And what kind of
knowledge does one contemplate? The answers to these questions are important in our
discussion, but elusive due to akara’s ambiguous usage.  They are also difficult
because of the unique ways epistemology and metaphysics interact in akara’s system.
Scholars and practitioners may be tempted to assume a simple hierarchy of
knowledge types based on the triple method of ravaa, manana, and nididhysana.  This
might look something like the following:  (1) At first, without having undergone proper
ravaa, one may gain some basic preliminary ideas about non-duality.  This would not
be knowledge, but perhaps some form of belief, an entertainment of Advaita propositions
that lack firm conviction or justification.  (2) Then the student gains propositional
knowledge from proper ravaa involving firm conviction and justification, but this
propositional knowledge may still be subject to philosophical doubts.  (3) The student
then gains an unshakable conviction through manana.  This knowledge is so confident
that it cannot be dislodged by doubt.  (4) Next, the student contemplates this doubtless
knowledge to remove any psychological issues and dispositions that may disturb self-
knowledge.  This is necessary because the propositional knowledge of unity is constantly
challenged by sense experiences presenting diversity as well as our dispositions to think
in a non-unitive fashion.  Contemplation makes the propositional knowledge “firmer,” in
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the sense of not being subject to disruption.  Finally, the student achieves an immediate
recognition of brahman as non-dual, a form of non-propositional knowledge.
The reader will notice that, given the discussion of the prasakhyna meditation
in the preceding chapter, the above description outlining the knowledge process is subject
to a number of criticisms.  The difficulty with this simplistic description is its distinction
of propositional knowledge and non-propositional knowledge.  The assumption is that
everything before  brahmavidy is some form of propositional, intellectual, and
conceptual knowledge based on grasping the meanings of the Upaniads, and that
brahmavidy is something else.  Brahmavidy is some kind of deeper direct spiritual
knowledge or knowledge by acquaintance.  This distinction appears to mirror the
difference made by Maana between mediate (paroka) verbal knowledge and
immediate (aparoka) brahmavidy.  Nididhysana is what would facilitate transition
from one to another.  However, both distinctions presuppose or lend themselves to the
prasakhyna view that all textual self-knowledge is inherently mediate and requires
contemplation to become immediate, a position I am critical of as an interpretation of
akara.
The problem with understanding knowledge from the Upaniads as only
descriptive or conceptual and nididhysana as a necessity for brahmavidy, is that it
contradicts akara’s theory that testimony is a direct means to brahmavidy.  akara
upholds the status of the Upaniads as a means of self-knowledge at all costs and refuses
to share that status with any other means of knowledge.  We may try to preserve the
distinction of propositional knowledge and non-propositional knowledge by saying that
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both are possible with regard to a single object of knowledge.  For example, in the story
of the tenth man, the tenth man first gains propositional knowledge of his self, and upon
further listening and reflection gains immediate knowledge that he is the tenth. In this
case there is a change from propositional to non-propositional knowledge through
testimony without depending on another means or compromising the immediacy of his
self-understanding.
Another solution is to see self-knowledge gained from ravaa as immediate non-
propositional knowledge from the beginning, but also as appearing as though mediate and
propositional due to obstacles and a lack of qualification (adhikra) for self-knowledge
of a purest type.  This view attributes authority to the Upaniads as the sole means of
knowledge; however, it may not do a good job of recognizing the final cognition of
brahmavidy or pinpointing exactly when ignorance is removed.  Nevertheless, this is
what I think must be our judgment about akara.  In this perspective it is problematic to
use terms like “intellectual knowledge” for ravaa before brahmavidy, but I think we
could use descriptive phrases such as “deficient knowledge” or “brahmavidy with
obstacles.”  It is more useful to make cautious divisions within brahmavidy where all
types of self-knowledge deriving from ravaa are considered direct and immediate
though they have varying amounts and types of obstacles that prevent them from
appearing direct.
But whether taking a position of paroka leading to aparoka self-knowledge or
one that dismisses such a distinction, we should recognize that as a phenomenon that
would seem to be propositional self-knowledge on the part of the Advaitin student prior
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to a final liberating cognition, if akara’s teaching is correct.  But what change is there
to be to self-knowledge in nididhysana prior to brahmavidy that could distinguish it
from self-knowledge derived from ravaa and manana?
This lends itself to another distinction about self-knowledge that is potentially
useful in talking about nididhysana, the distinction of “occurrent” and “non-occurrent”
knowledge.  In ravaa  and manana , and perhaps when a student first begins
contemplation, there may be occurrent knowledge, which requires an overt or implicit
assent to the propositional knowledge that he or she is brahman and non-dual.  In
nididhysana this may include an intentional process of drawing the mind away from
sense objects and distractions and giving assent to the proposition.  We may speculate
that with time nididhysana facilitates a transition to non-occurrent knowledge where
self-knowledge, though still propositional (at least in appearance), remains subconscious
and latent in the form of knowledge impressions or dispositions (saskra).  This
transition to non-occurrent knowledge marks a deepening of knowledge that allows it to
be easily available because one only needs to trigger the saskra to retrieve the
knowledge.
Even though the general assumption is that brahmavidy occurs after or through
nididhysana and that nididhysana is then no longer necessary, this view is not always
clearly evident in akara’s writing. akara does not specify a chronological position
for nididhysana with reference to an immediate cognition of brahmavidy. It is not clear
whether nididhysana comes before and culminates in liberating immediate self-
knowledge or if it is used after such knowledge according to him.   There are a few
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textual passages that lend themselves to an interpretation that contemplation is still
possible, perhaps even necessary, after direct brahmavidy takes place due to residual
disturbances from problematic dispositions.278  In this perspective nididhysana is not the
catalyst for immediate brahmavidy but a practice for maintaining, securing and/or
stabilizing it.  This interpretation would also reject use of categories of “occurrent” and
“non-occurrent” knowledge in nididhysana.  If nididhysana can come after non-
propositional brahmavidy and target non-propositional knowledge, it involves more than
occurrent or non-occurrent knowledge, which are both forms of propositional knowledge.
Even though we may feel impelled to make some distinctions between types of
self-knowledge, we must remember that there is no sharp division between mediate
propositional and immediate non-propositional self-knowledge within akara’s writing.
Once we label and qualify knowledge prior to brahmavidy as propositional, we
inevitably take a position privileging a controversial interpretation of akara. This may
not be a problem, for attempting to interpret and clarify akara’s ideas is an important
endeavor.  And indeed, my reading of akara favors the views of Surevara,
Padmapda, and the Vivaraa school who focus on direct knowledge arising from
ravaa, not Maana, Vcaspati, and the Bhmat school who recognize propositional
self-knowledge as distinct from non-propositional self-knowledge and emphasize the
importance of contemplation for the transition.   However, the scholar must be aware of
the limitations of bifurcating akara’s concepts.  Perhaps the greatest difficulty we have
is describing what akara thought about the transition from descriptive knowledge to
                                                 
278 BUbh 1.4.7, 1.4.10, BGbh 4.18, BSbh 3.2.51
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direct knowledge or from a type of modal knowledge (vttijñna) to a knowledge of
intrinsic being (svarpajñna).  This is all the more true when we realize that
brahmavidy is a strange knowledge that does not fit epistemic categories in English and
may indeed be indescribable in any language.  Brahmavidy is clearly not propositional.
It is sui generis, yet it still occurs in time, comes from a knowledge source, and is closely
related to whatever form of deficient self-knowledge one has before bramavidy. As I
reconstruct akara’s view we must keep in mind that akara does not give a clear
epistemological account of how this knowledge takes place. It is difficult to understand
how a conceptual truth can become understood and non-conceptual, though this leap is
supposedly self-evident to the liberated Advaitin. Later Advaitins did systematically
speculate on how this occurs, though I don’t think there is an entirely adequate account
given by anyone.  This is not necessarily a defect in the Advaita position.  There are
multiple twists that make this topic even more complex.  It is to be taken as inherently
problematic how to define liberation and self-knowledge according to akara.  This is
recognized in the doctrine of anirvacanya, “inexplicability,” about which however I
have more to say below.  akara’s conception of liberation attempts to remove itself
from the boundaries of ordinary discourse, debate, and causal epistemology.
We must also be aware of the limitations and subtle presuppositions of translating
Sanskrit terms, such as jñna and brahmavidy, into Western philosophical language.
One may attempt to map Advaita’s concepts onto Western epistemology in an effort to
articulate material in more useful and precise ways or to engage in comparison.
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However, there are many pitfalls.  The Western terms may be framed with assumptions
that do not fit the Indian material.
3.2: The Problem of Theory and Practice
akara understands the Upaniads as a means to immediate brahmavidy, like
perception for objects with color.  The Upaniads are like that a mirror reflecting one’s
true identity.  One only needs to look at the mirror and see the image.  At that point
knowledge immediately takes place and the mirror’s function is complete.  akara
believes the Upaniads are to be approached in a similar way because liberation is simply
the recognition of one’s self through the mirror of the Upaniads.279 Yet how this
approach translates to the ground reality of the practitioner is somewhat confusing.
Unlike the simplicity of the mirror analogy, reading the texts and studying with a
competent teacher are certainly not guarantees for knowing brahman.  Few students
suddenly understand non-duality when an Advaita teacher states, “You are non-dual.”
There is a vast difference between simply gaining a thorough semantic and philosophical
grasp of the Upaniad’s message of non-duality and having direct liberating insight into
non-duality.  Many Advaita practitioners and traditional scholars (paits) spend their
entire lives studying the ruti, yet still consider themselves lacking complete liberating
knowledge. Textual study is generally a long and drawn-out process, unlike the
immediate knowledge gained in perception.  There is a gradual deepening of knowledge
and clarity, with numerous breakthroughs and ‘aha’ moments; as well as cyclical
processes, learning how to navigate the texts, seeing new layers of meaning, revisiting
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previously studied passages, and allowing textual wisdom to penetrate one’s cognitive
and psychological understanding of self, world, and god.
If we hypothetically grant the validity of the Upaniads as a means for self-
knowledge and “try to feel from the inside” akara’s approach, then how does one
assimilate what appears to be an abstract philosophical idea – all is one – into one’s self-
understanding and life?  Can we label such a process a “practice”?  And if so should we
call the texts “theory”? Before moving to a detailed discussion of akara’s methods for
engaging with the Upaniads we need to understand the conflicts inherent to a theory –
and – practice orientation towards textual study. For akara it is vital that students
discard certain theory – and – practice orientations and embrace an orientation that would
employ the Upaniads as a valid and immediate means of self-knowledge.  It is here that
we find many problematic stances in encounters between practitioner and text and the
difficulty of understanding nididhysana in a discourse of practice.
There are two primary ways we commonly view theory and practice.  The first is
gaining conceptual knowledge about a particular subject matter and then using practice to
turn concept into application. The theory provides a conceptual underpinning that models
or at least facilitates practical application.280 For example, a person may understand an
abstract topic like physics and then apply it in technologies for energy production.  The
application may or may not give greater clarity to the science of physics, but is a
functional application of the knowledge.  A second type of theory – and – practice
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280 Mohanty 1990, p. 19.
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distinction is used in everyday language.  Reading a book on surgery does not result in an
ability to perform surgery.  Such a simple division of theory – and – practice is evident in
many of our daily activities.  There is of course a relationship.  But one must cook in
order to understand the subtleties of cooking, or drive a car to understand really how to
drive.281  In this view, one uses theory to learn how to do something in order to convert
conceptual knowledge to direct knowledge or to produce some result.
Generally, one assumes texts are inherently theoretical; thus it would seem
Advaitins must take the indirect theoretical verbal knowledge in the Upaniads and
convert it into direct knowledge.  This orientation naturally leads to a focus on
contemplation (or meditation) as the practice that transforms theory to knowledge.  It is
“knowing-how” to do something as opposed to propositional “knowing that.”  Oftentimes
the importance of contemplation is then focused on, separated from the texts, and
elevated to a special status; an orientation in which contemplative practice functions
independently of the texts and culminate as an immediate experience of non-duality.
These contemplation produced experiences are then identified as liberation. In some
sense, liberating insight, a recognition of self-nature, is a transformative process in which
one sees his or her self as complete, free of fear, and not subject to pain and suffering.
However, “transformation” is happening only on the level of one’s psychological
response to self-knowledge.  Liberation is not a product of transformation, and the self
does not change and is not affected by either knowledge or ignorance.
                                                 
281 Mohanty also discusses a conception of theory practice as “a logical structure of propositions
constituting a system, rationally grounded on some self-evident axioms” such as in Euclidean geometry
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Theory – and – practice approaches, such as those found among
karmajñnasamuccayavdins and prasakhynavdins presuppose an action subsequent
to textual study and bring questions to the Upaniads such as what is to be accomplished
(kim kartavyam)?  And by what and how is that to be accomplished (kena kartavyam)?
Here we see that even though Mms theory is embedded in arcane discussions of
ritual hermeneutics, its basic approach to search for actions and results in a sentence is
quite natural and presupposes a theory – and – practice orientation. This orientation
towards the texts considers ruti a map that one must follow to reach the goal.  ruti does
not have the power to bring a person to that goal, but provides directions that must be
followed.  It gives knowledge of how to do something. akara attempts to avoid this
orientation because it contradicts his distinction of knowledge and action and falls into
the problems associated with action discussed in the previous chapter. The primary
problem inherent in the theory – and – practice paradigm is a misunderstanding of
akara’s view that the Upaniads convey the nature of brahman through the words of a
teacher without depending on any additional practice or any other prama (though one
must have the proper adhikritva for this to occur).
akara’s textual method is a radical reorientation to Upaniadic texts, a
reorientation that also extends to contemplation.  For most people, verbal knowledge does
not convey immediate (aparoka) knowledge similar to perception.  In everyday usage
testimony typically provides indirect knowledge by description because it makes known
an object that is removed from the hearer either spatially or temporally or both.  When
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reading newspapers or listening to a valid source (pta vkya) we understand phenomena
outside of our immediate environs.  This indirect (paroka) knowledge may be perfectly
valid, yet the object remains distant.  For example, while sitting in a room a friend walks
in and informs me someone is waiting for me outside.  I accept his words as truth because
he is a respectable source.  This is indirect yet valid propositional knowledge, knowledge
by description, because a person is indeed waiting outside.  When I step outside and see
the person, then I have direct perceivable knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance.  Both
the indirect and direct knowledge are valid, though epistemic primacy attaches to direct
knowledge because of the direct acquaintance with the object of knowledge.
Furthermore, we may say that the ultimate starting point or source that establishes my
indirect knowledge is direct knowledge (i.e. my friend’s visual perception of the person
outside).  In contrast, however, according to akara, in special cases where the object is
immediately at hand, words can convey direct knowledge that is immediate like
perception.  For example, saying, “This is a pot,” to a person who does not know what a
pot is.  akara argues that words have this capability in the unique case of tman or
brahman, because tman/brahman underlies all experience, is intrinsically reflexive, and
is immediately available at all times as one’s self-luminous self.   Upaniadic language
immediately reveals brahman as one’s self-luminous self or could do so when wielded
with specific teaching and exegetical methods that remove ignorance.  The Upaniads
function like one’s eyes as a direct means of immediate knowledge in the form of verbal
testimony (abda prama), but must be employed properly to uncover 
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The classic example of this stated earlier is the story of the tenth man who recognizes
himself as the missing tenth person when told.
This understanding of the language in the great sentences appears somewhat
counterintuitive, an issue that akara raises himself.  How does language, which deals
with indirect knowledge of things, is limited, intrinsically dualistic, and dealing with
names, forms, actions, and qualities, possess the capacity to reveal directly and
immediately the unobjectifiable brahman?  Understanding akara’s approach to
sentences in the Upaniads answers this question, and is the key to understanding his
methodology and view of nididhysana. For akara, the Upaniads both reveal the
existence of brahman and directly convey that knowledge through methods intrinsic to
their language.  As I will explain, there are a number of particular verbal methods that the
Upaniads employ to accomplish this difficult task, such as negative language, continuity
and discontinuity, and secondary implication.  Advaitins situate these methods in their
wider systematic metaphysical and epistemological system in order to cultivate a
coherent and mutually strengthening flow between philosophy, method, and direct
liberating knowledge.
Understanding the ruti as a direct means of brahmavidy to be employed like
one’s eyes runs across the distinction of theory and practice.  Studying the texts (theory)
is itself the “practice” for akara.  Understanding the texts is synonymous with
immediate brahmavidy, after which there is nothing more to practice. This is analogous
to Advaita’s theory of visual perception where knowledge takes place simultaneously
with perceiving the object.  I explain the perception theory below.
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If one insists on using the term “practice” in akara’s Advaita, then it should be
as a method for understanding the meanings of the texts. In this sense Advaita praxis is
composed of the triple-method of ravaa, manana, and nididhysana (not nididhysana
alone).  However, the triple method is more accurately described as employing a source
of knowledge, not practicing theory.  This terminology maintains its object-dependent
knowledge content and precludes separating practice from the texts.  In the context of
Advaita, “practice” more accurately denotes the various methods for gaining adhikritva,
methods which hone the mind’s capacity to be a proper container for text-sparked
knowledge.282  Restudying texts is not additional practice; it is done to remove any
doubts or misconceptions about what the Upaniads are teaching.
3.3: The Six Means of Knowledge
It is important to understand Advaita’s epistemology and justification for relying
on the Upaniads before turning to akara’s textual methods.  A source of knowledge
(prama) is an instrument (karaa) for a specific type of cognition.  The action of the
instrument, which is conceived as a unique or special cause, triggers knowledge.283  For
example, the eye is the instrument for vision, and is a cause of visual perception along
with the object perceived and the self.  Each source of knowledge does not contradict
another, for it only tells us about those things that cannot be known by any other
                                                 
282 In a way, manana and nididhysana are similar to means for adhikritvam in that they remove
obstructions to knowledge, but their dependence on the ruti and its knowledge content separates them
from independent practices like meditation.
283 Datta 1960.
162
means.”284  A prama can be invalid for four reasons: (1) it reveals something that is
already revealed by another prama; (2) another prama contradicts the knowledge;
(3) the knowledge is doubtful or ambiguous; (4) it reveals nothing.285
akara did not discuss pramas in clear detail; however, post akara Advaita
Vedntins, who were more concerned with the fine points of epistemology, distinguish
six sources of knowledge (pramas).  There are no more. They agree that this
categorization is in keeping with akara’s writing. The six pramas are:  (1) perception
(pratyaka); (2) inference (anumna); (3) comparison (upamna); (4) postulation
(arthpatti); (5) non-cognition (anupalabdhi); (6) testimony or word (abda). In the next
section I outline these pramas following Dharmarjdhvarndra’s  Vedntaparibh,
perhaps the most influential and first Advaita text dedicated solely to an explanation of
Advaita epistemology.  Understanding the sources of knowledge will help us understand
akara’s emphasis on ruti and delimit the nature and method of nididhysana.
3.3.1: Pratyaka (Perception)
All Indian philosophical traditions accept some form of pratyaka, or perception.
For Advaitins, perception includes both external and internal perception.  External
perception results from the contact of a sense organ and its object.  Internal perception is
the direct knowledge of mental states such as love, hate, and anger without use of the
sense organs.286 The individual has five senses, sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell,
                                                 
284 BUbh 2.1.20, Vedntaparibh (VP) Ch.1, p. 5 (page numbers for the Vedntaparibh refer to
Madhavananda’s 1963 edition).
285 Rambachan 1991.
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with the corresponding visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory, and olfactory sensory
experiences.  Advaita has a specific theory about how the sense organs (indriyas) work.
According to Advaita there are subtle organs (jñnendriyas), which are imperceptible and
made of the same subtle nature as the mind, residing within the physical organs.
Perception depends on the subtle organs, which function through the corresponding
physical organs.287  The subtle organs can move with ease to modify their respective
objects just as the mind has the capacity to move quickly and take the shape of its objects.
In external perception each sense organ has its respective place.  Despite their
close association, there is no overlap or conjoining of roles that could result in
complications.  The sense organs contact their object in two major ways.  The organs of
sight and hearing both reach our to the object, while touch, taste, and smell receive their
object in their respective locations.  Perceptual cognition occurs when the mind,
illumined by the self, assumes a thought modification corresponding to the object.
Vednta, like the Nyya, Vaieika, Sakhy, and Mms philosophies, recognizes a
first stage of perception which is indeterminate and nonlinguistic.  This stage is followed
by a perceptual judgment which is conceptual and linguistic.288  The objects of internal
perception (sk pratyaka) are mental states such as feelings and emotions as well as
ignorance. Such internal states do not have an unknown existence.  For example, the
knowledge that “‘I am happy’ is invariably a perception.”289  In internal perception, the
mind does not reach outside of the body to contact an object.  The sense organs, which
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are designed only to move outwards, are not capable of knowing internal mental states.
Internal states are known immediately without the need of a corresponding mental
modification because they are directly presented to the witnessing awareness.290
Perception requires that a subject objectify an object, creating a dualistic
framework.  Brahman is non-dual and cannot be known as an external object.  Therefore,
self-knowledge cannot be gained through perception. akara is adamant that
“brahman’s relation with anything cannot be grasped, it being outside the range of sense
perception.  The senses naturally comprehend objects, and not brahman.”291
3.3.2: Anumna (Inference)
Except for the Carvkan materialists, all Indian philosophical systems accept
inference (anumna) as a valid means of knowledge.  Anumna literally means “knowing
after,” and comes from the Sanskrit “anumiti”, meaning “the consequent knowledge”
(from anu-after and miti –knowledge).  Inference is knowledge that follows from another
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knowledge.  The Vednta Paribha defines anumna as “the instrument of inferential
knowledge (anumiti).  And the latter is produced by the knowledge of invariable
concomitance (vypti) purely in its character as the knowledge of invariable
concomitance.”292
Invariable concomitance (vypti) implies a universal relation or coexistence in the
terms used in the inference.293  The classic example is the mountain, known to be on fire
because there is visible smoke on it.  In this situation “wherever there is smoke there is
fire” is the universal relation.  The knowledge of this relationship through observation
and generalization leads to direct inference.294 Vypti can be “apprehended by the
observation of concomitance when no violation of the latter has been noticed.”295  Unless
there is reason for doubt, the repetition of anumna is not necessary because vypti can
be discerned from on experience.  Advaita makes use of two models of syllogistic
inference in anumna.
Model one:
1) Proposition to be proved or established (pratijña)-  There is fire on the hill.
2) The reason (hetu)—Because the hill has smoke.
3) Universal proposition supported by example (udharaa)—Whenever there is
smoke there is fire.
Model two:
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1) Example (udharaa)—Whenever there is smoke there is fire.
2) Application (upanaya)—The hill has smoke.
3) Conclusion (nigamana)—Therefore the hill has fire.296
Anumna is deductive reasoning based on the application of a universal proposition to
a particular case, and is dependent upon perception in order to find an invariable
concomitance and the reason as qualifying the inferential subject (the hill).  Due to this
restriction, anumna is limited to the sphere of perception.  Thus any knowledge beyond
the means of perception, such as self-knowledge, is not knowable through inference.297
A constant relationship (vypti) between the self and anything else is not possible
because the self is non-dual, and inference is not possible in the absence of any
concomitance.  “Even when the mere effect (i.e. universe) is cognized, one cannot
ascertain whether it is related to brahman.”298
3.3.3: Upamna (Comparison)
Advaita, Nyya, and Mms accept upamna, or comparison.  Dharmarja defines
upamna as “the instrument of the valid knowledge of similarity.”299  Upamna is the
process where object A is known to be similar to object B because of the perceptual
comparison of B’s similarity to A.  The traditional example used by Advaita to illustrate
comparison is the cow and the gavaya (a type of wild ox).  A man who knows cows after
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seeing them in the city travels to a forest.  There he sees a gavaya.  Upon seeing the
gavaya he has the cognition that “this thing is like a cow”, and learns that gavayas look
like cows and cows look like gavayas.  The judgment of the cow’s similarity to the
gavaya is formed by the perception of the gavaya’s similarity to the cow he already
knows.300  The resulting knowledge is upamna.  Although upamna is not a case of
perception, it is still dependent on the sense organs.  For example, the knowledge of the
cow and gavaya is not possible without it.  Due to this dependency, upamna is also
limited to the sphere of perception, and therefore, cannot reveal the self.
3.3.4: Arthpatti (Postulation)
Advaita anda Mms accept Arthpatti, the assumption, supposition, or postulation
of a fact to explain an inexplicable fact (artha=fact and patti=supposition).301 Arthpatti
is defined as “the assumption of an explanatory fact (upapada) from a knowledge of the
thing to be explained (upapadya).302  A common example to illustrate arthpatti is the
situation of Devadatta.  Devadatta is fat and stout, however he does not eat during the
day.  A fact must be postulated to solve these contradicting circumstances, that Devadatta
must eat at night in order to remain fat.  Another example is the man who is alive but not
at home.  If the man is alive he must be either inside or outside his home.  If he is not
inside the home the only other possibility, that he is outside, must be postulated.303
Arthpatti may appear similar to the hypothesis in Western logic, but there are some
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important differences.  A hypothesis does not always solve a conflict or contradiction and
connotes a tentative supposition that is pending verification and therefore subject to
change. Arthpatti, as the only possible explanation, carries absolute certainty.304
Arthpatti is valid when only one possible explanation can resolve inexplicable facts.
When there are many possible explanations, the validity of postulation is not absolute
because one explanation may contradict another.  For example, a person may suppose
that one supreme omnipotent God created the world, however it is also possible that
multiple gods created the world.  The presumption that there can only be one supreme
creator is negated as definitive knowledge due to the other possible explanations.
Arthapatti is also ultimately limited to the sphere of sense perception, because the sense
organs are needed to identify the inexplicable facts; therefore postulation is unable to
reveal the self.
3.3.5: Anupalabdhi (non-cognition)
The fifth prama, anupalabdhi, is non-cognition or non-apprehension, a prama
which only Advaita and Bha Mms accept.305  Non-cognition is knowledge of the
non-existence of an object or its attributes within a given locus.306  The knowledge that a
vase is not on a table, or that a flower has no fragrance are both examples of non-
cognition.  Non-cognition must occur in the appropriate situation to reveal valid
knowledge.  For example, if the room is dark, then the non-cognition of the vase on the
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table is not absolutely valid because the prama is blocked by the darkness.  Even if the
vase is on the table, one could still not see it.307
The non-existence of the vase or the flower’s fragrance is not direct perception
because such non-existent objects are not available for contact with the sense organs.308
There is still a dependence on perception (the eyes must see the table), but it is not direct
perception that gives rise to non-apprehension, thus Advaita differentiates perception and
non-cognition.  Because non-apprehension is ultimately dependent on sense perception it
cannot impart self-knowledge.
3.3.6: abda (Verbal Testimony)
All schools of Indian philosophy, other than the Crvakans, Buddhists, and
Vaieikas accept verbal testimony as a source of knowledge about the world when
uttered by competent speakers.  abda is a major way in which we gain knowledge and
includes ordinary bits of everyday knowledge (laukika), what we should do, should not
do, and supersensous extraordinary (alaukika) realities.309  For akara, only testimony
(abda), in the form of the authorless and infallible Upaniads, possesses the capacity to
both reveal the existence of brahman and directly convey that knowledge through
methods intrinsic to Upaniadic language.  Perception, and other pramas that depend
on perception, cannot grasp brahman because the sense organs only see outwards and
perception is based on a subject/object duality. Instead they become secondary means,
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aiding in reflecting and analyzing knowledge gained from the Upaniads and for gaining
mental purity and the qualifications for understanding self-knowledge.
Advaita approaches the abda prama from a unique standpoint, and believes
abda is the essential and only means for self-knowledge.  Untangling the confusion
surrounding verbal testimony helps to establish the relationship of mental purity and self-
knowledge and to clarify the role of contemplation in gaining liberation.  The following
section clarifies the role and importance of the abda prama, explains akara’s
methodology for employing words, and provides a detailed case study of specific
Upaniad sentences.
abda literally means an articulate or inarticulate sound.  The abda prama
refers to knowledge gained from written or spoken verbal expressions.310  akara does
not provide us with a definition of abda, so we have to look much later to chapter four
of the Vedanta Paribha:
Now verbal testimony is being discussed.  That sentence is a means of knowledge
in which the relation (among the meanings of words) that is the object of its
intention is not contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge.311
The abda prama gives knowledge of both empirical reality and ultimate
reality.  In Advaita it imparts the knowledge of ultimate reality revealed by the ruti, that
the self of the individual is the self of the universe.  Advaita Vednta accepts the entire
Vedic corpus consisting of four Vedas, the g, Yajur, Sma, and the Athrva.  akara
divides the Vedas into two broad sections: the karmaka, which explains rituals for
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achieving various ends, and the jñnaka, which focuses on metaphysical and
theological speculations.  “Vednta” (veda + anta: end of the Veda) literally refers to the
jñnaka section,312 which is primarily located in the last portions of each Veda, and is
synonymous with the Upaniad texts. The Upaniadic texts are recognized as the source
of true knowledge of the nature of God and one’s self.  To claim otherwise would negate
the Upaniads as a reliable means of knowledge (prama) and relegate their traditions to
a nstika (heterodox) position that the Upaniads are not an authority, a position held by
the Buddhists and Crvka materialists.
In order for ruti to reveal the self, the words must have an authentic source and
be free from defects and doubt.  Any prama that contains an internal source of doubt
would require verification, and thus would lose its status as a means of knowledge.  Both
Advaita and Mimamsa agree that the ruti is a infallible knowledge source because the
Vedas are eternal, uncreated, and without authorship.313  According to Advaita, in line
with the Mmsaks, the eternal ruti is authorless and not the product of human
minds.314  During each cycle of creation it is revealed by vara to the is (seers), who
then transfer the knowledge to subsequent students.  According to akara, the Upaniads
would be invalid if created by the human intellect, because independent reason and
postulation cannot lead to self-knowledge.  Reason and postulation can suggest
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possibilities about ultimate reality, but are unable to reveal absolute conclusive
knowledge.
Advaita derives its knowledge from a triple canon (prasthnatrayam) of the
Upaniads, Bhagavadgt, and Brahma Stras, though they pay extra attention to the
Upaniads as the root source of knowledge about ultimate reality. 315  The dialogues
found in the Upaniads enjoin various meditations (upsans) and describe the nature of
brahman, the absolute formulation of truth and reality.  Among the Upaniads are a
handful of great sentences (mahvkyni) esteemed by the Vednta traditions, which are
an important source to understand akara’s nididhysana. In akara’s interpretation,
those Upaniad sentences indicate the unity of self and brahman. There are four primary
mahvkyas, one from each of the four Vedas:  “brahman is knowledge” (prajñna
brahma [Aitareya Upaniad 3.5.3]); “I am brahman” (aham brahmsmi [Bhadrayaka
Upaniad 1.4.10]); “You are that” (tat tvam asi [Chndogya Upaniad 7.8.7]); and “This
self is brahman” (ayam tm brahma [Mkya Upaniad]).316 I am not clear where
and when this list of mahvkyas become prevalent.  akara does not explicitly list
them, though their importance is self-evident in his commentaries and by the number of
times he cites them.317
In order to understand akara’s interpretation of the mahvkya, we need to
understand some basic concepts of the Advaitin’s theory of meaning and understanding
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of sentences.  According to the Indian grammatical tradition there are three meaningful
segments of language.  Morphemes (vara) combine to create words (pada), and the
words compose sentences (vkya).318  Advaita, in agreement with the M msakas,
believe that a word refers primarily to a universal, for example, “cow” to “cowhood”, the
general from of a cow. Words are linked naturally and eternally with their referents rather
then conventionally associated.
A sentence has two essential parts, the subject (uddeya) and the predicate
(vidheya), though a single word can stand for a sentence if the remaining word or words
can be inferred from the context.319  Following the P rva M msaka tradition, Advaita
Vednta accepts three necessary conditions for understanding a sentence, phonetic
contiguity (sanidhi), semantic fittingness (yogyat), and syntactic expectancy
(kk).320  Of these kk is the most important for a sentence must have a
complete expression of thought.  A sentence cannot lack syntactic unity and cannot leave
the hearer needing more information to complete itself.
Indian philosophers developed a rich philosophy of language, especially in
explaining how sentences, which are a collection of words, can convey a unified
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meaning.  Two primary theories were developed to solve this question.321  The
anvitbhidhna theory, embraced by the Prbhkara Mmsakas, takes the view that the
unitary sense of the sentence arises directly from the collection of the words.  The words
of the sentence present their individual meanings as well as their mutual relationship.322
According to the abhihitnvaya theory, followed by the Bha Mmsakas, the
sentence sense is understood indirectly through the recollection of the individual words.
The individual words only convey their individual word meanings, and the word
meanings convey the mutual relation.  When hearing a sentence we must understand each
separate word meaning and these meanings are put together in the sentence meaning
according to the three conditions or kk, yogyat and samnidhi.323  akara did not
specify whether he agrees with the anvitbhidhna theory or abhihitnvaya theory;324
however, most later Advaitins advocated the abhihitnvaya theory.325
3.4: akara’s Method
Advaita teaching methodology is designed to lead students to direct recognition
that his or her self is brahman  by means of the Upaniads, and specifically the
mahvkyas, which trigger this liberating knowledge.  Even if ruti is hypothetically
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accepted as eternal and authorless, one may object to its validity, claiming that words are
unable to reveal self-knowledge. Verbal testimony is generally indirect (paroka), and
lacks the immediacy of perception (or possibly even that of an inference based on
immediate perception).  An opponent might claim Advaita is committing a disservice to
the power of liberating knowledge, and question how words can reveal what perception
cannot when hearing is dependent on perception. akara accepts that words are limited
to describing characteristics such as species (jti), attributes (gua), action (kriy), or
relation and connection (sambandha), or symbolize objects possessing one or more of
these qualities.  However, the non-dual self is not a species or subject to action, and has
no attributes or qualities.326   The Taittirya Upaniad itself states the difficulty of using
words to grasp brahman: “Before they reach it, words turn back, together with the
mind.”327  In the Kena Upani ad we find a verse describing brahman as, “Which one
cannot express by speech, by which speech itself is expressed.”328  This confronts the
student with an epistemological puzzle.  How is it possible to know the infinite self
through the abda prama if it is unobjectifiable as an object of knowledge and
ungraspable by words?
akara believes the Upaniads resolve this predicament by revealing the self’s
status as a unique object of knowledge available for specific verbal teaching methods.
The non-dual self cannot be an object of perception, nor can it participate in the dualistic
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relationship of the knower and object of knowledge.  However, each individual is
intimate with the self as his or her very existence and subjective awareness. Yet even
though knowledge of one’s own existence and awareness is self-evident and immediate,
the self’s distinctive non-dual reality remains unknown for the unliberated, the
unenlightened.  Ignorance of this reality spurs individuals to continue superimposing
adventitious properties to the self, such as finiteness, mortality, and identity.  Thus
brahman  simultaneously holds the status of being both known (as immediate
existence/self-luminous awareness and as worldly objects) and unknown  (as non-dual)
when mistaken to be the superimposed limited individual self or worldly objects.  The
Kena Upaniad 1.3 describes the known and unknown nature of the self:
It is far different from what’s known.  And it is farther than the unknown – so
have we heard from men of old, who have explained it all to us.329
The verse implies that one cannot say, “I know the self” because knowledge refers to
known objects and the self is not objectifiable.  “I do not know the self,” is also
nonsensical because the self is all cognition, existence, and awareness.330
The Upaniads are capable of revealing direct knowledge of the self because the
self is already immediately known and simply misapprehended or unrecognized. For
example, a person who has never eaten sugar can only directly recognize its sweetness by
tasting it, but a person who already knows the taste of sweetness can be reminded of
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sweetness through a verbal description.331 The Upani ads do not establish, grasp, or
objectify brahman, nor are they practiced in order to create a positive result in the form
of some transformation of indirect language to a new direct experience of brahman.
They simply remove misapprehensions of one’s self so that it stands self-revealed as non-
dual.  The Advaita orientation of removing self-ignorance and obstacles to self-
knowledge is a crucial standpoint, opposed to the theory that knowledge creates anything
new or fills the absence of knowledge.  The theory of positive ignorance and obstacles
accounts for the fact that the tman is not properly recognized even though it is an
accomplished reality, the ground of all experience, and the presupposition of every
apprehension.  Even though the self never changes and remains forever self-luminous, the
removal of ignorance allows for a new vision of self-identity within the consciousness of
the liberated person.332
Upaniadic language removes ignorance and any other obstacles to self-
knowledge and immediately reveals brahman as one’s self-luminous self when wielded
with specific teaching and exegetical methods by a qualified teacher who is a master of
the scriptures (srotriya) and rooted in self-knowledge (brahmaniha).333 The question
that arises then is what relationship these texts and textual methods have with the method
of nididhysana? The most important soteriological methods of akara’s Advaita
include negative language (neti neti), continuity and discontinuity (anvaya and
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vyatireka), and secondary indication (laka).  However, as I will argue, these three are
to be considered in reality as part and parcel of one single method.
3.4.1: Negative Language (neti neti)
One strategy ankara uses is negative language  (neti neti –literally ‘not this, not
this’ [na iti na iti]).  Though the Upaniads often name brahman as an entity, they
employ negative language as a common device to prevent brahman from being known as
an objective entity.  For example, in the Bhadrayaka Upaniad we find the following
verse: “This self is that which has been described as ‘Not this, not this.’  It is
imperceptible, for it is never perceived; undecaying, for it never decays; unattached, for it
is never attached; unfettered – it never feels pain, and never suffers injury.”334  The
Muaka Upaniad describes brahman as “What cannot be seen, what cannot be grasped,
without color, without sight or hearing, without hands or feet…”335 The Kaha Upaniad
says, “It has no sound or touch, no appearance, taste, or smell; It is without beginning or
end, undecaying and eternal…”336The Bhagavadgt says “That brahman is without any
beginning.  That is called neither being nor non-being.”337
The negative language in the verses above attempts to avoid defining absolute
reality as a thing in the world, and forms a type of Indian negative theology.  It denies
any nameability of brahman, its grammatical object. This is directly tied to brahman’s
unobjectifiable status, for the hermeneutical premise of negative language is the inability
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of predicates to apply to absolute reality.338 To give positive predicates would reify the
absolute to a finite entity.  Neti neti is a means to negate all properties, conceptions,
limitations, and identities that one naturally attempts to place on brahman; however,
negative language cannot totally lose all reference.  Passages using negative language
often push their object away, allowing the unobjectifiable object to continually slip back
and beyond.  The purpose is not to be open ended and lapse into nihilism or an infinite
regress, but to strip away all false conceptions and negate one’s tendency to grasp after
the absolute.339  What appears to be an illogical infinite regress of negation is harnessed
as a semantic force for understanding the absolute. Negative language will even turn onto
itself, negating its prior negation.  By turning back upon its referential delimitations it
tries to free itself from those delimitations.340
akara provides a concise explanation of neti neti in BUbh 2.3.6:
How through these two terms ‘Not this, not this’ is it sought to describe the Truth
of truth? By the elimination of all differences due to limiting adjuncts, the words
refer to something that has no distinguishing mark such as name, or form, or
action, or heterogeneity, or species, or qualities.  Words denote things through one
or other of these.  But brahman has none of these distinguishing marks.  Hence it
cannot be described as, ‘It is such and such,’ as we can describe a cow by saying,
‘There moves a white cow with horns.’  Brahman is described by means of name,
form and action superimposed on it, in such terms as, ‘knowledge, bliss,
brahman’ (BU 3.9.28), and ‘pure, intelligence’ (3.4.12), ‘brahman,’ and ‘atman.’
When however we wish to describe its true nature, free from all differences due to
limiting adjuncts, then it is an utter impossibility.  Then there is only on way left,
viz to describe it as ‘not this, not this’ by eliminating all possible specifications of
it that have been known.341
                                                 
338 Katz 2000, p. 41.
339 This may not apply to all negative language, but concurs with akara’s understanding.  See BSbh
3.2.22.
340 Sells 1994, p. 8.
341 Madhavananda 1993, p. 239.
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Negative language sometimes constitutes half of a paradox that affirms positive
and negative propositions at the same time.  But this has a point: to ensure that the reader
does not try and grasp an object and at the same time not fall into a kind of nihilism.
There is a positive assertion of an entity but the negative language strips that entity of any
limitations or finite objectivity. Negative language is not constructing new content or
shifting one schema for another.  Negative language stops the supply of content and
deconstructs and rejects one’s current expectations, ideas, beliefs, and perceptual
patterns.342 The positive and negative assertions that employ neti neti are clearly seen in
akara’s method of anvaya and vyatireka.
3.4.2: The Method Called anvaya (Continuity) and vyatireka (Discontinuity)
This method of anvaya/vyatireka is a form of discriminative reasoning to
understand one’s self and underlies ravaa, manana, and nididhysana.  It serves as a
crucial exegetical strategy to unfold the enigmatic mahvkyas in ravaa, to resolve
doubts in manana, and to constitute the structure and content of nididhysana.343  Anvaya
and vyatireka are words used in other ways in classical Indian philosophies such as
Nyya (Indian logic) and Vykaraa (grammar).  The following example demonstrates
akara’s usage:
When a particular mental state (such as dreaming) (a) occurs, awareness (b)
occurs (anvaya)
                                                 
342 Forman 1999, p. 101.
343 Anvaya and vyatireka can also be translated as “presence” and “absence” or “positive” and “negative
concomitance.”  akara also uses the synonymous Sanskrit terms vyabhicra and avyabhicra in the
second prose chapter of the US.  My discussion of anvaya and vyatireka is primarily based on chapter 18 of
akara’s US.  I have also depended on the discussions of anvaya and vyatireka in Cardona 1981; Halbfass
1991, pp. 162-177; Comans 1996, pp. 59-63; and Mayeda 1992, pp. 51-58.
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When a particular state (such as dreaming) (a) is absent, awareness occurs (b)
(vyatireka)344
akara specifically employs this reasoning to determine the relationship of what persists
and what does not persist between two things (anuvttavyvttasambandha).  Through
this method he shows that one term is independent of another.345  For example, when
there is a pot (a) then there will be clay (b).  But when that clay is shaped into a bowl, the
pot (a) is absent and the clay (b) continues to exist.  Using anvaya/vyatireka in this
example distinguishes clay, the material that persists, from the transitory forms it may
take.  Properties such as pot, bowl, or plate are adventitious and not intrinsic properties of
the clay.
Similarly there is a given correlation, anvaya, of awareness, which is present at all
times with the mental states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep.  These states only
occur with awareness.  Awareness itself can never be absent.  One cannot escape from
one’s own awareness, nor can one directly separate a particular mental state from
awareness because awareness itself is not mutually exclusive of anything and not subject
to the negative instance of vyatireka.  However, separating awareness and a particular
mental state is possible because the states themselves are mutually exclusive.   For
example, the dream reality and waking reality are mutually exclusive, pointing to the fact
that awareness is independent of them even though it persists or is present in both of
                                                 
344 Anvaya – Fa, Ga; Vyatireka – nFb, nFa.
345 Comans 1996, p. 60.
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them.  Through anvaya/vyatireka one discriminates awareness as the fourth state (turya)
underlying the three other states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep (avasthtraya).346
This form of anvaya/vyatireka constitutes a basic structure of akara’s reasoning
(yukti, tarka, or anumna).  He uses this form to distinguish the self from the not-self,
consisting of adventitious elements, properties, forms, and identities.  It is only through
this method that the self can be known as non-dual awareness and existence. In the US he
states,
(The method of) continuity-and-discontinuity (‘coordinate presence and absence’)
of meanings and words, that should be the method, indeed, (which applies) here in
the case of the ascertainment of the meaning of ‘I.”347
akara specifically singles out the anvaya /vyatireka  method of self-
discrimination based on its coherence with numerous teaching methods (prakriys) and
mahvkyas in the Upaniads.  For example, he discerns this method in the explanation
of self-light (svayam jyoti) in BU 4.3.348 In this discussion between Y jñavalkya and
Janaka, Yjñavalkya  distinguishes awareness from the sun, moon, voice, the dream
world, and deep sleep.   In the discrimination of the self from the five sheaths
(pañcakoaviveka) in the Taittirya Upaniad awareness is separated from the physical
body, the subtle body, the mind, the intellect, and the causal-nanda body. All of these
                                                 
346 US 10.4, US 18.97, and akara on MUbh 7.
347 US 18.96. Halbfass 1991, p. 165.
348 See US 18.99.
183
deal with separating awareness underlying one’s sense of self from everything else.349
akara compares this process to separating the muñja grass from the stalk.350
For akara, anvaya/vyatireka is not to be used independently of the ruti.  By
itself it is just dry logic and will not lead to complete knowledge. 351 Nor is ravaa
productive without anvaya/vyatireka, because anvaya and vyatireka are necessary in
order to unlock the meaning of the sentences.  One of the well known mahvkyas for
which akara employs anvaya/vyatireka is “tat tvam asi”, “You are that.” This sentence
occurs in Chndogya Upaniad 6.8.7 where Uddlaka teaches his son vetaketu the
nature of the self:352
Oh vetaketu, that which is this subtle essence, all this has got that as the Self.
That is real.  That is the self.  You are that.353
In this sentence, “that” (tat), which has its antecedent as “existence” (sat) at the
beginning of the section, at first appears to refer to the world of objects outside of the
individual and “you” (tvam) refers to the finite sense of self constituting an individual’s
identity. However, this identity statement makes a logically inconsistent sentence because
                                                 
349 The method is also apparent in akara’s discussion of the parisakhyna contemplation in US prose
chapter three and the contemplations found in KU 1.3.10-13, BU 2.4, and BG chapter six. Generally we see
nididhysana as contemplation on the mahvkya itself, but we also see this in a dilated form in the various
prakriys and the contemplations in KU, BU, BG and US. These prakriys help the Advaitin to discover
the meaning of the words in the mahvkya.  Then the mhavkya becomes a condensed seed version of
larger prakriys.  It holds the entire prakriy along with the anvaya and vyatireka method in just a few
words.  In seeing the meaning of the sentence in nididhysana one is basically seeing the meaning of the
whole prakriy.
350 BUbh 4.3.7.
351 For example in BS 2.1.11 akara says that self-knowledge cannot even be guessed at without the help
of Vedas and that logic alone will not establish anything.
See BSbh  2.1.6 for arguments against dry logic.
352 Uddlaka repeats and explains tat tvam asi nine times to vetaketu.
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the equation of subject and object, in the form of the individual and the world, is
contradictory.  This apparent paradoxical contradiction is not grounds for dismissing the
sentence; rather it instigates the reader to inquire deeper into its meaning by employing
anvaya and vyatireka.
In akara’s opinion, one must understand the true meaning of tvam to
understand the sentence.354 This is only possible through anvaya and vyatireka.355
akara explains that “you” refers to the subject as the ahakra (I notion).  The
ahakra is in reality simply awareness, yet this awareness is reflected in the mind
(cidbhsa) and is then superimposed onto mind.  Due to this one believes the mind is
the locus of awareness and possesses awareness as an attribute or product of the mind,
analogous to a red-hot iron ball, where the heat and light of the fire is not easily
distinguished from the iron constituting the ball. Through anvaya and vyatireka, akara
derives the true meaning of tvam, first separating it from the ego and then pointing it out
as the unchanging self-luminous awareness underlying an individual’s experience.  Tat
undergoes a similar process of superimposition and discrimination.  All objects possess
name (nm a ), form (rpa ), and existence (s a t-being).  However, through
anvaya/vyatireka, the Advaitin understands that only sat persists and is independent of
both name and form.  Tat is that sat which is not restricted by boundaries of space and
                                                                                                                                                  
353 CU 6.8.7.  sa ya eo ‘imaitadtmyam ida sarva tat satya sa tm tat tvam asi vetaketo | (my
translation).
354 US 18.90.
355 US 18.96.
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time.  It is one only, non-dual, and the undifferentiated universal existence (sat)
pervading all names and forms.356
The verb “is” (asi) connects the two terms, showing that tat and tvam are referring
to each other and making an identity statement.  This is based on grammatical apposition
(smndhikarayam), where two or more terms in a sentence have the same referent.357
It is the lack of logical congruency (yogyat) in identifying the primary limited meanings
of the terms tat and tvam, which are not synonyms and contradict each other, that thwarts
the complete sense of the sentence and instigates the reader to employ anvaya/vyatireka.
The sentence equation employs a contradictory juxtaposition of terms, without which one
would have no inclination to look deeper in the words to negate adventitious layers of
their meanings.  Tat prods the anvaya of tvam and vice versa.  In the equation, tvam
negates the mediacy (parokatvam) of tat, as existence away from one’s self, and
indicates tat’s immediacy (aparokatvam) by equating it to one’s own awareness.  Tat
negates the individually limited subjective awareness of tvam by indicating its identity as
undifferentiated existence.  When they are identified they make a single partless meaning
(akhartha), 358 which reveals one’s self-identity as none other than brahman by
negating self-ignorance in the form of false self-superimpositions.359 These two meanings
are then equated as brahman and identified as one’s self. The equation is the key to the
means of self-knowledge.  Discriminating the self as awareness is arguably possible
                                                 
356 US 18.195.
357 US 18.170,18.196-7.
358 nandagiri’s commentary on US 18.173.
359 US 18.173.
186
without the Upaniads, however, it only leads to the witness.  The equation of identity is
necessary to understand that awareness as undifferentiated existence.
akara understands the method of anvaya and vyatireka as the intrinsic method
of the ruti and is adamant that properly understanding mhavkyas such as tat tvam asi
are the only means to liberation. Nothing else needs to be done.  He often illustrates and
the power of sentences such as tat tvam asi to reveal one’s immediately available self
with the story of the tenth man. Ten boys are traveling from one village to another.  After
traversing a river they line up on the riverbank to check if all have safely crossed.  Each
one counts but finds only nine boys, and they sorrowfully conclude that one boy has
drowned in the river.  An old wise man then walks by and noticing their forlorn
expressions, enquires about their problem.  Upon hearing their plight he tells them to line
up again and asks the eldest boy to count the others.  When the boy reaches nine the old
man points at him and says “You are the tenth.”  Through this statement the boy has the
immediate knowledge that he is the missing tenth boy.  He simply forgot to count
himself.360 This sentence uses anvaya/vyatireka to solve the situation by stripping away
false identities of the boy and the missing tenth and then equating them as the boy’s very
self.  The indicative statement possesses this capacity to give immediate knowledge
because the boy’s self is immediately evident to himself and because there is no real
                                                 
360 avidybaddhacakuvt kmpahtadh sad |
vivikta dimtmna nekate daama yath | | US 18.175
Just as the tenth man (did not know himself) so too he does not see the separate tman, who is the seer
because his eyes are blocked by ignorance and his intellect is always pulled by desires.  (US 18.175)
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problem to solve other than an ignorant mistake.  The tenth boy does not need to engage
any additional action or produce any new experience to become the tenth.361
3.4.3: Secondary Implication (laka)
The third method is secondary implication (laka). Laka became the
preferred method and terminology among later advaitins, though it is closely based on
akara’s anvaya/vyatireka.362  ankara himself rarely uses the term,  363 but the
methodology that later Advaitins describe is clearly evident in akara’s writing, even if
not systematically categorized.  The following section exemplifies the use of laka
through akara’s commentary on the sentence satya jñnam ananta brahma,
“brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite” in TU 2.1.1.  akara states that this sentence is
meant as a definition of brahman; however, if brahman is infinite and indescribable, then
is a sentence declaring its nature self-defeating?  How can language directly designate the
reality of brahman?  akara’s extended exegesis of this sentence resolves this apparent
contradiction through the method of implication.
akara begins his analysis of satya jñnam ananta brahma with a discussion
of grammatical apposition (co-referentiality), or “being in the same case”
(smndhikaraya).364  Each word in the sentence has the same case ending: singular,
                                                 
361 akara also mentions the tenth man in US 12.3, 18.172, 18.174-6, 18.192-3; BUbh 1.4.7 and TU 2.1.
A similar parable is the story of the lost prince who grows up as a hunter.  He mistakenly thinks he
is a hunter until a compassionate man informs him he is truly a prince.  See BUbh 2.1.20. For another brief
but important summary of tattvamasi, see BSbh 4.1.2.
362 This may have begun with Padmapda, though I am not sure.  Surevara places a heavy focus on
anvaya and vyatireka throughout his writing.  In fact, I would argue that his emphasis on this method is the
defining characteristic of his understanding of akara’s method.
363 See Comans 2000, pp. 291-299 for some exceptions such as US 18.29 and KeUbh 2.4.
364 As he also does in tat tvam asi.
188
neuter, and nominative and refer to a single referent.  According to akara, we have to
decide here which word is the substantive and which are the attributes.  akara explains
that due to the context of the previous sentence, brahmavid pnoti param (the knower of
brahman obtains the highest) where brahman is the object of knowledge, brahman must
also be the substantive element in satyam jñnam anantam brahma.
For Indian grammarians, the adjectives (vieani) in a sentence generally
provide the function of qualifying the substantive.  The subject-predicate construction
denotes the relationship of an attribute and its possessor.  However akara objects to
this understanding in his interpretation of satyam jñnam anantam brahma, and
differentiates the purpose of the adjectives as defining rather than qualifying.365  The
difference is between a qualification that distinguishes the substantive from other objects
in its class (jti) and a definition that distinguishes the object from all other objects.
We can distinguish two types of definition (lakaa).  The first is more aptly
termed a characterization because it identifies a characteristic mark to differentiate a
thing from other things.366  A second type of definition uses the universal, or class
character, to show the ground for the use of a word.  For example, we can define a cow as
that which possesses cowhood.  This latter type of definition can be termed a philosophic
or real definition.367 As we will see, akara employs a third type of definition for
defining brahman, which is similar to characterization for it depends on exclusion.
                                                                                                                                                  
See Comans 1996, fn. 45 for Kaiyata’s definition of this in his commentary upon the Mahbhya.
365 yasmllakarthpradhnni vieani navieaapradhnnyeva
366 Phillips 1997, p. 63.
367 Phillips 1997, p. 63.
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However, rather then focusing on defining by attributes he defines brahman by focusing
on its essential nature (svarpalakaa).
 akara argues that the words in the sentence cannot be attributes of brahman
because brahman does not belong to any class.  There is no need to differentiate brahman
from other brahmans, for only one brahman exists.  Instead, the words serve to define
brahman by distinguishing brahman from all objects.368
akara uses the common example of a lily to explain qualification.  In the
sentence “The big blue fragrant lily” the word “blue” is not meant to distinguish the lily
from another class/species of objects, but only from other lilies in the lily species (svajti
vieaa).  akara does not clearly make the use-mention distinction, the differentiation
of metalanguage and object language, though this distinction was clearly made by early
grammarians.369  Usually words are used to point to the objects they refer to, but words
can also be used to mention themselves.370  In this context akara is primarily referring
to the word “blue” rather then the quality blue.  However, this distinction may be difficult
for akara to make because according to Advaita theory the word is eternally linked to
its referent.  The word “blue” negates other vieaas such as pink or white, and thus
negates any lily that is not blue.  This type of relationship between substantive and
adjective (vieyavieaasambandha) is necessary when there is more than one object in
a given jti, but unnecessary when the jti consists of only one member.
                                                 
368 akara gives space as an example of a definition.  Space is that which accommodates.
yathvakapradtrkamiti.
369 Pini, in his Adhyy, makes the distinction in the stra, “sva rpa abdasyabdasajñ”
1.1.68.  See Matilal 1990, pp. 7-8.
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Grammatically, a definition (lakaa) acts as a vieaa to the subject, however,
rather then distinguishing the noun from things in its own class it marks the object from
everything else.  Thus, unlike an adjective, a definition distinguishes the object from
other objects in the same class (sajti) as well as dissimilar objects (vijti).  One may
argue that even when a species consists of many or only one member, as in the case of
brahman, a definition can still use adjectives to qualify the object.  For example, we can
define a cow as that which possesses a dewlap.  Only cows possess dewlaps so the
sentence acts as a definition.  The dewlap is a defining or characteristic mark (lakaa) of
what is to be defined (lakya), a cow.  It is perceivable and forms only a part of the cow.
 akara faces a difficult problem.  One cannot define brahman in the same way a
cow is defined.  If brahman is non-dual how can one posit a characterizing mark, for,
characterizing marks can only exist in duality.  One cannot perceive satyam sticking to
brahman like a dewlap to a cow.  Otherwise brahman becomes a substance in the world
(dharmin) possessing attributes (guas), a position which akara finds untenable both
according to logic and the Upaniads.  Furthermore, as pure awareness, brahman is the
ground and content of the subjective experience that lies at the core of a person and is the
witness of the mind.  As self-luminous consciousness, brahman is immediately evident as
the real subject but cannot itself become an object of perception like a dewlap. The
Advaitin’s argument appears to leave the reader in a conundrum.  How is it possible to
define brahman?  Either brahman is non-existent or it is an unintelligible paradox, so
why bother attempting to understand the sentence?
                                                                                                                                                  
370 See Martinich 2001, pp. 3-6.
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In fact, I believe akara wants the student to encounter the problem of definition
because it naturally leads to the fundamental method necessary to interpret such
sentences and gives the essential definition (svarpalakaa) of brahman, namely,
secondary indication (laka).371  According to Advaita, words have literal denotative
meanings (mukhy r tha  or vcyrtha) as well as implied connotative meanings
(lakyrtha).  In certain situations the secondary implied meaning is the actual referent of
the word.  There is some relationship between the literal and implied meaning, and the
implied sense is taken when the intention of the primary meaning is somehow blocked by
the sentence.372
Advaita distinguish three forms of laka.373  The first is jahallaka, where the
primary meaning is completely discarded and the implied meaning is taken.  The stock
example is “the village on the Ganga”.  The primary meaning of the sentence is
impossible because it is not suitable for the context.  A village cannot exist on the river
itself.  Instead, the primary meaning is dropped, and the secondary meaning of the “bank”
connected to “Ganga” is supplied.  The actual sense of the sentence, the secondary
meaning, comes to the hearer’s mind after recognizing the incompatibility of the sentence
                                                 
371 This definition of laka differs from its translations as a “definition” of “indicating mark”
(lakaam).
372 See Madhavananda’s translation (1993) of Vedntaparibh, p. 102.
Though I hesitate to use the terms denotative and connotative.  The secondary meaning used in Advaita’s
jahalajahallaka  is part of the direct reference  of the word unlike the other two forms of it.  Laka is
not pulling in a new meaning, as in the case of suggestion (dhvani), but negating aspects to reduce the word
meaning to the most basic aspect of the referent.
373 akara does not give a direct explanation of laka, though it is clear he depended on the concept.
Later Advaita texts such as Dharmarja’s Vedntaparibha give systematic explanations of laka.
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with the primary meaning.  In this case the relationship between the primary meaning of
“Ganga” and the secondary meaning is one of proximity.374
A second form of laka is ajahallaka, where the primary meaning is
retained and an implied meaning is added along with it.  In the statement “The lances
enter” it is obvious that lances lack the capacity of mobility.  Through ajahallaka we
know that people enter along with lances.  Another common example is “Protect the
curds from the crows”, where not only should one protect the curds from crows but
anything else which tries to eat it.
The third form of laka, jahadajahallaka (or bhgatygalaka), is
integral for akara’s exegesis.  In this type of indication, a portion of the primary
meaning is rejected while another part is retained.  For example, the statement “The
village is burnt” does not refer to the entire village but only a few homes within the
village.  The prominent Advaita example is “This (person that you see now) is that
Devadatta (who you knew in the past)” (so ‘yam devadatta).375  Here, the primary
referents of “this” and “that” cannot be identical because “this” and “that” refer to
different locations and times, Devadatta in the past somewhere else and Devadatta here
and now.  The two Devadattas are not completely identical because of the relationships to
time and place, nor are there two completely separate Devadattas.  The import of the
sentence creates a cognition of a single Devadatta substantive that is not connected to a
                                                 
374 Kunjunni Raja 2000, pp. 249-250.
375 See Kunjunni Raja 2000, pp. 251-254.
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specific time or place. This form of laka is employed in understanding “satyam
jñnam anantam brahma”and clearly parallels akara’s explanation of tat tvam asi.376
akara defines satyam as that which “does not change the nature that is
ascertained to be its own; and a thing is said to be unreal when it changes the nature that
is ascertained to be its own”.377  akara claims the primary distinction between what is
real or not real is change.  For example, when one mistakes a rope for a snake, the
imagined snake is negated by knowledge.  The snake name and form changes, but its
substratum and reality, the rope maintains its nature before and after the existence of the
snake.  This example is limited, for the rope also changes.  At one time it was simply
unbraided fibers and eventually it will disintegrate and lose its rope nature.  However,
even then pure existence remains as its reality.  Just as a lump of clay takes different
shapes as a pot or a plate, the clay remains as the reality of the forms.  So too is brahman
the unchanging existence that stays constant through all objects and all change. The clay
example also demonstrates akara’s view that a property such as shape (pot, lump,
plate) is not as real as the substance clay.  The properties depend on the substance for
their existence but the substance exists independently of the properties.378
The definition of brahman as satyam is incomplete, for certain doubts remain.  If
brahman is the reality or substratum of all objects like the clay is to the pot, is brahman
inert like the clay?  Does brahman, while retaining its nature as brahman, undergo
                                                 
376 akara cites this sentence as explaining the same content as tat tvam asi in BSbh 4.1.2.
377 satyamiti yadrpea yannicita tadrpam na vyabhicarati tatsatyam |  yadrpea nicita
yattadrpa vyabhicarad antam ity ucyate | TUbh 2.1.1 (my translation).
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changes by becoming objects in the world?  If so, akara’s definition of satyam would
be compromised.  In order to negate aspects of the primary denotation of satyam such as
inertness and change, which are incompatible with brahman, akara brings in jñnam
and anantam.  If brahman is also jñnam (knowledge/consciousness) then it must not
possess the aspect of inertness that something satyam may seem to have.  However,
jñnam generally refers to mental cognition or the agent of knowledge.  This naturally
leads one to assume brahman is the agent and creator of the world.  But then brahman is
still subject to change, for any agent is within time and changes.
akara’s issue with agency points to his refutation of defining brahman as the
creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the universe.  According to him, not only does this fail
to define brahman and reveal its svarpa, but also makes brahman subject to change and
therefore finite.  Vedic sentences pointing to agency are not svarpalakaa but
tatasthalakaa (accidental definition).  They indicate brahman by pointing to a non-
intrinsic attribute. This attribute does not inherently exist with the object at all times, but
can still distinguish it from other things.  For example, one may say, “The house you are
looking for is the one with a crow perched on it”.  The crow is not intrinsic to the house
so it is simply tatasthalakaa.  Similarly sentences pointing to agency for brahman do
not refer to brahman’s true nature, but are helpful in pointing us in the right direction.379
Agency is negated by the word anantam (infinite).  akara writes,
                                                                                                                                                  
378 akara’s discusses the clay in CUbh 6.1.4, “…as by knowing a lump of clay, all things made of clay
are known.”
379 See Bhattacharya 2000, p. 27-8 for Sarvajñtman’s explanation of svarpa and tatasthalakaam.
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If it be the agent of knowing, It becomes delimited by the knowable and
knowledge, and hence there cannot be infinitude, in accordance with another
Vedic text: ‘The Infinite is that where one does not understand anything else.
Hence, the finite is that where one understands something else’ (Ch.Bh. 7.24.1)380
Anantam negates any end or limitation for brahman.  It cannot be an object, for all
objects are spatially limited, yet all objects must be included within brahman.  To
exclude anything from brahman would place a limit on it, contradicting its nature as
anantam.   All objects are brahman, but brahman is not any object.  Anantam also
negates any limitation of time on brahman. Brahman is the reality of time and is not
subject to temporal limits.  Anantam provides an essential counter to the problematic
aspects of satyam and jñnam.  It breaks the finite agency of jñnam and removes satyam
from its association with finite objects.
 In the sentence, “ jñnam” does not refer to the common sense of the word such
as cognition or mind, but rather to the abstract meaning of the verbal root (jñapti).381  As
pure awareness, which is unchanging (satyam) and infinite (anantam) it is neither the
finite knower or known object, nor an inert object, or something that exists within the
relationship of cause and effect.  Jñnam, as the essential nature of brahman, is not
dependent on anything else for its existence (svata siddha) and is the nature of self-
illuminating (svapraka) awareness.  Jñnam is the invariable aspect that underlies the
action of knowing without ever changing.  It is the immediate reality of all subjective
experience.  According to Advaita, cognition, and objects of cognition constantly
                                                 
380 Gambhirananda 1995, p. 309.
381 jñnam jñaptiravabodha,  bhvasdhano jñnaabdo na tu jñnakart brahmavieaatvt
satynantbhy saha (p.104).
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undergo change, but consciousness itself remains the same.  It is the invariable satyam of
the knower.
akara explains that the sentence functions as a means to discard all commonly
construed associations with the words while retaining their fundamental meaning.  He
summarizes this in the following statement,
Thus the words ‘truth’ etc., occurring in mutual proximity, and restricting and
being restricted in turns by each other, distinguish brahman from other objects
denoted by the words, ‘truth’ etc., and thus become fit for defining it as well
(TUBh. 2.1.l).382
Through the sentence, time (kla), space (dea), name and form (nmarpa), limiting
properties (updhi), inertness (jaatvam), change (vyabhicra), and any finiteness
(antatvam) are all discarded.  Any distinction or qualification attributed to brahman must
be false. Only unchanging infinite existence and infinite consciousness exist, and nothing
is left to separate them if they are beyond the limitations of time and space.  Existence
and consciousness are one and the same non dual brahman. In akara’s Advaita these
three words, satyam, jñnam, and anantam indicate brahman by defining its essential
nature.
3.4.4: One Method, Different Names
Parallels between neti neti, anvaya/vyatireka, and lakan are apparent. These are
all in fact part and parcel of one exegetical method.  All these methods strip away all
qualities, attributes, identities, concepts, and anything associated with space and time
from one’s self-identity, so that only non-dual self-evident awareness-existence is left as
                                                 
382 Gambhirananda 1995, p.315.
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one’s self.  They all directly reveal the tman by indirectly communicating its true
immediate nature.  I believe the similarity of anvaya/vyatireka and laka in particular
are quite evident and that they constitute the same method.383 Both laka and
anvaya/vyatireka are used for mhavkya identity statements that form an equation
consisting of two or more co-referential terms. In all these cases a lack of logical
congruence prods the reader to use a hermeneutical method to resolve the equation.  Both
methods come in and function to restrict and indicate the meaning of the sentence by
juxtaposing the words.  They set the conditions for discriminating insight into what is the
self and not-self by negating adventitious properties and identities, and finally equate the
true underlying references of the terms into one entity, namely brahman.
Negative language is slightly different than the other two in appearance, but is
indeed functioning through the same method. akara clearly equates neti neti and
anvaya/vyatireka in the US.384 Laka and anvaya/vyatireka inherently depend on a
process of negation (neti neti) through their mutual restriction; however, negative
                                                 
383 The post-akara Advaita tradition favored the terminology of laka over anvaya and vyatireka.
This has led to some disagreement among scholars. Cardona 1981, pp. 94-6 and Comans 2000, pp. 289-291
argue that laka and anvayva/vyatireka are the same method. Others, such as Mayeda 1992, p. 55
interpret laka as different than anvaya and vyatireka.  He writes that later Advaitins dropped anvaya and
vyatireka in favor of laka.  I believe that the methods are not different; however, I am not clear why
laka became the favored terminology and classification for later Advaitins.  Mayeda reasons that there
is a defect in akara’s use of anvaya and vyatireka (referring to his example of “the black horse” not
fitting laka), though Madeya’s critique of this statement is weak because it only demonstrates
smndhikarayam.  Later Advaitins may have wanted to avoid terms borrowed from grammar and
Nyya.  It is also important to remember that akara was not wedded to consistent use of terms and later
Advaitins may not have felt any pressure to use the exact terms that akara uses.
Of special note is US 18.29-31, which uses the verb lakayeyu in the context of words indirectly
expressing the self.  This verse occurs in the wider discussion of anvaya and vyatireka and shows that neti
neti functions like laka.
384 akara clearly equates neti neti with anvaya and vyatireka. See US 18.195, and 18.198.  Earlier in the
same chapter he shows that neti neti functions like lakan (US 18.21, 18.29-31).   Also see akara’s
commentary on GK 3.26.
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language appears to be only half of the lakan and anvaya/vyatireka processes because
it lacks any explicit positive proposition of continuity. Laka is not a purely negative
process, for it restricts meaning while simultaneously asserting the positive nature of
brahman.  However, akara does not view negative language as purely apophatic, for
apparently, this would lead him to a position of nihilism where reality is absolutely none
existent.385  Negative language functions to negate anything remote or indirect from the
individual, anything which is superimposed on the self and which can become an object
of the mind.  It thus is supposed to break any mental grasping of an objectifiable
conceptual referent.  He still assumes the presence of pure awareness and existence as a
kind of referent underlying the negation of neti neti.  Pure awareness persists through the
negation process for one cannot deny one’s own existence.  The awareness and pure
existence that remains somehow referred through and after the negation does not have to
be directly referred to because it is supposedly self-evident and any direct reference to it
would have to be false.386
Neti neti as a soteriological method appears different from anvaya/vyatireka and
laka in other ways.  It is not drawn from a particular mahvkya, and thus is not
dealing with an identity sentence or the lack of yogyat in such sentences.  One may
                                                 
385 akara’s brahman is not a complete void (nyat) similar to the Buddhist position of Ngrjuna’s
Mdhyamika position (though it is also debatable whether Nagarjuna’s emptiness (nyat) is truly
absolute non-existence).  Many later critics of akara claimed he was a Buddhist in disguise or a crypto-
Buddhist (pracannabauddha) because brahman appears dangerously close to a complete void, but this is a
false accusation because there is an indirect assertion of brahman’s existence. Laka would not be
possible if its intention was to indicate a non-existent entity or absolute emptiness. akara gives an
excellent and lengthy explanation of this aspect of neti neti in BSbh 3.2.22
386 Though in BU 2.3.6 the text does directly state brahman as “something other than this which is
beyond.”
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assume that we do not find grammatical anvaya in negation itself or the passage in which
it occurs, but we do find it in the larger context surrounding the passage.  For example,
the immediate verses preceding neti neti in BU 2.3.6 speak of brahman as the subtle and
gross bodies.  They are then negated, yet brahman still remains as the “real of the real”
(or “truth of truth” – satyasya satyam).  Similarly in 4.5.15, the negation (almost verbatim
to 2.3.6) is preceded by a discussion indirectly pointing to the meaning of tvam.
Yjñavalkya describes the witness perceiver as unperceivable.  It is the absolute essence
and source of all things yet it is also beyond duality and a pure mass of undifferentiated
awareness without interior or exterior.  One cannot “know” this source, the knower
behind the knower, but it is indirectly indicated through negation.  In these examples we
find that in the larger context there is a superimposition of brahman which is
progressively negated so that only awareness remains as meant.387  The larger discussion
functions like a dilated mhavkya.  The method of resolution in the form of negation is
then directly stated as a means to resolve the situation and point to brahman.
                                                 
387 Laka and anvaya/vyatireka do not directly state a superimposition and then negate it, but
superimposition is already presupposed in the literal meaning of the terms in the sentence.  It may be more
precise to label this process as superimposition (adhyropa) and de-superimposition (apavda). The
context brings our attention to superimpositions of self-identity and the neti neti then removes those
superimpositions.  Adhyropa and apavda is fundamentally the same as anvaya and vyatireka. In BUbh
4.4.25 akara writes that, in a nutshell, the intention of the Upaniads is adhyropa and apavda (apoha)
and discusses de-superimposition as neti neti.  A good example akara identifies as adhyropa and
apavda is BG 13.13, which describes brahman as having hands and feet everywhere, etc.  This has
brahman as all pervasive in all limiting adjuncts, yet the prior negation in BG 13.12 and the subsequent
negation in BG 13.14 deny adjuncts as a limitation on brahman.
200
Chapter 4: The Method of nididhysana
4.1: Bhadrayaka Upaniad 2.4.5: The Root Text for nididhysana
akara only occasionally mentions nididhysana specifically by name and does
not employ other terms for contemplation with regularity, but rather uses the terms he
meets with in the root text he commentates upon.  However, he often implicitly includes
nididhysana within the expression “ravadi” (hearing, etc.).  It is intriguing to note
that he does not mention nididhysana in his one accepted independent work, the
Upadeashasr, despite the length of the text.  However, in the US he spends an entire
chapter on the parisakhyna contemplation, which I believe is the same thing as
nididhysana.  akara uses a number of other terms for contemplation in his writing
such as vtti (repetition),388 smti sant na or smti santati  (continuous flow of
memory),389 tmcint (thinking of the self) 390 dhyna yoga  ( yoga of
meditation/contemplation),391 or simply meditation/contemplation ( dhynam)392,
brahmayoga  (yoga of brahman),393 adhytma yoga  (yoga of the self), 394  manonigraha
(restraining the mind)395 jnana abhysa (practice/repetition of knowledge) or abhysa
                                                 
388 BS 4.1.1.
389 BU 1.4.7, 1.4.10.
390 BU. 1.4.7.
391 BG Ch. 6, 18.52
392 BG 13.24, KU 2.2.1, US 13.17.
393 BG 5.21.
394 KU 1.2.12.
395 GKbh 3.41-2.  Though it is debatable whether restraining the mind refers to contemplation or
meditation in this context, and whether there is self-knowledge available in manonigra.  In some places
akara says that knowledge is present.  For example, in GK 3.34 he writes, “And the behavior of the mind
under control is surely different, since ignorance, the seed of evil activities, has been burn away from that
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yoga,396 anusmarana (remembering), 397 anucintaa (thinking over), 398 adhytma-jñna-
nityatva (always contemplating self-knowledge),399 upsana or paryupsan,400 ananya
bhakti (unwavering devotion),401sardhana (absorbed contemplation),402 samdhi (deep
contemplation),403 and parisakhyna (repeated contemplation).404
Evidently akara was not concerned with using a unique term for the
contemplative process and prefers, as I have said, to follow whatever terms he finds in
texts he commentates on.  However, post-akara Advaitins desired to make Advaita
more systematic with more clearly defined terms.  Subsequently, nididhysana, along
with ravaa and manana, crystallized as terms used for a threefold process.  This choice
was not random though, for akara clearly placed great importance on the root text, BU
2.4.5, which indicates the triple process and often talks about the threefold process as the
quintessential Advaita practice(s) leading to liberation.
There are a number of key verses in the Upaniads that akara takes as referring
to contemplation;405 however, there is only one specifically for the term nididhysana.
The root passage for the three-fold process of ravaa, manana, and nididhysana occurs
                                                                                                                                                  
mind by the fire of the realization of the truth that is the self, and since from that mind has been removed
the blemish of all afflictions” (Gambhirananda 1992, p. 307).
396BG 6.35, 8.8, 12.9. See Gkbh 3.31 for viveka-darana-abhysa, a phrase similarly used in YSbh 1.12.
397 BG 8.9, GKbh 3.43.
398 BG 8.8.
399 BG 13.11.
400 BUbh 1.4.7, BG 12.3.
401 BG 13.10, though this is anaya-yogena-bhakti.
402 BS 3.2.24.
403 GKbh 3.37, BGbh 6.19. akara often uses the related term samhita, a synonym for yukta, in the
BGbh as a description of the yog engaged in contemplation.  For example, see BGbh 6.18.
404 US prose chapter three.
I’ve only found one reference to bhvan (tmdhibhvan) in BGbh 13.10.
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in the Yjñavalkya and Maitrey dialogue in Bhadrayaka Upaniad 2.4.5, and is
repeated almost verbatim in BU 4.5.6.  These two mantras are the only two passages in
the Upaniad corpus that specifically mention the triple process and nididhysana.406
akara introduces this brhmaa by continuing his preceding discussion distinguishing
the domains of knowledge and ritual action. He believes the thrust of the narrative is to
enjoin renunciation and reiterates that ritual is based in ignorance and dependent on
divisions, names, forms, and actions, which are all incompatible with recognizing non-
duality.  This incompatibility necessitates the renunciation of ritual and other activities
that do not lead to self-knowledge.  He also reiterates that actions, rituals, and
qualifications for rituals, which are usually prescribed as one’s duties according to stage
of life and caste (varrama dharma), are pointless for one possessing self-knowledge.
The context of BU. 2.4 is a dialogue between Yjñavalkya and one of his wives,
Maitrey.  Yjñavalkya chooses to leave the householder life and embark on a life of
renunciation, and  thus intends to divide his wealth between Maitrey and his other wife
Ktyyan.407   Maitrey , possessing a discriminative intellect, inquires if she will gain
immortality by having his and indeed all the worlds’ wealth.  When Yjñavalkya denies
                                                                                                                                                  
405 Such as BU 1.4.7, BU 1.4.10, BU 1.4.15, BU 3.5.1, BU 4.4.21, and CU 8.7.1,
406 akara held the BU in high esteem, and his commentary on it is only second to his commentary on the
BS in terms of maturity, length, and complexity.  He also quotes heavily from the BU in both the BSbh and
the US.  According to Mayeda (1965 pp. 187-8), the BU was the most important source for akara.  He
quotes passages from the BU more than the CU in the US.  In the BSbh he quotes more from the BU, but
the BS text itself cites the BU more often than the CU., and even then the ratio of bhyam quotes is higher
for BU compared to the citations in the stras themselves.
407 Yjñavalkya says he will depart from this place (aham asmt sthnd asmi).  It is debatable whether any
formal path of renunciation existed at the time of the BU’s composition and therefore it is unclear what
“sthnt” means.  It is perhaps anachronistic to identify it with an rama.  Whether it was formal
sanysa, simply leaving home, or even referring to death is unclear.  I am following akara’s
interpretation of the passage as renunciation, whatever precisely this was for him.
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any possibility of immortality through wealth, Maitrey requests that he explain the
means to immortality.  Yjñavalkya replies:
One holds a husband dear, you see, not out of love for the husband; rather, it is
out of love for oneself (tman) that one holds a husband dear.  One holds a wife
dear not out of love for the wife; rather, it is out of love for oneself that one holds
a wife dear.  One holds children dear not out of love for the children; rather, it is
out of love for oneself that one holds children dear.  One holds wealth dear not
out of love for wealth; rather, it is out of love for oneself that one holds wealth
dear.  One holds the priestly power dear not out of love for the priestly power;
rather, it is out of love for oneself that one holds the priestly power dear.  One
holds the royal power dear not out of love for the royal power; rather, it is out of
love for oneself that one holds the royal power dear.  One holds the worlds dear
not out of love for the worlds; rather, it is out of love for oneself that one holds
the worlds dear.  One holds the gods dear not out of love for the gods; rather, it
out of love for oneself that one holds the gods dear.  One holds beings dear not
out of love for beings; rather, it is out of love for oneself that one holds beings
dear.  One holds the Whole dear not out of love for the Whole; rather, it is out of
love for oneself that one holds the Whole dear.408
Yjñavalkya teaches a central insight into the reality and our misconceptions of
desires.  He critiques some of the most sought-after objects that are considered sources of
joy, and it is not incidental that many of these objects are closely tied to ritual action as
well.409  In fact, one of the underlying motives of this passage seems to be to denigrate
desires along with results that impel ritual and conventional actions.  The central idea in
this passage is that the self is the innermost entity in comparison to sons, wealth, or
heavenly worlds.  The self is the most intimate aspect of our existence and experience.
When we desire or love objects, it is not for the sake of the object but primarily for the
                                                 
408 Olivelle 1996, pp. 28-29.
409 This verse parallels and gives further commentary on BU. 1.4.8.  BU 1.4.8 and 1.4.7 are similar to BU
2.4.5 though the order is reversed.  1.4.7 says the self should be meditated upon (i.e. known) and explains
that the self is most dear in 1.4.8.
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love of our selves. Yjñavalkya then proceeds to speak the root text for nididhysana as
the means to understand the tman.
Oh Maitrey, the self should be seen, should be heard, should be reflected on, and
contemplated upon. By seeing, listening, reflecting, and contemplating, all this is
known.410
akara provides the following commentary on the passage:411
Therefore, the self, my dear should be seen – deserves to be seen, should be
obtained as an object of seeing (knowing).  Should be heard – first from the
teacher and the Vedas.  Then it should be reflected upon according to reasoning.
Then it should be contemplated – it should be contemplated on with certainty.
Indeed, in this way, by the performance of listening, reflecting, and
contemplating, it (the self) is known.  When these (three) are approached
(combined) as one, then correct understanding of the oneness of brahman
becomes clear, not otherwise by listening alone. 412
Despite the importance of the Upaniad, why should this single laconic passage,
repeated again in 4.5.6, identify and solidify the triple process as the means to
understanding non-duality?   akara certainly does maintain the triple process as the key
to brahmavidy and discusses it in a few places, but he does not elaborate on it or make
an effort to defend it against other possibilities. The triple process derived from this
passage was evidently already an established soteriological method by akara’s time,
                                                 
410 tm v are draavya rotravyo mantavyo nididhysitavyo maitreyi
tmano v are daranena ravaena maty vijñneneda sarva viditam | (my translation).
The last line of 4.5.6 is slightly different and reads tmani khalv are de rute mate vijñta ida sarva
viditam.
411 Italics refer to the source text.
412tasmt tm vai are draavya-daranrha, daranaviayam pdayitavya; rotavya -prvam
cryata gamata ca; pacn mantavya tarkata; tato nididhysitavya-nicayena dhtavya; eva hy
asau dro bhavati ravaamanananididhysanasdhanair nirvartitai; yad ekatvam etny upagatni
tad samyagdarana brahmaikatvaviaya prasdati, na anyath ravaamtrea |(my translation).
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not only in Advaita but also probably in other Vednta traditions.413 He often refers to it
in his writing, though usually in an abbreviated form, as “listening, etc.” (ravadi).414
akara may have been constrained to maintain the triple process due to its popularity,
and reinterpret it as damage control against karmajñnasamuccayavdins who wanted to
enjoin meditation as a separate independent action leading to liberation.  And apparently
this verse may have been contested even at the time of the Brahmastra’s composition,
for akara interprets a few stras as clarifying the meaning of BU 2.4.5.  He provides an
extensive discussion of this verse in BSbh 1.1.4 (samanvaya adhikaraa) and mentions it
in BUbh 3.4.5.  In BSbh 2.1.3 he mentions it as a type of yoga. At the end of BUbh 1.4.2
he says that ravaa, manana, and nididhysana are the direct means to brahman and
that other practices just remove obstacles.415
akara draws out the triple process from the mantra despite the fact that the text
does not demand high interpretation because there are four grammatically parallel words,
not three, in each line.  The related terms draavya (should be seen) and daranena (be
seeing) occur in the same case and verbal suffix as the other three in their respective
sentences, potentially leading to a four-fold method.  However, akara separates
draavyah and daranena from the other three because “seeing” (darana) denotes self-
                                                 
413 For example, in BUbh. 2.5.1 akara refutes Bhartraprapañca’s idea of identifying sections of the text
with each part of the triple process.  Some form of the triple process was common to many ancient Indian
traditions.  For example, see Nyyastra bhya 4.2.38.  In the Theravdin Buddhist’s Dgha Nikya we
find a description of three kinds of knowledges, knowledge by thinking, knowledge by hearing, and
knowledge by meditation: cintmay pacc sutamay pucc bhvanmay pacc (Carpenter 1960, p. 219).
414For example, see BSbh 1.1.4, 3.2.21, 4.1.1, US 18.203-5, US 18.210,213, BU 3.5.1, and KU 1.2.20, and
his introduction to IU.
415 For further discussions see BSbh 1.4.19 and BSbh 4.1.1.
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knowledge itself.416    Listening, reflecting, and contemplating are then the means for
darana.417
Darana draws attention to the Advaitin’s confusion and ignorance and the
necessity for a method to remove ignorance.  akara’s interpretation makes sense as an
exegetical strategy, particularly in light of Advaita’s epistemology.  Darana, as
knowledge, is better viewed as the goal identified with liberation rather than as part of the
means.  There is no separation between self-knowledge and liberation.  Although it is not
false to claim self-knowledge is the means to liberation, akara prefers to identify self-
knowledge and liberation.
akara’s commentary on the Bhadrayaka Upaniad is vast, but his remarks
explaining the triple method and nididhysana in particular are pithy.  He stresses the
importance of the Vedas and a teacher in ravaa and explains manana as reflection done
according to logic (tarka).  Tarka here may specifically refer to the process of anvaya and
vyatireka, or to the broader project of resolving any philosophical doubts regarding
brahman. He simply defines nididhysatavya as “to be contemplated on with certainty”
(nicayena dhytavya). With words such as “first” (prvam), “afterwards” (pact), and
“then” (tato) akara appears to say that there is a chronological process to the triple
method.418  He further states that all three are to be combined as one so that there is a
                                                 
416 Darana literally refers to bodily seeing, but in this context refers to spiritual knowledge.  It is common
practice for Indian philosophical systems to use this term for knowledge; hence, the term darana is itself
used to denote a philosophical system.
417 See Hirst 1996, p. 62 for more discussion of this.
418 Though this does not necessarily mean that ravaa and manana are preliminary steps that lead to
nididhysana, or are incapable by themselves of leading to brahman recognition, for in other places
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unity of method.  The use of “unity” (ekatvam) may indicate that there is only one
underlying method that connects all three.  Or it may indicate that all three are used at the
same time.  Interestingly, in the same sentence, ekatvam is repeated as a reference to
brahman. I am not clear if there is an intentional or coincidental use of ekatvam in both
sentences, but perhaps we may read further into this.  akara may be intimating a unity
of scriptural method that in the final act derives from the oneness of brahman.
akara stresses the necessity of all three processes and specifically states that
listening to the teacher and the Upaniads alone is not capable of accomplishing self-
knowledge.419  This is surprising and sounds somewhat contradictory, for in numerous
passages akara states that listening alone, or listening and reflection alone, gives
knowledge.420 We can reconcile this apparent contradiction by recalling that an analysis
through anvaya and vyatireka is required for proper ravaa.  It is easy to see the unity of
ravaa and manana if we assume that “tarka” refers to anvaya and vyatireka.  From this
perspective, manana is a means for proper ravaa.  If ravaa is not supported by
anvaya and vyatireka, then the sentences cannot release their content.  Manana may refer
to other types of reasoning, but akara is adamant that all reasoning should be based in
                                                                                                                                                  
ravaa alone is adequate.  In this case he does say all are necessary, and not one itself is sufficient.  This
confusion may be reduced to an issue of adhikritvam, which I will discuss further.
419 akara’s states that the self cannot be known through much hearing in his commentaries on MU 3.2.3
and KU 1.2.23.
420 BSbh 2.1.3 and CUbh 8.11.  Also see Bader 1990, p. 93 fn. 36 and 37, and p. 66 fn. 5, Comans 1988, p.
77, and Comans 1993, p. 36 fn. 49 for various other references in akara’s commentaries.
On the other hand, see TUbh. I.11.2-4, “meditation has emancipation as its result. …Deliberation and
nididhysana are well known to be different from the knowledge acquired through hearing.” Elsewhere in
BSbh 1.1.4, akara writes, “Reflection and profound meditation (just like hearing) are meant for giving
rise to immediate knowledge.  If brahman had been known through some other source of knowledge and
then used in some other act or meditation, then it could have become a part of an injunction.  But that is not
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the Upaniads, or should not contradict the authority of the Upaniads.  He clearly states
that independent or “dry” (uka) reasoning is not part of the means for liberation.421
The phrase “not by listening alone” is not only referring to the necessity of
manana, but also the necessity of nididhysana.   Self-knowledge should be revealed to
an Advaitin studying with a qualified teacher who properly employs the Upaniads, but
sometimes listening to the Upaniads will raise more doubts and create deeper confusion.
If one has not previously turned attention towards his or her self then this inward
directional gaze and the Advaitic vision of non-duality may be disorienting.  Reflecting
on self-knowledge through correct reasoning in order to neutralize philosophical doubts
should allow the Advaitin to recognize the tman. There is nothing else to be done.  But
in spite of that, listening and reasoning are not enough.  In this context akara does not
explain why they are not enough, but based on other passages we can assume that even if
one has listened and is not confused there may be problematic saskras, psychological
dispositions whose content contradicts non-duality and obscures self-knowledge.
Nididhysana itself is a rather unusual word for the Upaniad to employ.  It is the
desiderative form of the verbal root dhyai (to meditate) reduplicated with the prefix ni.422
Why does the Upaniad use the desiderative verb form with a prefix, which is more
complex than the other two, rotavya and mantavya?  The Upaniad could have used
an equally simple verb such as dhytavya.  Is Yjñavalkya setting nididhysana apart
                                                                                                                                                  
the case.  For just like hearing, reflection and meditation are also meant for knowledge” (Gambhirananda
1996, p. 43).
421 See BSbh 2.1.6 and 2.1.11.  Also see Halbfass 1983, pp. 27-84.
Also see my earlier section against inferential reasoning in chapter three.
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from ravaa and manana?  Or is this reading too much into the ussage? The main point
of akara’s gloss, “to be contemplated on with certainty,” is simply to point out the
basic derivation of nididhysana and to interpret the prefix “ni” as certainty (nicaya).
Considering the importance of this passage, it is frustrating to have such little explanation
from akara for it leaves many questions unanswered.   It also makes it all the more
important to survey the different potential translations of this brief gloss and their
potential repercussions.
akara’s interpretation of ni is his own speculation.  This prefix possesses
numerous possible meanings.  The term nicaya is itself ambiguous here.  Hirst rightly
points out the subtle changes in emphasis depending on how we translate the line
nicayena dhytavya.423 Out of context this can simply read as “Pay attention” or
“Concentrate (on what I say),” but in this context it is much more loaded.  If translated as,
“It should be steadfastly meditated upon,” “It should be contemplated unswervingly,” or
“It should be contemplated resolutely,” the emphasis shifts to the mind of the
contemplator and the contemplator’s ability to hold the mind concentrated in
contemplation.   Nicaya then refers to the focus and quality of the mind, leaning towards
mental control and meditative practice or the strong intention of the individual, an
intention also potentially implied by the desiderative reduplication.  On the other hand, if
translated as “It should be contemplated on with certainty” or “It should be contemplated
as ascertained,” the emphasis falls towards the knowledge content of contemplation and
                                                                                                                                                  
422 The desiderative expresses the desire to do the action of the verb.  In traditional Painian grammatical
terms, nididhysana is derived as ni + √dhyai + san + lyut.
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the requirement that the contemplation be in accordance with the Upaniads and with
reason.424
I believe that akara suggests both translations; however, the translation “It
should be contemplated on with certainty,” which focuses on the content may have more
prominence here.  The parallel word to nididhysitavyah, vijñnena (by knowledge), used
in the second line instead of the expected nididhysanena (by contemplation) supports
this interpretation.  In the almost verbatim passage in BU 4.5.6 akara does not even use
the term nididhysana in his commentary and immediately labels it with its parallel word
“known” (vijñte) from the second line.  He explains vijñte as “ascertained as this and
not otherwise.”425  Another important clue comes in BU 2.4.4, the previous verse, where
Yjñalvakya uses the imperative nididhysasva when telling Maitrey, “While I am
explaining, may you contemplate my words.”426 In his commentary on this verse akara
glosses nididhysasva as “May you desire to contemplate with nicaya the sentences
according to their meaning.”427  Here there is a specific emphasis on concentrating on the
sentence meaning and understanding its purport.428   From this verse we can assume that
Yjñavalkya (i.e. the composers of the Upaniad), and by extension akara due to his
commentary, is underscoring the process of focusing on the sentence meaning as the
basis for nididhysana.  However, akara’s commentary on 2.4.4 also shows the
                                                                                                                                                  
423 Hirst 1996, p. 63.
424 Hirst 1996, p. 63.
425 vijñte – evam etat nnyatheti nirdhrite | BSbh 4.5.6 (my translation).
426 vycakasya tu me nididhysasveti (my translation).
427 nididhysasva vkyni arthato nicayena dhytum iccheti (my translation).
428 Further evidence of this reading is found in BGbh 6.24, 6.27 and 18.4, where akara uses nicaya to
refer to certain knowledge.
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importance of concentration.  And the desiderative form of the verb expresses a strong
desire or committed intention. The obvious meaning of Yjñavalkya’s statement is
simply that Maitrey pay attention and listen carefully.  Thus, both a concentrated mind
that steadfastly contemplates as well as clearly ascertains the verbal content of the
listening, to wit, the oneness of tman and brahman, are implicit in akara’s definition
of nididhysana. Concentration and ascertainment are evident in that concentration is
necessary to maintain the flow of remembered knowledge without distraction, and of
course the sentence meaning is the same as the content.  In nididhysana, keeping the
mind focused is only in the context of focusing on non-duality as the content of the
mahvkya.
The parallel use of vijñnena  in BU 2.4.5 (and vijñte in BU 4.5.6) for
nididhysitavya in the second line is somewhat confusing.  It obviously parallels
nididhysitavya in the previous line, but why use the word “known” for contemplation?
Does this mean the self is already known prior to nididhysana or simultaneously with
nididhysana, or is nididhysana a means for that knowledge?  In the context of BU 2.4.5
akara clearly takes it as part of the triple means instrumental to direct spiritual
knowledge (darana). Therefore nididhysana appears to precede self-knowledge, as
instrumental causes generally precede their effects.  However, in BU 4.5.6 he appears to
take it as knowledge itself, leading to the possibility that nididhysana is identified with
darana and the self. 429  However, it is not clear if vijñna, translated “ascertainment”, is
                                                 
429 His disciple, Surevara, also takes nididhysana as knowledge itself.  Surevara appears to reduce the
knowledge process to ravaa and manana, and to identify nididhysana as stable knowledge and
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synonymous with darana.430 Perhaps we can assume that there is some difference; hence
the use of two different terms in such close proximity.  It is possible that akara uses a
term for knowledge to describe contemplation because it leads to knowledge, is closely
identified with knowledge, or relies on knowledge.431   The other possibility, as I will
argue in the following chapters, is that there is brahmavidy but a lack of stability in
knowledge  due to problematic psychological impression (saskras) for which
nididhysana is necessary. akara’s indecision, coming in virtually identical passages
forming the root text for nididhysana, is telling.  The ambiguity subtly raises some
interesting questions about the epistemological status of nididhysana and the chronology
of textual study, nididhysana, and knowledge. A close study of the teaching of
nididhysana reveals a number of epistemological conundrums regarding the way it
functions, its chronology in the study process, whether it leads to a gradual process of
clarity or to a sudden liberating recognition of brahman, and whether it is still necessary
after such recognition. Yet akara makes no attempt to take a particular position or
address such questions, and leaves them open-ended in his commentary on this key
passage.
                                                                                                                                                  
liberation (see Surevara on Yjñavalkya  Maitrey dialogue in Shoun Hino 1993, p. 187 and BU 4.4.21 in
Potter 1981, though in some other places Surevara also accepts nididhysana as part of the means for the
student who needs to resolve obstructions.  See Naikarmyasiddhi 3.125.
430 A similar issue can be read into nicaya, for in some contexts this is clearly used with reference to a
liberated person like in BG 6.27.  But in BU 2.4.5 one would assume it means part of the means leading to
self-knowledge.
431 For example, see BGbh 13.1.
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4.1.2: The tavya pratyaya432
The use of the tavya suffix associated with each word in BU 2.4.5 raises another
problem for akara because it appears to denote the sense of the imperative.  Why is an
injunctive used in connection with the triple process?  Does this not support the
contention that the process of knowledge, and nididhysana in particular, is an action?
Though akara does not discuss this in his commentary on the Bhadrayaka
Upaniad, the issue of nididhysana and injunctions was an important one, for it forms a
significant part of the discussion in the catu str in BSbh 1.1.4.  Here the opponent
complains that there is an incongruity between the example of  removing error in the
example of the rope/snake superimposition and removing error about oneself as brahman.
Error is removed immediately by hearing about the nature of the rope, but this is not so
with hearing about brahman.  Even after ravaa, the individual still suffers as before.
This is why the root passage of 2.4.5 points out an injunction about contemplation, so
says the opponent.433  In response akara argues at length against viewing knowledge as
an action that is subject to injunctions.  Later, in the same stra‘s commentary the
opponent again quotes BU 2.4.5 as a support for the possibility of injunctions in
nididhysana.  akara then gives a more pointed reply:
Opponent: Why are there then texts like “The Self, my dear Maitrey should be
realized, should be heard of” etc. (BU 2.4.5), which have a semblance of
injunction?
                                                 
432 I draw here on Padmapda’ discussion of this in his Pañcapdik (Venkataramiah 1948, pp. 143, 313-
15).
433 Gambhirananda 1996 p. 25.
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Vedntin:  We say that they are meant for weaning one back from objects towards
which one inclines naturally.  For a man hankering after the highest human goal
and engaging in outward objects under the idea, “May good come to me, may not
evil befall me”, but failing to achieve thereby the highest human goal, there are
such texts as, “The Self, my dear Maitrey, should be realized”.  These turn him
back from the objects, naturally attracting his body and senses etc., towards them,
and then they lead him along the current of the indwelling Self.434
akara provides another similar explanation in his commentary on BS 3.2.21:
Expressions such as “(the self) is to be seen” (BrU 2.4.5, 4.5.6) are read in the
context of the highest knowledge and are primarily meant to cause one to turn
towards reality.  They are not meant as an injunction to know reality.  Even in
common speech, when there are instructions said in the manner of “Look at this”
and “Listen to this,” they are only meant as “Pay attention” not as “Gain direct
knowledge.”  Even for someone turned towards the object of knowledge,
knowledge sometimes occurs and sometimes does not occur.  Therefore, that
object of knowledge alone should be seen due to the desire to impart knowledge.
When that is seen, knowledge arises on its own according to the object and
according to the means of knowledge.  And when a fact is not established
otherwise without a means of knowledge, another knowledge is not possible even
for one who is enjoined.  Even if one thinks “I am enjoined to know this
knowledge otherwise” then that is not knowledge of the object.  What is it then? It
is a mental action.435
akara explains that the tavya pratyaya in the context of BU 2.4.5 functions
solely to direct the Advaitin’s attention to a particular object.  These statements do not
have the specific function that the tavya or vidhili (optative) may have in the context of
a Vedic ritual where they might mean an injunction such as an aprvavidhi that enjoins
an action.    Rather they are used similarly to common parlance.  When one states ‘listen’
                                                 
434 Gambhirananda 1996 p. 35.
435 draavydiabd api paravidydhikrapahits tattvbhimukhkaraapradhn na
tattvvabodhavidhipradhn bhavanti | loke ‘pda payedam karayeti caiva jtyakeu nirdeeu
praidhnamtra kurvity ucyate na skjjñnam eva kurviti | jñeybhimukhasypi jñna kadcij
jyate kadcin na jyate tasmt ta prati jñnaviaya eva darayitavyo jñpayitukmena |  tasmindarite
svayam eva yathviaya yathprama ca jñnam utpadyate | na ca pramntarenyathprasiddhe
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or ‘look,’ there is a grammatical imperative.  However, the imperative form only
functions to bring one’s attention to a particular thing.  It is not enjoining knowledge
itself.  This is necessary because even when people stand in front of an object they may
miss it if they do not specifically direct their attention to the object.  Similarly, akara
claims that sentences such as BU 2.4.5 are meant to direct our attention.  The tavya
pratyaya functions by either turning one’s mind towards the self or turning one’s mind
away from objects.  Both of these conceptual directions are required, and match the two
related meanings of concentration and ascertainment that we found with nicaya.   In the
context of nididhysana , turning the mind towards the self is contingent upon
concentration and removing any distraction.
4.2: Contemplation in Bhadrayaka Upaniad 2.4.6-14
After telling Maitrey the triple method for knowing brahman in BU 2.4.5,
Yjñavalkya then precedes to explain the basic process.  He provides a series of
analogies, such as the sounds of a drum, a conch, and a v (a stringed musical
instrument), that help explain the inherence of brahman in all things and points to the
fundamental method underlying nididhysana.  The various sounds that each emit when
played are not distinguishable from the instrument in the sense that one cannot capture
the sound without capturing its source. These analogies exemplify how all objects in the
world exist due to brahman and have no existence apart from brahman.  They are simply
                                                                                                                                                  
‘rthe ‘nyathjñna niyuktasypy upapadyate | yadi punar niyukto ‘ham ity anyath jñna kuryn na tu
tajjñna ki tarhi mnas s kriy| (my translation).
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modifications of brahman, their source. Yjñavalkya continues to give a series of
analogies.  In 2.4.11 he says:
It is like this. As the ocean is the point of convergence of all the waters, so the
skin is the point of convergence of all sensations of touch; the nostrils, of all
odours; the tongue, of all tastes; sight, of all visible appearances; hearing, of all
sounds; the mind, of all thoughts; the heart, of all sciences; the hands, of all
activities; the sexual organ, of all pleasures; the anus, of all excretions; the feet, of
all travels; and speech, of all the Vedas.436
akara uses these analogies to outline a contemplative process in his
commentary on BU 2.4.11:
As the ocean is the one goal, meeting place, the place or dissolution or
unification, of all sorts of water such as that of rivers, tanks and lakes.  Likewise
as the skin is the one goal of all kinds of touch such as soft or hard, rough or
smooth, which are identical in nature with air.  By the word ‘skin,’ touch in
general that is perceived by the skin, is meant; in it different kinds of touch are
merged, like different kinds of water in the ocean, and become nonentities without
it, for they were merely its modifications.  Similarly, that touch in general,
denoted by the word ‘skin,’ is merged in the deliberation of the manas, that is to
say, in a general consideration by it, just as different kinds of touch are included
in touch in general perceived by the skin; without this consideration by the manas
it becomes a nonentity.  The consideration by the manas also is merged in a
general cognition by the intellect, and becomes nonexistent without it.  Becoming
mere consciousness, it is merged in Pure Intelligence, the Supreme brahman, like
different kinds of water in the ocean.  When, through these successive steps,
sound and the rest, together with their receiving organs, are merged in pure
intelligence, there are no more limiting adjuncts, and only brahman, which is Pure
Intelligence, comparable to a lump of salt, homogeneous, infinite, boundless and
without a break, remains.  Therefore the self alone must be regarded as one
without a second.437
In his commentary akara explains that one must collapse or merge the particular
(viea) into the universal (smya) which is its locus (yanam), the place from which it
                                                 
436 BU 2.4.11, Olivelle 1996, p. 29.
437 BUbh 2.4.11. Madhavananda 1993, pp. 253-4.
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arises and returns.  This process begins with the sense objects.  All touch is non-separate
from the universal sense organ, skin.  All sounds are merged into the ear, all smells into
the nose, etc.  Each sense organ perceives its respective objects, in all their variety, while
remaining one and the same.  Objects are unified in what perceives them, namely the
sense organ, which remains changeless with reference to the changing sense objects.  All
the sense organs are perceived by the mind, along with all their changes.  The mind
perceives the changing sense organs, such as when the eyes are blind, blurred or clear,
and is therefore the locus of the sense organs.  Therefore one should resolve the senses
into the mind.  If the mind does not perceive the senses, then they would be a non-entity.
Similarly the mind is merged with the higher intellect which perceives the aspects of the
mind, such as desire, resolve, doubt, and emotions.438   Finally the intellect is merged
with brahman.  All cognition is dependent on brahman, as pure awareness, for their
existence.  Through this process one is left only with brahman, the ultimate locus and
untouched source of all things.
These successive steps negate all conditioning properties until one is left only
with non-dual awareness. The second portion of the mantra refers to the organs of
actions, grasping, procreation, excretion, walking, and speech. akara writes that the
organs of action are all merged in pra, constituting the subtle body, which is then
merged in brahman.  Evident in this method is a gradual process of hierarchically
subsuming particulars into their higher sources.  This is a widening process that negates
any conceived self-identities by penetrating each level and ultimately reaching one’s true
                                                 
438 See BU 1.5.3 for the Upaniad’s explanation of the mind.
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self.  The process is both exclusive and inclusive.  At each step there is a jump to a
broader more universal source, which on the one hand negates the previous more
particular one consisting of dependent effects, yet includes it within the larger “universal”
which is its cause. Thus all identities are excluded and simultaneously included as non-
separate from one’s self, which is brahman, the absolutely universal.  All things are in it
and not separate from it, but brahman is not them.  Here, akara’s commentary points
back to his doctrine of dependency (mithytvam) and anvaya  and vyatireka as
constituting his theory of contemplation.
4.3: Contemplation in the Kaha Upaniad
The Kaha Upaniad provides an important method for contemplative practice in
verses 1.3.10-12.  The Upaniad provides an ascending gradation of objects in terms of
subtlety, innerness, and pervasiveness, moving from external objects to the highest goal,
the purua:
Higher than the senses are their objects;
Higher than sense objects is the mind;
Higher than the mind is the intellect;
Higher than the intellect is the immense self;
Higher than the immense self is the unmanifest;
Higher than the unmanifest is the person (purua);
Higher than the person there’s nothing at all.
That is the goal, that’s the highest state.
Hidden in all the beings, this self is not visibly displayed.
Yet, people of keen vision see him, with eminent and sharp minds.439
                                                 
439 Olivelle 1996, p. 239.
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This passage moves progressively from the senses, to the sense objects,440 to the mind,
intellect, and to the mahn (great one).  Higher than the mahn is the unmanifest
(avyakta) and finally, the person (purua) is highest and is the same self hidden in all
beings.441  KU 1.3.13 then states the method for gaining this vision:
The wise person should withdraw speech into the mind, he should withdraw that
(mind) into the knowledge self (the intellect).  He should place that intellect into
the mahn, he should place that (mahn) into the tranquil self. 442
 akara elucidates the process articulated in KU 1.3.13 further in BSbh 1.4.1.443
There he explains that withdrawing speech refers to ceasing all activities related to the
external organs of action.  The Advaitin should hold the mind steady in the higher
intellect (buddhi) for the mind (manas) will otherwise think of objects and possess faults
such as doubt and indecision.   The buddhi is more subtle and pervasive than the manas,
the sense mind. One should then withdraw that intellect into the “immense self” (mahn
tman), by making the intellect clear (or calm) like the “first-born” hirayagarbha.444
Why this identification?  akara suggests two interpretations of the mahn tman.  It is
either the experiencer behind all objects of experience, or it is the intellect of
                                                 
440 In the BG 3.42 the senses are said to be higher than the sense objects.  According to akara, this
hierarchy is based in subtlety, innerness, and pervasiveness. In the KUbh akara explains that the senses
are created for the sake of knowing objects and in that senses are lower than the objects.  The sense objects
determine the nature of the perceptual organs (also see BSbh 1.4.1 and BUbh 3.2.1-6).
441 This refers to preceding chariot analogy.
442 yacched v manasi prjñas tad yacchej jñna tmani |
jñnam tmani mahati niyacchet tat yacchec chnta tmani || KU 1.3.13 (my translation)..
443 He also mentions it again in BSbh 3.3.15 as the meditation for understanding the purua.
444 What akara exactly means by a clear intellect is unclear.  In KUbh 1.3.13 he writes “prathamajavat
svacchabhvakam tmano vijñnam pdayet”.  In BSbh 1.4.1 he writes “…sukmatpdanena dhrayet”.
Making the intellect clear (svacchabhvakam) or subtle (sukmat) may refer to refining the buddhi
through meditation practice or perhaps it refers to gaining a deeper lucid understanding of hirayagarbha
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hirayagarbha, the first born all pervading principle of intelligence, which resides inside
all beings as their intellect. This is something akin to a universal mind, where
hirayagarbha, identified with vara is present in every being as the intellect.  Finally,
the mahn tman is withdrawn into the “tranquil self”, the tman which is the most
pervasive, non-dual, and identified with brahman.  In KU 1.3.11, the Upaniad makes an
additional distinction between the mahn and the absolute tman, referring to the
unmanifest from which the mahn arises.  The absolute tman, referred to as the purua,
is even beyond the unmanifest and not subject to any duality such as manifest and
unmanifest, according to akara’s reading.
akara understands these passages as laying out a contemplative process through which a wise
person, who has developed sharp and subtle intellect, is able to perceive things at an increasingly subtle
level.445  The contemplative process is designed to reach what is ultimately real by the contemplator’s
following a hierarchical distinction based on subtlety, causality, permanence, and pervasiveness.  It is
difficult to say what akara exactly means by “withdrawing” one thing into another, such as the intellect
into the mahn.  He glosses yacchet (the 3rd person singular optative of the root yam) with upasaharet,
niyacchet, and sayacchet.  These verbs share the meanings of placing, restraining, excluding,
withdrawing, and controlling, and are often used in the contexts of meditation. However, the process of
withdrawing is not a simple meditative one of ignoring distractions.  There appears to be a process of
focusing on the higher object through understanding its higher hierarchical position or greater ontological
reality.  Concentrating on that higher object naturally excludes the lower particular, yet simultaneously
includes the particular within the larger underlying universal signified by the higher object. In recognizing
the purua (brahman), all other phenomena are understood as part and parcel of the purua.  Yet all
                                                                                                                                                  
and in effect finding a sense of merger by matching one’s intellect with the universal mind of
hirayagarbha.
445 KA 1.3.13.
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phenomena born of ignorance are also understood as mere appearances and eliminated, just as water in the
desert is eliminated when understood as a mirage.446
4.4: Contemplation in the Bhagavadgt
We now turn to the detailed discussions of contemplative practice in chapter six
of the Bhagavadgt, aptly titled the “the yoga of meditation” (dhynayoga). The
contemplation in chapter six is an elaboration of the description presented in brief at the
end of chapter five.  In BG 5.27-8 we find the following verses:
Keeping the external objects outside, the eyes at the juncture of the eye-brows,
and making equal the outgoing and incoming breaths that move through the
nostrils, the contemplative who has control over his organs, mind and intellect
should be fully intent on liberation and free from desire, fear, and anger.  He who
is ever thus is verily free.447
K a develops the ideas of these verses in 6.8-32.  In 6.10-13 he explains the
fundamentals of meditation, such as the location,448 how to make a proper seat, how to sit
and hold one’s body, and how to focus the mind:
A yog should constantly concentrate his mind by staying in a solitary place,
alone, with mind and body controlled, free from expectations, (and) free from
acquisition.
Having firmly established in a clean place his seat, neither too high nor too low,
and made of cloth, skin and kua-grass, placed successively one below the other;
(and) sitting on that seat, he should concentrate his mind for the purification of the
internal organ, making the mind one-pointed and keeping the actions of the mind
and senses under control.
                                                 
446 KAbh 1.3.13.
In 1.3.15once again we have a neti neti passage, presumably, following akara, this is given so
the person does not objectify brahman.
447 Gambhirananda 1995, p. 267.
448 Also see BGbh 13.10.
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Holding the body, head and neck erect and still, being steady, looking at the tip of
his own nose – and not looking around.449
A number of actions in these verses, such as concentrating the mind, making the
mind one pointed, keeping the external objects outside, keeping the eyes at the juncture
of the eye-brows, and restraining thoughts and senses, are forms of the basic mental effort
of meditation. When these verses are read along with the advice in BG 5.27, which
guides the meditator to keep the exhalation and inhalation moving through the nostrils
equal,450 we find parallels to limbs three to six of Pata ñjali’s Aga Yoga, namely how
to sit (sana), how to breath (pryma), how to restrain the activity of the mind and
senses (pratyhra) and how to focus on a single object (dhra).451
Keeping external objects external means not dwelling upon them. The mind
should not wonder distractedly due to thinking about external objects or situations. When
mental modifications take the form of external objects, then external objects are brought
within the mind and internalized.  Many mental modifications are somewhat
inconsequential, for the mind takes on forms that are benign.  However, when external
objects are associated with likes (rga) and dislikes (dvea), in the form of “I want that”
or “I want to be rid of that,” then the internalized object is empowered, rooted in the
psyche, and capable of distracting one’s mind.  Emotions such as anger, anxiety, or fear,
which are subsequent to rga and dvea and result from obstructed desires, then possess
the mind.  Ka’s teaching of karma yoga, discussed in chapters two, three, and four of
                                                 
449 Gambhirananda 1995, pp. 286-88.
450 prpnau samau ktv nsbhyantaracriau
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the BG, is a specific method to neutralize rga and dvea. Resolving such emotions and
cravings, a prerequisite for pursuing brahmavidy and nididhsana, is necessary to a
relative degree to establish an internal space available for successful meditation or
contemplation.
The nature of the mind is to wander, but when one neutralizes rga and dvea
then external objects are not binding for the mind.  However, even when rga and dvea
are neutralized, one must learn to restrain the mind to one object in order to meditate or
contemplate successfully.  A curious way of describing this one-pointedness (ekgrat) is
the Bhagavadg’s instruction to concentrate between the eyebrows or on the tip of the
nose. akara dismisses the literal meaning of this instruction. In his commentary on BG
6.13 he adds the particle iva, explaining that fixing the eyes on the tip of the nose is not
meant literally, only “as though” or “as it were.”  Concentrating on the tip of the nose
simply expresses the following statement of not to look around in other directions,
meaning that one should keep the head steady and facing forward, and one should
withdraw the mind from external objects.452 If one is completely focused on one’s nose
than how can one contemplate the self?  In fact, akara clearly sees these verses as not
simply describing basic meditation but as contemplation where one fixes the mind on the
self.453 However, it is important to note that there is no specific distinction made between
                                                                                                                                                  
451 YS 2.29, 2.46-55, 3.1.
452 Also see BGbh 8.10.
453 It is interesting to note that the “tip” of one’s nose may also refer to the top of the nose between the
eyebrows, as in BG 5.27.  If one does meditate on the tip of the nose literally, it may also connote the
process of observing the breath.
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contemplation and meditation internal to the Bhagavdgt or in akara’s commentaries
on the verses.
After providing basic details common to both meditation and nididhysana, Ka
further explains the main idea of contemplation in verses 6.14-31 as allowing the mind to
abide in the self. BG 6.14-15 states,
He should remain seated with a placid mind, free from fear, firm in the vow of a
celibate, and with the mind fixed on me by controlling it through concentration,
having me as the supreme goal.
Concentrating the mind thus forever, the yog of controlled mind achieves the
peace which culminates in liberation and which abides in me.454
In 6.14 Ka says that the contemplator, having controlled the mind and making
it concentrated, should sit with mind fixed on him (maccitto), with him as the highest
goal (matpara).  In 6.15 he states that connecting the mind and fixing it on him in this
way (yuñjann eva sadtmna). one gains the highest liberation. The first point to
clarify is the object of this contemplation.  It is a bit tricky in BG chapter six to
understand the objective reference of the demonstrative first person pronoun “I” (mat)
and its various forms when spoken by Ka.  Ka could be referring to himself in the
most limited way, as the friend of Arjuna and ruler of the Ydavas, yet this interpretation
looks incongruous with the context.  Another possibility is that he is referring to himself
as vara in the form of lord Viu.  From this standpoint he represents brahman as the
universe and with attributes (sagua brahman).  A third possibility is that there is a
reference to himself as brahman without attributes (nirgua brahman), the true tman.
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Depending on the interpretation the corresponding practice may be viewed as a form of
upsan or worship of vara as sagua brahman or as nididhysana on nirgua
brahman. This dual possibility is also present in verses such as 6.14, with phrases such as
“with mind fixed on me” (mat-citta), or “with me as the highest” (mat-parah). However,
akara interprets such verses as not referring to Ka as an individual, a deity or as
vara, who is the cause of the world, but to his true nature as the highest lord
(paramevara) synonymous with non-dual brahman. 455  And indeed, such identification
seems evident in the interchangeable usage of tman, brahman, and mat  in the
contemplation verses in chapter six. This is a crucial point, for it pulls our idea of the
process presented in this chapter away from that of worship, upsan, or basic forms of
yogic meditation, processes that are all based in duality, and identifies it as nididhysana
on the svarpa of tman.  Keeping one’s mind on paramevara is no different than
continuously maintaining one’s knowledge of brahman.456
Ka goes on to provide more details about this contemplation in verses 6.18-25:
                                                                                                                                                  
454 Gambhirananda 1995, pp. 288-9.
455 Sometimes brahman is also identified in the BG as paramevara (the highest lord) who may be either
wither with attributes (sagua) or without attributes (nirgua). akara himself is ambiguous with regard to
interpreting the brahman mentioned as the higher or lower.  It is quite likely that he was not too keen on
maintaining this distinction and prefers to use paramevara as a reference to absolute brahman. akara
sometimes uses brahman and paramevara as synonyms, without the clear distinction of being with or
without attributes.
456 We find a similar situation in other places in the BG.  For example, in BG chapter eight Ka refers to
keeping vara in mind through a process called abhysa yoga.  It is possible to take this as a type of
ahagraha upsan, where one creates and maintains cognition of identity between self and vara.
However, akara interprets these verses as indicating nididhysana, and dealing with knowledge of vara
as brahman rather than a superimposition of identity.  In a number of verses, such as BG 8.9, which
describes the parama purua as inconceivable, etc., it is clear that the text is discussing nirgua brahman,
not sagua vara.
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A man who has become free from hankering for all desirable objects is then said
to be self-absorbed when the controlled mind rests in the self alone (6.18).
As a lamp kept in a windless place does not flicker, such is the simile thought of
for the yog whose mind is under control, and who is engaged in concentration on
the self (6.19).
At the time when the mind restrained through the practice of yoga gets
withdrawn, and just when by seeing the self by the self one remains contented in
the self alone (6.20);
When one experiences that absolute bliss which can be intuited by the intellect
and which is beyond the senses, and being established (thus) this person surely
does not swerve from reality (6.21);
Obtaining which one does not think of any other acquisition to be superior to that,
and being established in which one is not perturbed even by great sorrow (6.22);
One should know that severance of contact with sorrow to be what is called yoga.
That yoga has to be practiced with perseverance and with an undepressed heart
(6.23).
By totally eschewing all desires which arise from thoughts, and restraining with
the mind itself all the organs from every side (6.24);
One should gradually withdraw with the intellect endowed with steadiness.
Making the mind fixed in the Self, one should not think of anything whatsoever
(6.25). 457
Verse 6.19 illustrates this contemplative mind with the simile of a flame that does
not flicker.  This analogy is not simply the mind staying focused but specifically the mind
contemplating the tman and constantly seeing all things as the tman.458  The key verses
that summarize the Bhagavadgt’s contemplation are 6.24-25.  Verse 6.24 provides two
                                                 
457 Gambhirananda 1995, pp. 292-7
458 Also see BGbh 8.8 where akara defines abhysa yoga as “the repetition of the same kind of thought,
uninterruptedly by any contrary idea, with regard to me who am the object of concentration of the mind;
that practice itself is yoga; the mind of a yog is engrossed (yuktam) in that itself” (Gambhirananda 1995, p.
347).
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preliminary steps that prepare the student: (1) Renouncing all desires born of thoughts,
and (2) completely withdrawing the group of sense organs (from their sense objects) with
the mind alone.  Verse 25 then provides the next two steps comprising contemplation
itself: (3) With the intellect endowed with steadiness (or fortitude) one should slowly
resolve or withdraw (uparamet); and (4) having made the mind abide in the self, one
should not think of anything else, meaning one should meditate that there is nothing here
other than tman.   The surrounding verses provide similar basic definitions of
contemplation with statements such as “he remains in the self alone” (tmany
evvatihate), “seeing the self by one’s self” (tmantmna payan), “he delights in
the self” (tmani tuyati), and “not moving away from the truth (of tman)” (na calati
tattvata).  These statements refer to nididhysana and something like a point of clarity
where the mind naturally stays fixed on the self.  These verses do not appear to point to
any new brahmavidy being created.  They describe a contemplative process of gaining
clarity in brahmavidy.459
Neither the BG nor akara furnish a clear methodology for exactly how one
abides in the self or sees the self by one’s self. “Residing in the self” is the culmination of
the contemplative process stated in 6.25, “With the intellect endowed with steadiness (or
fortitude) (dhti), one should slowly (anai) resolve (or withdraw [thoughts from their
objects]) (uparamet).”  This is a fecund sentence giving us three clues, the Sanskrit words
                                                 
459 Dhyna yoga is also the same as anusmarana (8.7, 8.9) and anucintayan (8.8).  There, akara
explains the prefix anu as “in keeping with the stra and logic.”  Thus, this is contemplation based on
knowledge from a prama, following ravaa and manana.  It is based on memory.459  There is no new
prama taking place and no new knowledge arising, one is simply keeping the mind fixed on what is
already known.
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dhti, anai, and uparamet. akara glosses dhti only with the related and not very
helpful word, dhairyena.  Dhti may refer to the courage and firmness required to
maintain one’s contemplation of unity in the face of duality.  It also may refer to wisdom
and discrimination.  Both interpretations may be the same in this context if we interpret
firmness as remaining grounded in brahmavidy.  Dhti may parallel nicayena in 6.23,
which akara glosses with the phrase, adhyavasayena yoktavya, referring either to
effort, perseverance, and determination or clarity and apprehension.460
The second question is what it means to slowly resolve or slowly withdraw
(anai uparamet) and what is being withdrawn? The issue resembles the difficulty of
translating yacchet in KU 1.3.13. akara makes a reference to withdrawing later in
BGbh 13.24 where he provides another brief definition of contemplation as pulling back
(upasamhtya) the sense organs, such as the ears, etc, from their sense objects such as
sound, etc., into the mind; and then pulling back the mind into the self.  Pulling back
refers to a somewhat mysterious contemplative process of letting go of all sense objects
and progressively “resolving” the mind, with all its components, into the self.  When the
manas is thus fixed on the self, it abides in self-knowledge.  The manas, which is
naturally in a state of constant flux, will not easily stay fixed on the self.  Like all forms
of meditation, the contemplator must bring the manas back from distraction to the object
of meditation, however in this unique case, the manas comes back to oneself, not an
                                                 
460 This question of translation parallels the difference of possible interpretations of nicaya in BU 2.4.5.
Dhti can also refer to the courage it takes to keep the intellect fixed on this knowledge because
non-duality is so radically different that one’s former world view and it negates the ego, the world, and
everything else one holds dear
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object.  Implicit to this contemplation is that all adventitious personality must be
“resolved” also. akara does not clarify the exact meaning of “resolve.”  Does he mean
the manas is somehow dissolved into brahman , leading to mental cessation
(cittavttinirodha), or does he mean a change in one’s understanding of self and a
radically transformed vision of self and world, or both?  This question is open to debate,
but akara’s emphasis is most likely not on mental cessation because elsewhere he
clearly refutes Patañjali Yoga’s emphasis on cittavttinirodha.461   The term anai,
which is repeated for emphasis, indicates that this is a gradual contemplative process.
akara glosses anai, as “not all at once” (na sahas).  It is gradual in that it resolving
occurs at different levels of subtlety, from object to self, and takes time.
 akara provides a unique method of bringing the mind back to the self in his
commentary on the following verse, BG 6.26:
For whatever reason the wandering and unsteady mind goes, having restrained it
(the mind) from that, one should bring (the mind), under control, to the self alone.
(6.26).462
 In his commentary, akara writes,
One should bring the mind, under control, to the self alone, having recognized
each cause (of distraction) as an appearance by the ascertainment of their truth
and with an attitude of detachment….  In this way, the mind of the yog rests in
the tman alone through the strength of the practice of yoga.463
                                                 
461 BSbh 2.1.9.  See my discussion in chapter six.
462 yato yato nicarati mana cañcalam asthiram |
tatas tato niyamyaitad tmany eva vaam nayet || 6.26 (my translation).
463 tattan nimitta ythtmyanirpaena bhsktya vairgyabhvanay ca etat mana tmany eva
vaa nayet…eva yogbhysabalt yogina tmany eva pramyati mana (my translation).
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akara’s reference to objects as appearances is not to a process of simply dismissing
them as illusions or as non-existent. Nor is it to a process of mentally repeating the idea
that objects are appearances or looking at objects and conceiving them as brahman.   This
contemplation is the direct recognition that their names and forms are superficial and
completely dependent on unqualified existence for their reality.  This represents a shift in
perspective, analogous to seeing a variety of golden ornaments and realizing that their
truth, or content, is uniformly gold despite their appearance as names and forms.
Nididhysana is a matter of abstracting away all particularities of the world through
recognizing what remains unchanging within changing phenomena.
Seeing objects as non-separate from their ultimate substratum allows one to see
through appearances and penetrate to their true reality as pure undifferentiated being.
One has to then recognize this being as self-evident existence, which is none other than
the individual’s self-luminous awareness. In this process the contemplator fixes his or her
mind on the tman by recognizing that the existence of objects is not different than the
awareness witnessing the object. This last step is a big one.  The transition to identifying
being (sat) and awareness (cit) is difficult to explain either philosophically or
phenomenologically, and likely the most difficult obstacle in one’s contemplative
practice; but recall our discussion of the sentence tat tvam asi.  The contemplative
process negates all particularities and adventitious qualities of the world and the self and
finds the continues presence of tat and tvam.  At the culminating point of this process
there are no more boundaries to circumscribe either undifferentiated being or self-
luminous awareness and their identity ought to be self-evident to the contemplator.
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According to akara’s explication, contemplative method is a fundamentally
different method for the basic meditation of withdrawing the mind from sense objects and
gaining an attitude of dispassion (vairgya), because it relies on the power of knowledge,
not mental effort. Just as one does not need to melt an ornament to understand it is gold,
so too one does not need to “destroy” perceptual objects, emotions, and distractions by
avoiding them or suppressing them by stopping the thoughts of the mind. Recognizing
the dependent (mithy) status of objects not only neutralizes them as distractions, but also
points to their essential nature as pure existence. Without the underlying prama of the
Upaniads the student may stop at this point, but the next step is to use existence as a
transition to shift to the self.  This ultimately brings the contemplator back to the tman
because he or she knows that undifferentiated existence is the same as self-illuminating
awareness having been properly exposed to this wisdom through ravaa. When the
contemplator is distracted and carried into an external object, he or she simply needs to
shift perspectives by recognizing the reality of brahman making up every object.  This
resolves the cause of distraction and turns the tables by allowing the distraction to point
to its substratum of existence free of particularities, which then leads to an identification
with the self.  Each object, situation, concept, desire, emotion, etc., becomes a
contemplative link, a means to penetrate and connect subjective and objective realities
and to see oneself as unqualified brahman.   From this perspective objects and
distractions are not simply distractions or problems, but means to contemplation.
BG 6.27-33 describes the liberated person.  Though verses 6.29-31 primarily
describe the type of vision this jñan has as a result of successful contemplation, we may
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view them as a further elaboration of contemplation. These verses articulate different
ways of appreciating self-knowledge by maintaining the vision of sameness everywhere
(sarvatra samadarana) and abiding in an appreciation of this reality:464
One who has his mind self-absorbed through yoga, and who has the vision of
sameness everywhere, sees his self existing in everything, and everything in his
self (6.29).
One who sees me in everything, and sees all things in me – I do not go out of his
vision, and he also is not lost to my vision. (6.30).
That yog who, being established in unity, adores me as existing in all things, he
exists in me – in whatever condition he may be (6.31).465
Verse 6.29 offers two conceptual directions for what is basically the same contemplation
in the final analysis.  The first is looking outwards and recognizing all objects as one’s
self.  The second is looking inwards and recognizing everything outside within the self.
Both lead to the infinite self, but the former moves through a contemplative analysis of
name, form, and existence, and the latter through contemplating one’s self as awareness.
This is important for our interpretation of samadarana.  The point seems to be not to see
everything equally or to treat them equally, but to understand that their basis is the same
brahman.466
Verse 6.30 parallels 6.29, yet brings vara into one’s contemplative practice from
a different contemplative angle.  It points out the non-difference of vara and all objects
                                                 
464 One issue that becomes apparent in the Bhavadgt’s brief and enigmatic explanation of dhyna-yoga
is the multivalent way the meditation can be understood, either as simple dhyna meditation (early parts) as
upsan or as nididhysana.  The nididhysana is further complicated concerning whether it functions to
gain knowledge or if it is a description of the liberated individual who continues to lead a contemplative
life.
465 Gambhirananda 1995, pp. 300-1.
466 BG 5.18.
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and results in an equation between self and vara in 6.31.  Devotion (bhakti) is elevated
to a form of contemplation by understanding vara as the same as brahman and one’s
self.  For Advaitins, this type of contemplation, sometimes referred to in the BG as
unwavering devotion (ananya bhakti), is not devotion dependent on worship, upsan, or
experiences of deep emotional attachment to a conception of God as distinct from one’s
self.  It is what akara considers as the highest bhakti due to understanding complete
unity between vara, brahman, and individual.467  This seems also understood with the
phrase “for him I am not lost” (tasya aham na praaymi), which refers to the absolute
identity of vara and individual according to akara.  vara is never remote or away
from the individual, and is immediately available as the self of the individual who
understands this vision.  At that point there is no situation or experience where one can
feel distant from vara because vara is never away from oneself.468
4.5: The parisakhyna Contemplation in the Upadeashasr
akara breaks his usual reticence on the topic of contemplation in the third prose
chapter of the US.  The prose section (gadyabandha) is composed of three chapters,
which appear to outline the triple process of ravaa, manana and nididhysana. They
are of special significance, for the three prose chapters are one of the few textual
instances where akara details the kind of advice an Advaita teacher should share with a
                                                 
467 See BGbh 7.17, where akara describes the knower of reality (jñnin) as an eka-bhakti, whose
devotion is focused on vara because he knows vara is his own self and is non-dual, therefore the only
appropriate locus to direct bhakti.
468 BGbh 6.30.
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student.  The first chapter describes the qualifications of the ideal student and the proper
teacher, and explains the primary intention of the Upaniads, including the means to
liberation and the identity of the individual and brahman.  The second chapter narrates a
discussion between teacher and student.  It describes the student’s process of manana
through his questions and the teacher’s resolution of his doubts.  The third chapter is a
rare instance where akara clearly details a particular form of nididhysana named
parisakhyna.469
There is some doubt whether akara is the authentic author of the US, and
specifically if he authored the three prose chapters, which stand apart from the nineteen
metrical chapters (padyabandha).  Mayeda, who argues convincingly and extensively for
akara’s authorship of the US,470 comments that other texts such as Sure vara’a
Naikarmyasiddhi, Bhskara’s Gabhya, Vidyraya’s Pañcada, and Sadnanda’s
Vedntasra only quote verses from the metrical section and not the prose section.
However, Mayeda does not feel this is sufficient evidence to doubt akara’s authorship
of the prose section.  In support of akara’s authorship of the prose chapters, Mayeda
notes that akara’s direct student, Toaka, imitates the prose section in his
rutisrasamuddhraa.  Mayeda also claims that there is no significant difference in the
                                                 
469 Curiously, this is only one of two places that I have found in all of akara’s work where he uses the
term parisakhyna as a form of nididhysana. The other location is BUbh 4.4.2. Mayeda also cites KU
pada bhya 1.5.29 (Mayda 1992, p. 254 fn. 1) but I’m unable to find this.
akara may occasionally use the term parisakhyna in the context of a parisakhyna
injunction but that is not a context for nididhysana. This brings up the relationship between
parisakhyna and the parisakhyna vidhi.  I think the connection is not direct or important. See Bader
1990 pp. 78-80, who makes a connection with anvaya-vyatireka and explains that exclusion is common to
both. Also see Vidyasankaran 1998.
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use of terms between the prose and metrical sections, though he does not consider the
term parisakhyna.471
As explained earlier (in chapter two), akara refutes the prasakhyna
contemplation as a legitimate path leading to liberation in US metrical chapter eighteen.
However, the term prasakhyna is strikingly similar to parisakhyna.  Both share the
verbal root sakhy and the basic meaning of enumeration.  And both are used as forms
of contemplation. This similarity makes his refutation of prasakhyna  and his
explanation of prasakhyna somewhat conspicuous.  Why does akara use such
similar terms in the same text, when they may lead to confusion? And how might we
separate these two practices? Why does he label his contemplation parisakhyna here
and not use it elsewhere, other than a fleeting mention to it in BUbh 4.4.2.  In chapter 18,
where he refutes the idea that prasakhyna is important, there is no mention or
acceptance of any contemplative practice.  In fact, other than in prose chapter 3, akara
does not discuss contemplation in the entire US. Some scholars, noting the discrepancy of
prose chapter 3 and metrical chapter 18, suggest that akara may be self-
contradictory.472 If these sections contradict each other, then this lends some doubt to the
                                                                                                                                                  
470 See Mayeda (1965) for many arguments in favor of akara’s authorship, such as the ratio of
Upaniadic citations that are similar to the BSbh, akara’s use of particular terms, etc.
471 Mayeda 1965, p. 196.
472 See Kunjanni Raja 1990, pp. 191-193 and Mayeda 1992 pp. 88-9, 197, and p. 245.
Mayeda claims that both prasakhyna and parisakhyna are not knowledge but kinds of actions.  He
believes akara is intentionally contradicting himself by refuting action and prescribing it at the same
time, and questions “for what purpose does he knowingly sacrifice logical and theoretical consistency?”
(Mayeda 1992, p. 89).  I think this is unlikely.
Kunjanni Raja makes a better argument.  He believes akara must have made some distinction between
prasakhyna and parisakhyna, where parisakhyna is not mental concentration involving action or an
asaprajñta samdhi state (Kunjanni Raja 1990, p. 193).
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authenticity of the prose section.473  But even if akara did not write the prose chapters,
why would later authors insert a description of prasakhyna in chapter three? One
possibility we should not rule out is that there was a later movement to incorporate more
contemplative practices in Advaita?  Another possibility is that the discrepancy reflects
akara’s own ambivalence about nididhysana, where on the one hand he recognizes it
as an important part of spiritual practice, but on the hand, struggles to place it coherently
into his philosophical system.  In any case, this discrepancy is not strong enough
evidence to reach a conclusion about akara’s authorship, and it is prudent to assume it
is his.
akara does not clearly define who requires the parisakhyna contemplation.
In the first line of the chapter he writes,
This parisakhyna is said to be for those who desire liberation, who are devoting
themselves to destroying their acquired merit and demerit and do not wish to
accumulate new ones.474
Clearly this is a qualified student (outlined in USG 2-3) who is not a novice to
Advaita teachings, however, it is unclear whether this student is already a knower of
brahman who has gained liberation, though this seems unlikely.  One would assume he is
not yet liberated and has not destroyed his ignorance and gained clarity in self-knowledge
if he requires this contemplation and is still desirous of liberation.  But in USG 114
                                                 
473 Or it is possible that akara just truly contradicted himself.  But considering the craftsmanship of this
text, I find it hard to believe he was unaware of or comfortable with this conspicuous contradiction.  It
makes more sense to interpret the two in a non-contradictory method or conclude that the third chapter or
chapter 18 is a later addition from a different author.
474 mumuk upttapuypunyakapaapar aprvnupacayrthin parisakhynam idam
ucyate | USG 112 (my translation).
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akara writes, “The wise person (vidvn) who is distressed by sounds, etc, which are
being perceived, should do the parisakhyna contemplation.”475  Here, the one who
desires liberation (mumuku) is characterized as a vidvn.  Unfortunately akara does
not clarify what kind of knowledge the vidvn possesses, but we must assume he
possesses at least some form of conceptual self-knowledge.476  This is a student who has
gone through a thorough process of listening and reflection detailed in the first two
chapters and is at an advanced stage of study.  He already possesses self-knowledge
because he has studied the Upaniads with a qualified teacher.  So we cannot claim he
has no conceptual knowledge whatsoever of brahman.   However, this vidvn is certainly
not the ideal Advaitin who is fully liberated and established in understanding brahman
and we may assume this knowledge is not liberating brahmavidy.477  The contemplation
is for the person who has studied the Upaniads, yet at the same time is afflicted by the
objects he perceives. 478
In the first passage of chapter three (USG 112) akara explains that
parisakhyna destroys puya and ppa.  He further explains that avidy causes doas
(faults), which in turn cause activity of the mind, speech, and body.  The fruit of this
activity is desirable and undesirable results of karma .  akara brings up the
parisakhyna contemplation as a means to destroy the results of karma, thereby
releasing one from karma.  This raises some questions; particularly, what kind of karma
                                                 
475 tatra abddibhi upalakyamnai pyamno vidvn eva parisacakta | USG 114 (my
translation).
476 Toward the end of the chapter in USG 116 he uses vidua, another term for a wise man.
477 akara describes the ideal teacher in US 2.1.6.
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is he referring to, and how does parisakhyna effect that karma?  Is akara referring to
the idea that one is freed from sacita karma (the unseen total of one’s accrued karma)
and gmi karma (karma accrued during one’s life) through moksa because of the
cessation of any identity with the mind and body, due to which there is no more agency to
create karma or a locus for accumulated karma to cling to?  And if so, is there any
specification of the particular purpose of parisakhyna?  Freedom from karma is stated
as a generic result of self-knowledge.  How is parisakhyna differentiated from this
basic result?  It appears that akara sees parisakhyna as a means specifically to
neutralize prrabdha karma (karma that has begun) and/or its afflictive effects.479
Parisakhyna is required when situations or objects afflict the Advaitin even
after studying the Upaniads.  akara does not identify it as a basic form of meditation
nor does he discuss any mental states, experiences, or worship as part of the process.  The
basic premise behind the contemplation is the possibility of discrimination of the
perceiver and perceived and the repeated recognition of the perceiver as brahman.
Anything perceived possesses attributes, is born and perishes, is connected and separated,
etc., and of a fundamentally different nature than the perceiver.  In USG 115 akara
specifies that the vidvn should repeat,
                                                                                                                                                  
478 This state is described in more detail in the next chapter.
479 These effects may be vipartabhvans (contradictory tendencies), a type of problematic saskras
(habitual psychological impressions). It is not clear whether saskras are the faults caused by avidy
(along with raga (like), dvea (dislike), kma (desire), krodha (anger), etc.) or the desirable and undesirable
results of action.  In other contexts, saskras, in the form of vipartabhvans, are the impressions
generated from prrabdhakarma but not identified with karma.  In other contexts. akara recommends
sanysa as a process of letting go of karma, but no such recommendation occurs in this chapter and he
does not make it a necessary part of parisakhyna , though in the first chapter he identifies the qualified
student as a sanysin.
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I (=[]tman) am of the nature of [s]eeing, non-object (=subject) unconnected
[with anything], changeless, motionless, endless, fearless, and absolutely subtle.
So sound cannot make me its object and touch me, whether as mere noise in
general or as [sound] of particular qualities – pleasant [sounds] such as the first
note of music or the desirable words of praise and the like, or the undesirable
words of untruth, disgust, humiliation, abuse, and the like – since I am
unconnected [with sound].  For this very reason neither loss nor gain is caused [in
me] by sound.  Therefore, what can the pleasant sound of praise, the unpleasant
sound of blame, and so on do to me? Indeed a pleasant sound may produce gain,
and an unpleasant one destruction, for a man lacking in discriminating
knowledge, who regards sound as [connected with his] []tman since he has no
discriminating knowledge.  But for me who am endowed with discriminating
knowledge, [sound] cannot produce even a hair’s breadth [of gain or loss].480
This includes all manifestations of sound, such as pleasant, false, insulting, praising, or
abusive words. The contemplator understands that sounds cannot affect him or her by
recognizing the self as free and unattached.  He or she cannot gain or lose anything from
them because the self is intrinsically whole and complete. akara proceeds to repeat this
teaching in terms of each type of sense perception through the remainder of USG 114.
Touch, manifest as sickness, pain, hot or cold, etc., vision as pleasurable and ugly sights,
taste as pleasant and unpleasant tastes, and smell as pleasurable or disgusting, all have no
effect on the self.
akara explains in USG 116 that,
Moreover, whatever sound and the other external [objects of the senses] may be,
they are changed into the form of the body, and into the form of the ear and the
other [senses] which perceive them, and into the form of the two internal organs
and their objects [such as pleasure and pain], since they are mutually connected
and composite in all cases of actions.  This being the case, to a me, a man of
knowledge, nobody is foe, friend or neutral.481
                                                 
480 Mayeda 1992, p. 252.
481 Mayeda 1992, p. 253.
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 According to akara, sounds and other external objects, including their
associated pains, pleasures, and their impressions,482 are transformed into the body and
sense organs and have the mind and intellect as their locus.  Thus they are of the mind
and not the true self. There is no friend or foe for the wise man and no one can connect
the wise man with anything pleasant or unpleasant or with any results of action in the
form of merit or demerit.  The wise person understands that he is free from old age,
death, and fear because nothing exists outside of his self.
4.5.2: Anvaya and vyatireka in parisakhyna
The method of discrimination (viveka) between the self and not-self presented in
the first two chapter of the US is clearly evident in akara’s explanation of
parisakhyna.  akara affirms the nature of the tman as unobjectifiable, infinite,
unlimited by time or space, and unconnected to anything else.  The corollary of this
affirmation is the impossibility of any connection of the self with mental afflictions and
the things that cause affliction.
As explained earlier, anvaya and vyatireka is the primary method that akara
endorses.  This method is clearly evident in ravaa and manana, but it is not clear how
this method can or should function in nididhysana. Some scholars, such as Cardona and
Sundaresan, state that there is no anvaya and vyatireka in meditation.  Cardona writes
that anvaya and vyatireka is only a mode of reasoning and not a kind of meditation.483
He specifically refutes Mayeda’s claim that anvaya and vyatireka is a meditational
                                                 
482 See USG 34.6.  Also see USP 15.13.
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method.484  Sundaresan claims that anvaya and vyatireka is not a prominent feature in
parisakhyna, and that it seems as if parisakhyna is intended to be taught before the
instruction of tat tvam asi, whereas anvaya and vyatireka enter into the picture only after
the instruction of tat tvam asi according to akara.485
Cardona is partly right for taking exception to the term “meditation”.  Anvaya and
vyatireka are usually terms for inductive procedure.  A process of reasoning moves
through a series of different cognitions and is naturally opposed to meditation defined as
maintaining a flow of similar thoughts.  In most forms of dhynam and upsan there is
no possibility of anvaya and vyatireka as mental processes.  However, Mayeda uses the
ambiguous term “meditation” to denote parisakhyna in the US.  In this there does
appear to be taught an active contemplation, which first recognizes afflictions and objects
and then moves through a process of repetition and affirmation of one’s self-recognition
through anvaya and vyatireka. On the other hand, it is difficult to decide if parisakhyna
does incorporate a more active reasoning process.  While it is logical that there is no
active process of anvaya and vyatireka reasoning in nididhysana (which I believe is
more or less synonymous with parisakhyana), such reasoning still constitutes the source
and mechanism that makes nididhysana possible.  The continuous remembered
cognition of one’s self as brahman in nididhysana is a product of anvaya and vyatireka.
Perhaps we can say that anvaya and vyatireka are analogous to a grammar that becomes
transparent when one reaches total fluency in nididhysana.  At that point the
                                                                                                                                                  
483 Cardona 1981, p. 93.
484 Cardona 1981, p. 104 and Mayeda 1992 p. 52, 56.  Also see Bader 1990, p. 79.
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contemplator feels no dependence on the contemplative grammar and makes no
conscious use of it, but the grammar remains as part of the underlying structure.486
Perhaps nididhysana is not one simple practice, but a process with different
manifestations.  The anvaya and vyatireka method may be implicit as structure when
contemplation is in the form of a continuous flow of memory (smti-santati) holding
cognitions of atma-brahma-aikyam.  In other forms of contemplation it may be an active
process that allows one to gain greater depth and clarity in the discrimination of self and
not-self (tma-antma-viveka). It one sense it is more active than meditation because
there is a process of recognizing and responding to afflictions along with reaffirming
one’s understanding of brahman, but it is the activity of the abda prama, and not the
individual dependent activity of meditation.  Such an approach allows one to regard
anvaya as a reasoning process.  However, in akara’s parisakhyna contemplation, the
wise person who has already done ravaa and manana, does not require anvaya and
vyatireka to resolve basic doubts or to understand the Advaita teaching for the first time,
but naturally follows it while repeating his understanding of brahman.
The argument that anvaya and vyatireka are not present in parisakhyna
depends on making a fundamental distinction between anvaya-vyatireka and tma-
antma viveka, which is clearly present in the contemplation.487  As argued earlier there
                                                                                                                                                  
485 Sundaresan 1998, p. 76.
486 I explain this theory of a contemplative grammar later in the chapter.
487 For example, see Sundaresan 1998, p. 74.  Sundaresan makes an interesting argument that
parisakhyna is to develop tma-antma-viveka in order that tat tvam asi can be grasped immediately.  By
placing parisakhyna at this point of the study process, as part of gaining the preparedness and eligibility
(adhikritvam) for brahmavidy,  Sundaresan attempts to avoids conflation of parisakhyna and
prasakhyna (which comes after understanding the sentence) and the contradiction that would entail in
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is no absolute difference between the methods of atma-antma viveka, in the form of
negating (neti neti) associations of self and mind/body, and anvaya-vyatireka and
implication (laka).  They are essentially the same methods, though their names
emphasize different aspects of the process. Parisakhyna uses sublation in terms of a
perceiver/perceived distinction yet points to the self (the perceiver) as what is continuous
and unchanging.  This clearly involves on anvaya and vyatireka. If anvaya and vyatireka
does not precede or structure parisakhyna , the process cannot be a part of
parisakhyna. This position would potentially reduce parisakhyna to some kind of
meditation separate from studying the Upaniads, either as a preparatory stage for gaining
mental purity or as the prasakhyna method that akara rejects in chapter eighteen.  In
either case it becomes an activity that cannot result in self-knowledge.
Interpreting anvaya and vyatireka as necessarily preceding or present within
parisakhyna is more faithful to the text and more coherent with akara’s system.
akara refers to the one doing parisakhyna as a vidvn and a vidua.  Clearly this
individual has undergone ravaa and has some degree of intellectual clarity about the
mahvkyas stating the identity of self and brahman.  He only needs to remind himself of
what he already knows, and thus is intimate with anvaya-vyatireka.  It is also textually
incongruous to claim parisakhyna precedes understanding a mahvkya like tat tvam
asi, or is only to be used for understanding tvam and not the complete equation, i.e.,
given that the prose chapters endorse the chronology of the triple method.  The US
                                                                                                                                                  
akara’s writing.  The basic issue at stake here is the chronology within the process of contemplation and
whether contemplation is possible before or after understanding the mahvkya.
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explains sentences such as tat tvam asi earlier in prose chapter one.  Moreover, the three
prose chapters read as a complete text that encapsulates the entire Advaita teaching.
There is nothing else for one to do after completing the discipline laid down. The two
earlier chapters do not explicitly describe the anvaya and vyatireka process by name, but
they make use of it in numerous passages and in different teaching sections
(prakriys).488 Parisakhyna is a “knowledge” contemplation wholly dependent on
one’s understanding the mahvkyas, which in their turn employ anvaya and vyatireka.
akara affirms the intimate relationship of parisakhyna and understanding the
Upaniads in the last sentence of the chapter, which states that the Upaniads’ sentences
should be contemplated.489
Parisakhyna, for akara, does not amount to anything more than what he has
explained with regard to the Upaniad sentences and ravaa.  It is a contemplative
repetition, presupposing that the practitioner is deeply engaged in the Advaita vision of
reality, and is able to purposefully maintain that vision in the face of mental disturbances.
Michael Comans notes that the primary distinction between parisakhyna and
prasakhyna is that parisakhyna is practiced on self-knowledge that is already
gained, whereas prasakhyna is designed to produce self-knowledge from repetition.490
                                                 
488 For example, see USG 19, 23, 24, 28, 31, 89-93, and 109.
489 “As duality does not exist, all the sentences of the Upaniads concerning non-duality of tman should
be fully contemplated, should be contemplated” (Mayeda 1992, p. 253).
tmana ca advyatvaviayi dvayasthsattvt yni sarvi upaniadvkyni vistaraa samkitavyni
samkitavynti
Samkitavyni is repeated to signify the end of the chapter.
490 Comans 1988, p. 82.
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akara introduces the parisakhyna to neutralize mental affliction, yet the focus is on
one’s self-nature, not the objects which are sources of affliction.  The point is not so
much to dismiss or negate the objects of perception but to shift one’s focus and
orientation towards the self, a shift which automatically negates objects. Mental
afflictions naturally cease to disturb the practitioner who makes this vision unshakeable.
Through this practice a mumuku becomes established in his immediate recognition  of
brahman so that this knowledge is immediately available at all times.
                                                                                                                                                  
Though again, how we characterize these different types of knowledge is problematic, for even in the case
of prasakhyna in US chapter 18 there is some sort of conceptual knowledge that precedes the repetition
of prasakhyna.
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Chapter 5: The Process, Experience, and Function of nididhysana
5.1:  Reconstructing the Process of nididhysana
The basic contemplative method outlined in BU, KU, BG, and US employs a
process of withdrawing the mind from objects and in some sense “placing the mind on
the tman” to recognize non-duality.  These contemplations move through particular
conceptual directions that employ distinctions such as particulars and universals, subject
and objects, dependency, causality, subtlety, purity, permanence, or pervasiveness.  They
lead the Advaitin to what is true, real, unchanging, and the ultimate source.  The
Upaniads repeat this process in numerous places.  For example, BUbh 4.2.4 succinctly
states, “Thus the sage identifies himself, by stages, with the vital force that comprises
everything.  Then withdrawing this all-comprising vital force into the inner self, he next
attains the natural state of the witness, the transcendent self that is described as ‘not this,
not this.”491  Such a process is common to many Upaniadic teaching sections (prakriys)
according to Advaita interpretations. With most prakriys, such as the analysis of the five
sheaths (pañcakoa v i v e k a ) in TU 2.1-5 or the analysis of three states
(avasthtrayviveka) in MU 1-7, practitioners have to move from looking externally to a
deeper process leading to the direct recognition of tman.
Despite the preceding discussions of the contemplative methods in the primary
Advaita texts and akara’s commentaries, the process, practice, and experience of
contemplation are still rather mysterious. I spent a number of extended periods at the
                                                 
491 Madhavananda 1993, p. 414.
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Arsha Vidya Gurukulams, founded by Swami Dayananda Saraswati, in order to gain a
clearer understanding of what contemplation entails. Swami Dayananda has been
teaching Vedanta for over four decades and many of his students have taken vows of
renunciation under his guidance.492  Sanysins (renunciates) at Arsha Vidya identify
themselves as traditional Advaitins, particularly because of their close adherence to
Advaita texts and the commentaries of akara.  They view their teaching and monastic
tradition as an unbroken lineage going back to akara.493 Though allegiance is to
akara and teachers tend not to endorse Advaita’s sub-schools, their views on
contemplation fall more towards Surevara and Padmapda rather than Maana and
Vcaspati.
Dayananda has three gurukulams (centers for study), two in India, in Rishikesh
and Coimbatore, and one in Pennsylvania.494  These gurukulams offer short Ved nta
camps as well as long-term residential programs.  Swami Dayananda himself or senior
residential monks teach the courses. Classes are free of charge and are mostly taught in
English in order to accommodate a diverse student body that includes both Indian and
international students.  The majority of students are well educated and many have
                                                 
492 He is not to be confused with Swami Dayananda of the Arya Samaj.
493 This lineage is rather complicated. Swami Dayananda was not trained within the akara Mahas,
though he has regular contact with the presiding akarcryas and appears to be accepted by them.  He
began his study of Vednta with Swami Chinmayananda in 1952 and took his vows of sanysa from
Swami Chinmayananda in 1962. However, he credits Swami Pranavananda, a teacher who lived in
Gudivada, Andhra Pradesh, for teaching him how to understand the role of textual study as a means to
liberation.  Subsequently he trained extensively with Swami Taranandagiri of the Kailash Ashram in
Rishikesh.
The emphasis on lineage is in terms of staying in line with the teaching method and content of
akara’s commentaries. In other ways Arsha Vidya is rather liberal and unorthodox.  For example, they
teach in English, accept non-Indian students, and allow women to become renunciates (sanysins).
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established professional careers. Many of the sanysins in teaching roles had
professional careers as doctors, engineers, computer programmers, or scientists.  The
gurukulams have a large lecture hall, yoga studio, dining hall, residential quarters, and a
temple dedicated to iva in the form of Dakimrti.495
Dayananda emphasizes textual study, and this emphasis is reflected in Arsha
Vidya’s daily schedule.  The average day consists of a morning contemplation session,
followed by three Advaita Vednta classes that analyze texts such as the Upaniads, the
Bhagavadgt, and the Brahmastras, a Pinian Sanskrit grammar class, a Vedic
chanting class, and a question and answer session in the evening.   There are also temple
rituals in the morning, afternoon, and evening, and an optional yoga class.   There I
discussed nididhysana and textual study with students and sanysins and observed
their classes and practices.
In the following chapter I attempt to reconstruct the basic method of
nididhysana.  This reconstruction makes use of my fieldwork with contemporary
Advaitins, when specified, and the processes and difficulties they encounter in their own
contemplative practice.  I have also interwoven my own speculation based on the
preceding chapter’s textual analyses and extensive discussions with Advaita practitioners.
In addition, the outline of the first half of this chapter is based on a set of verses found in
Vidyraya’s Dgdyaviveka that lay out a categorical interpretation of contemplation.
My reconstruction is speculative, and perhaps bold, for it is impossible to know whether
                                                                                                                                                  
494 The Pennsylvania location, set in Saylorsburg, a small town in the Pocono Mountains, is one of the few
Vednta retreat centers for traditional Advaita in the United States.  It also functions as a cultural center for
Indian families and Indian-American children.
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my own speculation, or one particular lineage’s interpretation of akara, or a text
composed long after akara can accurately retrieve akara’s views.  However, despite
these limitations, I believe this reconstruction will help the reader gain insight into
nididhysana outside of the enigmatic and formulaic confines of Upaniadic language
and akara’s terse commentaries.  The second half of the chapter returns to akara’s
commentaries and explores the role of repetition (vtti), the continuous flow of
knowledge (smti santati), and the problem of injunctions (vidhi) in nididhysana.
 Though the date of the Dgdyaviveka’s composition, sometime in the 14 th
century, falls many centuries after akara, it serves as a model for categorizing types of
nidididhysana.  It is also a rare example of a well-known Advaitin clearly and directly
addressing contemplation. Vidyraya uses the term samdhi, not nididhysana, in the
Dgdyaviveka.  At first glance this is somewhat strange and forces us to question
whether he understands samdhi as nididhysana or as a form of a non-dual experience
similar to that found in Patañjali’s Yoga.    However, even though Vidyraya’s
discussion, which uses the terms savikalpa (with division) and nirvikalpa (without
division), appears to respect and parallel the conceptions of samprajñta and
asamprajñta samdhi found in the Yogastras, I believe it unlikely that he is directly
referring to Yoga’s samdhi.  Advaitins appropriated terms paralleling Yoga by
Vidyraya’s time, but loaded them with concepts specific to Advaita.496  As I will
                                                                                                                                                  
495 Dakimrti (the deity who faces south) is iva in the form of a teacher.  The Gurukulam in Rishikesh
has a temple for iva as Gagdharevara.
496 In fact I believe it is incorrect to assume classical Yoga’s ownership of the term samdhi.  Various
traditions used samdhi with their own specific meanings.  For example, in the Sangti-sutta of the Dgha
Nikya  (Rhys Davids 2002, p. 213) we even find a Buddhist distinction between savitarka and nirvitarka
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explain in detail in the next chapter, akara clearly rejects Yoga’s samdhi as an
experience lacking knowledge content.497  In addition, Yoga’s samdhi may lead to a
non-dual state, but results in knowledge of the fundamental duality between awareness
and matter, a duality antithetical to the Advaita program.  I find it highly unlikely that a
scholarly and orthodox Advaitin would identify samdhi as part of the path to
understanding non-duality while equating it with Patañjali’s conception.  Furthermore, as
I will argue, akara himself identifies or reinterprets samdhi as nididhysana in
numerous passages.498  Therefore it is not unprecedented for a scholar such as
Vidyraya, who was deeply familiar with akara’s commentaries, to view samdhi and
nididhysana as synonymous terms, and highly unlikely he viewed samdhi in the Yogic
sense when aware of akara’s rejection of Yoga.  The passages immediately preceding
Vidyraya’s discussion of contemplation proceed along the lines of anvaya and
vyatireka, showing that his contemplative samdhi depends on ravaa.  Thus we can
assume that Vidyraya understands samdhi as nididhysana in the Dgdyaviveka
Nididhysana is a single method that can take different forms. Vidyraya divides
samdhi or nididhysana into internal and external contemplation, contemplations that
follow words or objects, and contemplations with distinction or without distinction:
Having become indifferent to name and form and being devoted to saccidnanda,
one should always practice concentration (samdhi) either within the heart or
outside. (22)
                                                                                                                                                  
(with thought and without thought) samdhi, a distinction that Patañjali also makes within samprajñta
samdhi.  Such terminology had already spread by the composition of the Yogastras and probably
predates the Yogastras.
497 BSbh 2.1.9.
498 BGbh 2.39, 2.54, 4.38, 6.18, GKbh 3.37, BSbh 2.3.39.
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Two kinds of samdhi to be practiced in the heart (within one’s self) are known as
savikalpa and nirvikalpa.  Savikalpa-samdhi is again divided into two classes,
according to its association with a cognizable object or a sound (as an object).(23)
Desire etc. centered in the mind are to be treated as (cognizable) objects.
Meditate on consciousness as their witness.  This is what is called saviklpa-
samdhi associated with (cognizable) objects. (24)
I am existence-consciousness-bliss, unattached, self-luminous and free from
duality.  This is known as the (other kind of) savikalpa-samdhi associated with
sound (object). (25)
But the nirvikalpa-samdhi is that in which the mind becomes steady like the
(unflickering flame of a) light kept in a place free from wind and in which the
student becomes indifferent to both objects and sounds on account of his complete
absorption in the bliss of the realization of the self. (26)
The first kind of samdhi is possible with the help of any external object as it is
with the help of an internal object.  In that samdhi the name and form are
separated from what is pure existence (Brahman). (27)
The entity which is (always) of the same nature and unlimited (by time, space,
etc.) and which is characterized by existence-consciousness-bliss, is verily
brahman.  Such uninterrupted reflection is called the intermediate absorption, that
is the savikalpa-samadhi associated with sound (object). (28)
The insensibility of the mind (to external objects) as before, on account of the
experience of bliss, is designated as the third kind of samdhi (nirvikalpa).  The
practitioner should uninterruptedly spend his time in these six kinds of samdhi.
(29)
With the disappearance of the attachment to the body and with the realization of
the supreme self, to whatever object the mind is directed one experiences
samdhi.(30)499
                                                 
499 Nikhilandanda 1998, pp. 27-40.
252
5.1.1: External Contemplation
External contemplation focuses on external objects in order to discover brahman.
Rather than simply ignoring objects as something other than the self, the objects are
understood as brahman. This contemplation may take different forms, though in some
sense they match akara’s usage of “withdrawing” or “pulling back” in the KU and BG
discussed earlier.  One can take up external objects in a process of concentrating on a
higher object to exclude the lower particular object and move hierarchically towards
larger universals and ultimately to the self.  The student uses various ways based on some
form of hierarchy in terms of causality, subtlety, purity, permanence or pervasiveness.
However, in each case, the contemplative mind is pulling back towards brahman by
means of mentally “dissolving” objects of knowledge into brahman, their ultimate
substrate reality.  This does not mean the world is actually dissolving or changing in the
contemplator’s experience.  The world remains the same, but the contemplator
progressively understands the world to be an appearance whose reality depends on
brahman.  These contemplations focus on the undifferentiated existence  manifesting as
objects, rather than the witnessing awareness as in the seer-seen contemplation explained
below.  Ultimately the process of withdrawing the mind is one that moves from seeing
the object to understanding everything as universal non-dual existence which is brahman.
Perceiving any common object can exemplify the basic method of external
contemplation.  For example, when perceiving a clay pot, one sees a form identified with
a corresponding name, and then recognizes that the pot exists and is perceived in
awareness.  However, though we assume that a real object must exist, when enquiring
253
into the existence of the object we cannot locate it in any form.  The existence continues
despite the changing form, but we cannot find that existence even if the form is reduced
to smaller parts.  This contemplation consists of rejecting mentally the name and forms of
perceived objects and recognizing that their existence is nothing other than brahman and
completely dependent on brahman.  In this external meditation I refer to objects
“outside” only with reference to the body.  One’s skin is the boundary delimiting internal
and external.  But external contemplation also refers to the mind.  This is clear with the
seer-seen analysis, for anything objectifiable is ultimately external to what is the most
internal to the witnessing awareness (skin).  Therefore, the external contemplation also
applies to the forms of the mind that one perceives internally and reduces to non-dual
existence.
5.1.2: Internal Contemplation
 Internal contemplation, which is more commonly known in Advaita parlance as
the discrimination between the seer and the seen (dg-dya-viveka), turns the Advaitin’s
mind towards the basis (adhihna) of thoughts. The explanations and the major
prakriys in the Upaniads formulate a method of negating self-identities, progressively
moving from external identities and moving inwards in terms of intimacy.  One way of
navigating this inward reflective process is through a contemplation based on the
discrimination of subject and object, self and not-self, or between seer and seen.  This
contemplation is clearly used in the parisakhyna contemplation and is derived from
Upaniadic passages such as the discussion of self-light in BU 4.3, the witness in Kea
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Upaniad 1.2-8, brahman as turya in Mndukya Upaniad 1.7, and the discrimination of
the five sheaths in Taittirya Upaniad 2.1-5.
Advaita accepts the fundamental logic that in perception there is a duality
between subject and object.  The subject must be other than the object, for it is illogical
for the subject and object to share the same locus at the same time. Applying the
subject/object duality to perception, one understands that whatever object is perceived is
fundamentally separate from the perceiver.  This is self-evident in the perception of
external objects such as a table, for no sane person believes “I am the table that I
perceive.”   However this wisdom collapses with regard to the body even though one
perceives his or her body.  The sensations of the body are intimately and directly known,
connected with the mind, and assumed to be a part of oneself.  In contemplating the
dilemma of an intimately known yet objectified body, the student is reminded that the
body changes yet his or her sense of self remains constant.  There is some unchanging
presence that is aware of the changing body. Furthermore even if a body part like an ear
or an arm is lost, the self is not lost with it.500  The same form of discriminating inquiry is
then applied to the sense organs and the body’s physiological processes.  One is aware  of
the times when senses or processes such as respiration and digestion are not functioning
properly.  The next stage, after gaining proficiency with the negation of the body and
sense organs as self, is inquiring into the mind as the self.  In the seer-seen
contemplation, the student finds that all categories and aspects of cognition, memory,
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desire, mood, doubt and emotion are known as an object. Therefore the mind is also an
object that is fundamentally different than the subject.
The process of dgdyaviveka is specifically designed to decondition the student
from longstanding identities and constructions of self, including relational ones that
people deeply identify with, such as being a father, a son, a woman, a brahmana, or a
Hindu.  All of these, as well as those based on career, success, wealth, fame, ethnicity,
nationalism, etc., are placed under the uncompromising magnifying class of
dgdyaviveka. As identities arises in the mind, the contemplator recognizes that they are
objective constructs that are adventitious to the self and subsequently mentally dismisses
them.  In nullifying erroneous identities, the student steps outside of his or her culturally
conditioned box towards the tman, which has no relational points of reference.
Advaitins do not consider this reconditioning, for it is a process of negation rather than a
positive accumulation of identity.
This process of negation strips away the body, mind, and personal identity until
only the subject, the true self identified with tman, is left.  The tman, by definition,
never exists as an object, but is the eternal witnessing awareness (skin) according to the
Advaita conception. When mind, body, and senses are removed, then there is no
remaining instrument to make the subject an agent of action or knowledge.  The
ahakra (ego-sense), the locus of agency, is a function of the mind’s reflection of
                                                                                                                                                  
500 It is not clear how this can account for the loss of the brain, without which there would be no ego-sense
or agent for knowing.  But akara believes awareness  is aware of the mind, and thus aware of the brain
also, and therefore  distinct from the brain.
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awareness.  When the ahakara is itself negated, then there is no locus for agency.
Awareness itself is simply self-luminous and is not performing action.
One may argue that moving one’s identity from the mind as ahamkra to the
skin is a form of reconditioning; however this would misunderstand the nature of
Advaita’s skin.  The skin is the primitive presence and locus of reflexive awareness
constant throughout all experience, including the experience of the mind as oneself.
Dgdyaviveka is not intended to introduce the skin to the student as a new entity, but
rather indicates what has always and necessarily existed as the subject.  In the
disassociation of identity, there is also a parallel deconstruction of cultural constructs. For
those constructs require an identity as a locus to cling to. The process is to be viewed as
negative rather then positive conditioning from the standpoint of Advaitins.501 Through
this process, the student is able to appreciate the mind as an object and also recognize that
the true subject is nothing but pure awareness, which is none other than non-dual
brahman.
5.1.3: “Catching” the Witness
The internal seer-seen contemplation leading to the witness appears to be
straightforward and simple. The Advaitin who accepts the difference of subject and
object should easily be able to negate everything that he or she objectifies.  However,
there is an increasing difficulty in separating the subject, as awareness, from objects in
deeper levels of the contemplation that target subtle aspects of the mind, such as the
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higher functioning intellect and the ahakra.  The ahakra constitutes the deepest
sense of self-identity and is most intimately superimposed with awareness.
Understanding that the ahakra does not possess awareness is difficult.  The mind must
understand that the witness illumines it, not vice versa.  Tackling the ahakra is
especially difficult because the contemplative process itself requires the ahakra as
some form of agency to engage in discrimination. The process of negating an identity or
construction of self presupposes the ahakr a. How can that aha k ra  use
discrimination self-reflexively to negate itself?  Attempting mentally to dismiss the
ahakra may well lead to an infinite loop.  After each attempt to negate the ahakra
one recognizes that the ahakra itself was directing the process.  The Advaitin must
find some way to allow the ahakra to resolve by recognizing it as an appearance,
which depends on brahman for its existence and awareness. This is not necessarily an
experience where the ahakra is cancelled out and ceases to exist, but rather the direct
recognition that the ahakra is only awareness. Yet who has this recognition and who
maintains it afterwards?  The paradox is that the ahakra must recognize itself as an
appearance, leading to the negation of its identity as an independent entity.  After this
knowledge takes place the ahakra ought to continue functioning, aware of its reality
and dependent nature.
The seer-seen contemplation presents an additional yet related dilemma to the
thesis of the ahakra’s agency.  How can one “catch” the witness and isolate
                                                                                                                                                  
501 This is a view that offers an interesting perspective on current theories of mysticism that are divided
into two broad groups of constructivism and essentialism.  See Katz 1978, 2000, Proudfoot 1985, and
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awareness? The skin has a unique epistemological status, for even though it can never
be objectified it remains as the self-evident subject.  As the subject, it is immediately
present as the locus and substratum of all knowledge and experience and is never
unknown. At advanced stages of the contemplation, after exhaustively mentally negating
objects and identities, the student may fall into a cat and mouse game of trying to catch
the witness by attempting to objectify the witness with the intellect. This attempt requires
awareness as its basis, and during the attempt, the mind is mistakenly trying to objectify
awareness. With time the contemplator may recognize that this enterprise is hopeless
because awareness is witnessing the mind’s attempt to catch awareness.  Awareness is
independent of the attempt.  According to the Advaitin conception, one cannot place the
mind on tman because the tman is not located in any place.  Furthermore the mind is an
object of tman and not vice versa.
Some of the Advaitin practitioners outlined at the beginning of this chapter
informed me that there may be a persisting desire and tendency of the mind to find and
objectify awareness even after clearly recognizing this conundrum in their contemplation.
As each thought arises and falls in the mind, the fact that the thought is immediately
illumined and known by awareness is self-evident.  The immediacy of awareness appears
tantalizingly close, tempting the mind to seek it.  But when the mind again tries to turn
towards awareness, then awareness slips away, remaining as though both behind and
facing in the same direction as the mind.  Immediately following that attempt, the
contemplator recognizes the fact that awareness was present, self-evident, and the most
                                                                                                                                                  
Forman 1990 for some of the influential writings on these theories of mysticism.
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intimate ground of experience during the attempt itself.   The contemplator may feel as if
awareness escaped the mind by a hair’s breadth or the shortest of moments, and then he
or she repeatedly tries again.  Such an effort is premised on drawing a line dividing the
seer and the seen.  But it is not possible to draw this line.  The student must recognize
that every time he or she draws a line between seer and seen, both sides end up being the
seen. This type of reflexive response is natural because the mind is conditioned to
objectify.  Yet in the case of the seer-seen inquiry the mind must let go of this fruitless
pursuit and find an alternative way to recognize awareness without locating or
objectifying awareness.
With dgdyaviveka, one can quickly see through the projection of self-identities,
but at the deeper levels of this process the student must be careful not to fall into a self-
defeating cycle of “catching” the witness. When mistakenly attempting to objectify
witnessing awareness, the mind can only turn towards a mental concept constructed or
visualized from a preceding experience.  This problem is inevitable in trying to grasp the
awareness that made a prior cognition known. Looking for the witnessing awareness in
the past is the inherent mistake of retrospectively examining an experience because
awareness exists solely in the present. The skin is illumining the very effort to
understand awareness from a prior experience.  The moment one tries to grasp awareness,
the present moment becomes the past.  From the standpoint of awareness, there is no past
or future because awareness is not subject to time.  It is eternally present. Memory itself
takes place in the present as does conceiving the future.
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Attempting to find awareness in the future is just as problematic as looking to the
past, perhaps more so. A number of Advaita teachers informed me that the most difficult
yet important reality to understand in contemplation is that the tman, which the
Upaniads point to, is my self right now.  The tman is not a conception of self or some
event or experience occurring in the future.  To look to the future is premised on
something lacking in the present, yet this contradicts the very reality of the tman. People
take themselves for granted as limited and finite and have great difficulty breaking
through this conditioned assumption, I am informed. They focus on what happened, what
is changing, and what will happen.  Therefore novice Advaitins tend to look towards a
future event when they will become complete, gain knowledge, experience non-duality,
or attain a state devoid of problems and insecurity.  However, looking to the future
occludes one’s mind from recognizing awareness in the present. Understanding the skin
necessitates that the contemplator is immediately present and not looking to the past or
future. This requires giving up the attempt to catch or grasp awareness.
Thoughts continuously move and change whether one is objectifying internal
states or external objects.  Awareness is constant and it illumines the rise of thoughts as
well as their absence.  The continuity of awareness with reference to thoughts and the
changing mind and ego appear to be the key to recognizing the skin.  In deep
contemplation, the Advaitin understands that despite the rise and fall of thoughts,
different states, and changing mind and ego, there is a continuous presence of awareness.
Though awareness is not isolated as an experience or object, it is isolated in terms of
knowledge because the unchanging and self-luminous nature of awareness is self-evident.
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I believe this occurs somehow when in the process of holding Upaniadic knowledge in
mind while remaining in a unique place of total presence and dispelling the natural desire
to apperceive the process happening, the contemplator recognizes the skin as self-
evident, the constant source of illumination which is not subject to the changing states of
the mind.  It is brahman and simply is.  Brahman is not something that requires
objectification or proof, for it trumps the very need for grasping, let alone proof,
perception, inference, etc.  There is an acknowledgement and comfort with the fact that
one is awareness, without being able to grasp it.   While this is a cognitive contemplative
process, it is obviously not intended to be merely conceptual. It is a crucial reflexive
method of inquiry that is unlike most forms of learning.  One’s self is always included in
the inquiry.
5.1.4: Making The Equation
Internal and external contemplation are strikingly similar because they both
employ the anvaya and vyatireka method.  Both follow a method of finding either pure
awareness or undifferentiated existence, while negating what is adventitious.  The seer-
seen inquiry finds awareness through a subject/object distinction, and the external
contemplation finds existence though an analysis of objects and dependency (mithytva).
However, the contemplator faces a major dilemma.  All objects and identities are
supposed to be mentally discarded through dgdyaviveka and one is left with the
witness, the pure unobjectifiable subject.  Yet the witness (skin) is a subject relative to
objects.  The skin is not to be circumscribed by constructed identities and is other than
external objects, but its nature as other to things included in contemplation as not it leads
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to a duality incompatible with non-duality.  This conclusion however is more akin to
Patañjali Yoga’s isolation of awareness (prua), untouched and separate from any
material or substance (prakti).  When one comes to the conclusion that “I am the
witness,” then everything else becomes the non-self.  Somewhere in the deepening
contemplative process the Advaitin must understand that the tman also includes all
objects; however, this sets up a contemplative paradox.  How does the contemplator
recognize that on one hand pure awareness excludes all objects because objects fall
outside of awareness’s intrinsically subjective nature, yet on the other hand awareness
includes all objects?  How can I be the object if I am the subject?
External contemplation raises a similar dilemma.  The recognition that universal
existence underlies objects and is not limited to their name and form occurs within a
dualistic framework.  How is the existence evident in objects, not separate from them,
identical with one’s own awareness?   At the most advanced stages of study and
contemplation, the Advaitin must make a gradual transition or leap from internal to
external or external to internal, in which all duality resolves.  This is crucial, for the
tman is said to include and transcend all dichotomies such as subject and object.  This
transition is difficult because one cannot simply look at objects and name them as tman
or conceive of the skin as all objects. Associating objects and tman in this way is
simply playing with concepts, a new level of superimposition and objectification that in
fact leaves awareness out of the equation and is more like a form of upsan.   The
contemplative process must work at a deeper and more profound level to remove
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ignorance of non-duality, rather than at a superficial level of constructing new identities
and beliefs.
The impossibility of grasping the witness shows the student that one cannot locate
one’s self.  Awareness is not located in or limited to the physical body.  The dichotomy
of inside and outside does not apply to awareness.  Furthermore, awareness stands
outside of time, always present in the immediate moment.  Time is a constructed concept,
a part of my that falls within awareness and is dependent on awareness.  The same can
be said for space.  According to akara, the dependence of space, time, and causality on
awareness also negate any internal external distinction such as the difference between
seer and seen. Nothing limits or conditions the skin, leading to the knowledge that the
same awareness is present in all things and not separate from non-dual existence.
The external contemplation focusing on thoughts and the seer-seen inquiry is to
lead to recognition of the unity of awareness and existence. The self is wherever the mind
is.   Every thought arises from awareness, is illumined by awareness, sustained by
awareness, and resolves back into awareness. Awareness is the locus for each cognition
and constant throughout the process.  As the locus of cognition, awareness is also the
existence underlying each cognition. After cognition releases its content and disappears,
awareness/existence does not disappear, but remains as the existence of one’s self, the
skin.
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This theory provides a method of contemplation that akara specifically
indicates in his commentary on the phrase, “(brahman) is known, being known with
every thought, indeed one gains immortality” (KeU 2.4).502 In the KeUbh 2.4. He writes:
Pratibodha-viditam – known with reference to each state of intelligence.  By the
word bodha are meant the cognitions acquired through the intellect.  The self, that
encompasses all ideas as its objects, is known in relation to all these ideas. Being
the witness of all cognitions, and by nature nothing but the power of
consciousness, the self is indicated by the cognitions themselves, in the midst of
cognitions as pervading them.  There is no other door to its awareness.  Therefore
when brahman is known as the innermost self (i.e witness) of cognitions, then it is
matam, known, that is to say, then there is its complete realization.  Only by
accepting brahman as the witness of all cognitions can it be established that it is
by nature a witness that is not subject to growth and decay, and is eternal, pure in
essence, the self, unconditioned, and one in all beings.503
He writes further in KeUbh 4.5:
Though the mind goes, as it were, the mind enters into brahman, as it were,
encompasses it as an object.  And the fact that anena, by that mind; the spiritual
aspirant; abhkam, repeatedly; upasmarati, remembers intimately; etat, this
brahman; and the sakalpa, thought of the mind with regard to brahman.  Since
brahman has got the mind as its limiting adjunct, it seems to be revealed by such
states of the mind as thought, memory, etc., by which it seems to be objectified.
…in the context of the soul, it has the attribute of manifesting itself
simultaneously with the states of the mind.504
akara points out a fascinating method of contemplation here. The goal is to see
all existence as one’s self, and recognize that the witness exists equally in all things. One
                                                 
502 pratibodhaviditam matam amtatvam hi vindate | KeU 2.4 (my translation).
503 pratibodhavidita bodha bodha prati viditam | bodhaabdena baudh pratyay ucyante | sarve
pratyay viaybhavanti yasya sa tm sarvabodhn pratibudhyate sarvapratyayadar |
cicchaktisvarpamtra pratyayair eva pratyayev aviiay lakyate; nnyad dvram antartmano
vijñnya |  ata pratyayapratyagtmatay vidita brahma yad tad tat mata tatsamyagdaranam ity
artha sarvapratyayadaritve copajananpyavarjitadksvarpat nityatva viudhasvarpatvam
tmatva nirvieataikatva ca sarvabhteu siddha bhavet | (my translation).
504Gambhirananda 1995, p. 86.
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can allow the mind to run where it wants.  Wherever it goes, whether to internal thoughts
or external objects, one sees the self. In this contemplation there is no effort to place the
mind on brahman, but rather an unobjectifying recognition of brahman which does not
require a particular thought of brahman.  Through this knowledge one cannot but see
brahman wherever the mind wanders because the contemplator immediately recognizes
that awareness is underlying the cognition of the object.
This ostensibly requires a high degree of mental alertness, perhaps something
similar to the Buddhist’s mindfulness contemplation (vipayan).  The Advaitin must be
intentionally aware and remind himself that each arising thought points back to the
awareness illuminating the thought.  Even if the mind wanders from object to object, it is
really not wandering for there is a continuous intentional and occurrent recognition of
awareness.  Here we must make a clear distinction between a mind wandering within the
contemplation and a mind truly distracted and unaware of the contemplation. In this
contemplation the mind is certainly not wandering in a distracted way for the
contemplator cannot lose sight of his purpose and must remain vigilant in the midst of the
wandering mind. One can even turn the distractions of the mind into a contemplative aid,
for every thought indicates the awareness illuminating it.  One can welcome distractions
by negating them and returning to the locus of awareness. With this process, the objects,
along with the emotions that are associated with them, such as rga (like), dvea
(dislike), oka (grief), and krodha (anger), cease to disturb the contemplator because the
contemplator leans to transform such distractions into contemplative aids.
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This contemplation may be compared to standing in a house of mirrors, where the
infinite reflections, like the infinite objects one perceives, point back to the single self.
Another excellent example is a lucid dream.  In a lucid dream, where one remains in the
dream world but is aware it is a dream, one sees the dream objects but is absolutely clear
that all dream objects are not separate from his or her mind despite the appearance of
subject-object duality.  If the lucid dreamer holds this knowledge in awareness, then the
dream objects he or she perceives point back to the underlying reality of the mind. There
is no ultimate difference between the dream object and dream individual.  From this
perspective there is no necessity to isolate brahman or experientially “negate” the world.
Perceiving duality is not the destruction of non-duality because the contemplator
recognizes the dependence of duality on awareness.
Knowledge of external objects takes place through cognition in the mind.  Objects
exist (asti), are known (bhti), and possess name (nma) and form (rpa).  In external
contemplation the Advaitin may take up an object like a pot and look at the word “pot”
and its meaning, a pot shaped form of clay.  Then he or she mentally discards the name
and form, and analyzes the substance, “clay”, and its meaning, a substance having a
shape and formed of minerals.  Then the analysis shifts to minerals.  The process of
seeking the ultimate existence of any object is endless, as every substance and form is
infinitely divisible.  This leads to a position that name and form are adventitious,
constantly shifting on the constant ground of existence.
At this point Advaitins make a staggering metaphysical transition in their
contemplation by identifying existence and awareness.  Advaitins claim that the universal
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existence that they arrive at through dismissing names and forms, which has no
boundaries or limitations, is identical with one’s own existence.  If existence is not
limited by name and form, what is there to separate the existence of one’s self from the
existence we conceive as inherent to another person or another object? The same can be
said for awareness.  If awareness is unobjectifiable, self-luminous, uncaused, and without
boundaries, what can separate it from universal existence?  Or how can we make a
distinction between two awarenesses?  According to the Advaitin, it is only in awareness
that we can recognize unchanging existence.  This is why it is no surprise that wherever
there is awareness there is also existence, and wherever we perceive something that exists
there is also awareness. They identify self-existence with self-luminous awareness, thus
equating all unqualified existence with one’s witnessing awareness.
The theory of identity between unqualified awareness and existence is difficult for
the Advaitin to defend.  However, though later Advaitins do formulate sophisticated
arguments to support the identity of awareness and existence, we must remember that
ultimately akara takes recourse to the Upaniads to justify his position.  Knowledge of
non-duality is not arrived at by dry logic and therefore, even though supporting
arguments may be made, ultimately it is not a thesis established by logic.  This is one
reason the Upaniads must function as a source of knowledge.  Advaitins take Upaniads
at their word and understand them to be more powerful as a knowledge-generator than
any philosophical challenge.   Furthermore, direct recognition of the identity of existence
and awareness occurring as brahmvidy is not conceivable according to the Advaita
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conception.  It is a unique, direct, and universal recognition of brahman unlike modal
cognition or psychological states, which cannot include everything within its scope.
 The “am-ness”, the awareness and existence underlying every cognition is the
same “is-ness” available with every object.  Or one could also say unqualified “known-
ness” and “is-ness” are not separate in the Advaita view.  Neither one ever changes,
deviates, is qualified by names or forms, or is subject to limitations. The contemplator
recognizes that pure non-dual existence comprises all objects and that same non-dual
existence is his or her self. This is not intended to be a conflation of thought and reality
where the existence of an external object depends on my thought.  Advaita recognizes a
difference between mind and object, and in fact defends realism. The key to understand
the Advaita position is to remember that awareness is other than the mind and transcends
the mind.  Even though existence is identified with awareness, awareness is not
dependent on or identified solely as the finite mind.  Both mind and object share the same
level of reality, equally dependent on awareness, which is non-dual.
5.1.5: Contemplation Following Words (abdnuvidha nididhysana)
The internal and external contemplations outlined above focus on seen objects
(dya-anuvidha) whether in terms of moving internally through the seer-seen
contemplation or externally by understanding brahman as the locus (adhihna) of
objects.  One question that comes up here is the role of the mahvkyas.  How do
Advaitins employ such sentences in contemplation?  Does understanding mahvkyas
function differently from contemplation or in some unique manner?  Vidyraya’s
Dgdyaviveka divides contemplation into different categories, first internal and external
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and then two more categories of those that follow objects and those that follow words. I
don’t believe akara specifically makes a distinction between contemplations that
follow words (abdnuvidha) and those that follow seen objects (dynuvidha).  In some
ways it is difficult to make this division because contemplating a mahvkya does not
refer to the mention of the words or simply repeating a mantra as in japa, but seeing their
meanings and the unified meaning of the complete sentence.  As I will show,
contemplating the meaning of the great sentences (mahvkyni) is more or less the same
as contemplating the equation of existence and awareness made in internal and external
contemplation.
Contemplation following sentences is only possible after listening to the
Upaniads taught properly by a qualified teacher.  Only then does the contemplator
understand how to move beyond the direct meanings of the words to the implied ones
that point to the self. The sentences function to bring the contemplator back to his or her
self, revealing the nature (svarpa) of tman through secondary indication (laka). So
too is anvaya and vyatireka (continuity and discontinuity) and neti neti (negation)
implicit to the contemplations detailed earlier, for such contemplations depend on a
process of mentally dismissing adventitious properties such as name and form in order to
arrive at what is constant, continuous, and unchanging.  It is simple to see that these
contemplations lead one through the same process of understanding the mahvkya.  The
internal and external contemplations mirror the mahvkya, tat tvam asi (“You are that”).
The internal attempts to find tvam  and the external attempts to find tat. The
contemplation then equates both sides.
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These contemplations, in whatever form, achieve a form of “yoking” through
knowledge (thus the use of terms such as yuñjan in BG 6.28).  The fundamental process
of nididhysana ultimately depends on knowledge content.  The knowledge content of
larger teaching sections (prakriys) in the Upaniads, such as the pañcakoa in TU or the
avasthtraya in MU,  is the same as the m a hvk y as according to  akara’s
interpretation. The process of understanding the meaning of the sentence requires
contemplative means such as withdrawing the mind, the seer-seen inquiry, reducing
names and forms to existence, etc. However, one might argue that an initial
understanding of the sentence, even if only conceptual, is helpful to structure
nididhysana.
Many Advaitins I interviewed consider abdnuvidha nididhysana an advanced
part of the Advaita path, consisting of abiding in and staying with the sentence meaning
after understanding the equation of tat and tvam. This advanced contemplation, of
repeating or abiding in one’s knowledge of non-duality, whether direct brahmvidy or
some form of deficient self-knowledge due to obstacles, is not essentially different from
the culmination of the internal/external contemplation because both arrive at
brahmavidy or alternatively, continue to repeat one’s brahmavidy.  However, at the
outset it is somewhat different in that it intentionally makes use of a sentence rather than
seen objects. The Advaitin may favor contemplating the sentence because it provides the
simplest structure that encapsulates and leads one through larger Upaniadic prakriys.
Both the mahvkya and the prakriys move through a process of anvaya and vyatireka,
though the prakriys do so in more detail and from a particular conceptual angle. The
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pithiness of the mahvkya also makes it a convenient device to encapsulate the entire
Advaita teaching.  At the advanced level the contemplator does not require multiple
contemplative steps to work through Advaita concepts and eventually arrive at unity. It
may be more efficient for him to use the sentence as a trigger that retrieves the
knowledge, whether deep intellectual insight or direct brahmavidy, that he has
cultivated over years of intensive study.
The contemplator may engage a variety of sentences for nididhysana such as “I
am complete” (pro ‘ham),505 “I am infinite” ( ananto ‘ham ),506 “I am unattached”
(asago ‘ham),507 “I am brahman” (aham brahmsmi),508 etc.  In a sense, these sentences
direct one towards internal contemplation because they refer to oneself.  The student may
also use sentences that directs one towards external contemplation, such as “Brahman is
truth, knowledge, limitless” (satyam jnam anantam brahma), “All this is brahman
(sarvam idam brahma), or “Brahman is partless (akhaam brahma), etc.  All have the
same fundamental meaning, which asserts one’s identity with brahman; however, the
student may fluidly employ different sentences to target different emotional obstacles.
For example, if one’s sense of insecurity disturbs one’s deficient understanding of
brahman, then the teacher may recommend using the sentence “I am complete.”  If one’s
desires are problematic, then the student may use “I am unattached.” The entire Advaita
vision is anchored into the sentence and the sentence is believed to trigger immediate
                                                 
505 Bhadrayaka Upaniad 5.1.
506 Taittirya Upaniad 2.1.1.
507 Bhadrayaka Upaniad 4.3.15.
508 Bhadrayaka Upaniad 1.4.10
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knowledge of non-duality when engaged by mental repetition and when the student has
achieved the proper fitness for brahmavidy through mental purification.
The focus interviewees at the Arsha Vidya Gurukulam place on mahvkyas in
nididhysana reiterates akara’s emphasis on the Upaniads.  Contemplation cannot be
reduced to an independent intellectual endeavor or some form of additional practice.
Implicit to contemplating the sentences is a surrendering to the teaching of the Upaniads
as well as the guru as an authority that conveys liberating knowledge.  Implicit in the idea
of surrendering is a reworking of how students understand the Upaniads and the teacher.
They must not only accept the Upaniads as the ultimate authority for self-knowledge,
but also recognize the teacher as that authentic voice, whose words are sacred and
transformative.  The teacher is a mouth of the tradition and a manifestation of the
Upaniads because he or she has gained complete infallible self-knowledge
(brahmaniha) and is able to communicate that knowledge (rotriya).
A few sanysins at Arsha Vidya reported to me that novice students need to
change their orientation radically away from viewing contemplation as an independent
practice for knowledge.  Instead, they must recognize the words of the texts as the source
and means of liberation and base their contemplation on the intrinsic power the texts have
for conferring knowledge. These sentences meanings possess active agency for revealing
non-duality.  The student must make some effort to direct his or her mind to engage the
sentences in listening or contemplation,509 and then allow the sentences to do their work.
This is a natural relaxation into the texts and teacher, often described as “surrendering to
273
the prama” and allowing oneself to become an open and passive recipient of textual
knowledge.  From this perspective, the sentences themselves, when taught through the
speech of a teacher and subsequently contemplated, are capable of knocking off one’s
self-ignorance.  When dwelling on the meaning of the sentence in nididhysana the
student must step out of the way and allow the sentences to do their magic.
A couple of sanysins reported to me their own struggle to adopt an orientation
of surrendering to the texts in their contemplation.  They recognized that their minds
created resistance, a screen of their own ideas and concepts that acted as a filter and
obstructed absorption of the Advaita teachings.  When they were young students, they
required considerable effort in contemplation to extract the meaning from the sentences.
The words did not penetrate deeply and doubts or confusion would pop up. Yet as they
continued to study and gained clarity, their experience of contemplation changed
significantly.   Their minds became increasingly passive, and they recognized that in
reality the words are doing all the work.  This transition from mental effort to relaxing,
cultivating textual receptivity, and allowing the words to become active was a major
turning point in their contemplative practice.  They reported that the great difficulty in
allowing the words to become effective was having the courage to let go of their
resistance to the words and cultivate a more receptive attitude.
The capacity to dwell on the final conclusion of the sentence and see the meaning
clearly in abdnuvidha nididhysana appears to be an advanced stage of the study
process. No new knowledge is created through the contemplation.  The student maintains
                                                                                                                                                  
509 This refers to the tavya suffix in nididhysitavya (BU 2.4.5).
274
a repeated repetition of textual knowledge produced from listening, though it is not
actively listening nor does it require effort to consider the meanings of words. .
Otherwise he or she requires more ravaa and manana.  At this point the student easily
surrenders to the meaning of the sentence and appreciates it. The mind relinquishes its
resistance to the sentence meaning and understands that it is illumined by the tman.
Contemplation may occur spontaneously at this point because the mind, having
recognized its reality as brahman without limitations and complete, naturally desires to
stay with this recognition.
Some sanysins at Arsha Vidya reported that repeating the sentence meaning is
only the starting point. In moving through the contemplative process and eventually
clearly recognizing the meaning of the sentences there is no more action.  As their
contemplation gains maturity, the words act like a mirror to see oneself.  They let go of
any attempt to objectify self-knowledge or to use will power and effort, and recognize
that there is no separation between self, brahman, and the meaning of the mahvkya.
Here there is no more action because there is no agency.  According to their theologically
informed descriptions, the cognition created by the sentence appears to resolve into its
own meaning because the object of the sentence is oneself.  Subject/object dualities such
as contemplator and contemplated or listener and object of listening are eliminated in the
process of contemplation.  At this point, the contemplator is not simply dwelling on the
knowledge or abiding in it, but is the very knowledge itself. The identification of self-
knowledge and individual points to the problem of misleading phrases such as
“remaining, residing, or abiding in knowledge” or “being absorbed in knowledge.”
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Advaitins must understand these phrases as purely metaphorical, according to my
informants.
5.1.6: Words as Contemplative Grammar
akara does not specify how contemplation is to be done as clearly as we would
like.  However, it is clear that the meanings of the mahvkyas themselves, or when
dilated as larger prakriys or in the form of external or internal contemplation, are both
the entry points and the content of nididhysana. The crucial aspect to be aware of is that
the method(s) of continuity and discontinuity (anvaya-vyatireka), negation (neti neti), and
indirect implication (laka) discussed earlier in chapter three, is the intrinsic keys
within the mahvkyas and larger prakriys that unlock the sentence meaning and reveal
self-knowledge.  A translation of the sentence is inadequate.  One first requires listening
to a capable teacher who employs these verbal methods to unfold the sentence meaning.
The sentence meaning then forms the content of nididhysana, and anvaya-vyatireka
constitutes the method and contemplative grammar that enables nididhysana.  Thus
nididhysana possesses a deep structure and content composed of the meaning of the
Upaniad sentences.  It cannot be separated from the Upaniads or possess any function
independent of them.510
                                                 
510 This theory goes back to akara’s refutation of action and practices such as the prasakhyna
contemplation (US chapter 18) that emphasize meditative action,  and his emphasis on upholding the
authority of the Upaniads. Otherwise nididhysana would be elevated to an independent source of
knowledge. In BUbh 1.4.7 akara writes that contemplation does not create any new special state of
knowledge separate from textual knowledge and arises naturally from texts. From this standpoint it is clear
that nididhysanam is a mode of ravaa and is completely dependent on the hearing of the Upaniads.
Also see BUbh 2.5.1 for nididhysana being in accordance with ravaa and manana.  However, Advaitins
such as those in the Bhmat school do not agree with this view and they emphasize nididhysana and
claim ravaa and manana are modes of nididhysana.
276
Recall also that according to akara’s conception, nididhysana is not a will
based process of mechanical repetition because such practices fall into the problematic
category of actions. Rather it is a allowing the prama, in the form of the sentence
meaning, to convey brahmavidy, a process that requires total receptivity and a high
degree of mental purification. We do not know how to characterize the knowledge being
contemplated at least at the early stages of nididhysana.  Some Advaitins, such as
Maana Mira and Vcaspati Mira, may claim it is propositional and indirect
knowledge.  Others, such as Surevara, Padmapda, and Madhusdhana Saraswati may
claim it is direct non-propositional self-knowledge throughout the process.  However, at
some point after the student has gained clarity and stability in knowledge (jñnaniha)
through nididhysana, then he ought to be able to continuously recognize and
contemplate direct brahmvidy with total clarity (nicayena dhynam).  Throughout this
contemplative process the student is engaging the meaning of the sentences through
laka, anvaya-vyatireka, and neti neti, however the student is not doing this in a step
by step process, but rather recognizing the reality of his self as non-dual in a continuous
stream of cognitions (smti santna). The methods remain as a transparent structure
supporting contemplation and continually providing its content.  From this standpoint it is
clear that nididhysana is a mode of ravaa and is dependent on the teaching of the
Upaniads.  But what Advaitins really mean by dependence on the Upaniads is not the
words themselves, but their meaning and the verbal methods necessary to convey that
meaning.
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Unfortunately, the contemplator’s approach to the sentences in nididhysana is
not always clear.  In the beginning does one just mull over the words and their meanings?
Does one think of them like a math problem, like a zen koan, or hold them in mind in
some creative way? The process is surely not like learning other bodies of knowledge.
There is a clear difference between studying Advaita as a theory and changing one’s
orientation to see oneself in the words and explanation of the teacher. This type of inquiry
has an inward direction even though it makes use of formal methods like anvaya and
vyatireka.  However, we can only speculate on the phenomenological process.
The transparency of nididhysana’s grammar and structure is analogous to
language fluency.  When we begin learning a language as an adult we first learn
vocabulary, grammar, and sentence composition, and then carefully compose sentences
with such rules in mind.  Eventually, with language fluency, we drop the grammar as part
of the active mental process.  This is not to say that grammar is absent from our speech,
but that it becomes effortless, spontaneous, and transparent.  It is the structure of speech
and fully present, yet absent in our effort and not visible in our minds as we speak.  It is
only visible in retrospect if we look back upon our sentences and analyze their structure.
Advaita’s language method is present during nididhysana in a similar manner, but at a
mature level of contemplation it becomes a transparent and effortless grammar.511   In the
case of Advaita, the language methods constitute the structure of contemplation and
provide the content as well.
                                                 
511 How far can we use language as an analogy for nididhysana? Language is highly structured and
governed by rules. It is uniform and a rule governed code shared by people.  This is limited but gives us a
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5.2: Repetition (vtti)
Repetition is an intrinsic aspect of nidididhysana, though it does not always fit
clearly into akara’s Advaita.  Repetition is explicit to contemplative descriptions such
as “bringing the mind back to the self” and  “remaining in the self” as well as
contemplative terms such as abhysa (continuous practice), 512 anusmaraa
(remembering), 513  anucintana (thinking of the self),  514 smti santati (continuous flow of
memory) 515 and vtti (repetition). 516   The importance of repetition is evident in the
teaching of various Upaniads, which often repeat phrases and ideas in a particular
passage or text.  Concepts and verses are often repeated verbatim in different Upaniads.
The Upaniads use repetition as a teaching method within narratives between teacher and
student.  For example, Uddlaka repeats and explains tat tvam asi nine times to vetaketu
in Chndoyga Upaniad chapter 6.
A natural question that arises in Mims hermeneutics is how to justify such
repetition. Repetition appears to be redundant when the Upaniad provides the same
information elsewhere.  This is a serious issue because according to Mms
hermeneutics, redundancy is a flaw that potentially negates the validity of the Upaniads.
Some Mmsakas might claim repetition of sentences like tat tvam asi or neti neti is
                                                                                                                                                  
good model and gives us an idealized account of nididhysana.  Though we have to assume individuals and
their context bring a lot more complexity to this process.
512BG 6.35, 8.8, 12.9. See Gkbh 3.31 for viveka-darana-abhysa, a phrase similarly used in YSbh 1.12.
513 BG 8.9, GKbh 3.43.
514 BG 8.8.
515 BU 1.4.7, 1.4.10.
516 BS 4.1.1.
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simply eulogistic (arthavda), but this is unacceptable to akara.517  akara believes
that sentences such as tat tvam asi are not arthavda and provide direct knowledge of
brahman. akara also makes use of repetition (abhysa) as part of the aliga vicra, a
six-fold exegetical strategy necessary in order to understand scriptural meaning during
ravaa. 518  Furthermore, According to akara, repetition is necessary for a student who
has difficulty grasping non-duality, and is employed to remove fresh doubts and other
obstructions to brahmavidy.519 The same subject is expounded repeatedly, sometimes
with unique and subtle nuances, to counter whatever new doubt arises for the student.
akara raises a significant discussion about repetition and nididhysana in his
commentary on the first two stras of the fourth chapter of the Brahmastras.  These two
stras follow a discussion of nididhysana at the end of the third chapter.  BS 4.1.1 states
“Repetition (is necessary) because the teaching (of the Upaniads is given) multiple
times.”520  In his introduction to this stra akara specifically raises doubts with
reference to the root passage for nididhysana (BU 2.4.5) as well as the related passages
BU 4.4.21 and CU 8.7.1. The question is whether one should do the mental act once or
repeat it.  There is a concrete need for clarification. This question is critical for
understanding Advaita praxis, and the Vedic statements in question are centrally
important.  An opponent answers, claiming that one should repeat only once, for that
fulfills the action, just as one should repeat a ritual enjoined by the Veda only once.  One
                                                 
517 This I had explained earlier in chapter two.
518 See Vedntasra  chapter 5, particularly verse 185 for an explanation.
519 See BSbh 3.3.36, US 1.2, and BGbh 4.18.
520 vttir asakd upadet (BS 4.1.1)
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should do an act only as many times as the scripture enjoins it. Repetition may be
permissible if there is a visible result; but if the result is not visible, then even if one
repeats the action he cannot say how many times to repeat; so it is better to say there is no
repetition and just perform it once.
In reply, akara explains that the repetition in the sentence indicates a repetition
of the mental action is to be done.  He further takes a pragmatic stand, explaining that
ravaa, manana, and nididhysana culminate in self-knowledge (darana).521  They
must be repeated until their goal of brahmavidy is recognized.  Repetition would be
useless if knowledge of brahman is never direct, unseen, and not an immediate result.
Repetition in the triple process is analogous to the repetitive action required for husking
rice.  akara specifically singles out nididhysana for this repetition and draws a parallel
to upsan.  Even though nididhysana and upsan are fundamentally different, they
both involve the same type of continuous repetition. The Advaitin in nididhysana
continuously thinks of brahman just as a student adores his teacher or a woman
constantly thinks of her departed husband.  In concluding the stra commentary, akara
states that repetition is clearly established when the instruction is repeated,522 but even if
spoken only once; repetition is necessary until the purpose is fulfilled.
                                                 
521 We must keep in mind that this is not an “act” in the usual sense of karma, nor is it creating something
truly new as a result (phala).   It is object-dependent (vastu tantra) and moka is already gained.
522 As in the sentences directing one to do nididhysana, such as BU 2.4.5, BU 4.4.21, and CU 8.7.1.
281
In the following stra, “Because of the meaning”  (ligc ca),523 akara again
explains that repetition of the cognition is established and then continues his discussion
with a number of new objections.  What purpose can there be in repeating a cognition
about brahman?  Repeating a cognition is not like repetition of an activity which
establishes some result.  And if listening to a sentence such as tat tvam asi does not
generate knowledge the first time, then why will repetition be productive?  Repeating
something not understood will not result in direct non-propositional knowledge.  One
may argue in response that when first learning something, one only receives general
knowledge of the subject, but repetition is necessary to understand the specifics and to
gain intimate knowledge.  The opponent refutes this also, claiming that repetition of
general knowledge (smnya) will not give specific knowledge (viea), even if repeated
a hundred times.  Furthermore, this argument can only work with empirical examples that
have universal (smya) and particular (viea) characteristics.  If the Advaitin says
brahman has no attributes, then there is no possibility of gaining particular knowledge
through repetition.  This objection points to a fundamental issue.  Upsan may be
repeated because it targets only brahman with attributes.  How is there any possibility of
contemplating unqualified brahman?  And how can such repetition either produce
brahmavidy or make one’s brahmavidy clearer and free from obstruction?  These
objections strike to the heart of some crucial and potentially contradictory aspects of
                                                 
523 The translation of liga as “indicatory mark” may be more of a Nyya translation rather than a
Mms one.  I take it as “meaning” (abda-artha-liga).   It could either be the verbal import or the
inherent nature of the object.  Verbal import is better because the context is Vedic injunctions.
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nididhysana.  They bring into question the validity of Advaita’s theory of verbal
knowledge and the whole contemplative process.524
akara dismisses these objections.  He recognizes that students struggle to gain
brahmavidy and thus accepts the need for repetition.  Ideally, a properly qualified
student will immediately gain brahmavidy upon listening to a teacher skillfully unfold a
mahvkya.  But listening alone may be insufficient. akara first draws our attention to
the fact that repetition is common in the Upaniads, like vetaketu’s repeated request to
understand tat tvam asi.  He then takes recourse to common experience where we find
that a sentence vaguely apprehended is clearly understood only after removing the causes
of doubt.  The sentence tat tvam asi cannot reveal its meaning when it is obstructed by
ignorance, doubt, and confusion. A person must progressively understand the terms tvam
and tat by negating what they are not and removing false superimpositions. Each attempt
at understanding the sentence negates different falsities, doubts, and misconceptions,
facilitating a progressive clarification of self-knowledge.525 akara resolves the initial
doubt, showing that repetition is not to clarify smnya to viea, but to remove various
obstructions and doubts.  The self is partless, but there are various superimpositions that
have to be seen through.526  The contemplative process is not geared towards any
objectification of brahman but a negation of the variegated superimpositions of self-
identity that individuals cling to. Repetition does not clarify brahman’s attributes but
                                                 
524 This issue did not go unnoticed by other traditions.  See Vedntadeika’s  Tattvamuktkalpa 2.45-50
for a Viidvaita critique (Chari 1988, pp. 289-295).
525 Also see KeUbh. 2.1 and BSbh 3.3.37.
526 This refers to neti neti.  See my earlier section on this, as well as BS 3.2.2 and BS 3.3.36.
283
removes doubts and other obstacles.  Once again we see Advaita’s negative epistemology
as a way of resolving difficulties.
The gradual process of study through repetition points to the difference between
simple confusion and a deep-rooted problematic orientation.  One can quickly solve
confusion due to a basic intellectual error without requiring repetition.  Further repetition
is sensible when confusion is not merely intellectual but deeply rooted in terms of
outlook and desires, and has caused life long habitual errors in self-identity.  However,
akara still insists that a rare person of sharp intellect, who possesses the qualifications
for brahmavidy, can understand tat tvam asi upon hearing it once.  This points to the
fact that the necessity of repetition is not intrinsic to the teaching of the Upaniads.  A
requirement for repetition points to limitations of the practitioner, not to any limitation of
the Upaniads.  It is clear that adhikra is the pivotal factor playing into repetition.
In concluding his commentary on this stra, akara reinforces the importance of
the guidance of the mahvkya throughout the process, emphasizing that in repetition the
contemplator should fix his or her mind on the meaning of the sentence.527  It is also clear
that akara is not recommending mechanical repetition or some type of mantra japa.
Repetition is to function at various levels through ravaa, manana, and nididhysana.
Repeated listening resolves doubts about the means of knowledge (pramaaks) and
repeated reflection satisfies intellectual doubts (prameyaaks) about one’s identity as
brahman; however, the student may require repeated contemplation if listening and
                                                 
527 Also see BSbh 3.3.37.
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reflection are insufficient to bring deep self-knowledge.528 The primary function of
repeated contemplation is the neutralization of obstacles immune to listening and
reflection, namely contradictory habitual thinking patterns (vipartabhvan) that involve
affective investment.
5.3: The Continuous Flow of Knowledge (smti-santati)
According to akara, the repetition within nididhysana takes the special form
of a flow of continued memory of verbal knowledge.529 An understanding of identity of
self and brahman is repeated, creating a uniform and continuous cognition of non-duality,
to the exclusion of all other thoughts; however, as I have repeated, akara does not
clarify if the repeated knowledge is propositional knowledge without doubts or direct and
immediate brahmavidy. The smti santati is a process of continuously appreciating the
fact of non-duality.  Though the continuous flow, compared to a constant flow of poured
oil, is a phrase used synonymously for meditation, upsan, and nididhysana, its nature
is fundamentally different in nididhysana because nididhysana depends on self-
knowledge gained from the Upaniads.  I intentionally interpret smti as knowledge here
rather than memory because nididhysana is an active and present appreciation of self-
evident and immediate truth.  Memory entails calling to mind a distant or mediate object,
which exists for the individual as a memory but is not anymore available for a
                                                 
528 See BUbh 2.4.5: “When these (three) are approached (combined) as one, then correct understanding of
the oneness of brahman becomes clear, not otherwise by listening alone” (my translation).
yad ekatvam etny upagatni tad samyagdarana brahmaikatvaviaya prasdati, na anyath
ravaamtrea
529 tmavijñnasmtisatati. See BU 1.4.7, 1.4.10; BG 12.3, 13.24, 18.50, 18.55; PU 5.1; BS 4.1.8.   The
term smti (memory) refers to one’s understanding of the mahvkya.
285
functioning means of knowledge.  Even if initial understanding of the sentence occurred
in the past, repetition of the sentence meaning is a continuously valid cognition, which
continuously re-cognizes the immediate and always present self.  On the other hand, there
is a sense of memory in nididhysana because it runs through the structure of the
mahvkya gained through previous ravaa. The knowledge vtti is created by the
mahvkya, which destroys self-ignorance.  In nididhysana the contemplator
strengthens the vtti born from the mahvkya, continuously enlivening it over and over
again and removing any habitual contradictory patterns of thought and emotion.  In a way
this is akin to memory because no new knowledge is taking place.  Yet it is completely
different because there is only the immediate self-luminous tman  present in
contemplation.
In the situation where one’s self-knowledge is deficient and disturbed by habitual
tendencies, the student must make a concerted effort to maintain nididhysana.
However, akara states that this continuous repetition of knowledge is a natural
progression that arises spontaneously and invariably from studying the texts, and thus
does not need to be enjoined.530  Brahmavidy removes contradicting emotions and
affective states, such as sorrow or fear, which are derived from a false sense of self.  This
immediate self-knowledge is more powerful than knowledge of the non-self.  In this
situation the Advaitin’s mind automatically holds a continuous flow of memory regarding
the true tman.  The flow of memory-based cognitions is not a sdhana that is enjoined
                                                 
530 BUbh 1.4.7.
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or should be done, it just naturally occurs.531 Apparently for akara, nididhysana is not
a will-based process of repetition or repeated conceptual learning, nor does it include
effort in extracting the meaning of the sentence.  While it may require one to intentionally
pull the mind back from distractions it ultimately requires one to be properly receptive
and allow the sentences directly to reveal brahman.  During the contemplative process
the student is an open and passive recipient to the intrinsic power and active agency the
texts have for conferring brahmavidy.  Another way of understanding the process is
viewing it as a negation of a theory/practice model, where one first understands sentence
meaning and subsequently acts on them. akara’s nididhysana at first glance looks like
this, but it is not a practice done to the text, or a practice to produce knowledge from the
text.  Nididhysana is a mode of textual study.532   The texts alone convey knowledge and
nididhysana is simply an extension of listening (ravaa).
This argument should make us pause and rethink our notions of contemplation.  If
we identify nididhysana, or at least an advanced form of nididhysana, with smti-
santati, then it automatically arises with knowledge from the sentence and cannot be
separated from understanding the texts.  It is not something done before knowledge from
the sentence, nor is it any type of practice or process to requiring intentional action after
the rise of brahmavidy.  In fact smti santati should require no effort and there is no
                                                 
531 akara discusses this in BUbh 1.4.7.  See later section on BU 4.4.21 for more information.
532 We may understand this in terms of Advaita’s theory of causality where the cause inheres in the effect
(satkryavda).  ravaa is the cause/content of nididhysana and therefore we may, in a sense, reduce
nididhysana to ravaa just as we can reduce a pot to clay.
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option to do it or not to do it.  Once one knows the tman he sees his self in all things and
all things in his self.  Where is the possibility of not seeing the self?
5.4: Revisiting the Problem of Injunctions: Bhadrayaka Upaniad 4.4.21
The issues of repetition and smti santati are not always as clear in akara’s
writing as I have made them out to be in the preceding section. As I have shown earlier,
one of akara’s primary concerns is prohibiting any form of action from the pursuit of
self-knowledge because knowledge and action are incompatible.  Actions such as karma
yoga and meditation are vitally important for gaining the requisite four-fold qualifications
for knowledge (sdhana catuaya), but they cannot act as independent generators of
brahmavidy.  ravaa, manana, and nididhysana are thus not actions like karma yoga.
akara believes this distinction is crucial in the study and orientation of Advaita
students.  Performing ritual actions, following injunctions, and accepting a
theory/practice model runs afoul of important Advaita doctrines.  This position
compromises the validity of the Upaniads by privileging action as a means for self-
knowledge, and undermines the individual’s pursuit of liberation by leading him astray
along a fruitless path.
akara would hold that there is no action present in nididhysana if he viewed it
as a mode of the abda prama; however, we find some curious twists in akara’s
writing regarding  action and nididhysana, particularly within the context of repetition
and smti santati.  These twists raise epistemological questions about the chronology and
relationship between contemplation, textual study, and self-knowledge. As Paul Hacker
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notes, akara is uneasy with repetition and smti santati.  In some places he endorses
them and in others he rejects them.533
akara lumps together a handful of Upaniadic sentences that parallel the root
text for nididhysana.534  These sentences include “The tman should be meditated upon”
(Bhadrayaka Upaniad 1.4.7);535 “That (is the self) you should try to discover, that (is
the self) you should seek to perceive” (Chndogya Upaniad 8.7.1);536 “Therefore the
knower of brahman, having known all about scholarship, should try to live upon that
strength which comes of knowledge; having known all about this strength and
scholarship, he becomes meditative; having known all about both meditativeness and its
opposite, he becomes a knower of brahman.” (Bhadrayaka Upaniad 3.5.1);537  “One
should meditate only upon the world of the Self (BU 1.4.15);538 and “Having known just
that (self), the wise brahmin should obtain insight.  He should not ponder over many
words, for that is wearying of speech.” (Bhadrayaka Upaniad 4.4.21).539  Each of
                                                 
533 See Hacker 1995, p. 107.  Hacker (as well as other scholars such as Nakamura and Trevor Leggett)
believed akara was the author of the Yogastravivaraa and that he was a Yogin before becoming a
Vedntin.  Hacker sees akara’s changing position over repetition as a manifestation of his early
indecision over reconciling Yoga and Vednta theories. Though Hacker is correct in noting akara’s
changing and perhaps conflicting views on repetition, I disagree with him on a couple points.  Hacker
argues that akara rejects smti-santati in BUbh 1.4.7.  I believe he accepts it here, as well as elsewhere,
most notably BGbh 18.55.  Hacker then uses this argument to claim the MUbh (in which akara accepts
abhysa in 3.31 and which is similar to YS 1.12) is an earlier work of akara.  This does not make sense
because akara clearly accepts repetition in the BS and the BG also. akara is amenable to yoga praxis in
most of his work.
534 For example, see BSbh 1.1.4 (Gambhirananda 1996, p. 24) and BSbh 4.1.1, where akara groups the
passages together within the view of an opponent who critiques contemplation as an action.  Also see BSbh
2.3.39. Sometimes this group also includes MU 2.2.6 or 3.2.9.
535 tmety evopsta (my translation).
536 so ‘nveavya sa vijijñsitavya (my translation).
537 Madhavananda 1993, p. 331.
538 Madhavananda 1993, p. 125.
539 tam eva dhro vijñya prajñ kurvta brhmaa
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these sentences is controversial for similar reasons.  In the following section, I will take
just one, BU 4.4.21, as a case study to explain akara’s efforts to reconcile some
potential contradictions among Upaniadic sentences.
BU 4.4.21 appears within the discussion of Janaka and Yjñavalkya, and is the
last of a series of verses from 4.8-21 dealing with knowledge of brahman and the self.
akara wrote a brief and seemingly innocuous explanation of this sentence; however,
akara’s direct disciple, Surevara, spends 268 vrtikas focusing on the first line of this
passage in his Bhadrayakopaniadbhyavrttika.  Surevara, perceiving a dangerous
precedent in his teacher’s commentary, disagrees with him, and instead proposes eight
other possible interpretations of the sentence.540  He also summarizes and refutes
Maana Mira’s position on 4.4.21. Surevara’s unexpected discussion of this passage
should make us pause and reconsider the views of Maana and akara.  What is it
about their views that prompted such a discussion?  Maana  and akara’s
interpretations of 4.4.21 document a problem in the relationship between contemplative
practice, textual study, and liberating knowledge, which led to conflicts among later
Advaitins.
Maana cites BU 4.4.21 along with other passages such as BU 1.4.7 and BU
2.4.5.541  Evidently Advaita’s broader philosophical community accepted the association
of these sentences by akara’s time.  Maana believes these refer to a contemplative
                                                                                                                                                  
nnudhyyd bahñ chabdn vco viglpana hi tat | BU 4.4.21 (my translation).
540 Potter, 1981, pp. 515-16.
Also see Naikarmyasiddhi, 1.67.
541 Brahmasiddhi, p. 113, 154.
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practice he labels variously as dhyna, bhvan, anucintana, and/or upsan.  This
contemplation consists of a continuous succession of thoughts cultivated from verbal
knowledge of the tman.  With repetition it eventually culminates in direct self-
knowledge, sktkra or anubhava.542  Among these passages, BU 4.4.21 fits his model
the closest because the verb vijñya, having known, is a gerund indicating an earlier
action than the principal verb. This implies that vijñya is one stage of knowledge and
prajñ, or insight, is a later one.  Thus he can interpret vijñya, as “understanding the
Upaniad sentences explaining the absolute nature of brahman,” and can interpret the
obtaining of prajñ as a matter of contemplating that earlier verbal knowledge.  The
particle eva in the phrase tam eva indicates exclusion and further specifies this type of
contemplation, in which the flow of thoughts can rest only on the non-dual tman without
any relationship to other objects or attributes.543
One problem Maana faces is the optative verb, kurvta.  He spends considerable
effort denying any action or injunction for action implicit to this verb.  In arguments
reminiscent of akara, he argues that BU 4.4.21 deals with an existing entity and has an
immediate result of direct knowledge.  This removes contemplation from the domain of
ritual action, which produces a future result. Maana also argues that contemplation is a
natural inclination that arises spontaneously after studying the Upaniad texts and thus
does not require an injunction.544
                                                 
542 Brahmasiddhi, p. 153.
543 Brahmasiddhi, p. 154.
544 Brahmasiddhi, p. 154. Also see akapi’s commentary p. 292.
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Let us now turn to akara.  According to akara’s brief gloss on BU 4.4.21,
vijñya, refers to a wise person who has known the tman from the texts and from the
instructions of the teacher.  Yet this wise person must still gain insight (prajñ) in order
to put an end to all questioning.  The means for obtaining prajñ are renunciation
(sanysa), calmness (ama), control (dama), withdrawal of the sense mind from the
objects of senses (uparati), fortitude (titika), and concentration (samdhna).  He goes
on to explain that one should not use too many words, but a few words dealing with the
unity of the self may be used. akara’s explanation raises a difficult issue.  If a wise
person has already listened to the teaching, studied the texts, and gained vijñna of the
tman, then why do anything else?  Why will the wise person still have any remaining
questions after gaining brahmavidy? Furthermore, what difference is there between
knowledge from texts and knowledge gained from contemplation? akara does not
answer this question in BUbh 4.4.21, yet he discusses the issue earlier in the context of an
extensive commentary on BU 1.4.7.
In BUbh 1.4.7 akara first specifically refutes opponents who say,
One should generate another particular knowledge regarding the tman by
meditation.  By that, the tman is known, and that alone is the removal of
ignorance, not the knowledge regarding the tman born from the Vedic sentences.
With regard to this issue, there are sentences such as: “Having known just that
(self), the wise brahmin should obtain insight” (BU 4.4.21).  “The self should be
seen, should be heard, should be reflected on, and contemplated upon” (BU
2.4.5).  “That (is the self) you should try to discover, that (is the self) you should
seek to perceive” (CU 8.7.1).545
                                                 
545 upsanentmaviaya viia vijñnntara; tentm jñyate; avidynivartaka ca tadeva
ntmaviaya vedavkyajanita vijñnam iti |  etasminn arthe vacanny api vijñya prajñ kurvta,
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 In his response to this passage, akara writes that the contemplation referred to in BU
4.4.21, and other such passages such as our root text for nididhysana (BU 2.4.5), does
not create any new special state of knowledge separate from textual knowledge.  This
strong statement puts into question any distinction between propositional knowledge
from ravaa and non-propositional knowledge from nididhysana that we may be
tempted to assign to akara.  akara clearly admonishes other Advaitins who make
such a distinction and he claims the knowledge from ravaa is itself direct brahmavidy.
He reiterates that sentences such as tat tvam asi, lead to direct brahmavidy when
understood, therefore there is no necessity for other actions or repetition.
Later in the commentary the opponent again objects that the continuous flow of
remembered self-knowledge (tmajñnasmtisantati) arising from the sentence is
fundamentally different than the knowledge cultivated from only listening (ravaa).
akara continues to explain his position when the following response,
Right when the knowledge, whose subject is the tman, rises from listening to the
sentence imparting (the knowledge of) tman, at that time, the arising of it
destroys the false knowledge of the self.  It arises only in this way.  And when the
false knowledge concerning the tman is removed, there are no memories, which
are natural, produced from that (ignorance), and whose matter are things other
than the self.  And because of the knowledge of worthlessness (or the state of not
possessing absolute reality) and because the self is contrary to that worthlessness
– when the tman is indeed known other things are understood as worthless
because they possess numerous defects such as being transitory, painful, impure,
etc. Therefore, for one who has understood the self, there is an absence of
memory of knowing the not-self.  Because it remains, there is no need to enjoin
                                                                                                                                                  
draavya rotavya mantavyo nididhysitavya, so ‘nveavya sa vijijñsitavya itydni ||  (my
translation)
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the continuous flow of memory of the knowledge of the oneness of the self, since
it exists already in fact. And because that memory (of the self) removes the
defects of suffering such as sorrow, confusion, fear, and effort, etc.546
akara explains that prajñm kurvta refers to a contemplative process of repeating
memory-based knowledge focused on the unity of the self.  This contemplation arises
automatically from listening to the texts.  It does not require an injunction for additional
action because it happens naturally and is invariable after the goal of brahmavidy is
gained through understanding the sentence. There is no activity on the sentence separate
from the brahmavidy arising from the sentence, and there is nothing left to accomplish
after the sentence destroys ignorance.
Yet later in the same commentary on BU 1.4.7 akara makes a few surprising
statements in his dialogue with the opponent:
akara:  You said that sentences such as ‘vijñya prajñ kurvta’ signify (the
practice of) contemplation distinct from understanding the sentence meaning.
This is true.  But it does not signify an original injunction.  A restrictive
injunction is intended for what is posited as an alternative.
Opponent:  How is contemplation posited as an alternative, since you said that the
continued flow of memory (of self-knowledge) is invariable because it is an
inevitable consequence?
akara:  True.  But still, because there are inevitably the results of karma, which
cause the production of the body, even when there is the gain of right knowledge,
there is also necessarily the future activity of body, mind, and speech because of
the strength of karma, whose course has been undertaken like the continuation of
                                                 
546 yadaivtmapratipdakavkyaravad tmaviaya vijñnam utpadyate tadaiva tadutpadyamna
tadviaya mithyjñna nivartayad evotpadyate; tmaviayamithyjñnanivttau ca tatprabhav
smtayo na bhavanti svbhvikyo ‘ntmavastubhedaviay; anarthatvvagate ca tmvagatau hi satym
anyadvastu anarthatvenvagamyate, anityadukhudhydibahudoavattvt tmavastuna ca
tadvilakaatvt; tasmdantmavijñnasmtnm tmvagater abhvaprpti; prieyd
tmaikatvavijñnasmtisatater arthata eva bhvn na vidheyatvam  |
okamohabhayysdidukhadoanivartakatvc ca (my translation).
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an arrow after it has been released.  The cognition of knowledge, being weaker
than  (karma), is posited as an alternative. Therefore the continuous memory of
self-knowledge, dependent on the strength of practices like renunciation,
dispassion, etc, must be restricted. But an original injunction should not be
enjoined because we said (contemplation) is posited (as an alternative).
Therefore, sentences such as ‘vijñya prajñm kurvta’ have the meaning of a
restrictive injunction for the contemplation of gained knowledge.  Another
meaning is not possible.547
This passage is quite dense so I will unpack it a bit.  akara concedes that prajñm
kurvta has the meaning of a contemplation in addition to understanding the sentence
meaning.  He then claims that this contemplation can be an alternative, meaning one has
a choice whether to contemplate or not, and thus he accepts a restrictive injunction
(niyama vidhi).  akara’s acceptance of an additional contemplation and a restrictive
injunction appears to contradict his earlier arguments for a complete knowledge triggered
from the sentences and his exclusion of any injunctions from the way scripture works.
Earlier akara argued that contemplation is a natural course with no other alternative,
making an injunction superfluous.  The opponent catches this apparent contradiction, and
questions how one can have a choice with regard to contemplation when it was said to be
inevitable.
                                                 
547 yat tktam – ‘vijñya prajñ kurvta’ itydivacann vkyrthavijñnavyatirekeopsanrthatvam
iti, satyam etat; ki tu na aprvavidhyarthat; pake prptasya niyamrthataiva |
katha punar upsanasya pakaprpti yvat prieyd tmavijñnasmtisatatir nityaivety abhihitam?
 bham – yadyapy evam arrrambhakasya karmao niyataphalatvt samyagjñnaprptv api avaya
bhvin pravttir vamanakynm, labdhavtte karmao balyastvt  muktevdi pravttivat; tena pake
prpta jñnapravttidourbalyam  |
tasmt tygavairgydisdhanabalvalambena tmavijñnasmtisatatir niyantavy bhavati; na tv aprv
kartavy; prptatvt ity avocma |
tasmt prptavijñnasmtisatnaniyamavidhyarthni ‘vijñya prajñm kurvta’ itydivkyni,
anyrthsabhavt |  BUbh 1.4.7 (my translation).
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akara responds that one must maintain this contemplation, in the form of
continued memory of verbal knowledge, to counter the force of karma that has already
begun to manifest (prrabdha karma), because karma is stronger than knowledge from
the texts. akara explains that contemplation can be an alternative and subject to a
restrictive injunction when we factor in karma as a variable, which disrupts knowledge
after it has arisen from the Upaniads.  Once again akara’s explanation makes us
question just what kind of knowledge he is speaking of.  In the earlier passages in BUbh
1.4.7 where he writes about self-knowledge (atmajñna) arising form Upaniadic
sentences, he clearly means direct liberating brahmavidy.  In this passage “knowledge”
has an ambiguous meaning.  Either it is not direct brahmavidy, which would appear to
contradict his earlier statements, or it is brahmavidy which is somehow susceptible to
karmic disturbances.  The latter position is problematic for it may force the Advaitin to
concede brahmavidy is subject to faults, disturbances, or vitiation.
The restrictive injunction points out a specific way of accomplishing something
when there are multiple options, and is used particularly when there is some other way
we are likely to resort to.  When we favor an inappropriate action, the injunction comes in
as a restriction, which supplies a different action not usually adopted.548 The common
example for a niyama is “He pounds the rice” (vrhn avahanti) from the context of
making the puroa cakes in the darapramsa ritual. Removing the husks from the
rice grains is the goal to be accomplished.  There is more than one option to accomplish
                                                 
548 According to Bhaskara, a “niyamavidhi establishes a matter which is non-established in the alternative.”
pake ‘prptasya prpako vidhir nyamavidhi (Arthasasagra, 3.50)
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husking such as pounding or using one’s nails.  The vidhi comes in here and restricts one
to pounding the rice and simultaneously excludes other means such as the nails.  Thus it
functions in two ways.  Another example used is “Perform the sacrifice on even ground”
(same dee yajeta).  This vidhi restricts one to performing sacrifice on even ground and
excludes using uneven ground.549 If one has already adopted a proper alternative, such as
pounding the rice, then the niyama does not come into play.
In this case, contemplation is not an invariable course if one’s mind and
tmajñna are distracted or obstructed by karma.  Therefore, due to the problem of
karma, the injunction comes in to restrict the Advaitin to contemplation.  akara’s
intention is to avoid making contemplation an action subject to the Mmsaka’s original
injunction, the aprva vidhi.  Contemplation is not an original injunction because original
injunctions establish something previously unknown, and here contemplation is already a
known alternative.
akara’s and Maana’s explanations of BU 4.4.21 raise some difficult issues
with reference to Advaita’s contemplative practice.  The crucial question is whether to
see contemplation as occurring before or after the rise of correct knowledge.  According
to akara and Surevara, there are a number of problems in Maana’s position, which
emphasizes that contemplation would be carried out after gaining correct verbal
knowledge.  An insistence on contemplation to occur after verbal knowledge gained from
                                                 
549 The niyama also plays an important function in Sanskrit grammar.  “The term is very frequently used
by grammarians in connection with a restriction laid down with reference to the application of a
grammatical rule generally on the strength of that rule, or a part of it, liable to become superfluous if the
restriction has not been laid down” (Abhyankar and Shukla, 1986, p. 222).
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the Upaniads opens contemplation up to the dangers of the action interpretation.  Most
importantly, this position vitiates the importance of the Upaniads as a means of
knowledge and implies two types of self-knowledge, indirect verbal knowledge and
directly occurring self-knowledge.  If contemplation is a separate and independent
activity that produces an additional type of knowledge, then Maana’s position
mistakenly elevates contemplation to the status of an independent prama, and leads to
the absurdity, at least in akara’s view, that an action can produce self-knowledge.  But
according to akara, correct knowledge from the texts alone liberates the individual.
Nothing else is required.  The confusion, however, from akara, is whether this must be
so in all cases.
The commonly accepted view of akara among Surevara, Padmapda, and the
Vivaraa school, explains contemplation as a mode of the abda prama, simply an
extension of listening and studying the texts.  The repetition in contemplation is
dependent on the texts, and only necessary when a student faces certain obstacles in the
process of studying even after ravaa and manana.  Maintaining a continuous flow of
verbal knowledge perfects one’s understanding of the texts.  Yet this basic position has
its own problems. akara does not clearly explain how this contemplation differs from
listening or how it functions separately.  Furthermore, how does repeating one’s memory
of improperly understood textual knowledge cultivate self-knowledge?
akara gives a third, nuanced position in his explanation of vijñya prajñ
kurvta.  He admits contemplation after brahmavidy as a separate activity yet he places
it in the context of karma.  This contemplation does not create new brahmavidy but
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functions to stabilize one’s brahmavidy in the face of difficult life experiences.  This
position attempts to avoid the pitfalls of Maana’s view of contemplation.  I believe
akara recognizes the real difficulties that his students faced in gaining a direct and
immediate recognition of non-duality even after extended studying with a qualified
teacher.  His position refers to the predicament of holding awareness of non-duality in the
face of contradictory life experiences; however, he articulates this problem in terms of the
mechanics of karma, a position that has its own problems.  How is prrabdha karma
affecting a liberated person’s knowledge and how can contemplation counteract this
karma?
Surevara provides a radical fourth alternative to avoid these problems.  He
defines contemplation as brahmavidy itself.550  Sure vara’s position negates the whole
concept of contemplation as a practice of mentally repeating textual knowledge, and
emphasizes listening and logical reflection as the only means for gaining liberation.  He
avoids many of the difficulties that Maana and akara have; yet at the same time he is
forced into textual acrobatics, for many Upaniadic sentences appear to recommend some
type of contemplation for self-knowledge.551
It is evident from this discussion of BU 4.4.21 that early Advaitins faced some
troubling questions trying to reconcile the placement of contemplation within a
                                                 
550 Bhadrayakopaniadbhyavrttika  Verse. 282  on the Puruavidha Brhmaa (Jog and Hino 1993,
p. 282).  See Potter 1981, p. 465.
551 Surevara does accept contemplation in some places.  For example, in Naikarmyasiddhi 3.125 he
accepts some form of repetitive contemplation in the case that the texts are “heard only a little” (atrutam)
or are “half-heard” (smirutam).  In this case contemplation can help perfect one’s hearing.  Surevara
carefully distinguishes his position from the theory that contemplation cultivates a new and different
knowledge over and above knowledge from the Upaniadic sentences.
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chronology of Advaita discipline involving textual study and gaining self-knowledge.  It
is perhaps of little surprise that akara rarely discusses contemplation unless forced to
by the text he is commentating on.  Even then, akara obliquely raises these issues
without clearly resolving them.  His own ambiguity on these issues is historically
significant, for it foreshadows the unresolved debates that would follow among later
Advaitins over the function and application of contemplative practice.  These scholastic
debates are concerned with technical and somewhat obscure aspects of Advaita
soteriology and Mms hermeneutics; yet I believe they reflect the pragmatic concerns
of Advaita practitioners, who struggled to practice contemplation and sought to clarify
and define their contemplative process.
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5.5:  The Question of Liberating Experience
akara understands the nature of one’s true self (tman) as awareness, which is
always present, immediately knowing, and intrinsically reflexive.  He further identifies
liberation (moka) with the tman, and claims that liberation is never gained because it is
already present as one’s self.  Yet despite this, individuals are still driven to move from
insecurity and finiteness towards security, wholeness, and freedom from suffering.  This
brings them to study Upaniadic texts in order to remove self-ignorance and recognize
the self-luminous tman.  Such study is not for the sake of mere academic or theoretical
knowledge.  At some level there is to be a change, a transformation of the individual in
terms of one’s identity, emotional freedom, and happiness, which occurs through
liberating self-knowledge even though self-knowledge is not separate from the ever-
present tman, and the tman cannot be a new experience by definition.  These theses set
up a question within the parameters of akara’s soteriology:  How does the Advaitin
recognize the crucial change, the direct recognition that is brahmavidy occuring in time
through studying the Upaniads and at the same time avoid making self-knowledge a new
experience?
5.5.1:  Indirect Knowledge (parokajñna) and Direct knowledge (aparokajñna)
Gaining brahmavidy is often viewed as a transformative movement from
mediate verbal knowledge (paroka jñna ) to immediate knowledge or experience
(aparoka jñna or anubhava). The basic difference between paroka and aparoka
jñna is sometimes illustrated with the example of the taste of sugar.  If someone has
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never tasted sugar she cannot understand sweetness.  Someone may describe the
experience of sweetness, giving her paroka knowledge, but her knowledge is aparoka
only after she tastes sugar.  No amount of descriptive indirect knowledge compares to the
direct experience.  Similarly, some Vedntins consider nididhysana, or other practices
such as meditation, as essential for gaining immediacy of knowledge and as the bridge
between paroka and aparoka knowledge.
A rigid distinction between paroka and aparoka self-knowledge was an
influential concept in Advaita literature by akara’s time that continued through later
centuries.  This distinction has remained in much of contemporary academic literature
and has assumed even more importance among many neo-Vednta traditions during the
past century. The distinction between paroka and aparoka self-knowledge reflects the
importance of gaining immediate knowledge of non-duality. However, this distinction is
ambiguous and problematic.   How do we define it? How is it related to the process of
studying and contemplation? And does it conflict with other aspects of Advaita’s
metaphysics and epistemology?  A better understanding of aparoka self-knowledge is
necessary before questioning if and how nididhysana can function as a bridge or vehicle
for the immediacy of brahmavidy.
In the following sections I explain some of the nuances of the paroka and
aparoka distinction, why it is problematic or useful, and in what ways we can properly
interpret akara’s use of it. I will also analyze the importance of anubhava (experience)
and contextualize how this discussion affects the way we define the function of
nididhysana and how it illumines some problems that akara and post akara
302
Advaitins faced in explaining nididhysana .  I then explore akara’s theory of mental
dispositions (saskras) and the way such dispositions and habitual affective tendencies
and affect even self-knowledge.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of how
nididhysana helps to remove such saskras and cultivate a stability and steadfastness
(nih) in brahmavidy.
The nature of mediate (paroka) and immediate (aparoka) knowledge is closely
related to earlier discussions of the prasakhyna contemplation and of theory and
practice. akara’s adversaries such as Vedntins who combine knowledge and action
and the prasakhynavdins, as well as many popular neo-Vedntins such as Swami
Vivekananda, view verbal knowledge as indirect (paroka) theory, contemplation as
practice, and direct (aparoka) experience as the result of practice.  Implicit to this
interpretation of the term paroka, is the idea that verbal knowledge is intrinsically
limited because words denote finite objects, and function within empirical dualities such
as knower and known.  Such knowledge, limited by verbalization and conceptualization,
cannot be identified as liberating knowledge of non-duality.  Thus, something beyond
that is necessary, and this indirect knowledge must be made immediate (aparoka)
through some radical transformation or transcendent experience (often termed anubhava).
The simplistic illustration of tasting sugar reveals some major problems for the
idea of paroka self-knowledge.  The illustration is clearly flawed because it is premised
on the mediate nature of the object of perception, sweetness, before one tastes sugar.  In
Advaita theory, a new experience of brahman is not necessary nor even possible because
of its nature as self-illuminating.  Based on the earlier discussions of knowledge and
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action, and theory and practice, a number of similar problems with trying to coherently
understand paroka  and aparoka knowledge are quickly evident.552  I think the
fundamental problem with the view that you can know the tman in an indirect manner is
that there is an tman to realize when in fact that tman is just you and already
immediately known. The distinction between paroka and aparoka self-knowledge
nurtures the idea that there must be a movement from mediacy to immediacy.  This is
partly legitimate for certainly there is a change in terms of one’s experience of ignorance
and its removal, but it is also an idea that lends itself to a quest for experience,
particularly if we equate brahmavidy with some form of mystical experience.   If one
believes that the aparoka tman is separate from and distant from one’s self-identity
then there is inevitably a pursuit to gain and experience that tman.  This mistaken
pursuit of experience is a potential problem that completely contradicts the basic tenets of
Advaita Vednta and compromises the importance that akara places on the ruti.
akara’s understanding is not that one must attain brahman, but that one already is
brahman.  Experiential events are products, transitory, dependent on the person (not the
object), and do not necessarily contain knowledge content. However, as I will explain
below, the paroka/aparoka distinction itself is not necessarily in contradiction to
akara because with the proper interpretation it may not force one to seek a new
experience of brahman.  But this distinction has lent itself to the misleading assumption
of seeking experience, either as its premise or as its result.
                                                 
552 The conflicts are obviously with experience, a knowledge event, self-luminosity, etc. Self-luminosity is
a theory which is clearly not compatible with a paroka and aparoka distinction and at subtler levels we
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A second related issue is the idea that self-knowledge is something positive.
Despite recognizing that brahman is not attainable and is ever present, one may assume
that knowledge is something new and positive. The paroka and aparoka distinction
lends itself to the interpretation that knowledge is positive because aparoka knowledge
must be gained or because paroka knowledge must be positively transformed into
aparoka knowledge.   This interpretation contradicts Advaita’s theory of ignorance.
Colloquially Advaitins often use the phrase “gaining knowledge” or speak of a prama
as conferring knowledge.  However, this contradicts an important and often overlooked
epistemological idea of Advaita; that self-ignorance exists in a positive manner and self-
knowledge is only the removal of positive ignorance.
According to virtually all influential post-akara Advaitins, self-ignorance is not
the absence of knowledge, but rather a projecting and veiling power with some level of
ontological reality even if indescribable.  In the context of the fundamental problem of
the misapprehension of self-luminous brahman  and the resulting mistaken
superimposition of self and not-self, brahmavidy functions as the negation of self-
ignorance, not as the accretion of new positive knowledge. This is the inverse idea of the
more popular notion that views ignorance as the absence of knowledge, and which
requires positive knowledge to fill that absence.  For Advaita, self-knowledge is stripping
away false assumptions, confusion, and ignorance that cause the superimposition of
erroneous identities.  Knowledge removes these till one is left with only the aparoka self
as one’s identity.  It negates all dualities and even the concept of identity between two
                                                                                                                                                  
may have conflicts with saskras and jvanmukti, etc.
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objects.  This is why Advaitins interprets the Upaniads as employing language methods
which function in mostly negative ways, other than negating the existence of brahman
(so as not to lapse into nihilism or emptiness) because brahman transcends the duality of
existence and non-existence.  This is a key that allows Advaitins to maintain the
aparokatva of the self regardless of knowledge or ignorance.  They can claim there is no
true change in liberation, only a change in the sense of removing obstacles to what is
always available and evident.  This position, which emphasizes the immediate
availability of the self and points to the role of the ruti as correcting misunderstanding
rather then producing totally new knowledge, provides room for the ruti  to
independently give liberation.  The issue is only one of ignorance, and in akara’
opinion, the ruti possesses the power to remove that ignorance. 553
Given the above critique of paroka and aparoka knowledge, and the earlier
critique of theory and practice, one would think that akara clearly dismisses this
conceptual distinction.  For the most part he does. We find implicit rejections of paroka
and aparoka self-knowledge in his refutation of action and meditation, his explanation
of self-luminosity, and his emphasis on ruti as a souce of knowledge.  And he explicitly
dismisses this distinction in his criticism of prasakhyna (repeated meditation) in
chapter eighteen of the Upadeashasr.554  Yet despite his clear rebuttals of this
distinction among other Vedntins, we find other places where akara leaves himself
                                                 
553 See Rambachan 1986, p. 31.
554 See the comparison of akara and Maana in chapter 2.  In US 18.14 akara indirectly criticizes
the paroka aparoka distinction as part of the prasakhynavdin prvapaka. In US 18.201-2 akara
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open to such a distinction or even endorses it.  The following section analyzes some
textual attestations that may be interpreted as paroka and aparoka jñna and the related
problem of anubhava (tentatively translated as experience); and speculates whether
akara is self-contradictory in such instances or if we can integrate such exceptions into
his more commonly accepted ideas of Advaita epistemology.
I am not aware of akara using the terms paroka and aparoka knowledge
together in reference to his own understanding of Advaita; however, he sometimes uses
other terms together while referring to self-knowledge such as jñna and vijñna,555 or
jnti and abhijnti.556  These terms show his recognition of some difference in
knowledge or a process of changing clarity.  akara also refers to clarity, depth, and
stability of self-knowledge with terms like sthita-prajñ and jñna-nih (one whose
knowledge is firm).557  Why does he bother qualifying self-knowledge as firm ( sthita or
niha)?  These compounds imply there is an earlier time where one lacks this clarity
even after exposure to the abda prama.  But akara does not clearly explain his use
of these terms and whether or not they correspond to some sort of paroka and aparoka
distinction. These terms are mostly found in his commentaries when he is constrained to
use them because they are in the source text.  The terms jñna and vijñna occur together
in the Bhagavadgt 3.41, 6.8, 7.2, 9.1, and 18.42.558   akara’s consistent gloss on these
                                                                                                                                                  
directly denies paroka knowledge and explains that aparoka knowledge comes from text itself.
Surevara, however, is probably the most forceful critic of paroka aparoka brahmavidy.
555 Another potentially supporting term is prajñ.
556 Some later Vedntins do make this distinction. For example see Vidyraya’s Pañcada 1.62-3.
557 See the section on jñna-nih at the end of this chapter for a detailed discussion.
558 I am not aware of places where akara uses such terms together independent of their mention in the
primary texts; though I have not specifically searched through all his writing for them.
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terms provides some important clues to how we may better understand the usefulness of
the paroka and aparoka distinction.559
BG 3.41 states: “Therefore, O scion of the Bharata Dynasty, after first controlling
the organs, renounce this one which is sinful and a destroyer of jñnam and vijñnam”560
akara provides the following commentary, “Jñna is the knowledge of the tm from
the stra and the teacher. Vijñna is the anubhava of that in particular (or the specific
anubhava of that).561
BG 6.8 states, “One whose mind is satisfied with jñnam and vijñnam, who is
unmoved, who has the organs under control, is said to be Self-absorbed.  The yogin treats
equally a lump of earth, a stone, and gold.”562  Here, akara explains
jñnavijñnatpttm as, “Jñna is the thorough knowledge of the things (or word
meanings) explained by the stra.  But vijñna is making the things known from the
stra one’s own anubhava just as they are.”563
In these examples akara makes a distinction between the knowledge (jñna)
gained from the ruti and some type of specific or particular knowledge (vijñna), which
is more intimate or thorough than jñna.  This distinction recognizes some process in
                                                 
559 akara does not explain the terms in BG 18.42
560 Gambhirananda 1995, p. 171.
tasmd tvam indriyy dau niyamya bharatarabha
ppmna prajahi hy ena jñnavijñnananam  (BG 3.41)
561 jñnam strata ca tmdnm avabodha; vijñnam vieata tadanubhava
562 jñnavijñnatpttm kastho vijitendriya |
yukta ity ucyate yogi samaloamakñcana || (my translation).
563 jñnavijñnatpttm - jñna- stroktapadrthn parijñna vijñna tu strato jñtn
tath eva svnubhavakaraa | (my translation).
In BG 7.2 and 9.1 akara similarly defines vijñnam as svnubhavasayuktam and
anubhavayuktam respectively.
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understanding beyond simply hearing the words and having a thorough intellectual
understanding of the texts.  Vijñna appears to be fully assimilated knowledge where
there is no distance between one’s self and what the ruti is saying.  Vijñna is not just a
possibility, belief, or shaky knowledge.  It is sure recognition where one directly and
completely sees the truth of brahman.564  Should we then understand the terms jñna and
vijñna as synonyms for paroka jñna and aparoka vijñna?565  This question hinges
on the term anubhava, which I purposely left untranslated in the above BG passages.
5.5.2:  Is Liberation an Experience (anubhava)?
The term anubhava is enigmatic and ambiguous.  According to Wilhelm
Halbfass,
Anubhava  and corresponding verb forms appear in statements about
‘experiencing’ pain, ‘being in’ states of consciousness, such as waking and
dreaming, ‘realizing’ or ‘comprehending’ the meanings of words and sentences,
but also in the compound tmnubhava, ‘experience of the self,’ which is said to
be free from all pain (sarvadukhavinirmukta).  On the other hand, anubhava is
used in an absolute sense, as ‘experience,’ ‘immediate awareness,’ ‘self-
presencing’ per se; we hear about a ‘seeing’ (di) which has the ‘nature of
immediate awareness’ (anubhavtman), about the absolute or brahman as
anubhavtman, or simply about anubhava as such in a sense which commentators
unanimously paraphrase as skin, ‘absolute witness’ or ‘self.’566
Though akara uses the term anubhava rarely, it occurs in some key contexts and has
become a source of academic debate.  The most common translation of anubhava is
“experience”.   However, the word “experience” is highly problematic.  Personal
                                                 
564 Following akara, we can define vijñna as correct vision (samyagdarana) (BSbh 4.1.7).
565 In other contexts vijñna can refer to mind or buddhi (see BS 2.3.32) or may be used synonymously
with upsan (see TU 1.3.3-4)
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“experience” implies an observational psychological event and a transitive action, such as
perception, that requires an object.  However, brahman cannot be the object of an
experience.  A number of people, including contemporary neo-Vedntins such as Swami
Vivekananda as well as neo-Hindu scholars such as Radhakrishnan attempt to make
anubhava an independent means of knowledge, a type of empirical evidence of non-
duality.  They then read forms of mystical experience or yogic asamprajñta samdhi (a
nondual experience where there is no object) into anubhava and by extension into
akara’s Advaita.  Thus, anubhava becomes a unique mystical experience and a
prama independent of the ruti.  I believe this idea is unwarranted and lacking any
basis in the Upaniads or in akara’s commentaries.  As explained below, experiences
such as Patañjali’s samdhi do not play a role in akara’s conception of brahmavidy.
567
Both Halbfass (1988) and Sharf (1998) note that premodern philosophers of
Hinduism and Buddhism based the authority of their teachings on scripture and not on
their personal experience.  The contemporary emphasis on gaining experience by means
of meditation may not have played such a central role in ancient religious practice.
Furthermore, Halbfass argues that Vedic revelation “speaks in the mode of timeless
                                                                                                                                                  
It is also possible to identify vijñna with nih.  If we identify it with nih then by extension aparoka
knowledge can be identified with nih.  This identification places the emphasis on clarity of knowledge
rather then experiential immediacy.
566 Halbfass 1991, pp. 389-90.
567 akara’s critical attitude towards yogic experiences follows the opinions of Kumrila (Halbfass 1988,
p. 388).
The insistence on mystical states was developed among neo-Vedntins, particularly during the Hindu
renaissance in Bengal during the late nineteenth century and has become the norm in many contemporary
popular Advaita traditions.
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presence.  Its words are not articulations of experiences, and they are not subsequent and
subordinate to an awareness of meanings, but prior to such awareness—not only insofar
as their validity is concerned, but even from a temporal and psychological angle.”568
The recent scholarly debates over anubhava  mostly revolve around one
significant passage in akara’s commentary on BS 1.1.2.569  This passage begins as a
response to an opponent who claims that inference alone is sufficient to establish
brahman due to the authority of the second stra, “That (is Brahman) from which (are
derived) the birth etc. of this (universe).”570  In his reply, akara writes:
The knowledge (avagati) of brahman is accomplished by determination through
inquiry into the meaning of the (Upaniad) sentences, but not accomplished by
other means of knowledge such as inference, etc.  But when there are Upaniad
sentences speaking of the birth, etc. of the world, then inference, being a means of
knowledge that does not contradict the Upaniadic sentences, is not prohibited as
a means for strengthening the understanding of those sentences because the ruti
accepts reasoning as a help.  Therefore there are sentences such as ‘The self is to
be heard, to be reflected on…’ (BU 2.4.5) and ‘An intelligent and informed man
would reach Gandhra, in the same way a man who possesses a teacher gains
knowledge’ (CU 6.14.2).   Thus the intelligence of a person assists the ruti.
ruti, etc. are not the only means of knowledge in the inquiry into
brahman as in the inquiry into dharma.   Moreover ruti, etc. and anubhava, etc.
as far as possible571 are the means of knowledge here because anubhava is the
                                                 
568 Halbfass 1988, p.392.
569 Halbfass (1988) mentions this passage in his seminal article, “The Concept of Experience in the
Encounter of India and the West,” which discusses the problem of anubhava and its misappropriation
among neo-Vednta.  An important discussion of this passage took place in the Journal East & West, in
which Arvind Sharma  (1992) discusses this passage and (1993) criticizes Anantanand Rambachan’s
position on anubhava in a book review of Rambachan’s “Accomplishing the Accomplished.”  Rambachan
(1994) responded to Sharma to refute the criticism.  Previous to this discussion Rambachan wrote about
anubhava in the Journal East & West (1986) and K. N Upadhyaya discusses Rambachan’s position in the
Journal of Indian Philosophy (1991).  Kim Skoog (1993), Michael Comans (2000), and Forsthoefel (2002)
among others, have discussed the problem of anubhava.
570 janmdyasya yata. Gambhirananda 1996, p. 13.
It is important to note that akara’s introduction and commentary on the catu-str (the first four stras
of the Brahmastras) is arguably his most influential piece of writing.
571 yathsambhavam is a problematic phrase here and its translation can change the interpretation of the
passage.  See Sharma 1992, p. 521 for a discussion of this.
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culmination of brahman knowledge and because it (brahman) is an existing
object.  If the object is something to be accomplished then anubhava is not
necessary and texts, etc. alone would be the means of knowledge.  And because
what is to be accomplished is produced by human effort.  Conventional and Vedic
action can be done, not done, or done otherwise.572
The pertinent question this passage raises is what akara means by anubhava
here.  Does he believe that anubhava is a valid prama independent of the ruti?  In the
previous chapters I explained why the ruti is an independent means of self-knowledge
for akara; however, the wording in the second paragraph of the passage appears to
contradict the sole authority of the ruti by placing equal emphasis on anubhava.
Accordingly, a number of scholars interpret this passage to argue that for akara,
anubhava is an independent prama for self-knowledge. For example, Arvind Sharma
claims that anubhava cannot be made subservient to the ruti because akara uses
“ruti, etc.” and “anubhava, etc.” in the same line.573  He explicitly argues that ruti is not
the only prama for brahman, and that this passage shows that anubhava is a prama
and a direct exception to the ruti.574
Anantanand Rambachan on the other hand, argues in his response to Sharma that
anubhava should be understood like inference as supplementary to the ruti and not as an
                                                 
572 vkyrthavicradhavasnanirvtt hi brahmvagatir nnumndipramntaranirvtt | satsu tu
vedntavkyeu jagato janmdikraavdiu tadarthagrahaadrhyynumnam api
vedntavkyvirodhi prama bhavan na nirvryate, rutyaiva ca sahyatvena tarkasybhyupetatvt |
tathhi ‘rotavya mantavya’ iti sruti ‘paito medhv gandhrn evopasapadyetaivam
evehcryavn puruo veda’ iti ca puruabudhishyyam tmano darayati | na darmajiñsym iva
rutydaya eva pramam brahmajijñsym | ki tu rutydayo ‘nubhavdaya ca yathsabhavam iha
prama anubhavvasnatvd bhtavastuviayatvc ca brahmajñnasya | kartavye hi viaye
nnubhavpekstti rutydnm eva prmya syt purudhntmalbatvc ca kartavyasya | kartum
akartum anyath v kartu akya laukika vaidika ca karma…| (my translation).
573 Sharma 1993, p. 741.  Also see Skoog 1993, p. 71.
574 Sharma 1993, p. 742.
312
alternative prama.  Using the traditional Mmsaka exegetical strategy of upakrama
(beginning) and upasamhra (conclusion) as a means to find the textual purport based on
the conceptual cohesion between the introduction and conclusion, Rambachan
demonstrates that Sharma’s interpretation contradicts the context of akara’s
commentary.  akara explicitly denies the independent capacity for knowing brahman
for any prama other than the Upaniads at the conclusion of his commentary on
BS1.1.2.575  This denial should also exclude anubhava.576  In fact, in BS 1.1.2, as well as
numerous other places, he accepts reasoning as an aid to self-knowledge only when it is
based on or in accordance with the ruti.  Dry logic (uka-tarka) independent of ruti is
unacceptable to him in the pursuit of self-knowledge.  In the BG passages it is also clear
that anubhava is directly dependent on the Upaniads and ravaa.
Furthermore, if we posit anubhava as an independent prama based on this
passage then we must also include other pramas like inference due to the addition of
etc. (di) to anubhava; yet this is certainly not acceptable to akara.  The di includes
other pramas but in the larger context of making them subordinate to ruti.577
According to Rambachan’s argument, it is evident that akara did not intend to
distinguish anubhava and ruti as two distinct pramas capable of providing self-
knowledge.
                                                 
575 Rambachan 1994, pp. 721-2.  Rambachan also discusses flaws in Sharma’s interpretation of anubhava
in BS 2.1.4, where akara does not make an exception for anubhava as a prama.
576 Furthermore, there is no prama called anubhava unless we identify it with direct perception, but this
is obvious not the context of external perception.  Even if internal perception, then it is simply sk
pratyaka. Where is the knowledge?  This is why it leads to experience hunting and mysticism, because one
must posit anubhava as a mystical experience that somehow negates ignorance and is an independent
prama.
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The question still remains, what is this anubhava indicated by akara if it is not
an independent prama?  In this passage akara clearly says anubhava is the
culmination of self-knowledge.   Anubhava is not the source or cause of brahmavidy, it
is the brahmvidy itself which eliminates ignorance.  The ruti is the means, and
anubhava is the end of some kind of self-knowing process.578  I believe that akara uses
the term in the same way while glossing vijñna in the BG lokas.  And if we identify
vijñna as aparoka knowledge, then we can also identify anubhava as immediate self-
knowledge or self-consciousness. The removal of ignorance and obstacles to self-
knowledge is a negative process, which is not producing anything new or accomplishing
something through action.  However, due to the perspective that aparokatva is always
present, I believe it is more accurate to use the terms jñna and vijñna instead of
paroka and aparoka.
Anubhava according to akara is a cognition of brahman produced through the
ruti.  It is the clear and assimilated understanding of brahmavidy through the
Upaniads.  Whether this happens merely through hearing or through a longer triple study
process is not relevant to trying to separate anubhava and ruti in akara’s thought.
From this perspective anubhava may be viewed as non-separate from the ruti in the
sense that it depends on knowledge from the ruti.579  This is not to say that some
                                                                                                                                                  
577 Rambachan 1986, p. 36.
578 Also see BGbh 18.55.
579 Accordingly, some later Advaitins such as Madhusdhana Saraswati say that one gains aparoka
knowledge from the first time they listen to the ruti, though he makes an interesting distinction between
aparoka knowledge and the direct knowledge (saktkra) culminating at the end of the study process (see
Advaitaratnarakanam, p. 44). By claiming aparoksa knowledge from the beginning, Madhsdana affirms
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experience or absence of experience occurs simultaneously with self-knowledge or as a
result following in the wake of self-knowledge according to akara.580  We may or may
not posit some type of nirvikalpa (non-dual or without division) experience as part of
anubhava as brahmavidy in akara’s understanding.  But regardless, I believe a
nirvikalpa experience is not the primary denotation of the term for akara, because he
believes such experiences can ostensibly occur without brahmavidy. It would make
better sense to claim that the important aspect of akara’s anubhava is not the mental
state one achieves but the immediate destruction of ignorance and direct recognition of
brahman.   This is seen in other instances where akara uses the term anubhava, as in
the BG verses above in his explanation of vijñna.  Another example is BS 4.1.2 where
akara employs anubhava and pratipatti (understanding) interchangeably.581  In US
18.213-14 añkara clearly states that anubhava is the knowledge resulting from a means
of knowledge consisting of sentences such as tat tvam asi.582   It is prudent then, in order
to follow akara, to restrict the primary meaning of anubhava in his usages to self-
knowledge rather than some form of mystical experience, and to understand it as
depending on the Upaniads rather than as an independent source of knowledge.
                                                                                                                                                  
the ruti as the means of knowledge and that anubhava is a part of the abda prama, while also
recognizing there is a process and a culminating vtti for removing ignorance.
580 One may argue that all types of knowledge are forms of experience, so such a distinction is superfluous.
This is true in the Advaita view, but the distinction akara makes goes back to the concepts of object
dependent (vastu-tantra) knowledge and person dependent (purua-tantra) action discussed earlier.  All
experience is knowledge (in the general sense of the term) but not necessarily valid knowledge (pram).
581 See Comans 2000, p. 311.
Often times akara defines liberation as right vision (samyag darana), but darana does not refer to
experience. akara defines samyag darana as knowledge (pratipatti) of self as brahman (BSbh 4.1.12).
582 Also see US 18.218.  In his commentary, nandagiri writes “Anubhava, which is aparoka and non-
relational (asamsa) is born from the sentence.”
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akara brings up both the ruti and anubhava in the same sentence in the long
passage quoted above (BSbh 1.1.2) not to place special importance on some mystical or
transcendent state of consciousness, but in order to separate self-knowledge from the
realm of ritual action.  Both self-knowledge and ritual knowledge depend on the ruti, but
self-knowledge is intrinsically immediate while ritual knowledge is intrinsically paroka,
concerning the future.  His point is to reiterate that self-knowledge is not something new
to accomplish and deals with an existing entity that is known immediately, unlike ritual
action, which produces a future unseen result.583  akara separates self-knowledge from
ritual because it reveals an existing object (bhta-vastu) rather than a future object
(bhavya-vastu), and is dependent on that object (vastu-tantra) rather than the person’s
will (purua-tantra).584  In this context, anubhava is used to emphasize the immediacy of
the direct knowledge, which is appropriate for an immediate existing entity.
If anubhava is the result of understanding the Upaniads, then why does akara
associate anubhava with inference and other means to strengthen or clarify self-
knowledge?  That hearing may not be enough is understood in the BSbh 1.1.2 passage.
In fact akara brings in manana from BU 2.4.5 as textual evidence that reasoning in line
with ruti may be necessary to strengthen knowledge.   Evidently then, akara
recognizes that even after ravaa, one’s knowledge may be deficient or obstructed and
not self-evident to the practitioner.  Then reasoning and contemplation are required for
                                                 
583 This idea is explained in detail earlier in the action-knowledge section.
Advaitins mean this in two primary ways: 1) it is not accomplished like any object of knowledge – like in
perception. And 2) not accomplished because it is identical with caitanyam and therefore eternal.
584 Recall the discussion of puruatantra action and vastutantra knowledge in the upsan section in
chapter two.
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greater clarity and finally for brahmavidy.  From this perspective, as Rambachan argues,
anubhava plays a supplementary role to the ruti; however, it is somewhat confusing to
associate anubhava (as the culmination of brahmavidy) with inference.  Inference is
used to help strengthen knowledge, but one would assume anubhava does not strengthen
self-knowledge because it is the result of strengthening, the culmination of self-
knowledge.  In our interpretation of akara, with anubhava (or vijñna) one’s clarity is
absolute and self-evident. At this point there is no need for further inquiry into the truth
of the ruti.  One has complete conviction, no more doubts, and brahmvidy shines
clearly in one’s mind.  Anubhava marks this point of absolute clarity where brahmavidy
is self-evident and non-propositional.  But it is important to note that akara is not
pointing to anubhava as a phenomenological state for validating theoretical paroka
knowledge gained from the ruti.  Anubhava is also not a proof of brahman or a
validation of the ruti.  Once one has brahamvidy there is no need for proof.585
                                                 
585 Potter 1981, p. 98.
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5.5.3:  Paradoxes and Different Levels of Discourse
The nature of paroka and aparoka knowledge and the nature of the liberating
cognition of direct insight as taught by akara gives rise to a number of paradoxes. For
the sake of discussion, I divide some potential usages of anubhava into three levels of
discourse: (1) in empirical discourse it signifies experiences, usually direct external
perceptual experience or the internal perceptual experience of states of consciousness,
thoughts, and emotions;586 (2) In metaphysical discourse it means tman as absolute non-
dual self-luminous consciousness, the underlying basis and witness of every experience,
which is unattached and not limited to any single individual;587 and (3) in metaphysical
discourse it also means the immediate culminating cognition of brahmavidy that
destroys self-ignorance and is synonymous with liberation.588
Talking both of empirical and metaphysical absolute of anubhava lends itself to
confusion.  Speaking of an ignorance-removing cognition occurring in time as
aparokajñna or anubhava refers to the conventional level of an individual’s knowing
process in my understanding.  It is produced through a means of knowledge, and self-
destructs after it releases its content. When Advaitins speak of aparokajñna or
anubhava as the intrinsic nature of tman and as self-illuminating consciousness, such
usage refers to absolute reality, which is always present, constant, and unchanging.  From
the absolute perspective, immediacy is the constant nature of one’s self and common for
all individuals.
                                                 
586 For example, akara on BS 2.2.29.
587 US 18.104.
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Advaitins cannot ultimately categorize liberation discretely because it is held to
be indeterminable (anirvacanya), to further complicate matters. The liberating cognition
allows one to see through the appearance of knower and known and remains only as
undifferentiated consciousness and being after revealing brahman.  In this transition, the
soteriological discourse moves from viewing the cognition from an empirical standpoint
as occurrent knowledge (vttijñna) to an absolute one of brahman’s  intrinsic
undifferentiated nature (svarpajñna).  It is as though there is a leap from the empirical
to the absolute in the movement from the propositional form of the cognition to its non-
propositional one that transcends any form.589
On the other hand, the immediate nature (aparokatva) of one’s self never
changes and is never produced. In reality there is no change whatsoever.  The leap is only
in one’s understanding, from what appears to be propositional self-knowledge to the non-
propositional self-knowledge which was always available and evident as the self, but
veiled due to one’s self-ignorance and lack of qualification (adhikra).  Penetrating this
appearance of propositional knowledge is akin to seeing through the appearance of my.
Even the possessive pronoun referring to a knower has no reference at the same time, so
that the phrase “one’s self-knowledge” becomes a contradiction.590 In self-knowledge
there is a cognition to recognize immediacy (aparokatva), but liberation is identical with
                                                                                                                                                  
588 As in the passage under discussion, BS 1.1.2.
589 Part of the issue is that as a vtti we want to say it possesses form, but if we identify form and content,
in the Advaita theory of perception that the mind takes the shape of the object of knowledge  (like in the
case of knowledge of a pot), then what form can aparoka brahman vtti have?  Therefore it is formless.
590 This points to one of the conceptual paradoxes of jvanmukti.  The jvanmukta has no true individuality
so say “my knowledge”; yet at the same time the jvanmukti continues an individual existence despite
recognizing his or her true nature as brahman.
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immediacy at the same time.  The immediacy is not an object grasped by the cognition
and immediate anubhava is not localized any more after brahmavidy.  Aparokatva of
the self does not occur in time because one is already intrinsically free, but the
brahmavidy must occur for one to recognize that fact.  This sets up a paradox of sorts,
because liberation occurs in time yet never occurs because it is already present in the
mainstream Advaita view.  This may be incomprehensible to the ignorant person, but
after knowledge the liberated individual (jñnin) ideally recognizes that liberation never
took place at all.  The main Advaita tool for unraveling this paradox is to switch between
conventional and absolute levels of reality in the meanings of the terms. Statements such
as, “Awareness at the empirical level must be realized at the transcendent level” or “ruti
is a prama for the conventional level and anubhava is for the transcendent level” are
nonsensical and only create confusion.  Within akara’s system it is more accurate to
say that there is no real jumping levels of reality in self-knowledge
Despite my interpretation of anubhava, my intention is not to dismiss important
transformative experiences that the Advaitin may ostensibly have due to liberation. There
may be a number of changes that take place in the jvanmukta’s (one who is liberated
while living) psyche in response to liberating brahmavidy.  His or her mind recognizes
that it is illumined and not a finite vulnerable entity.  The mind can rest, secure in its
knowledge that its true identity is not a fragile body and ego that are subject to
approaching death.  This provides emotional space and is a powerful coping mechanism
because the mind is no longer an isolated finite entity that runs in survival mode in fear of
its own mortality and in fear of others due to a vision of difference.  Perhaps a number of
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other positive changes may occur in the mind after ignorance is removed because the
mind can relax, let go of past trauma and insecurities, and develop new levels of
emotional maturity.  Some of these changes may be radical, powerful, and
transformative.  They should not be ignored, yet it is mistaken to identify them with self-
knowledge.
Trying to describe this situation is problematic.  On one hand the Advaitin must
not discount the transformative experiences of the psyche after self-knowledge or the
process of deepening clarity through dedicated study necessary for self-knowledge.  And
this clarity is certainly experienced differently than a lack of clarity.  Yet in the final
analysis, there is no new experience of one’s self.  Both sides of this issue need to be
understood.  The Advaitin must focus on studying for otherwise he or she remains
ignorant.  Yet the student must also understand that “knowledge” is nothing new and not
a personal experience, otherwise he or she will hunt for new experiences with the false
assumption that such experiences constitute brahmavidy.  I don’t believe akara’s
intention is to negate the various mystical experiences, awakenings, devotional states, and
psychological breakthroughs that may arise in the course of studying Vednta or other
traditions.  Such experiences may serve important functions such as mental purification,
emotional growth, or inspiration. Rather the point is to be absolutely clear on the nature
of self-knowledge, its function of removing self-ignorance, and its source in the
Upaniads; and in addition, to negate the mistaken tendency to attribute pramatva to
other phenomena such as experiences or practices such as meditation.
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After recognizing some of the details and difficulties of maintaining a distinction
between paroka and aparoka self-knowledge, I believe we have two basic options with
reference to how we interpret it.  We can take a polemical stance and completely dismiss
this distinction as conflicting with Advaita’s epistemology and the metaphysical position
of self-illumination.  Or, we can accept a more empathetic interpretation that attempts to
properly understand paroka and aparoka self-knowledge in a way that is faithful to
akara’s Advaita. The empathetic interpretation recognizes a growing and deepening
change of clarity, which includes the assimilation of wisdom, removing various obstacles,
and eventually leading to the removal of ignorance and any problematic habitual
tendencies.  Yet this stance continues to uphold the ruti as a prama and dismisses any
emphasis on anubhava as an alternative prama or as a mystical experience.  In this
interpretation, even if immediate knowledge free of any deficiencies may not occur
through ravaa alone, the Advaitin in my reading must expand the domain of the abda
prama to encompass the supplementary roles of manana and nididhysana, as well as
the culminating anubhava.  The ruti in the form of knowledge is universal and primary
throughout every part of this process.
Our discussion of anubhava helps us to understand the function of nididhysana.
Nididhysana is part of the means for cultivating anubhava in the form of brahmavidy.
The dismissal of anubhava as an alternative prama or as a mystical experience means
that nididhysana is not a means for mystical experience, and is not necessary for
creating an experience which functions independently as a prama.  As I have explained
repeatedly, akara views nididhysana as a mode of studying ruti, and anubhava as
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brahmavid, a deep understanding of ruti.  If so, then akara understands these all to
be modes of the ruti, or inversely, he is expanding the semantic range of ruti to include
both nididhsana and anubhava.  Thus, nididhysana does not produce a transcendental
experience nor is nididhysana an independent means for gaining the knowledge
cognition.  Rather, nididhysana functions as a means to deepen one’s understanding of
brahman by removing obstacles to brahmavidy.  akara purposely places more
emphasis on ruti than on nididhysana.  If one insists on the importance of nididhysana
by pointing out the difficulties students typically face in gaining brahmavidy after
having only listened, then akara can respond by accepting nididhysana as an
advanced mode of Upaniadic study completely dependent on ruti and included within
the domain of ravaa.
5.5.4:  Nididhysana and samdhi
Is it possible to identify nididhysana with Yoga’s highest state of concentration,
samdhi?  To answer this question we need to look at akara’s view of samdhi. In
Patañjali’ Yoga system, asamprajñta samdhi, also known as nirvikalpa samdhi, is a
state where all fluctuations of the mind are suppressed and at rest and there is no more
distinction of subject and object.  Only latent tendencies (saskras) remain in the mind,
which accounts for the ability of the individual to return to the waking state and have
thoughts again.  Yogins usually identify asamprajñta samdhi as the means for gaining
Yoga’s liberation, known as  “isolation” (kaivalya).  In kaivalya the yogin is perfectly
isolated and distinct from matter (prakti) and identified with pure awareness (purua).
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As some scholars have correctly argued, during the past century a number of neo-
Vedntins appropriated the term nirvikalpa samdhi and placed far greater importance on
Yoga’s samdhi experience as the means for liberation or as the final culmination for
understanding non-duality, than on studying the Upaniads.591  In doing so they conflated
Yoga’s samdhi with akara’s brahmavidy.  This conflation subsequently influenced
many scholars to hold the same opinion.  However, the appropriation of some form of
samdhi (not necessarily Yoga’s) existed in earlier historical periods.  Various Advaitins,
such as Sadnanda (ca. 1450 CE), the author of the Vedntasra, place an emphasis on
samdhi that is not found in akara’s writing.
Though the term samdhi occurs in the Bhagavadgt, it does not occur in the
Upaniads.  Unfortunately akara himself does not make his understanding of samdhi
clear because he does not explicitly explain it in his commentaries.   Samdhi comes from
the verb samdh (sam +   + dh), which means, “to put together,” “to unite,” or “to
concentrate.”  The closest term we find in the Upanisads is samhita.  akara generally
interprets samhita, or the related word samdhna, as a collected mind, which can
withdraw from objects and maintain one pointed concentration (ekgrat).592  This is
closer to Yoga’s use of dhra or dhyna and comprises part of the preliminary steps
that lead to gaining mental purification in both Advaita and Yoga.593 In other places
akara uses samdhi in various ways, potentially as liberation itself, as a means of yoga,
                                                 
591 Comans 1993, Rambachan 1994, and Halbfass 1988.
592 Comans 1993 p. 22.
See US 13.17, 13.25, BU 4.2.1, 4.4.23.
593 Occasionally akara also uses samdhi to specifically denote dhra.  See BGbh 18.33.
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as nididhysana, as steadfastness in knowledge (jñnaniha), as well as Yoga’s
asamprajñta state.594
The question of the relationship between nididhysana and samdhi states is a
tricky one because akara does not clarify what he means by samdhi in his
commentaries.  In some cases, it is Yoga’s asamprajñta samdhi; however, this is
probably not his usage of it in the context of his description of Advaita’s method of study
and of nididhysana.  In a number of places akara appears to equate samdhi with the
process of gaining knowledge, which we can equate with the triple process, particularly
nididhysana.  This is most evident in the Bhagavadgt commentary.  In BGbh 6.19
akara defines the one who practices yoga as one who practices samdhi regarding the
self.  In BGbh 2.39 and 4.38 he makes a distinction between karma yoga and samdhi
yoga, which is the direct path to steadfastness (niha).  In BGbh 2.54 he refers to the
sthita prajña (the one who is steadfast in knowledge) as engaged in samdhi.
Elsewhere, in GK 3.37, Gaudapada defines the self as samdhi. In his gloss,
akara writes that it is called samdhi “because the self is understood by the wisdom
caused by samdhi.”595  And perhaps most importantly, in BSbh 2.3.39, he writes,
This samdhi which is taught in the Upaniads is the means for knowledge of the
Upaniadic self in such sentences as, “The self should be seen should be heard
should be reflected on “ (BU2.4.5) and “That is the self that you should try to
                                                 
594 In BG 6.29 samhita equals the word jñna and samadara and seeing oneness.  This is leading to
liberation, not usually liberation itself. Also identified with abhysa in BG Ch. 6 (or at least as anutihata
in BG 6.19).
595 samdhinimittaprajñvagamyatvt (my translation).
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discover, that is the self that you should seek to perceive” (CU 8.7.1),” and “Om –
meditate thus on the self (MU 2.2.6).”596
This passage identifies samdhi with the meaning of three of the primary
sentences that akara understands as meaning nididhysana, particularly CU 8.7.1
which refers solely to nididhysana.  In some of the other above attestations it is difficult
to isolate the association of samdhi with nididhysana alone, rather than with ravaa
and manana, and so it could refer to the general process of Advaita’s study process. One
could also argue that it may be possible to restrict the meaning of samdhi to having a
one-pointed mind, and/or a mind withdrawn from all objects.  However, the fact that in
these textual contexts samdhi is said to be intimately connected to the means of self-
knowledge surely excludes it from being a simple experience and points to something
more than basic concentration and yogic meditation (dhyna, or ekgrat) in akara’s
opinion.  As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, akara believes that such practices are forms
of action and devoid of any self-knowledge and primarily useful for preparing and
purifying the student’s mind. The practice of samdhi at least in the Gkbh requires both
withdrawal and self-knowledge from negation and anvaya/vyatireka at the same time.597
When we consider that samdhi also denotes forms of deep concentration, it is likely that
in these contexts it points more towards nididhysana, rather than ravaa and manana
which do not require the same types of meditative practices.
                                                 
596 yo ‘py ayam aupaniadtmapratipattiprayojana samdhir upadio vednteu tm v are draavya
rotavya mantavya nididhysitavya so ‘nveavya sa vijijñstitavya,’ ‘om ity eva dhyyatha
tmnam’ (my translation).
This stra is not the definitive view in the discussion but there is a clear association between samdhi and
nididhysana.
597 For example, see GKbh 3.31-48 and anvaya-vyatireka and neti neti in 3.26.
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akara does not see Yoga’s samdhi mental state as the means to liberation or
the culmination of liberation, but his intention is not to negate the very possibility of
samdhi.  He acknowledges and accepts it as a possible experience.  There are also some
Upanisadic passages which appear to advocate some type of samdhi state or that point
out the absence of perception in liberation as in deep sleep.  akara points out the
absence of perception in knowledge in passages such as the following:598
When, however, the Whole has become one’s very self (tman), then who is there
for one to smell and by what means?  Who is there for one to see and by what
means?  Who is there for one to hear and by what means? Who is there for one to
see and by what means? Who is there for one to hear and by what means?  Who is
there for one to greet and by what means?  Who is there for one to think and by
what means.  Who is there for one to perceive and by what means? (BU 2.4.14)599
It is like this.  As a man embraced by a woman he loves is oblivious to everything
within or without, so this person embraced by the self (tman) consisting of
knowledge is oblivious to everything within or without (BU 4.3.21).600
The infinite is that where one does not see anything else, does not hear anything
else, and does not understand anything else (CU 7.24.1).601
However, akara clearly does not approve of Yoga’s asamprajñta samdhi as
the ultimate goal.  For example, in BSbh 2.1.9 he writes:
As in natural slumber and samdhi, though there is a natural eradication of
differences, still owing to the persistence of the unreal nescience, differences
occur over again when one wakes up.”602
                                                 
598 akara cites BU 2.4.14, BU 4.3.21 and CU 7.24.1 together in BUbh 3.9.28.7.
599 Olivelle 1996, p. 30. This passage is repeated in BU 4.5.15.
600 Olivelle 1996 p. 61. The Upaniad seems to refer to deep sleep in this example, but akara also
associates it with liberation.
601 Gambhirananda 1992, p. 558.
602 Gambhirananda 1996, p. 319.
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In this passage akara recognizes samdhi as a phenomenological state similar to deep
sleep. In both these states there is an absence of any duality where there is no self or
object. 603  They are also similar because neither one leads to knowledge.  Just as one’s
ignorance continues to exist after waking, so does self-ignorance continue for the one
coming out of samdhi.  akara is not impressed with samdhi even though it may be an
exalted mystical experience.  The fundamental deficiency is that knowledge that removes
ignorance is not possible in either samdhi or deep dreamless sleep, and for akara, self-
knowledge alone is the solution. Neither state is generated through a prama, but only
though mental processes and suppression. If in fact there is no duality available in this
experience and no agent to apperceive it then there can be no knowledge either.  In fact,
one could argue that people experience silence between any two consecutive thoughts.  If
mental silence were the sole requisite for liberation, then every individual would already
have self-knowledge.  One may also argue that it is not possible to claim that memory
can take place during this state.  How could one even know or remember that he or she
was in a samdhi state?
There are some other potential Advaita critiques of Yoga’s samdhi.  For
Advaitins, the self is the cause and existence of every thought; thus, thoughts are not
separate from the self and cannot create a true obstruction dividing the self and
individual.  Thoughts need not be destroyed in order to know their reality, just as one
does not need to break a pot in order to understand that the pot space is identical with
                                                 
603 He also makes this identification in BGbh 18.66.
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universal space.604  In fact we saw that in KeUbh 2.4 and 4.5 akara uses thoughts as a
way to point back to one’s tman in contemplation.  But according to the Yogic theory of
samdhi, thoughts in the mind are ultimately real and must be extinguished to find the
self. Even if samdhi does lead to some type of self-knowledge, this would be the
knowledge that Yogins seek, which affirms the absolute dualism of awareness (purua)
and matter (prakti) underpinning Yoga metaphysics.  Why would the Advaitin seek out
or accept samdhi when it does not lead to non-duality but to the idea that purua and
prakti are equally real and distinct? Yoga’s asamprajñta samdhi is a nirvikalpa
experience that gives sagua knowledge, if any, and affirms the duality of the world.605
5.6:  The Function of nididhysana
As explained earlier,  brahmavidy is imparted to the student by listening to the
Upaniads.  The rest of the triple process is focused on removing the obstructions to that
self-knowledge, specifically doubts regarding the means of knowledge (prama akas)
and doubts regarding the object of knowledge (prameya akas).  ravaa is alone
capable of liberating an individual by removing all doubts about the object of knowledge
(prameya akas).  ravaa along with manana, which removes doubts about the means
of knowledge (prama akas), should provide definite self-knowledge, a type of
unshakeable conviction that cannot be dislodged by doubt; however, as noted earlier, one
of the mysteries we continue to encounter in akara’s thinking is whether we can label
this definite knowledge as immediate brahmavidy  or as some form of deficient
                                                 
604 akara rejects the method of suppression of thoughts as a means to liberation in BUbh 1.4.7.
605 Comans 1993, p. 28.  See BSbh 2.1.3.
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propositional self-knowledge, of if such distinctions are even appropriate for
understanding akara. However, in some cases, when ravaa and manana are not
adequate, then nididhysana is necessary to neutralize obstacles that are blocking self-
knowledge despite properly studying the Upaniads with a qualified teacher and having a
high level of adhikritva.
5.6.1:  Resolving Contradictory Patterns, Impressions, and Dispositions
Previous conditioned beliefs of oneself as finite, limited, and intrinsically
separated from the surrounding world may cause habitual reflexive and reactive thought
patterns. These habitual thought patterns, variously called v ipar tabhvan ,
vipartapratyaya,606 saskra, vsan, kaaya,607 klea,608 or kalmaa609 persist as traces,
impressions, dispositions, or tendencies from earlier actions and longstanding
identifications.  Within the broader system of Advaita, saskras are variously
understood as some type of psychological seed, subconscious impression, trace,
tendency, affective disposition, or karmic residue that are created by previous actions and
longstanding identifications.  They persist after actions and function as causal
mechanisms for memory, error, positive or negative habits, psychological afflictions,
pleasure and pain, further action and the production of dreams.  In a separate, yet related
function, they comprise part of the subtle body and are closely related to karma,
determining the nature of future births. However, in the context of self-knowledge they
                                                 
606 BUbh 1.4.10.
607 GK 3.44.
608 BSbh 4.2.7.
609 BG 5.17, 6.27-8.
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play a specific role as a unique class of obstacles that reinforce notions of duality or
limited self-identities and disturb one’s understanding of non-duality.610 They are
secondary obstacles, not as direct as doubts about brahman and the means of knowledge,
and more ambiguous and subtle, but powerful nonetheless and capable of obstructing the
abda prama from functioning properly.  Nididhysana is a particular method for
cultivating maturity in self-knowledge by resolving these habitual contradictory thought
patterns and preventing further ones.611  With repetition it cultivates stability in self-
knowledge (jnanih  or sthitaprajn), so that self-identity as brahman is always
available and immediately evident. 612
akara does not clearly define these obstacles or articulate the way in which
nididhysana removes them and perhaps only grudgingly admits to the existences of
these obstacles, but he does use a variety of terms for them and assumes a familiarity
with such terms on the part of the reader.  This category of obstacles does not fit easily
into his epistemology because its relationship with ignorance is not clear.  The problem is
not only explaining why such obstacles exist but also why they should have any effect of
destabilizing knowledge if one has already directly recognized brahman.  As we will see,
there are also some problems reconciling the theory of saskras with the doctrine of
                                                 
610 See akara on BU 1.4.7, 1.4.10; GK 3.44; BS 4.1.15, 3.4.26, 3.4.47-48, 3.4.51; and BG 4.18, 5.13
Some Advaitins also say nididhysana removes asambhvans. I think asambhvans is a type of
“difficulty in comprehension” similar to or directly connected to vipartabhvans because it cannot be a
prameya aka, which is the domain of manana (translating it as improbability or impossibility does not
make contextual sense).
611 Mental purification is for gaining proper qualification so the prama can function properly.
Nididhysana and manana may be viewed as a type of mental purification, but they are intrinsically unique
because of their content and dependence on the Upaniads.
612 See akara on BGbh 2.54-72, 3.4, 3.17, 5.17, 5.20, 18.55; BSbh 3.4.20; MUbh 1.2.12, 3.25-6.
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jvanmukti (living while liberated). In addition, in some places akara appears to refute
the theory of saskras.  For example in US 18.13, akara specifically raises the theory
of saskra and rejects it as part of an opponent’s position endorsing the prasakhyna
contemplation.  The theory of saskra is also a key aspect of Maana Mira’s
understanding of contemplation in the Brahmasiddhi, a position criticized by akara’s
disciple, Surevara.  Nevertheless, in other contexts akara accepts saskras as a
serious obstacle that must be neutralized with contemplation.  Analyzing saskras and
their contexts yields important insights into the function of nididhysana and its potential
paradoxes.
5.6.2:  Saskra in its contexts
Terms such as sa skra and vsan  are common to almost all Indian
philosophical and religious systems and have a diversity of usage, though for many
traditions they function as subconscious mechanisms. 613  For example, in Yog cra
Buddhism vsans constitute the infinite seeds contained in the layavijñna (storehouse
consciousness) that simultaneously sprout as awareness and object of perception.  In
Nyya, saskras may have a psychological reference or refer to certain qualities such as
impetus, experiential (or mental) qualities, or elasticity as a physical property.614 The
brahmanical tradition also uses the term saskra in other ways.  For example, the
ghyastras and dharma texts, prescribes a variety of saskras as sacraments and rites
of passage that an individual must go through during life. And saskra may mean
                                                 
613 See Chapter 3 of Phillips’ forthcoming book on Yoga for an overview of saskras in yoga as well as
other Indian philosophies.  Also see Whichter 2005, pp. 601-630.
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“purification” in a variety of ritual contexts. These can include such events as purifying
ritual utensils or purificatory rites of passage, such as those at birth, the thread ceremony
(upanayanam), and many others used within the classical rama system.615  Saskra
meaning a rite or purification is homonymous with saskra as a disposition, yet they
are related in that ritual and purifying saskras make the individual different and thus
add something.
An extensive discussion of psychological saskras comes in Patañjali’s Yoga
Stras.  A brief description of saskras in classical yoga is helpful and the most
relevant discussion of saskras outside of Advaita when we consider akara’s
acceptance of yogic praxis and his familiarity with the YS.  In the YS, saskras or
vsans are latent impressions derived from previous actions, previous births, and
experiences of pleasure and pain.  They have no beginning and give rise to memory.616
Saskras and vsans, and the related term karmaya, are crucial concepts for
Patañjali, particularly at the higher stages of Yoga praxis.  One of the primary endeavors
of the yogin is to burn up all saskras because saskras manifest as disturbing
thoughts in the mind.  Thoughts are a manifestation of matter (prakti).  They disturb the
yogin and keep him or her entangled with matter.  Yogic practice is designed to create
new saskras through its various practices such as nonharmfulness (ahis),
meditation, etc, that in turn neutralize negative saskras and function to keep the yogin
on the proper path.  At higher stages of yoga praxis, samprajñta samdhi and
                                                                                                                                                  
614 Phillips (forthcoming), p. 122, p. 165 fn.5.
615 Olivelle 1993, p. 126-8.
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discriminative knowledge (viveka khyti) create meditation saskras which inhibit
impressions of empirical life.617  Yet they also leave impressions in the mind, albeit
helpful ones. Saskras, which exist independently of ceased cognition, remain even at
the highest stage of mental cessation  (asamprajñta samdhi) when all thoughts are
quieted.618  These can cause subtle fluctuations of the mind that draw the yogin back into
the material world.  Therefore the yogin must repeatedly practice the complete cessation
of mind (nirodha).  Nirodha creates its own special saskra that destroys any remaining
saskras capable of disturbing nirodha , even those saskras produced by
samprajñta samdhi.619  These nirodha produced saskras eventually self-destruct,
burning themselves so no saskras exist whatsoever and the yogin can remain in a
continuous state of samdhi.620 This process of saskra creation and negation occurs
unperceived at a subconscious level unless the yogin has achieved high levels of
sensitivity and is directly aware of his saskras.621
5.6.3:  Saskras in Advaita Vednta
For the most part, Advaitins uses the terms saskra, vsan, and in some
instances, vipartabhvan and kaya, as synonyms. Vsan metaphorically refers to the
lingering scent an object leaves behind, as in the case when garlic is removed from a
vessel.  An action, thought, or experience, similarly leaves a trace as an ingrained mental
                                                                                                                                                  
616 YSbh 2.13
617 YS 1.50
618 YS 1.18, 3.9
619 YS 1.51. Swmi Hariharnanda raya 1983, pp. 259-60.
620 Also see YS 3.9-10.
621 YS 3.18
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impression (or as an unseen potential metaphysical seed for a habit) in the mind and
subtle body of the individual.  akara writes that, the subtle body “consists of
impressions (vsan), and is produced by the impressions of gross and subtle objects and
the union of the individual self.”622  Later in the same commentary he writes,
As in life we have a cloth dyed with turmeric, so in the presence of objects of
enjoyment the mind gets a similar colouring of impressions [saskra], whence a
man under such circumstances is said to be attached, as a cloth, for instance, is
dyed.  Also as sheep’s wool is grey, so are some other forms of impressions….
The colouring varies sometimes according to the objects presented to the mind,
and sometimes according to the tendencies of the mind itself….  It is impossible
to ascertain the beginning, middle or end, or number, place, time and
circumstances of these impressions, for they are innumerable, and infinite are
their causes.623
 Actions and their resulting experiences ingrain  saskras. The mind contains a
variety of different saskras in the form of subconscious psychological impressions.
Most Indian philosophies, including Advaita, theorize that saskras constitute part of
the mechanics of memory.  Saskras provide the bridges or connecting triggers that
bring past experiences into present memory.  All memories are dependent upon
saskras and maintained by such dispositions.  We may not be able to directly perceive
our memory saskras because they are subconscious but we infer them.  When I
perceive certain objects that draw emotions, desire, or prompt actions in me I can
postulate some saskra that links the object with prior events and experiences.   A
saskra triggers memory when some perceived content combines with or triggers the
                                                 
622 BUbh 2.3.6. Madhavananda 1993, p. 236.
623 BUbh 2.3.6. Madhavananda 1993, p. 238.
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saskra to produce its respective kind of awareness.624  askras are also memories
that serve as latent impressions of knowledge that facilitate the intermediate operation of
reminding one of invariable concomitance (vypti) in the process of inferential
knowledge.625
In a closely related context, there is also an affective side to the concept.
Dispositions somehow trigger affective states and desires in the mind to seek certain
outcomes.  For example, eating sweets everyday produces physical and psychological
saskras, which subsequently manifest as physical and emotional craving for eating
sweets.  The saskras then further influence a person to continue performing such
actions, whether physical, oral, or mental. One’s actions determine the types of vsans
one accrues. Saintly or meritorious actions breed vsans that lead the individual to more
meritorious actions, pleasant experiences and helpful vsans.  Negative or harmful
actions lead to painful vsans, actions, and experiences.626   These actions, when
repeated, further strengthen the saskras or create new ones.  The process is a cyclical
one that fuels itself and deepens the saskras through habitual conditioning.  Saskras
as dispositions occur in the present, but are caused by past actions.  Present events are
triggers for the saskras, which lie right below the conscious surface in the mind.
When triggered, saskras in turn awaken unresolved issues that manifest as fear,
anxiety, desire, aversion, etc.  For example, a small event may trigger great anger that
                                                 
624 For example, in GKbh 3.5 akara uses saskras as the causes of memory, though this in the context
of Vaieika philosophy.
625 VP Ch. 1, (Madhavananda 1963, p. 69).
626 Potter 1981, p .23.
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possesses a person’s psyche.  The situation itself may not be sufficient for such a
reaction, but the saskra links the mind to deeper traumas in the past.
One can intentionally manipulate or reverse the cyclical self-propelling cycle of
saskra and action.  Intentionally changing ones actions and thoughts in positive ways
creates positive saskras.  By creating new saskras one can ingrain new habits and
actions and negate or disassociate from old saskras and their corresponding emotions
and actions. A simple analogy for this process is the attempt to flatten a rolled up piece of
paper.  The paper carries a saskra to repeatedly curl back up despite unrolling it and
placing it flat.  In order to counter that saskra one can roll the paper in the opposite
direction so that the paper gains a new saskra to roll in the opposite direction.  These
saskras neutralize each other and the paper then remains flat.
This type of deconditioning and reconditioning forms an essential part of yogic
practice in Advaita as in all askesis. The general task of the spiritual aspirant is to avoid
forming harmful saskras, neutralize problematic ones, and to cultivate and reinforce
positive ones.  This general orientation falls within the domain of gaining mental purity
and the requisite qualifications for self-knowledge.  Practices used to cultivate the proper
qualifications for brahmavidy such as karma yoga, non-injury, compassion, and
meditation generate corresponding dispositions that result in mental purification, negate
engrained habits detrimental to self-inquiry, and facilitate internal emotional space to
allow the abda prama to function.  However, I would theorize that we may also view
nididhysana as a special means of antakarana uddhi, but unlike the four-fold means
for purification, nididhysana targets a unique class or subset of saskras, which
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disturb propositional knowledge of non-duality by creating new saskras or enlivening
old saskras. Nididhysana is fundamentally different from methods for mental purity
in that it uses knowledge gained from the Upanisads as the means to neutralize such
saskras which are immune to listening and logical reflection.  Such Advaita specific
saskras only respond to practices that make use of self-knowledge, not any other
practice such as meditation.
False notions that exist prior to the rise of brahmvidy  lead to a sense of
insecurity and breed emotional states such as greed, hatred, anger, anxiety, and fear,
which in turn impel one into various actions.  These actions and the emotions
surrounding them create and further ingrain saskras that produce memories and link
the individual’s mind back to those emotions and erroneous ideas. These saskras
continue to exist antecedent to proper knowledge from ravaa and manana.  Even
though that self-knowledge has firm conviction and cannot be dislodged by doubt, the
saskras continue to simulate previous false notions and create corresponding
emotions.   The samskras are dependent on ignorance but not ignorance itself.  They are
memories that can cause temporary confusion or psychological states that are not in
keeping with one’s understanding of self and reality as non-dual brahman. The problem
with these saskras, from the standpoint of self-knowledge, is their reinforcement of
notions of duality, a phenomenon Advaitins specify as contradictory habitual thinking
patterns (vipartabhvan). Vipartabhvan or vipartapratyaya (contradictory thought)
are specific terms used after introducing Vednta and signify a situation where one’s
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experience and disposition is opposed to what one knows as his or her true identity.627
Vipartabhvans are the underlying saskra that ‘I am the body and mind” (dehdi
abhimna or dehtmabuddhi bhvan).  These mental impressions regarding one’s finite
nature bubble up into one’s mind despite one’s conviction of the infinite nature of
brahman.628 They are Advaita specific bhvans that reaffirm one’s previous tendency to
view the self as an individual finite entity. They may temporarily knock the individual off
balance and disrupt his understanding and prevent liberating brahmavidy.  He may then
mistakenly take the previous false notion as real again. akara gives the example of a
lost person who learns the proper direction but subsequently becomes confused about the
direction again.629  For example, in his commentary on BU 1.4.10 akara writes:
Sometimes, however, memories due to the impressions of false notions antecedent
to the dawning of knowledge, simulating those notions, suddenly appear and
throw him into the error of regarding them as actual false notions; as one who is
familiar with the points of the compass sometimes all of a sudden gets confused
about them.630
In his commentary on BG 4.18 akara writes,
                                                 
627 BUbh 1.4.10.
628 Kaya is a specific type of negative saskra that creates mental affliction. Kayas are attested in
GK 3.44 where Gaudapda says one should know (the mind) with kayas (sakaya vijnyt). akara
writes, “When the mind of a man, who is practicing again and again, is awakened from deep sleep and is
withdrawn from objects, but is not established in equipoise and continues in an intermediate state, then
vijnyt, one should know; that mind to be sakaayam, tinged with desire, in a state of latency”
(Gambhirananda 1992, p. 317).  Kaya also occurs in CU 7.26.2, where akara defines them as
impurities such as rga and dvea, which are like tree sap that must be washed off by the repetition of
knowledge and detachment.
These kayas arise during meditative absorption.  They may be akin to problematic psychological
tendencies that surface from the unconscious according to some depth psychologists. Also see their
mention in GKbh 4.90, which defines kaaya as attraction, repulsion, or delusion.  The term kaya
generally refers to negative impressions, whereas saskras and vsans represent both positive and
negative impressions.
629 This may be an indirect reference to CU 6.14 where a blindfolded man needs directions to find his way
back to the land of Gandhra.
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As such, although this answer has been given more than once, still a man becomes
repeatedly deluded under the influence of a totally opposite perception. And
forgetting the truth that has been heard again and again, he repeatedly raises false
issues and questions!631
The metaphysical relationship between vipartabhvan and avidy and their
relationship with regard to an individual are not clear.  Is this type of saskra a part of
avidy, identical with it, or an unrelated entity?   akara does not precisely define either
avidy or saskra.632 Both saskras and avidy positively exist and veil knowledge,
though in two entirely different ways. However, it appears to make more sense to
separate saskras and avidy. Saskras are fundamentally different because they are
products of action and indirectly tied to ignorance.  Ignorance leads to one’s false notion
of limited self, leading to insecurity and desire, which then lead to action.  The actions
then leave saskras. Saskras are secondary products whereas avidy is beginningless
and indeterminable.633  In addition, it is questionable whether avidy even exists at the
time of nididhysana if one has already understood the meaning of the mahvkya and
                                                                                                                                                  
630 Madhvananda 1993, p. 116.
631 Gambhirananda 1995, p. 193.
In BS 3.4.47 we also find the stra, “On account of continued overpowering force of vision of
difference we have injunction for sagehood (nididhysana).
632 akara himself was reluctant to define the ontological reality of avidy or its precise location.  For
example, when one questions for whom avidy belongs to, akara dismisses the question by saying it
belongs to the one who asks. See BSbh 4.1.3, BGbh 13.2 and US 2.2.62-65.
Advaitins generally conceive of avidy as indeterminable, but a variety of post-akara Advaitins
disagreed over the nature of avidy.  The locus of avidy, whether within the individual or within brahman,
would become a major point of contention among post-akara Advaitins.
633 However, in some places akara is ambiguous about this issue and appears to identify saskras and
ignorance.  He uses the term avidy lea (trace of ignorance) synonymously with saskras. In BU 1.4.7
(See Potter 1981, p. 189) he says false notions are memories due to impressions.
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gained brahmavidy.  This last point is debatable and perhaps controversial because we
have not been able to specify what kind of knowledge, propositional or non-propositional
brahmavidy, is present in nididhysana; however, perhaps at this point, when one
continues to practice nididhysana in order to gain niha, then avidy does not cover
one’s self anymore and brahmavidy has already arisen.  At that point only saskras,
the shadow of ignorance, tenuously veil the full manifestation of brahmavidy in the
mind of the wise person.
akara explains that, “even when knowledge emerges from ravaa, etc., it
arises only after the impediments wear away.”634 Nididhysana cultivates clarity of self-
knowledge by removing saskras and/or neutralizing their virulence so that self-
knowledge is not subject to disruption. Dispositions will not interfere with an individual’s
steadfastness in self-knowledge when the dispositions’ tendency to reinforce notions of
duality is disempowered.  In this way nididhysana brings self-knowledge alive without
any obstruction or obstacles. Saskras are endless in number, just as karma is endless.
It is not that the Advaitin must eliminate all saskras for this is an impossibility if they
are endless.  Furthermore, the jvanmukti would not be capable of talking, memory, and
other action without any saskras.  The Advaitin only needs to deal with those that are
specifically disrupting self-knowledge, and only so far as to let knowledge rise or to
allow knowledge to remain steady.  After there is total clarity of brahmavidy one may
                                                 
634 ravadidvrepi vidyotpadyamn pratibandhakaypekayaivotpadyate | BSbh 3.4.51 (my
translation).
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naturally continue to handle other saskras, but this is not necessary at that point for
gaining steadfastness (niha).
How exactly nididhysana neutralizes saskras is not clear. It is possible to
look at nididhysana as instilling a new s askra of non-duality that counters or
supercedes saskra’s of duality (a position held by Maana Mira and similar to
Patañjali).  It is the impressions arising from right knowledge and contemplation that
suppress disturbing saskras and maintain one’s non-dual identity in the midst of such
situations.  Another possibility is that contemplation neutralizes saskras without
creating any new saskras.  I believe the positive creation of a new saskra in the
former view is not as coherent as the latter in akara’s theory of knowledge because it
may emphasize the necessity for a new experience.  It also may leave nididhysana open
to the critique that it is an action. Saskras are products of action and experience, so if
nididhysana creates a new saskra, one may argue that nididhysana is also an action.
This is not necessarily a problem though, because it is important to understand that even
if nididhysana produces a new saskra, this saskra does not negate ignorance but
neutralizes other saskras.  In at least one passage akara does support the creation of
a new saskra through contemplation.  For example, in BG 8.10 he writes “Imbued
with that (strength) also, consisting in steadfastness of the mind arising from
accumulation of saskras resulting from samdhi (nididhysana).”635   However, this
quote comes in the particular context of reaching the highest purua at the time of death.
                                                 
635  yogabalam tena samdhijasaskrapracayajanitacittasthairyalakaam yogabalam tena ca yukta |
(my translation).
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The context of death and the function of dispositions and contemplation with regard to
death bring us to a curious twist regarding vsans.
 Advaita, as well as Ny ya and other Indian philosophies, single out vsans to
explain the projection of the dream world during sleep. In the dream there is an as though
temporary death because the organs of action cease functioning and there is no means to
see anything. Only awareness remains present, as one’s self-light.  The dream objects,
colors, and shapes are a manifestation of the mind that is conditioned by vsans, which
are aspects of the mind.636 The vsans become the objects in the dream.  They create the
dream body and the dream world, the duality of knower and known, and they are in turn
illumined by pure awareness.
Vsans also function in significant metaphysical ways beyond psychological
descriptions of habits, memories, and dreams. These impressions, or residue of karma,
help determine future actions or facilitate the manifestation of karmic potential and the
corresponding experiences, not only in the present but in death and rebirth too. Just as in
the dream, where the organs stop functioning and the vsans determine the dream, so
too in death the organs cease and the vsans determine the trajectory of the subtle body,
dictate the type of new body required in the next birth, and forge a link to that body.
BU 4.4.2 provides a description of what happens at death.  The functions of the
sense organs and the functions of the organs of actions withdraw into the subtle body of
the individual.  Thus when people see a person in the process of dying they notice that he
or she loses the functions of the senses and action.  According to the Upaniad, the sense
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functions are united in the intellect.  At death, the self (as the vital force) leaves the
physical body through the top of the head or the eye or through some other body part.
The vital force along with the merged functions then moves to another body. Knowledge,
work, and past experience also goes along with the departing self.637  Vsans form an
essential component of the transmigrating subtle body (liga-arra).638 According to
akara, experiences are the impressions from the results of past action.  These vsans
bring past actions into fruition and initiate new actions.  Without them karma cannot
fructify and new actions will not be done in the following birth.639
5.6.4:  The Problem of karma, vsans, and jvanmukti
The concepts of vsans or saskras for a theory of transmigration of the subtle
body present a difficult question: What is the relationship or identity of saskras in the
context of nididhysana with karma leading to rebirth?  Although saskras are
ostensibly the impressions or shadow of previous karma, akara does not clarify
whether to or how to distinguish them from karma.  This leads to the question of whether
we should identify karma with contradictory dispositions (vipartabhvans), the type of
saskras we are concerned with in nididhysana.  This question is especially relevant in
the context of jvanmukti (liberation while living).  akara himself uses saskra as
vipartabhvan, but also in terms of karma when discussing his theory of living while
liberated (jvanmukti).  For example, he writes:
                                                                                                                                                  
636 BUbh 4.3.9, CUbh 8.5.4, PUbh 4.5, US 11.10.
637 BS 4.2.1-21 presents a similar but more detailed explanation of what happens at death.
638 In other contexts the vsans composing the liga arra are vsans from avidy, karma, and kama.
See MU 3.1.1 and PU 4.5.
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This false ignorance, even when sublated, continues for a while owing to past
tendencies (saskras) like the continuance of the vision of two moons.640
…the residue of prarabdha work is the cause of the persistence of the body after
knowledge. 641
Even in the case of one in whom has arisen discriminating wisdom and who has
renounced all actions, there can be, like staying in a house, the continuance in the
body itself – the town with nine gates – as a consequence of the persistence of the
remnants of the results of past actions which have started bearing fruit…642
These quotes all come in the context of akara defending the doctrine of jvanmukti
(though the term jvanmukti itself became popular for later Advaitins).  Andrew Fort
concisely defines jvanmukti according to akara:
Jvanmukti is knowing, while still in the body, that you are really the eternal
nondual self (which is brahman), and knowing further that the self is never
embodied, since the body (and all world appearance) is not ultimately real.
Somewhat like a reflection in a mirror, the world appears and exists, but it is not
finally real.643
In order to defend this doctrine, akara takes recourse to CU 6.14.2,644 which states, “I
will remain here just as long as I am not released (vimuc), then I will attain (release).”645
                                                                                                                                                  
639 Madhavananda 1993, p. 491.
640 BS 4.1.15.  bdhitam api tu mithyjñna dvicandrajñnavat saskravat kacitklam anuvartata
eva | (my translation).
The continuing sight of two moons even when one knows there is only one moon results from some type of
eye disease (timira).
In BGbh 18.48 akara denies any trace of the two moons after ignorance is dispelled.
641 BU 1.4.10,  Madhavananda 1993, p. 115.
642 BG 5.13, Gambhirananda 1995, p. 253  (prrabdhaphalakarmasaskraenuvttay)
Also see BUbh 4.4.21 and BUbh 1.4.7
643 Fort 1998, p. 5.
644 BSbh 4.1.15.
645 Fort 1998. p. 24. Olivelle translates this sentence as “There is delay for me here only until I am freed;
but then I will arrive!” (Olivelle 1996, p. 155).  Balasubramanian translates this sentences as, “For him
there is delay only so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with brahman.”
(Balasubramaniam,  p. 121 of Jivanmukti: A New Interpretation). See Fort 1998, p. 25 for other important
passages regarding jvanmukti.
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akara interprets this passage as saying the body continues for some time even after
brahmavidy.
One of the basic challenges of explaining jvanmukti is how to account for the
continuation of the body after liberation.  According to primary texts, liberation burns up
all karma.646  If karma fuels the continuation of life, then how can life continue after
liberation?  The body ought to immediately fall down because there is no more karma to
impel it.  The basic Advaita answer is found in akara’s distinction between actions that
have already begun yielding results verses those that have not.  akara writes,
After the acquisition of knowledge, those virtues and vices that have not begun to
yield their fruits and that were accumulated in earlier lives or even in this life
before the dawn of knowledge are alone destroyed, but not so are those destroyed
whose results have already been partially enjoyed and by which has begun this
present life in which the knowledge of brahman arises.647
According to akara, self-knowledge only immediately exhausts previously
accrued karma (sacita karma), and prevents the accumulation of further karma (gmi
karma) because there is no more self-agency and no locus for karma in the liberated
person who is free from action.648  However, prrabdha karma  is already set in motion
and continues for some time just as an arrow released from the bow continues to its
                                                                                                                                                  
Vedntins who support the immediate fall of the body in liberation (sadyomukti) cite MU 2.2.8,
“When one sees him – both the high and the low; The knot of one’s heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled;
and his works come to an end” (Olivelle 1996, p. 273).
646 BG 4.37, MU 2.2.8, CU 5.24.3, BU 4.4.23.
647 BSbh 4.1.15.
648 BSbh 4.1.19, BUbh 1.4.7, 1.4.10.
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target, or the potter’s wheel continues to spin even after the potter removes the pot from
the wheel.649
akara’s effort to defend jvanmukti raised a host of serious questions, which
many post-akara Advaitins, such as Citsukha, Sarvajñtman, Praktman,
Vimukttman, and Madhusdana Saraswati, analyzed in great theoretical detail,
sometimes disagreeing amongst themselves. In the Advaita doctrine of jvanmukti, the
liberated person is free from self-ignorance and continues to live out his or her life.
However, many classical Indian philosophers identify the body (and the pain it entails)
with the existence of self-ignorance, for ignorance is the cause of becoming embodied.
In this view one should become “bodiless” upon the destruction of self-ignorance.  If the
association of body and ignorance is correct, than ignorance must still remain for any
living person and living while liberated is not possible. In response some Advaitins
argued that the remaining prrabdha karma post-liberation is only a slight remnant of
ignorance, but how can there be a remnant? Does that imply that one can partially know
brahman and be partially ignorant? Furthermore, there are Upaniadic passages such as
MU 2.2.8650 that state all karma is destroyed at the time of knowledge according to
akara’s interpretation. Many other questions remain, such as, how is ignorance
working in liberation? Is only individual ignorance negated and not universal ignorance?
Is only the concealing power of ignorance negated and not the projecting power?  Is a
                                                 
649 BSbh 3.32, 4.1.15, BU 1.4.7, 1.4.10, and CUbh 6.14.2.  akara may be drawing the analogy of the
potter’s wheel from Skhya Krika 67.
650 When one sees him – both the high and the low; The knot of one’s heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled;
and his works come to an end  (Olivelle 1996, p. 273).
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jvanmukta required to live an ethical life if he or she cannot accrue bad karma? Is he or
she outside of all societal and ethical norms and able to follow antinomian social
practices without any karmic repercussions? How long does it take for the body to fall
after liberation?  Does the body fall immediately or after some time?
Though no clear resolutions to these questions are forthcoming, I think the
simplest and safest position the Advaitin may offer is to sever the association of
prrabdha karma and ignorance.  Karma and ignorance do not have a direct relationship.
Their relationship is mediated by the individual’s agency and false sense of self.
Knowledge directly negates ignorance but not karma.651  Brahmavidy removes the false
sense of self, and secondarily results in the dispersion of currently accruing and
previously accrued karma (gmi and sacita karma) that has not yet begun.  But
brahmavidy need not destroy prrabdha karma because it is already manifesting and
does not depend on the individual’s sense of agency anymore.652  From this perspective
there is no contradiction between holding knowledge of non-duality while living
embodied as a finite individual.  However, some Advaitins, such as Citsukha,
Praktman, and Madhusdana Saraswati, associated the remaining prrabdha karma as
a trace of ignorance (avidylea) due to akara’s acceptance of the sight of two moons
remaining after knowledge of one moon in BSbh 4.1.15.  If identifying prrabdha karma
as a form of ignorance is too problematic (because it conflates two different species,
ignorance and karma, which are not identical nor mutually exclusive), then one could
                                                 
651 BUbh 3.3.1.
652 CUbh 6.14.2, BSbh 4.1.15, 4.1.19, BUbh 1.4.7, 1.4.10.
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identify avidylea with saskras, where saskras are impressions of ignorance, but
not ignorance itself.  This response avoids the argument over ignorance but results in the
identification of the jvanmukta’s prrabdha with saskras, which is admittedly
perhaps still a tenuous position to hold.653
The problem is that akara does not make a clear distinction between saskras
that cause the continuation of the body post-liberation from the s askras that
nididhysana neutralizes.  Prrabdha karma does not pose a problem for the jvanmukti
for he or she is “bodiless” even while embodied, meaning he or she understands the
apparent and dependent nature of the body and the world even while continuing in the
body and worldly activity.654 In this case brahmavidy overrides the appearance of the
world, just as the perception of the sun arising at dawn does not confuse the physicist
who knows that the sun revolves around the earth. Advaitins generally assume there is
total stability (niha) and clarity in knowledge at the point of jvanmukti, and would deny
that the jvanmukta with immediate brahmavidy is still subject to contradictory
dispositions (vipartabhvans) that could override his self-knowledge through some
type of disturbance or confusion.  If we identify the remaining prrabdha of the
jvanmukta with saskras, then we should not view saskras as obstacles or as
contradictory dispositions.  In fact, from this position one could even argue that
akara’s discussions of saskras have little to do with nididhysana or the practical
difficulties that Advaitins face, and are in fact only a theoretical doctrine to defend
                                                 
653 Post-akara Advaitins argued over these issues in great detail and with many nuanced positions.  For
an overview, see Fort 1998, Chapter 4.
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jvanmukti. But this is not always the case for akara does not make a distinction
between saskras as vipartabhvans and samskras as the jvanmukta’s remaining
karma.  Perhaps the most telling example of this non-distinction occurs in BU 1.4.7
where he writes:
…but still, because there are inevitably the results of karma, which cause the
production of the body, even when there is the gain of right knowledge, there is
also necessarily the future activity of body, mind, and speech because of the
strength of karma, whose course has been undertaken like the continuation of an
arrow after it has been released.  The cognition of knowledge, being weaker than
(karma), is posited as an alternative. Therefore the continuous memory of self-
knowledge, dependent on the strength of practices like renunciation, dispassion,
etc, must be restricted.655
In this quote akara refers to the continuation of the body due to the strength of
karma, a clear reference to jvanmukti.  But he also alludes to the fact that karma
overrides textual knowledge in the sense of the difficulty of dealing with habitual thought
patterns that disrupt knowledge and/or as a way of explaining why the body continues to
exist for one who has knowledge.  He then recommends the continuous memory of self-
knowledge (smti santati), a reference to nididhysana, to counter the force of such
karma. It appears here that he identifies vipartabhvans as the prrabdha karma for a
jvanmukti yet he still emphasizes the necessity for nididhysana.656 The difficulty in this
position is explaining how nididhysana can have any effect on prrabdha karma.  If
                                                                                                                                                  
654 BSbh 4.1.15 and BSbh 1.1.4.
655 yadyapy evam arrrambhakasya karmao niyataphalatvt samyagjñnaprptv api avaya bhvin
pravttir vamanakynm, labdhavtte karmao balyastvt  muktevdi pravttivat; tena pake
prpta jñnapravttidourbalyam  |
tasmt tygavairgydisdhanabalvalambena tmavijñnasmtisatatir niyantavy bhavati |  BUbh 1.4.7
(my translation).
656 A similar situation, where the two ideas come together occurs in BUbh 1.4.10, BSbh 3.4.51, BSbh
4.1.15, and CUbh 3.14.4.
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prrabdha karma continues despite brahmavidy , then why would continuing
nididhysana have any effect on prrabdha?657  This potential problem raises the
possibility that akara conflates the two types or two powers of s askras, as
prrabdha karma or as habitual psychological tendencies. akara did not make a clear
distinction between karma and saskras and perhaps thus struggled to make room for
saskras in his soteriology.  Even through from a broad standpoint we may include
thoughts and emotions, particularly their manifestation as vipartabhvans, in the larger
universal of prrabdha karma that makes up all occurrences in one’s life,
vipartabhvans are more accurately understood as the effects of prrabdha karma or
the effects of the impressions of prrabdha karma accumulated throughout life.
The above quote from BUbh 1.4.1 connects with one of the primary problems in
determining the chronological place of nididhysana.  Is nididhysana a means to
brahmavidy or something used to stabilize self-knowledge after brahmavidy?  In the
BUbh 1.4.7 passage it looks as though nididhysana is for stabilizing one’s knowledge
after proper self-knowledge (samyagjñna).  In this case I do not see how it could have
any effect on already begun (prrabdha) karma or effect the continuation or non-
continuation of the body after knowledge. The body and worldly duality exist regardless
of the neutralization of saskras.  This is one reason why in this context I prefer to
interpret the terms vipartabhvan or saskra as psychological dispositions rather than
as karma. Brahmavidy and prrabdha karma are not mutually contradictory, which is
precisely why jvanmukti is possible.  Otherwise one would drop dead simultaneously
                                                 
657 A similar critique can be aimed at Maana’s prasakhyna contemplation.
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with brahmavidy or one would have to wait till death for brahmavidy to come, at
which point there would be no functioning mind remaining to gain brahmavidy.
5.6.5: Jñna-nih: Stabilizing Knowledge
The Advaitin’s self-identity as brahman is ideally free of doubt and available at
all times and in all situations.  This individual remains free from sadness and insecurity,
is not pulled by desires and aversions, and is unattached to action and the results of
action.  akara refers to this clarity as jñna-nih  or brahmanih,  compounds that
translate as “steadfastness in knowledge” or “grounded in brahman.” 658   “Grounded in
brahman” is of course metaphorical, indicating that one with nih is grounded and
completely secure in knowledge of brahman.  He or she knows “I am brahman” without
doubts or error in an immediate fashion.659 The following section explores how akara
interprets steadfastness in knowledge and understands its relationship to nididhysana.
akara adopts the term nih from different passages in the primary texts. It
occurs most often in the Bhagavadgt where it has various meanings such as a state,
lifestyle, path, devotion, commitment, certainty, or steadfastness. In some verses of the
BG nih appears to be a practice, means and/or a corresponding lifestyle in general.
For example, in BG 3.2 Arjuna questions which means, action or knowledge, will lead
him to the ultimate good.  Ka responds in BG 3.3 that in the beginning he told of two
types of commitments (nih), karma yoga for the yogins and jñna yoga for the
                                                 
658 Or to the person, a brahmania.
659 Some other similar phrases coming from the root sth (to stand, to stay) relating to either knowledge or
brahman are also used.  See brahma samstha in BS 3.4.20, 5.5.17, 5.19-20, brhmisthiti in BG 2.72, prajñ
pratithit in BG 2.68, and sthitaprajña in  BG 2.72.
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renunciates (skhyas).660 For akara, both commitments ultimately have the pursuit of
self-knowledge in common, but the first makes use of action (pravtti) to purify oneself
for knowledge while the second forgoes action (nivtti) and focuses solely on knowledge.
The choice in BG 3.3 is not exactly between action and knowledge but between karma
yoga for the householder and renunciation for the ascetic. In this context, nih is a
means leading to liberation as its end.  It refers to the general meaning of a commitment
or path leading to liberation, which includes both practice and a type of lifestyle either as
householder or renunciate.
akara specifically associates nih with the lifestyle of renunciation because
the sanysin is completely dedicated to knowledge of brahman.661 akara accepts
sanysa as appropriate for both the one seeking liberation as well as the one who is
already liberated.662  Later Advaita texts, such as the Jvanmuktiviveka, designate the
former type of sanysa as vividi-sanysa and the latter as vidvat-sanysa.663 Both
types of sanysins ideally live a quiet secluded and contemplative life, without
relationships or social, familial and ritual obligations, and they are dedicated to gaining
liberation.  The vividi-sanysin, one who desires to know brahman, has not yet
gained self-knowledge but takes to a life of renunciation because he lacks any inclination
for worldly pursuits and believes there is nothing left to gain in the conventional world of
means and ends. This person is a jñnaniha in the sense that he or she is pursuing self-
                                                 
660 Nih equals persistence in what is undertaken (sthitih anustheyattparya)
661 BGbh 3.17, 18.3 18.12, 18.55, and MUbh 3.2.6.
662 BUbh 4.5.15 and BUbh 4.4.22.  See Olivelle 1993, p. 226.
663 Jvanmuktiviveka 1-4.
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knowledge to the exclusion of all other pursuits and is thus defined by the means pursued.
In context of BG 3.2-3 nih is ostensibly the yoga of knowledge  (jñna yoga), the
means appropriate for the vividi-sanysin, which includes ravaa, manana, and
nididhysana (or jñna yoga may be specifically synonymous with nididhysana).   For
example, in akara’s introduction to the Bhagavadgt, he writes, “That (liberation)
results from dharma, in the form of abidance in self-knowledge preceded by renunciation
of all action.”664 Terms such as ananyayoga, yukta cetas , and smti-santati, used for
nididhysana and jñnayoga may also be synonymous with nih in akara’s opinion.
In such contexts nih indicates an absolute commitment to self-knowledge in the form
of the repetition of contemplation and the continuous flow of memory.
The vidvat-sanysin is a renunciate who can discriminate between self and non-
self and possesses knowledge of identity with brahman.   Any sense of agency or
attachment to action necessarily falls away in this brahmavidy  and he or she
automatically leads a life of renunciation.665  It is important to note that akara’s
correlation of renunciation of action and nih is not only referring to the sanysa
stage of life (rama) as the formal renunciation of ritual and rama duties.  Freedom of
action is not avoiding action but recognizing that the self is actionless.666 One gives up all
action only through self-knowledge.   Action implies factors such as an agent, object, and
means, but the vidvn sees these as mithy and only leading to transient results. From this
perspective, sanysa is an end in itself. Most Advaitins understand the vidvn as
                                                 
664 tat ca sarvakarmasanysaprvkd tmajñnanihrpd darmd bhavati (my translation).
665 BU 3.5.1.
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possessing jñna-nih in the sense of total clarity and brahmavidy.  He is living while
liberated and a paramahasa.667 When nih describes the  vidvat  sanysin whose
wisdom is established (sthita-prajñ), then nih means liberation in a sense different
than the path of knowledge for the vividi sanysin.
In the cases of the vividi and vidvat sanysin, nih is either the means (for
the vividi) or a description of the end (for the vidvn).  However, even though in some
contexts nih is the path, involving a process of contemplation, akara in most usages
identifies nih with the culmination, perfection, and steadfastness of self-knowledge in
the form of immediate knowledge of brahman.  For example, in his commentary on BG
18.50 he writes, “nih is the culmination or completion.  Of what? That which is the
highest culmination of the knowledge of brahman.668  In  MUbh 1.2.12 he uses the phrase
brahmaniha to describe the proper teacher who is liberated.  In his commentary akara
writes:
One who, having given up all action, is steadfast in the non-dual brahman alone,
is a brahmaniha, just as the one who is steadfast in japa (repeating a mantra),
the one who is steadfast in tapas (austerity).669
In the context of the BG, nih is often synonymous with the sthita-prajña, “one
of firm wisdom” whose knowledge that “I am brahman” is established and clearly
                                                                                                                                                  
666 BGbh 3.4.
667 The paramahasa is generally considered the highest class of the renouncer; however, it is not clear
whether akara endorsed the classic four-fold division of renouncers (Olivelle 1993, p. 229).
668 nih paryavasna parisampti ity etat | kasya? brahmajñnasya y par parisampti | BGbh
18.50 (my translation).
Also see BGbh 2.72 and 3.17.
669 hitv sarvakarmi kevale ‘dvaye brahmai nih yasya so ‘ya brahmaniha japaniha
taponiha iti yadvat | MUbh 1.2.12 (my translation).
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grasped.670 Ka provides a thorough description of the sthita-prajña in chapter two of
the Bhagavadgt following  Arjuna’s query of how to describe him.  Ka responds
saying the sthita-prajña has given up all desires and is happy in his self by his self (2.54).
He is not affected by sorrow or attached to pleasure and is free from desire, fear, and
anger (2.56).   He is unattached in every situation, neither rejoicing in nor rejecting the
pleasant and the unpleasant (2.57).  And he is able to withdraw his sense organs from
their objects (2.58).671
A similar set of verses describing nih  occurs in BG 5.17-21: Those whose
intellect is awake to that self-knowledge, whose self is that tman, who are steadfast
(nih) in that brahman attain the state from which there is no return (5.17).  They have
a view of equality and see brahman in all things (5.18).  Those abiding in brahman
conquer the cycle of birth and death (5.19).  The one who knows brahman and is
established in brahman does not rejoice or become dejected in gaining what is desirable
or undesirable (5.20).  He who is not attached to external objects finds happiness in the
self.  He is deeply engaged in his knowledge of brahman and gains happiness that never
wanes (5.21).672  akara also defines nih as freedom from action ( naikarmya) and as
the state of abiding in one’s own self .673
                                                 
670 BGbh 2.54-72.  akara identifies the sthita-prajña as having nih in BGbh 2.72.
The sthita-prajñ is also identified as one who is established in wisdom (prajñ-pratihit) in BG 2.57,
2.58, 2.61, 2.68.
671 Also see BG 2.68-72.
672 Also see BG 4.18-23, 12.13-20, 14.22-26.
673 BGbh 3.4
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The terms sthitapraj  and jñnanih674 support the importance of
nididhysana. The Upaniads and akara could use the term tma-jñna by itself
because self-knowledge does not require any qualification.  But the term nih signifies
that self-knowledge requires commitment and steadfastness in the Advaita view.  This is
similar to the distinction discussed earlier of jñna and vijñna which points to some kind
of change or deepening of knowledge that is necessary when obstacles block verbal
testimony.  Nih in this case ostensibly occurs through the gradual removal of
saskras in the form of vipartabhvans. When vipartabhvans do not disturb one’s
knowledge, then he or she possesses nih and naturally remains immersed in self-
knowledge.  In a few places akara clearly recognizes a distinction between the rise of
knowledge eventually leading to steadfastness in knowledge.675 The use of nih
recognizes this reality and the great difficulty required to gain steadfast brahmavidy.
If a phrase such as the continuous memory of self-knowledge (pratyaya-satna,
or smti-santati), which sometimes denotes nididhysana also denotes nih in some
contexts, then this leads to a potential problem. Nih is used for both nididhysana as
well as the brahmavidy gained through nididhysana.  Sometimes it is not clear whether
the text or akara’s interpretation refers to nididhysana or to complete steadfastness
and whether it is sensible to make such a distinction. One question this raises if whether
we should identify both types of nih as nididhysana.  In some cases it is possible to
interpret the text either way. But if nih is understood as clarity, then why would
                                                 
674 BG 18.55
675 For example see BGbh 5.12 and 18.10.
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akara employ terms such as smti-santana or other such references to maintaining
one’s knowledge?  One would assume that after the rise of knowledge, and certainly by
the point of nih, no more contemplative practice is necessary. In BGbh 18.55 akara
raises this very question in the voice of an opponent who asks:
Whenever any knowledge of something arises in a knower, at that very moment
the knower knows that object.  Hence, he does not depend on steadfastness in
knowledge which consists in the repetition of the act of knowing.  And therefore,
it is contradictory to say one knows not through knowledge, but through
steadfastness in knowledge which is a repetition of the act of knowing.
akara responds, saying:
There is no such fault, since the culmination of knowledge – which (knowledge)
is associated with the causes of its unfoldment and maturity, and which has
nothing to contradict it – in the conviction that one’s own self has been realized is
what is referred to by the word nih.  When knowledge – which concerns the
identity of the ‘knower of the field’ and the supreme self, and which remains
associated with the renunciation of all actions that arise from the perception of the
distinction among their accessories such as agent etc., and which unfolds from the
instruction of the scriptures and teachers, depending on purity of the intellect etc.
and humility etc. which are the auxiliary causes of the origin and maturity of
knowledge – continues in the form of the conviction that one’s own self has been
realized, then that continuance is called the supreme steadfastness in
knowledge.676
Sankara, as the voice of the opponent, first defines nih as the repetition of
knowledge, which sounds like a definition of nididhysana.  But akara then redefines
it not as a means but as the culmination of knowledge.  Nididhysana as a commitment to
jñna-yoga requires some intention and effort to direct the mind to the self.  It is the
means that provides one with the ability to remain steadfast in knowledge, at which point
it becomes superfluous. The continuous memory of self-knowledge (smti-satati)
                                                 
676 Gambhirananda 1995, p. 729-30.
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naturally continues in nih without any obstruction from saskras. Implicit to this
discussion is akara’s recognition of a potential confusion between identifying nih as
nididhysana or as final clarity, as well as potential contradictions if he insists on
repetition after final brahmavidy. One does not gain new knowledge in nih, only
maturity, and there is no more necessity of repetition and nothing remaining to do or
recognize.  However, terms such as ananya bhakti and smti-santati are still appropriate
in this case because the liberated person’s mind naturally comes back to his or her
baseline identity as brahman .  The jvanmukta  is by nature engaged in deep
contemplation.677 This stream of thoughts is a natural result of clarity, not a practice
necessary to remove problematic saskras, for at this point there are no more
obstructions to self-knowledge.
                                                 
677 MUbh 3.2.5.
359
Conclusion
Throughout this study of nididhysana we have repeatedly encountered difficulty
in explaining just how akara’s liberation takes place within the causal nexus of the
world.   The causal paradigm, one presumed in the broader epistemology developed in
several schools of classical Indian philosophy, has it that liberation occurs as the effect of
a set of entities and causal factors.  But the causal view is not compatible with akara’s
epistemology of liberation for two interdependent reasons.  First, akara conceives of
the tman as self-illuminating awareness and self-evident existence.  Awareness is
supposed to be intrinsically reflexive and does not require a second or higher-order
cognition to reveal it.  As pure awareness, the tman is the very presupposition of all
experience and knowledge, and the locus of reflexive awareness.  The tman is already
present as the very substratum and the primitive presence of one’s own being and sense
of self.  Self-illuminating awareness exists independently of any causal process and can
never become an object of knowledge within a causal epistemology.  In the final analysis
of Advaita’s metaphysics of non-duality, that same awareness is immanent and
transcendent to both causes and their effects.  It is limitless by nature, unchanging, and
free from any relations, attributes, or predication.
akara’s conception of awareness leads to a second reason Advaita’s
“liberation” is not compatible with a causal epistemology.  The soteriological goal of the
Advaitin, freedom from sasra and suffering, is attained through brahmavidy, the
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direct recognition of oneself as non-dual brahman.  However, in akara’s conception of
liberation, the object of knowledge, the knowledge itself, and the knower are all supposed
to be the one tman. akara equates liberation to the self, so by extension liberation is
also already present and eternally self-existent.  Just as self-illuminating awareness is not
a result to be accomplished, so too is self-knowledge not to be accomplished.  This leads
to the position that moka, in the form of brahmavidy, is independent of any world-
based causal processes.  From this ultimate metaphysical standpoint akara can claim
that in reality there is no fundamental problem, no suffering, and no sasra.  Everyone
is already liberated because the tman is free from all duality and limitations.
While akara agrees that there is no problem in reality, he accepts the common
view that we do not know or experience ourselves as liberated.  akara thus holds a
seemingly paradoxical position that the individual is liberated yet ignorant of this fact,
and thus requires brahmavidy as a solution for a problem that is not real.  The Advaita
seeker has to accomplish what is already accomplished.  From the standpoint of the
seeker, akara does employ an epistemology leading to brahmavidy, but does so with
sophisticated thinking and a number of subtle manipulations not to contradict his doctrine
of non-duality or to place liberation in a causal process.  He accomplishes this in a
number of ways, but in this study I have singled out three of them repeatedly: (1) akara
separates the fields of knowledge and action. (2) He identifies the Upaniads as a unique
source of knowledge that when studied under a suitable teacher will convey direct
liberating brahmavidy.  And (3) he reframes the nature of ignorance as something
positively existing, which leads to the view that moka is the removal of ignorance and
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various obstacles to brahmavidy.  These three points shape his interpretation of
nididhysana.  Let me summarize each one and describe how it leads him to a particular
conception of contemplation.
A presupposition of akara’s Advaita, following the Prvammsaks, is that
action and self-knowledge operate in mutually distinct domains.  In some ways this is not
entirely true, for surely cognition guides voluntary action in the Advaita view, and
brahmavidy will cause changes in the liberated person’s mind and self-identity.
However, akara’s essential point is that self-knowledge and action are autonomous and
do not have an effect on each other’s content. Cognition is not identical to action, does
not directly produce action, and cannot destroy the results of action.  Action cannot
produce knowledge or destroy ignorance (avidy).   Therefore one should not pursue
brahmavidvy through action for actions cannot produce self-knowledge.   Furthermore,
the eternal and uncaused nature of liberation removes it from the domain of action, which
can only take place in time and result in time-limited effects.  If the self is non-dual, self-
existent, and self-illuminated, then there is no need to gain, produce, purify, or modify
oneself because one already is what he or she seeks to be. However, even though critical
of the soteriological value of action, akara does not completely discount action.  A
variety of actions are necessary to align a source of knowledge so that it can properly
function.  But he distinguishes such actions from knowing itself.  The student must fulfill
a number of prerequisites to gain the adequate eligibility for brahmavidy.  Cultivating
prerequisites such as a concentrated and penetrating mind that is not swayed by emotions
362
and is receptive to Advaita wisdom is only accomplished through practices such as
meditation and karma yoga among others.
akara’s critical separation of action and self-knowledge narrows our
understanding of his view of nididhysana.  akara considers nididhysana as part of
the knowing process for brahmavidy, and therefore also excludes nididhysana from the
domain of action.  He believes nididhysana is distinctly separate from mental actions
such as meditation, visualization, devotion, worship, and prayer. Nididhysana does
share some similar qualities to meditation practices that seek to control or extinguish
thoughts in one’s mind.  Both require a clear collected mind able to repeat and maintain a
single thought to exclusion of all others.  However, akara expains that nididhysana is
fundamentally different from meditation.  Meditation, like all actions, is person-
dependent (puruatantra).  Its content is subject to a person’s will and does not
necessarily correspond to an object of knowledge.  Meditation is not an independent
prama nor dependent on a prama , and thus cannot function as a source of
brahmavidy in akara’s opinion. Nididhysana, in contrast, is object-dependent (vastu
tantra).  It is defined by its knowledge content, which must match its object.
akara’s nididhysana is separate from actions such as meditation, but akara
does not believe it removes self-ignorance independent of the teaching of the Upaniads.
One of the defining doctrines of akara is his claim that only verbal testimony, in the
form of the words of the Upaniads, is the prama for brahmavidy. For akara, the
Upaniads both point to the existence of brahman and directly convey that knowledge
through methods intrinsic to their language.  According to akara, the Upaniadic
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sentences can provide immediate and non-propositional brahmavidy because the self is
an immediate self-reflexive entity.  Otherwise, if the self was an indirect distant object,
then one could only gain propositional knowledge of it by description.  However,
understanding the Upaniadic texts is exceedingly difficult due to their unique content
and enigmatic style. The teacher requires specific verbal methods to unlock the meaning
of the Upaniads, and the student must cultivate a receptivity and ability to encounter the
texts successfully. As we have seen, akara’s primary technique to grasp the Upaniadic
sentence meanings is a sophisticated form of secondary indication (jahadajallaka), a
type of metaphor, which simultaneously retains and rejects a literal and conventional
sense.  akara also describes this technique as continuity (anvaya) and discontinuity
(vyatireka), a form of Upaniadic reasoning that determines the relationship of what
persists and what does not persist between two things and determines if one is
independent of the other. The great sentences (mahvkya) such as “You are that” (tat
tvam asi) or “I am brahman” (aham brahmsmi) instigate this process of what I have
called indication through negation in order to solve their incongruous equation of
individual and world. The Upaniads do not directly designate and objectify brahman,
but indirectly point the student to brahman . Through this method the student
distinguishes the self, the continuous presence of non-dual existence and awareness, from
the not-self, consisting of impermanent and adventitious elements, properties, forms, and
identities.
We can understand nididhysana properly only after understanding the way in
which akara conceptualizes the Upaniads as a prama  for brahmavidy .
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Contemplation becomes possible after listening to the Upaniads because only then can
the contemplator understand how to see beyond the direct meanings of the words to the
implied ones that point to the self. The sentence meaning, which provides the content of
nididhysana, brings the contemplator back to his or her self by uncovering the non-dual
nature of tman through secondary indication.  Indication through anvaya and vyatireka
constitutes the method and contemplative grammar that enables one to contemplate the
sentence meanings. Anvaya/vyatireka is the basic and explicit premise behind
nididhysana in akara’s understanding, evident in the discrimination of the perceiver
and perceived along with the contemplative process of mentally dismissing adventitious
properties such as name and form in order to arrive at the constant, continuous, and
unchanging tman. Thus akara reasons that nididhysana cannot be separated from the
Upaniadic teachings or possess any function independent of them.
akara does not specify how contemplation is to be done as clearly as we would
like. The method and result of his contemplation is somewhat mysterious and puzzling,
but close readings of his commentaries allows us to reconstruct a basic outline. The
contemplator “pulls his mind back” from the world, a contemplative process of letting go
of all sense objects similar to the Yogastra’s pratyhra.  He then progressively
mentally “withdraws” his mind, with all its components, into the self. The contemplation
is intended to bring the contemplator to what is ultimately real by following a hierarchical
distinction of sense objects, sense organs, mind, intellect, and brahman based on subtlety,
causality, permanence, and pervasiveness. There appears to be a process of focusing on
the higher object through understanding greater reality. This is a gradual process of
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subsuming particulars into their higher sources. Seeing objects as non-separate from their
ultimate substratum allows one to see through appearances and penetrate to their true
reality as pure undifferentiated being.  Here the Advaitin seems to reach universal being
and makes a difficult transition to identifying this being with the tman.
Contemplation negates any conceived self-identities by penetrating each level and
ultimately reaching one’s true self according to akara. The process is both exclusive
and inclusive.  At each step there is a jump to a broader more universal source, which on
the one hand negates the previous more particular one consisting of dependent effects, yet
includes it within the larger “universal” which is its cause or substrate reality. In this
manner all identities are excluded as the not self and simultaneously included as not
separate from one’s self, which is brahman, the absolute universal, according to akara.
One may think about contemplation through various conceptual angles found in
different Upaniadic teaching episodes.  We may also categorize nididhysana from
either an external or internal orientation, following akara and his disciples.  The former
would look outwards and recognize all objects as one’s self.  The latter contemplation
would look inwards and recognize everything outside within the self.  Both lead to the
infinite self, but the former moves through a contemplative analysis of name, form, and
existence, and the latter through contemplating one’s self as awareness. We may also
divide nididhysana into contemplations that follows objects and those that follow words,
as does akara.  In his view, all forms of nididhysana depend on the Upaniad sentence
meanings, but contemplations following words do so in an explicit way where the
contemplator repeats a mahvkya while recognizing its meaning.  These pithy sentences
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encapsulate the teaching of non-duality and in contemplation they act as triggers to
retrieve self-knowledge gained from ravaa.  akara tells us that the recognition of
identity of self and brahman from the sentence meaning is repeated in nididhysana,
creating a uniform and continuous cognition of non-duality, to the exclusion of all other
thoughts. This is metaphorically described as “placing the mind on the tman.”   It is
supposed to culminate in the direct recognition of brahman and the knowledge that
names and forms, i.e. anything we can objectify, are superficial and completely
dependent on unqualified existence for their reality. This represents a radical shift in
perspective. Seeing objects as non-separate from their ultimate substratum allows one to
see through appearances of conventional realities and penetrate to their true absolute
reality as pure undifferentiated being.
The theory of the positive existence of ignorance (avidy) and obstacles is to
account for the fact that the tman is not properly recognized even though it is an
accomplished reality, the ground of all experience, and the presupposition of every
apprehension.  Ignorance and obstacles to brahmavidy veil the tman’s nature as non-
dual awareness. akara’s conception of nididhysana is in keeping with the theories of
positive ignorance and self-illuminating awareness, in that contemplation functions only
to remove obstructions to brahmavidy. Nididhysana expands one’s capability to
understand the Upanisadic identity of self and brahman. akara does not identify
brahmavidy as a new experience, and nididhysana by logical extension also does not
produce anything new.  It is not intended as a vehicle for transforming indirect theoretical
verbal self-knowledge into direct experiential self-knowledge or as a means for
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transcendent mystical experiences or altered states of non-dual consciousness, though he
does not deny those states occur in a soteriological process. At the same time, akara
does accept a deepening maturity of self-knowledge that may require nididhysana.
Nididhysana aims to deepen one’s understanding of the Upaniads by neutralizing
affective dispositions to think in a non-unitive fashion (saskras).  Saskras are due
to sense experiences presenting diversity and conditioned beliefs of oneself as finite,
limited, and intrinsically separate from the surrounding world.  Nididhysana is required
to neutralize such dispositions in the case that they persist and disturb self-knowledge in
spite of one having doubtless and full conviction cultivated through exhaustive ravaa
and manana.   It is this process of gaining clarity through contemplation that makes one’s
brahmavidy free of obstacles, immediately available, and stable through life situations.
I believe this distinction of knowledge with obstacles and stable knowledge without
obstacles, a distinction that validates a process of study and knowledge that takes time,
accurately describes akara’s position on the person liberated while living (jvanmukti).
These conclusions show how texts and contemplation are intimately intertwined
in akara’s Advaita. akara’s view of the Upaniads as a means of self-knowledge and
his understanding of nididhysana as dependent on Upaniadic sentences show a
soteriological emphasis on texts, not contemplation. Contemplation and liberation are
embedded in the active agency of texts and teacher and not in non-textual practice or
cultivation of personal experience.  akara was aware of serious philosophical problems
with Vedntic interpretations of contemplation as a practice separate from the texts. By
akara’s time, there was a tension internal to Advaita and with other Vedntic
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traditions, such as those of Bharprapañca and Brahmadatta, concerning the relationships
of contemplation, textual study, and liberation.  We have seen this in our discussions of
Maana Mira’s Brahmasiddhi, akara’s Upadeashasr , and in the views of
Surevara.   Perhaps the single most important example of this tension is the doctrine of
the prasakhyna  contemplation, in which contemplative practice functions
independently of the texts and culminates as an immediate experience of non-duality that
is then identified as liberation.  As we have seen, akara rejects the prasakhyna
contemplation for many reasons, but most importantly because it neglects the primacy of
the Upaniads as the source of brahmavidy, and is an action creating results, a causal
process incompatible with the tman’s self-illumination.
Yet akara did not dismiss contemplation outright and sought a harmonious
interaction between texts and contemplation in his system.  This effort is evident in his
removal of nididhysana from the domain of action and results, and into the domain of
self-knowledge in order to alleviate any opposition between textual study and
contemplation.  In fact, I believe the interpretation most faithful to akara is one of
understanding nididhysana as an advanced mode or limb of ravaa, designed to
internalize the external structure and content of sacred texts. I speculate that it is an
ancillary form of textual study whose necessity is contingent upon certain conditions,
namely problematic saskras. For advanced practitioners without obstructions,
nididhysana happens naturally and spontaneously without any willed effort.  akara’s
orientation blurs the differences of reading, listening, teaching, contemplation and their
respective experiences to the texts alone.
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akara’s interpretation of nididhysana presents an important perspective on the
relationship of text and practice. Contemplation cannot be reduced to an independent
intellectual endeavor or some form of additional practice.  akara emphasizes the
primacy of scriptural texts and reduces contemplation and experience to the texts alone.
In akara’s view one should not make a distinction of texts and their performance. His
Advaita system makes no room for a difference between the specialist in the study of
sacred texts and the specialist in spiritual practice.  In fact we should not project any such
distinction upon akara’s Advaita because he repeatedly rejects the notion.  For him,
these two specialists must be one and the same, for understanding the texts is the only
direct self-reflexive way of discovering the tman.  It is Advaita’s most important
spiritual pursuit. akara’s interpretation conflicts with the views of some neo-Vedntins
such as Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda, who made a distinction between the
textual specialist and spiritual specialist and emphasized the latter.
Properly understanding akara’s nididhysana may come down to our own
notions of what constitutes a text.  Contemporary scholars and some classical Advaitins
view texts as something static, bound by the written word or what is spoken between
teacher and student.  However, we may better understand akara if we drop our
presuppositions about what a text is.  I believe akara holds an orthodox yet fluid
interpretation of what constitutes the Upaniadic texts. On one hand the Upaniads are a
set of sacred texts that are eternal, unchanging, fixed, and carefully handed down through
the generations.  On the other hand, even though the words stay the same, he sees them in
a dynamic relationship with the student’s progression along the Advaita path.  In this
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conception, the boundaries of the text expand beyond the fixed written words to include
the spoken word, logical reflection, and the internal process of nididhysana .
Furthermore, akara views the texts from both a conventional and absolute perspective.
In the latter perspective he appears to identify the texts with their self-knowledge content,
as brahman itself.
Rather than try and force nididhysana into our conceptions of a text, we may
better understand akara by expanding our notion of texts.  In fact, I would speculate
that for akara the Advaita practitioner’s experience of texts naturally expands as he or
she studies and contemplates self-knowledge.  At first, in early stages of study, there may
appear to be a clean distinction between texts and contemplative practice, but this
boundary recedes the more one progresses. From one standpoint, that of the liberated
person, one may dismiss texts, the proverbial boat that helps one cross a river and is then
no longer useful; however, if we read akara as identifying the Upaniads with their
meaning, and this meaning is none other than tman, we may claim that texts not only
encompass contemplation, but stretch in their identification with liberation and brahman.
I have argued for a certain interpretation of nididhysana, which is coherent with
akara’s broader philosophy; however, akara did not systematically detail his
understanding of nididhysana.  It is no great surprise then that various conflicting
interpretations arose among post-akara Advaitins.  Why did akara not describe
contemplation more clearly?  akara was concerned with contemplation, for as we have
seen, in a few important places he discusses it and rejects the views of opponents.
Perhaps he figured it should arise spontaneously for the advanced practitioner and does
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not require extensive elaboration.  Or he may have refrained from discussing it in order to
maintain an emphasis on ravaa and to avoid the pitfalls of the prasakhyna theory.
But overall there is still a startling and conspicuous absence of discussions about
nididhysana in his writing, given the magnitude of his corpus.
akara’s relative silence raises concerns and issues.  He leaves open a number of
questions about contemplation. He is ambiguous about the specifics of nididhysana
practice and does not set out a clear definition or how it functions in his soteriology.  He
does not label the types of self-knowledge encountered in the Advaitin’s study, such as a
distinction between propositional and non-propositional self-knowledge.  We have also
repeatedly seen problems in trying to formulate a chronology of listening, contemplation,
and liberation for his view.    Does the wise person who practices nididhysana already
possess brahmavidy? Is repetition possible prior to brahmavidy? Is there any further
requirement for contemplative repetition if one has immediate brahmavidy?  Does
instrumentality for brahmavidy necessarily lie in the Upaniads and not in the
individual’s mind, or in both?  All too often scholars and Advaita practitioners accept
stock answers for such questions, but upon closer inspection these answers evade our
grasp due to akara’s silence or to subtle non-committal shifts in his writing.
I interpret akara’s silence as meaningful and intentional. His writing is vast, yet
he carefully chooses the extended discussions.  I think akara likely recognized the
many ambiguities, paradoxes, and unsolvable issues in Advaita formulations of
jvanmukti and thus of nididhysana. Furthermore, akara is aware that the Advaitin is
trying to solve a problem that does not truly exist according to the philosophy.  In a
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sense, the whole pursuit of liberation is illogical.  It is therefore questionable whether he
believed the underlying theory of a contemplative approach to an apparent delusional
problem must be logically watertight. While we can formulate a picture of
nididhysana’s practice, function, and relationship to textual study, it also holds a non-
verbal and non-rational position in akara’s soteriology.  Perhaps we may conclude that
the meaning and akara’s interpretation of nididhysana is fluid in order to help us
embrace the complexity and paradoxes we encounter in attempting to bridge non-dual
metaphysics and lived practice. It is fluid, in that our view of nididhysana changes
depending on shifting perspectives.  From one perspective it looks like a meditation
practice, but from another it is a mode of textual study.  From one perspective it may be
propositional knowledge and from another it may be direct brahmavidy.  From the self-
ignorant standpoint nididhysana is practiced before liberating brahmavidy, but from
the standpoint of the liberated person brahmavidy is present during nididhysana.
Allowing our formulation of nididhysana to shift depending on context and perspective
is I think the most appropriate understanding of its place in akara’s thought.
In my opinion many of the puzzles and unanswered questions that I have raised
about nididhysana are intrinsic to akara’s view, and perhaps some are intentional.
Future research might help us speculate on possible solutions to these puzzles, but it is
unlikely that any definitive solutions are forthcoming.  However, the unresolved
questions regarding akara’s nididhysana invite further study. There are many avenues
for future research to help us better understand nididhysana in the post-akara Advaita
traditions, beginning with Padmapda and Surevara. The later Advaita traditions tried to
373
solve problems and ambiguities and simultaneously raised more questions about
nididysana, especially in the realm of an increasingly sophisticated epistemology. As of
yet, there are no substantial studies that adequately address the conceptions of
nididhysana in the later Vivaraa and Bhmat schools, let alone an exhaustive
discussion of the debates about it between these two schools. There is also a scarcity of
any ethnographic fieldwork on Advaita practice. How are different Advaitins
approaching nididhysana in their practice today? How and why might these practices
differ among different lineages and in different geographic areas?   What are the political
and social forces that have influenced interpretations of nididhysana in classical and
neo-Advaita? Such future research would provide a clearer understanding of
nididhysana in past and present Advaita traditions.  Historical and indological studies
are only one set of research possibilities. The specialized study of nididhysana connects
to many broader issues in the study of religion and philosophy. Using the epistemological
and metaphysical framing assumptions from the Indian material may help us to approach
Western positions in novel and fruitful ways, and may facilitate a better reflexive
understanding of our own presuppositions.
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